Haig's book review

[Desmond7]

Have read with some amazement a paragraph in 'Eye Deep in Hell' by John Ellis (Penguin Classic Military History) that Haig, reviewing a military history book published in 1925 wrote:

I believe that the value of the horse and the opportunity for the horse in the future are likely to be as great as ever ... aeroplanes and tanks ... are only accessories to the man and the horse and I feel sure that as time goes on you will find just as much use for the horse - the well bred horse - as you have ever done in the past."

Now ... machine guns ... barbed wire ... industrial warfare. Is this quote for real or is the author taking Haig out of context? If he is not, I have to question the man's intelligence.

Should I put on a steel helmet?

Des

[Robert Dunlop]

Des

I can't be sure of the exact quote but the sentiment of what was quoted is correct AFAIK. I have read similar elsewhere. Haigh continued to be very optimistic about the cavalry right into the Last Hundred Days, even when it was quite clear that they were still struggling. Yes, one or two rather Boy's Own actions but by-and-large the effects of any obstruction coupled with MGs were lethal. The effects of planes against formed horse were demonstrated on many occasions.

It just shows how hard it is to let go of something that is almost an integral part of self, or at least the definition of who you are.

Robert

[Desmond7]

In the same book there is a wonderfully romantic drawing of a 'stirrup charge' by the Scots Geys and Highlanders at St. Quentin - in the picture the men are in 1914 style uniforms. Did this drawing have any basis in fact or was it, as I suspect, a PR effort.

Have to say I loved this little book - v. easy read and some great insights (horrific) including the numbers of flies on the western front uuugh!!

Back to Haig - did his views still have 'authority' post-war or was he 'Jurassic' in terms of military thinking?

Des

[Tom Morgan]

I wonder if we are any nearer to finding out the title of the book which H**g was reviewing. If we knew this, and what the book was about, it might explain why H**g expressed this opinion in his review. Just something I've always wondered about.

Tom

[Desmond7]

I wonder - could it have been a 'privately published' type cavalry regt. history with Haig being a 'nice guy' and boosting the ideals of someone?

Des

[Jonathan Saunders]

I wonder if we are any nearer to finding out the title of the book which H**g was reviewing. If we knew this, and what the book was about, it might explain why H**g expressed this opinion in his review. Just something I've always wondered about.

Tom

Tom - when this quote was discussed about a year ago, didnt a PAL provide the title of the book? I have just tried using the search engine but couldnt find the previous thread.

[Tom Morgan]

Tom - when this quote was discussed about a year ago, didnt a PAL provide the title of the book? I have just tried using the search engine but couldnt find the previous thread.

Now you mention it, Sig, I remember an earlier discussion too, but I can't find it either!

Tom

[Anthony Pigott]

This thread,

http://1914-1918.org/forum/index.php?showtopic=18254&st=30

got onto this topic somewhere towards the end.

I won't repeat my posting here but:

i) the speech was probably giving the audience what they wanted to hear;

ii) look at what he wrote in his final dispatch for a fuller more considered view;

iii) one needs to understand how cavalry were used, e.g. often as mounted infantry, even in 1914 before the advent of trench warfare. The idea of cavalry charging fixed defences was always likely to end in disaster, probably since the Romans. No one would seriously suggest it - it's not what's meant here by the use of cavalry.

Anthony

[Desmond7]

Thanks Anthony - bigger picture well expanded .. it will come up time and again!

Des

[Robert Dunlop]

There were some cavalry men who thirsted for the traditional charge. The enthusiasm was not confined to their ranks either. On several occasions, the infantry raised a cheer as the horsemen thundered by. Despite the obvious dangers of this, it was still attempted a few times.

The real focus of my comment was the notion that cavalry could exploit a breakthrough, becoming the central thrust of a breakout. Megiddo demonstrated this par excellence. But on the Western Front, it was a different matter.

Anthony, here is a segment of the quote that you provided in the previous thread, which is what I was refering to:

Had the German command had at their disposal even two or three well-trained cavalry divisions, a wedge might have been driven between the French and British Armies. Their presence could not have failed to have added greatly to the difficulties of our task.

In the actions already referred to east of Amiens, the cavalry were again able to demonstrate the great advantage which their power of rapid concentration gives them in a surprise attack. Operating in close concert with both armored cars and infantry, they pushed ahead of the latter and by anticipating the arrival of German reserves assisted materially in our success. In the battle of October 8 they were responsible for saving the Cambrai-Le Cateau-St. Quentin Railway from complete destruction. Finally, during the culminating operations of the war when the German Armies were falling back in disorganized masses a new situation arose which demanded the use of mounted troops. Then our cavalry, pressing hard upon the enemy's heels, hastened his retreat and threw him into worse confusion. At such a time the moral effect of cavalry is overwhelming and is in itself a sufficient reason for the retention of that arm.

Detailed accounts of cavalry actions in the Last Hundred Days are, I gather, pretty sparse. This period is important to consider because, like the German offensive in March, the conditions were more favourable to the cavalry's mobility. In March, the cavalry fulfilled its role of mounted infantry with great effect. Haig's appreciation of this is justified IMHO. In the Last 100 Days, the cavalry were operating in pursuit mode. Although the primary target was the main body of the German Army, the immediate object of this pursuit was the German rearguards until such time as the army stood and fought, as on the banks of the Selle. The rearguards operated principally on foot, potentially making them vulnerable to the mobility of the cavalry pursuit. Machine gunners were prominent. To quote the Marquess of Anglesey:

"Even beyond the eleventh hour the machine-gunners were not bereft of their morale! Had the end not come there can be little doubt that a successful cavalry pursuit would have been out of the question. Further [my emphasis] evidence of this is provided by the action of a patrol of the 16th Lancers. At about 10 am it made 'a daring mounted attack' against some machine-gunners. These kept their head and engaged the charging lancers at point-blank range; every horse was brought down.' Amazingly, only the patrol commander and four other ranks were wounded: the sole casualties of what must have been the last mounted charge made in the course of the war." While on the note of cavalry casualties, "the cavalry sustained on the Western Front the highest proportion of killed to other casualties of all arms. The Tanks Corps had the lowest. The proportion of officer casualties from all causes in the cavalry was more than twice the average for all arms: about one to every nine other ranks' casualties."

Now the quote about the 16th Lancers could rightly be argued to represent the foolishness of a frontal charge. The issue is that even in a retreat, provided the defenders held together, there were unlikely to be easy flanks or large holes. So the role of the cavalry was relegated to keeping in touch with the rearguards, who would usually retreat overnight. Even then touch was lost on several occasions.

Megiddo illustrates another aspect of the problems with cavalry pursuit. As the Turkish right flank collapsed, the cavalry and mounted infantry were able to breakout quickly. Within a few days, they had sealed off the major escape routes of the retreating Turkish infantry. By that stage, their mounts were exhausted and resupply became an increasing issue. So it was with the more protracted retreat in the Last 100 Days. Discounting the not inconsiderable effects of the flu' on the numbers of cavalrymen, the horses came under heavy physical strain. Getting sufficient feed to them was a major logistics headache. It was just not possible to keep large bodies of cavalry on the move at this time, partly because everything else was on the move as well. So you end up with very small units of cavalry mainly operating in a 'keep-in-touch' role.

Unlike Megiddo, I do not believe there is strong evidence to support the notion that the cavalry had an 'overwhelming' moral effect. They were of limited tactical value. Nice to have, but not essential to the speed and effectiveness of the pursuit of the retreating German army.

I do not believe Haig's comments about the potential for German cavalry in Operation Michael. The combination of Lewis guns, field artillery and particularly aircraft operating in their ground support role would have seen to this threat in the same way as the British cavalry experienced the Last 100 Days. Undoubtedly, small local successes would have been gained. The Tommy was not easily overawed though, just as his German counterpart was not.

The threat of aircraft to mounted units was considerable. Dispersal tactics, such as were used by the mounted infantry in Palestine, were effective in limited attacks. Determined air attacks on large formations of cavalry would have been a different story.

Lastly, the emergence of the light tank, coupled with the opportunities for using armoured cars and other motorised weapons, really pointed to the end of the cavalry. This is easy to say with hindsight. I discount this aspect when I say that Haig maintained a too rosey picture of the importance of cavalry in the pursuit role.

Robert

[AndyHollinger]

Well said ... gasoline became easier to furnish than Hay and Water ... and even the slight protection of an armored car to the airplane and artillery made it more effective. Their time had passed in general warfare ...

[Anthony Pigott]

There were some cavalry men who thirsted for the traditional charge ...

Robert

I wouldn't disgree with what you say. I think the use of cavalry to make frontal charges was severely limited even before the Great War, although not everyone may have realised it - see, for example the different approaches pre-war by French and Smith-Dorrien. Again, cavalry thoroughout history has rarely prevailed against disciplined, determined infantry, especially with any kind of fixed defences.

Another part of Haig's dispatch is worth quoting:

Throughout the great retirement in 1914 our cavalry covered the retirement and protected the flanks of our columns against the onrush of the enemy, and on frequent occasions prevented our infantry from being overrun by the enemy's cavalry. Later in the same year at Ypres their mobility multiplied their value as a reserve, enabling them rapidly to reinforce threatened portions of our line.

During the critical period of position warfare, when the trial of strength between the opposing forces took place, the absence of room to maneuver made the importance of cavalry less apparent. Even under such conditions, however. valuable results may be expected from the employment of a strong force of cavalry when, after there has been severe fighting on one or more fronts, a surprise attack is made on another front. Such an occasion arose in the operations before Cambrai at the close of 1917, when the cavalry were of the greatest service, while throughout the whole period of trench fighting they constituted an important mobile reserve.

I was thinking more of the use of cavalry as mounted infantry, as they were extensively by both sides even in 1914. The fastest way of moving men cross-country was the horse and would be until motorised vehicles, wheeled or tracked, surpassed them (in the early thirties?).

My original point was that by saying in 1926 that horses had a future in warfare, Haig may have been wrong, but it wasn't an unreasonable thing to say and it shouldn't be used as evidence that he was stupid.

I hesitate to contribute to this as others have much more knowledge but I am sure that the 'Haig / generals / whoever were stupid because they still thought there was any role for cavalry' line is one of those Great War myths that so many believe in but which doesn't stand up to analysis.

Regards

Anthony

[Robert Dunlop]

My original point was that by saying in 1926 that horses had a future in warfare, Haig may have been wrong, but it wasn't an unreasonable thing to say and it shouldn't be used as evidence that he was stupid.

Anthony

Quite right. I agree. Haig was not stupid. The fact that he fought hard to maintain the cavalry gave the British an edge in mounted infantry.

I guess my point was related to the 'parable' of the boiled frog. If you put a frog into boiling water, it will jump out. Supposedly if you put it into cold water and gradually heat the water to boiling, you can boil the frog (Do NOT try this at home, kids). Sometimes people have trouble letting go of the old and, in doing so, fail to grasp signs of the new. Not a sign of stupidity but rather difficulty in learning because of an emotional rather than intellectual block.

Cheers

Robert

[Terry_Reeves]

Bryn Hammond provided the name of the publication, the quote and its context. Bryn's discusssion of this worth taking a look at.

Terry Reeves

[PhilB]

Sometimes people have trouble letting go of the old and, in doing so, fail to grasp signs of the new. Not a sign of stupidity but rather difficulty in learning because of an emotional rather than intellectual block.

I`m no psychiatrist, Rob, but I would have thought that difficulty in learning was indicative of an intellectual block. Either way (or both!), difficulty in learning doesn`t sound like a good thing in a C in C! Phil B

[Anthony Pigott]

Bryn Hammond  provided the name of the publication,  the quote and its context.  Bryn's discusssion of this worth taking a look at.

Terry Reeves

I think the post referred to is in this thread:

http://1914-1918.org/forum/index.php?showtopic=4682&st=30

I don't think Bryn gives the actual reference to Haig's remarks, though.

Bryn's comments about the role of cavalry, etc. are very interesting (and I agree with them ).

Anthony

[armourersergeant]

Anthony,

Thanks for putting that link up, i had forgotten about that one. Got a great lot out of reading it again.

regards

Arm.

[Robert Dunlop]

difficulty in learning was indicative of an intellectual block.

Phil

You could rightly argue that. I guess the distinction that I am making is between a situation where the intellect is unable to grasp something new versus the situation where the intellect is able but is not allowed to. Your point (perhaps) is that the outcome is the same.

Either way (or both!), difficulty in learning doesn`t sound like a good thing in a C in C!

In the short-term, this is true. In longer-term, it may be possible to overcome an emotional block. People often use denial or similar mechanisms to shut off something that is deeply threatening, particularly to the sense of self. On occasion, these mechanisms may persist. Other times, they serve as a useful protection to allow new information to be gradually absorbed and processed by the intellect.

In a C-in-C, it is bad if carried on across key aspects of command. Weakness of insight and inability to learn may be relatively inconsequential in some areas compared with others. The importance of the horse has been acknowledged in this thread. Likewise, the importance of mounted infantry in an age where vehicular transport was possible but had not replaced the horse. Haig's views about the exploitation role of cavalry, as touched on in this thread at least, did not really amount to much in the grand scheme of things. As it happened, the cavalry contributed to the chase but were not absolutely necessary.

Robert

[Anthony Pigott]

Sometimes people have trouble letting go of the old and, in doing so, fail to grasp signs of the new.  Not a sign of stupidity but rather difficulty in learning because of an emotional rather than intellectual block.

I`m no psychiatrist, Rob, but I would have thought that difficulty in learning was indicative of an intellectual block. Either way (or both!), difficulty in learning doesn`t sound like a good thing in a C in C! Phil B

I would guess that those people we call 'great' are rarely well-balanced in their talents.

Anthony

[PhilB]

I recall reading a book called "The Psychology of Military Incompetence" which was quite illuminating. I can`t find it in my library catalogue. Anyone know it?

Phil B

Found it! "On the Psychology of Military Incompetence" by Norman Dixon, 1994.

[Guest Comsat Angel]

That must be a recent edition, as I remember reading it at least 20 years ago as a Psychology student at Manchester Polytechnic!

[AndyHollinger]

That must be a recent edition, as I remember reading it at least 20 years ago as a Psychology student at Manchester Polytechnic!

Ditto during the early 1970s ... thought it was typical anti-Vietnam, anti-military stuff ... didn't spend a lot of time on it.

[Anthony Pigott]

I've come across another reference to a reference to the Haig 'quotation':

John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun

(New York: Pantheon, 1975): 56

Does anyone have it? It might give the original reference.

Anthony

[armourersergeant]

I am sure also that there is a reference to this sort of quote in the Haig Diaries. In that Haig writes about a dinner he went to with some cavalry officers!

regards

Arm.

[Anthony Pigott]

I finally found the reference I'd seen, referred to earlier, but couldn't remember. It's from Robin Neillands' The Great War Generals on the Western Front 1914-18, p 514.

"In 1925, seven years after the war ended, Field Marshal the Earl Haig (as he had become) could remark, 'Some enthusiasts ... prophesy that the aeroplane, the tank and the motor car will supersede the horse in future wars. I am all for tanks and aeroplanes but they are only accessories to the man and the horse.' It should be noted, however, that this was addressed to an enthusiastic audience at the Cavalry Club, and that Haig may well have tailored his opinions to his listeners. Yet as late as 1936, long after Haig's death, the British Army was spending £400,000 a year on horse fodder and just £121,000 on petrol (Army Estimates, 1935-6). Haig's old regiment, the 7th Hussars, only gave up its horses for the Mark VI Vickers tank in 1937, when the regiment was stationed in Egypt."

Anthony