Haig

[Arnie]

This is not strictly correct. No advantage could be gained because of the attrocious weather and conditions. The battle of Cambrai showed that the British Army was not finished at the end of Third Ypres.

Dominate is too strong a word to use in this case. The British could probable see the German held territory, but were too weak to utilise this advantage. In fact the Allied troops became target practice for the German artillery with severe losses compounding those caused by the appalling conditions the troops were forced to endure

The total British casualties for the battle and later Cambrai was approx. 450,000 plus 50,000 French. A total of half a million. The Germans 270,000

This is not strictly correct. No advantage could be gained because of the attrocious weather and conditions. The battle of Cambrai showed that the British Army was not finished at the end of Third Ypres.

Ah Cambrai, an operation suggested by the Tank Corps before Passchendaele and ridiculed by Haig, even though it was supported by Gough and Plummer. Now used by Haig, desperately tring to salvage something from the Ypres battle. However successful the initial phase of the Battle, it was doomed to lack of total success, due to a dearth of reserves, exhausted by Haig's battle of attrition and and the GOC of the Highland Div. failure to follow orders. The British Attack took place on the 20th November. By the 30th November the Germans had counter attacked, capturing most of the lost ground back and the same amount of prisoners etc has the British had captured, the score was even! Leaving the British Official Court of enquiry to delve bitterly into the reasons for this latest debacle.

In conclusion of course the weather had a part in the Passchendaele battle. But Haig did start his attack late knowing full well the history of fighting in Flanders. he was warned on several occaisions of the likelyhood of bad weather. The latest warning from the Tank Corps, who were politely told not to bother HQ with their warnings.

The German tactics won praise from both sides: Holding the line with only machine guns, reports of machine gun positions surrounded by piles of British dead. Its use of reserves and its new counter attack drill caught the allies napping on numerous occaisions

Plumer withdrew from the salient to free up British troops for elsewhere.

I cannot believe you believe this. It was a bitter pill for Plummer to swallow He had to withdraw because of German pressure of 'Operation Georgette' the whole British Army withdrew to a more defence able position Perhaps if they had taken up this position in 1915 it would have saved perhaps over a million casualties.

Oh by the way Charteris was sacked to a torrent of abuse from all sectors. Going home were he wrote a a rather disgruntled book, not very well recieved. on his experinces

[Robert Dunlop]

Dominate is too strong a word to use in this case.

I have to disagree. The British steadily and systematically pushed the Germans back in a location that greatly favoured the German defenders.

The German tactics won praise from both sides: Holding the line with only machine guns, reports of machine gun positions surrounded by piles of British dead. Its use of reserves and its new counter attack drill caught the allies napping on numerous occaisions

The use of reserves and counter-attacks was significantly nullified in Third Ypres. The Germans became desparate in their efforts to restore the effectiveness of counter-attacks. Even to the extent of reverting to filling the forward lines with troops. Some minor local successes were achieved but the overall British dominance in the advance was maintained.

Yes, the Germans fought with great determination and doggedness. The effect on the troops was significant though. And the German High Command was shaken by Third Ypres. The threat of further British attacks lay across their strategic planning for 1918.

The British could probable see the German held territory, but were too weak to utilise this advantage.

Yes they could see. Messines was the best example. If you look out from Passchendaele, you can see the plains stretching off to the east. The advantage was not just in terms of observation, it was the sense of 'looking down on' or conversely for the Germans 'of being looked down on'. This advantage did not require more men to continue the attack. Remember that the Germans had thought their defences to be impregnable, especially at Messines. The psychological disadvantage cannot be overlooked, if you will pardon the pun.

The position of the British meant that Germans were concerned that a breakthrough might come in the Spring.

However successful the initial phase of the Battle, it was doomed to lack of total success, due to a dearth of reserves, exhausted by Haig's battle of attrition and and the GOC of the Highland Div. failure to follow orders.

We could debate this issue. My point was that the British were not so exhausted that they could not launch this major battle. The German counterattack demonstrated two things. One, that too much time was spent battering away at Bourlon Wood. The breakthrough remained tantalisingly close in the minds of key generals, whereas much (but not all) of Third Ypres illustrated the value of clear achieveable objectives within range of adequate artillery support. This is why the German counterattack system did so poorly by comparison to Cambrai. The second problem at Cambrai was the lack of co-ordination on the threatened right flank - but that is another story.

I cannot believe you believe this. It was a bitter pill for Plummer to swallow He had to withdraw because of German pressure of 'Operation Georgette' the whole British Army withdrew to a more defence able position Perhaps if they had taken up this position in 1915 it would have saved perhaps over a million casualties.

I did not say that the decision to withdraw was an easy one. But the withdrawal was proactively made to shorten the British line in order to free men for the areas under immediate pressure of German attack further south. It was not that the positions were more defensible down in the basin near Ypres. Only that the positions could be defended with fewer men because the line was shorter.

Oh by the way Charteris was sacked to a torrent of abuse from all sectors. Going home were he wrote a a rather disgruntled book, not very well recieved. on his experinces

I would be interested in any quotes relating to 'a torrent of abuse'. I have Charteris' book and it does not portray a man who was particularly disgruntled. In fact, if you did not know the circumstances of his removal, you would be hard-pressed from his book to know what happened. He writes:

"December 31 I am handing over charge of the Intelligence to General Lawrence. I asked to go to a brigade or a division out here, but DH [Haig] tells me he will not let me leave GHQ, so I become Deputy Inspector-General of Transportation, when I come back from leave. It is a big disappointment, but is softened by the verdict of the doctors that in any case they could not have passed me fit for front-line work."

For several months, Charteris stayed in close contact with DH. He seemed to continue this role to a lesser degree, remaining a confidante to DH. Eventually, he had to return to London for an operation.

Robert

[Arnie]

The British steadily and systematically pushed the Germans back in a location that greatly favoured the German defenders.

This remark does not even make remote sense, considering the original plan was to capture the Channel ports and release the cavalry onto the Germans rear. It says a lot for the German skill in defence to suffer so much artillery fire, consistent attacks and fight those conditions and to still inflict twice the number of casualties on the British as those nflicted upon themselves.

The Germans became desparate in their efforts to restore the effectiveness of counter-attacks.

I agree that the Crown Prince was desperate to restore the effectiveness the German Counter Attack. He did however restore the Machine Guns to to holding the line, surrounding their positions with Canadian Dead this time. His plan of delaying the counter attack by 24 hours was reasonably successful. If Luddendorf , Von Arnim and Hoffman (now in the east) are to be believed, they were happy to let the British waste them selves in the salient as it boded well for later. I assume meaning the March 1918 attacks

The advantage was not just in terms of observation, it was the sense of 'looking down on' or conversely for the Germans 'of being looked down on'.

This demoralizing factor never seemed to bother the British Generals to much even when casualties were 8000 a week. Sounds more of a justification for the battle of diminished returns

But the withdrawal was proactively made to shorten the British line in order to free men for the areas

Plummer refused Haig's initial order to withdraw but withdrew in time to stall a massive second German attack on the Messines position. Of course his new position was more defensible he was the other side of the canal and not in a salient

I would be interested in any quotes relating to 'a torrent of abuse'.

Regarding the quotes about Charteris see Neville Lytton's Book 'The Press and the general Staff' published in 1921 I also remember it being mentioned in 'Flanders Field' by Leon Wolff.

.

[Robert Dunlop]

The British steadily and systematically pushed the Germans back in a location that greatly favoured the German defenders.

This remark does not even make remote sense, considering the original plan was to capture the Channel ports and release the cavalry onto the Germans rear.

I am not sure why you say the 'remark does not even make remote sense'. You can't mean that the British did not push the Germans back. And the fact that the British did not achieve the ultimate goal was not any different from the major campaigns that had gone before. It was not until the Last 100 Days, when attrition (of manpower, morale and resources) had taken too great a toll of the Germans, that the German Army began to withdraw.

It says a lot for the German skill in defence to suffer so much artillery fire,  consistent attacks and fight those conditions and to still inflict twice the number of casualties on the British as those nflicted upon themselves.

The Germans applied their best man, General Fritz von Lossberg, to the defences at Third Ypres. The principles of die Leere des Gefechtfeldes (the empty battlefield), Flachenverteidigung (area defence in depth) and Lucken (gaps that form killing zones) were implemented for Third Ypres. There had been some urgency about building up the defences after the shock of Messines. Yes, these defensive strategies did have an effect, in no small part due to the skill and doggedness of the defenders. But the concept of Schlagfertigkeit (which Samuels described as 'quickness of repartee', a 'quality much admired in Germany'), with its instruments of Gegenstoss (immediate counter-attack) and Gegenangriff (delayed, planned counter-offensive), did not work to any appreciable degree. Indeed, many German soldiers were killed in predictable (to the British) counter-attacks, blown away by the artillery who remained in close enough support to protect the infantry or cut down by the British soldiers who were ready for them. In a recently published book by Paddy Griffith (Fortifications of the Western Front 1914-1918), he writes 'the Germans never did seem to recapture very much of the ground they lost [apart from Chemin des Dames and Cambrai]. During the middle phase of Third Ypres they tried a number of experiments in siting major counter-attack forces more or less close to the front line; but in no case were they particularly successful, and in some cases they met with total disaster.' They were unable to stop the British despite their best efforts.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The advantage was not just in terms of observation, it was the sense of 'looking down on' or conversely for the Germans 'of being looked down on'.

This demoralizing factor never seemed to bother the British Generals to much even when casualties were 8000 a week. Sounds more of a justification for the battle of diminished returns

I did not suggest that the advantage of observation was a 'demoralizing' factor, although there was a certain (though very limited) effect on morale for British soldiers when they were overlooked. Only that the British had an advantage once in possession of Messines, Gheluvelt and Passchendaele Ridges.

Plummer refused Haig's initial order to withdraw but withdrew in time to stall a massive second German attack on the Messines position. Of course his new position was more defensible he was the other side of the canal and not in a salient

The circumstances of the withdrawal from the Ypres Salient are important. The withdrawal occured over several days, starting on the 12th April, although the orders to shorten the line were issued by Plumer on the 11th April (Second Army Operation Order No. 17 11th April). This was on the third day after the opening of Operation Georgette. The instruction was 'to withdraw the II, VIII, and XXII Corps to the "Battle Zone"'.

From the British Official History:

'In the evening [of 13th April] the Commander-in-Chief instructed Lieut-General Sir N Birch, his Artillery Adviser, to see that the Second Army was taking steps to hold the line of hills, Monts des Cats - Mount Kemmel as flank position to the troops in the Ypres Salient. At the same time he directed Lieut-General Sir H Lawrence, the Chief of the General Staff, to speak to General Plumer on the telephone as regards the withdrawal from the Salient, pointing out that the British front had increased in length owing to the retirements further south, that the troops were tired and their effective strength falling; lastly there was no probability of getting any more British divisions as reinforcements.'

Starting on the 11th April, Plumer emphasized the need to avoid giving the Germans any indication of the gradual withdrawal. The 'outpost line' along the ridges was maintained. Here the advantage of the British gained in Third Ypres came into play. Because the Germans had lost their dominance of the ridges, Plumer's plan was superbly executed.

As you mention, by the end of the Battles of the Lys, the British had withdrawn to the Canal and Ypres itself.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

This map, from the British Official History, displays the extent of the withdrawal at the end of 13th April

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

By 15th April, the withdrawal had reached the following line. Note however that the Outpost Line remains on the high ground captured by the British in Third Ypres.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is the final line. I would respectfully submit that this is still a salient, only now the British defences are overlooked from the high ground now occupied by the Germans. It was easier to defend with the fewer numbers of men. It was not easier to defend in any other respect, IMHO.

Robert

[Arnie]

Robert very informative message congratulation... Unfortunately when you mention the Official War History my mind goes back to the old army adage ‘Bulls--- baffles brains’ I think that we are all aware that the OWH was weeded and sanitized to protect the reputation of the Generals. Fortunately this was not a factor with the Colonial histories.

So in ordinary soldier’s language can I put the following to you? Agree or disagree as you feel necessary?

1 The reasons for the Third battle of Ypres – Passchendaele.

Although called the Third Battle, it was not a battle, but rather a campaign. And, like its German forerunners of 1914 and 1915, it achieved little except loss - Passchendaele' has come to be, like Walcheren a century before, a synonym for military failure. Even the inexhaustible powers of endurance and sacrifice shown by the combatants, or the improved executive leadership which did much in the later stages to minimize their sufferings, tend to be not merely overshadowed, but eclipsed in memory by the futility of the purpose and result.

Most good Generals modify their plan to suit changing situations. The time for this battle was passed so had the original reasons. But, Haig was determined to fight his wearing down battle.

2. Guarantees given to

The Prime Minister

To enlist the support of the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet certain Guarantees were given, none of these Guarantees were kept

3. German Loss of Confidence

You claim that the Germans loss of confidence with the loss of part of the ridge line, That’s strange it would appear looking at the German history they were prepared to allow the British slog there way up the ridge Whilst with standing this British assault they prepared and launched a successful attack at Riga and Capperetto even to the extent of withdrawing divisions from the Western Front to assist (The Alpine Corps) in these two ventures which by the way were both successful.

The Germans were still full of fight. I don’t think we could say the same for the British

4. Cambrai.

Cambrai was a successful attack turned into a debacle by the German quick response and Haig’s exhaustion of his reserves at Passchendaele. Haig’s handling of this battle snatched defeat from the mouth of victory.

5. Battle of Attrition

Can any one doubt that this battle was one of attrition? With Charteris the official (if not honest) score keeper, but the losses of two to one in German favour do not tell the whole tale. The ratio of dead to wounded was far higher for the British, purely because in the later stages of the battle it was impossible to evacuate the wounded because of the state of the Ground. Haig and GHQ tried unsuccessfully to massage the losses later

Score; Allies 500,000, Germans 270,000.

6. German 1918 Offensive

You give the impression that there was no tactical pressure on Gen Plumer to with draw. The Germans did no want to attack through a Mud Lake of the old Passchendaele battlefield so it was easy for Plumer to withdraw. However he had difficulty at Messiness were he had to recapture the ridge and then withdraw in the face of a second assault. On the Southern Sector of the salient the Germans extended the battle on to Plumbers wing.

The German Advance helped by reinforcements from the east but was not two American Armies in the field?

Only a rabid revisionist can call Passchendaele a Victory. It tore the heart and hope out of the British Army. Asking an army to fight in such conditions was cruel and inefficient.

Of course the Generals loved their soldiers like they loved their horses and hounds. But like the horses and hounds they were just destroyed if the were unable to do what they were asked.

7. Conclusion

None of the original objectives were achieved and the minor one of pinching out the Salient left the British in a worse state than ever. without the protection of their guns who could not get forward.

[Robert Dunlop]

Robert very informative message congratulation... Unfortunately when you mention the Official War History my mind goes back to the old army adage ‘Bulls--- baffles brains’ I think that we are all aware that the OWH was weeded and sanitized to protect the reputation of the Generals. Fortunately this was not a factor with the Colonial histories.

Arnie

Are you saying that 'Colonial' war histories were not sanitized to protect reputations? Do you have any evidence for this?

So in ordinary soldier’s language can I put the following to you? Agree or disagree as you feel necessary?

1 The reasons for the Third battle of Ypres – Passchendaele.

Although called the Third Battle, it was not a battle, but rather a campaign.

Agree.

And, like its German forerunners of 1914 and 1915, it achieved little except loss - Passchendaele' has come to be, like Walcheren a century before, a synonym for military failure. Even the inexhaustible powers of endurance and sacrifice shown by the combatants, or the improved executive leadership which did much in the later stages to minimize their sufferings, tend to be not merely overshadowed, but eclipsed in memory by the futility of the purpose and result.

Disagree - that Passchendaele was a military failure. If you regard the purpose of Third Ypres as the destruction of the German Army and the winning of the war in that campaign (ie all over by Christmas 1917), then it was a failure. But that goal was never realistic. The capture of Passchendaele Village was the culmination of a series of successful British and Dominion advances against very strong defences.

Most good Generals modify their plan to suit changing situations.  The time for this battle was passed so had the original reasons. But, Haig was determined to fight his wearing down battle.

Plans for Third Ypres were modified, though not the overall purpose. The 'wearing down battle' did erode German forces further.

2. Guarantees given to

The Prime Minister

To enlist the support of the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet certain Guarantees were given, none of these Guarantees were kept

Neither agree nor disagree. How the politicians were handled is irrelevant to the military situation.

3. German Loss of Confidence

You claim that the Germans loss of confidence with the loss of part of the ridge line,

There may be some misunderstanding here. Apologies. I did not claim that the German's lost confidence. Merely that the British achieved dominance. Previously, when the Germans occupied the high ground around Ypres, they were dominant. But this state of affairs did not undermine British confidence.

That’s strange it would appear looking at the German history they were prepared to allow the British slog there way up the ridge

Disagree - the Germans fought very hard to resist the British attacks. Even to the extent that the MarinesKorps Flanderns had its heavy artillery assets stripped to help try and stop the British when there was the real threat of seaborne invasion of the Belgian Coast. The counter-attack policy of the Germans was maintained on the basis that they wanted to win back lost ground.

Whilst with standing this British assault they prepared and launched a successful attack at Riga and Capperetto even to the extent of withdrawing divisions from the Western Front to assist (The Alpine Corps) in these two ventures which by the way were both successful.

Agree - but I was not implying that the Germans lacked the will or the means to fight. German divisions that were involved in Third Ypres were not immediately able to fight, as the initial defence of Cambrai proved.

The Germans were still full of fight. I don’t think we could say the same for the British

Disagree - witness Cambrai.

4. Cambrai.

Cambrai was a successful attack turned into a debacle by the German quick response and Haig’s exhaustion of his reserves at Passchendaele. Haig’s handling of this battle snatched defeat from the mouth of victory.

Agree and Disagree - Cambrai was not successful in its limited aims. The initial advance was spectacular but not successful. Unless Bourlon Wood was taken and the corresponding right flank (la Folie and the higher ground east of the canal and west of Rumily) was controlled by the British, the furthest advance was not sustainable. Prior to the German counterattack, plans were already underway to withdraw the British salient back to Flesquieres Ridge. So even if the counterattack had not taken place, the British would have apparently lost much of their day 1 & 2 gains. Haig did not enforce his initial decision to stop at 48 hours if Bourlon Wood was not captured.

Remember too that the Germans were exhausted at the end of Cambrai.

5. Battle of Attrition

Can any one doubt that this battle was one of attrition?

Agree - every major British campaign under Haig was regarded as part of a continuous policy of attrition. Passchendaele was not different in this respect.

With Charteris the official (if not honest) score keeper, but the losses of two to one in German favour do not tell the whole tale. The ratio of dead to wounded was far higher for the British, purely because in the later stages of the battle it was impossible to evacuate the wounded because of the state of the Ground.  Haig and GHQ tried unsuccessfully to massage the losses later

Score; Allies 500,000, Germans 270,000.

Agree and Disagree - British losses were higher; they were the attackers. Just because the losses were higher in this campaign does not mean that the effort was for nought if, in the overall picture, Third Ypres contributed to the final demise of the German Army and the liberation of occupied Belgium and France. The only way to achieve victory was to push back the Germans. This meant having to attack. Having to attack means higher losses, until such time as the defeated army begins the final retreat.

Leaving aside Third Ypres specifically, do you think there was any other way (other than the Entente attacking Germany) that would have seen the Germans out of Belgium and northern France?

6. German 1918 Offensive

You give the impression that there was no tactical pressure on Gen Plumer to with draw.

What I have tried to illustrate is that the initial decision to withdraw was not made under the direct pressure of the German advance up the Lys valley.

The Germans did no want to attack through a Mud Lake of the old Passchendaele battlefield so it was easy for Plumer to withdraw. However he had difficulty at Messiness were he had to recapture the ridge and then withdraw in the face of a second assault. On the Southern Sector of the salient the Germans extended the battle on to Plumbers wing.

Agree - later on there were good tactical reasons why a further withdrawal could be justified.

The German Advance helped by reinforcements from the east but was not two American Armies in the field?

Agree - the first major American contribution came after Operation Michael had run out of steam. This was the Big Red One's involvement in the capture of Cantigny. American divisions played an important (but not dominant) part in the holding and then reduction of the Soissons-Reims salient.

Only a rabid revisionist can call Passchendaele a Victory. It tore the heart and hope out of the British Army. Asking an army to fight in such conditions was cruel and inefficient.

Disagree - the British Army fought magnificently in the Spring offensives. French help was vital but all of the accounts of those desparate battles from March to July 1918 do not speak of an army that lost its heart and hope. I feel very proud of the efforts of those involved, especially the British (and I am a Colonial), and it is such a shame that these efforts are not lauded (a lot) more outside of groups such as this.

If you are referring to the conditions of drowning mud, slime-filled shell holes, incessant shell fire, etc, then it should be remembered that these conditions only pertained to part of Third Ypres. I utterly loathe war. I utterly loathe what my Grandfather, and so many like him had to put up with during Third Ypres. Would I change any of this if I could - damn right I would. But I will not take away from what they achieved. The capture of Passchendaele Village was a victory - one that men like my Grandfather achieved with enormous effort and courage. I will not sell that achievement short by saying it was not a victory. It was certainly not a defeat. You may argue that the price was too high. I respect that argument. But it does not equate with calling Third Ypres as a whole, or the Battle of Passchendaele in particulry, a defeat.

Of course the Generals loved their soldiers like they loved their horses and hounds. But like the horses and hounds they were just destroyed if the were unable to do what they were asked.

Disagree - I am sorry you feel this way. I think you do an injustice to the generals and their fellow officers.

7. Conclusion

None of the original objectives were achieved and the minor one of pinching out the Salient left the British in a worse state than ever. without the protection of their guns who could not get forward.

Disagree - what evidence do you have that the guns could not get forward. The other issues I have addressed previously.

Robert

[Arnie]

Robert

I feel very proud of the efforts of those involved, especially the British (and I am a Colonial), and it is such a shame that these efforts are not lauded (a lot) more outside of groups such as this.

I feel that you are letting your pride and sympathy for the men over flow onto the Buffoons and Donkeys who caused them to fight this terrible battle

Let me just put you straight, I come from a military family my grand father served in the Boar War, the Great War (in all the big battles) and in early 1940 he was Guarding German Prisoners of war. Dad was a regular soldier and I served for 27 years in an Infantry Battalion so I would think that pride and sympathy is not the sole prerogative of the revisionists like your self

You continue to think of it as a victory, however the following Historians disagree;

“Passchendaele – A name black boarded in the records of the British Army. Even the inexhaustible powers of endurance and the sacrifice shown by the combatants, or the improved executive leadership which did much in the later stages to minimize their suffering, tend to be not merely over shadowed, but eclipsed in memory by the futility of purpose and result [/color]“---Capt Basil Liddell Hart.- The Real War 1914 – 1918 (1930)

“The remarkable fact emerging from this is that the Germans put only half the number of divisions through Passchendaele propor¬tionate to the total number in their army and none of them more than twice. In comparison, 25 per cent of British divisions fighting in the Salient did so more than twice, and 20 per cent served four times or more. Nor did any German divisions go in for a second spell before they had rested at least two months. Charteris unearthed the fact and reckoned that German divisions were restored to full establishment within fourteen days of leaving a battle, which meant that German divisions, unlike their British counterparts, had time to rebuild, train and maintain some sort of esprit de corps.---Denis Winter – Haig’s Command (1991)

"For 'Passchendaele' stood for all that was dismal, all that was futile and, by a strange quirk, all that was glorious in the history of warfare. In all the history of warfare, no campaign was more catastrophic, no 'victory' more empty. Passchendaele stands on the summit of the slopes that surround the city of Ypres. The troops called them hills."

When the German Army summoned up the last of its strength and pushed forward on its great offensive in the spring of 1918, it was no longer possible to continue to hold the ridges. There was a strategic withdrawal. Passchendaele was given up. The troops fell back and the salient was reduced to a tight little circle which consisted of little but Ypres and its outskirts. It was smaller than ever before. It was precisely the size to which General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien had proposed to reduce it in 1915. He had been sacked for his pains. But no one remembered that. By 1918 that was a lifetime and some 200,000 lives ago. --- Lyn Macdonald – They Called it Passchendaele (1978)

The point of Passchendaele, as the Third Battle of Ypres has come to be known, defies explanation. It may have relieved pressure on the French, in the aftermath of the mutinies, though there is no evidence that Hindenburg and Luddendorf knew enough of Petain's troubles to plan to profit by them. They had too much trouble of their own, in propping up their Austrian allies and in settling the chaos of the Russian front, to mount another Verdun; moreover, by the autumn of 1917, Petain's programme of rehabilitation was having its effect on the French army, which staged an attack near the Chemin des Dames, on 23 October, that recaptured over seven miles of front, to a depth of three miles, in four days, a result equivalent to that achieved with such effort and suffering at Ypres in ninety-nine. Edmonds, the official British historian, justifies Haig's constant renewal of the Passchen¬daele battle with the argument that it attracted eighty-eight divisions to the Ypres front, while 'the total Allied force engaged was only 6 French divisions and 43 British and Dominion [Australian, New Zealand and Canadian] divisions'.112 Context puts his judgment in perspective: eighty-eight divisions represented only a third of the German army, while Haig's forty-three were more than half of his. What is unarguable is that nearly 70,000 of his soldiers had been killed in the muddy wastes of the Ypres battlefield and over 170,000 wounded. The Germans may have suffered worse - statistical disputes make the argument profitless - but, while the British had given of their all, Hindenburg and Luddendorf had another army in Russia with which to begin the war in the west all over again. Britain had no other army. Like France, though it had adopted conscription later and as an exigency of war, not as a principle of national policy, it had by the end of 1917 enlisted every man that could be spared from farm and factory and had begun to compel into the ranks recruits whom the New Armies in the heyday of volunteering of 1914—15 would have rejected on sight: the hollow-chested, the round-shouldered, the stunted, the myopic, the over-age. Their physical deficiencies were evidence of Britain's desperation for soldiers and Haig's profligacy with men. On the Somme he had sent the flower of British youth to death or mutilation; at Passchendaele he had tipped the survivors into the slough of despond. --- John Keegan The First World War (1998)

The reason that the Guns could not get forward was simple the heavy Guns were stuck in the mud. The more mobile artillery were stuck at the the wrong side of the

the River Steenbeck which was in flood.

[Robert Dunlop]

I feel that you are letting your pride and sympathy for the men over flow onto the Buffoons and Donkeys who caused them to fight this terrible battle.

Arnie

The particular quote you have selected referred to the British soldiers in the Spring Offensives. I have enormous respect and sympathy for the British and Dominion forces that fought in Third Ypres. Please do not confuse that respect with respect for highest command. I have not presented any personal view on the high command, one way or the other.

You continue to think of it as a victory, however the following Historians disagree

With respect, none of the quotes disagree that Third Ypres was a victory. What they argue is that the victory was 'more empty' than any other or that the victory was not worth the cost or that the behaviour of 'the Chief' was reprehensible (my interpretations). The arguments about futility are well known. They do not change the fact that the British won the battles for the high ground around Ypres. They were not pinned to their starting positions. They did not make progress and then get beaten back, apart from minor losses of gains made in individual battles within the campaign of Third Ypres - the withdrawal from Ypres salient came significantly later.

Robert

[Archer]

Perhaps those who fought felt differently about Haig than do/did their sons and grandsons.

The death of Field Marshal [Haig] in January 1928 was an occasion of great public mourning throughout the United Kingdom. Huge crowds, made up predominantly of ex-soldiers, blocked the streets of London and Edinburgh as they came to pay their last respects to the former commander, who since the war had also become a leading figure in the struggle for veterans’ rights. (http://doc-iep.univ-lyon2.fr/wwi/article.php3?id_article=63)

If there is any truth in this report, the lions knew something about the donkey which we have, by and large, forgotten.

Defending Haig's reputation today would be very much a war of attrition!

Cheers!

William

[Arnie]

Archer

According to newspaper reports of the day, 100,000 attended and lined the route for Haig's funeral. Let's get this in prospective 350,000 attended Monash's funeral in Australia a country at the time with probably a fifth of Britains poulation.

In Colne in Lancashire at the service of rememberance for the a local football team killed in the Great War, a crowd estimated at 250,000 came to pay their respects.

I see you do not mention the the group of ex servicemen who turned their back on Haig's cortage.

Arnie

[Arnie]

Archer/ Robert sorry I got carried away and did not give a complete reply to either of you.

Robert, was not the original discussion about a pyrrhic victory? I think it is difficult to argue that this was anything but.

Archer, You seem to forget that the Haig Fund and the British Legion were mired in what to day would be called sleeze. Money was used from the charitable funds to refurbish Bermside, Haig's family home and grants made to well off officers for the private education of their children.

When the unveiled the statue to Haig in Whitehall the comment of the day among ex service men was "On a bloody horse, he should be on his knees facing the cenotaph begging their forgiveness".

[AndyHollinger]

Thought for the day:

Longstreet was mourned as well at his passing.

methinks we've reached the point where we should agree to disagree ...

Haig was ... Haig ... he was the guy who was in charge (to a point) of a long and bloody war the likes of which the world had not seen. We, the analysts are dancing on the edge of a razor trying to define what he did to get the precisely RIGHT word ...

My choices are "Command" and "Win" ... everything else is relative.

[PhilB]

Archer, You seem to forget that the Haig Fund and the British Legion were mired in what to day would be called sleeze. Money was used from the charitable funds to refurbish Bermside, Haig's family home and grants made to well off officers for the private education of their children.

I`ve never come across this Arnie. Where did you see the references to sleaze at Bemersyde etc.? Phil B

[Robert Dunlop]

was not the original discussion about a pyrrhic victory? I think it is difficult to argue that this was anything but.

It was. If we accept the definition of Pyrrhic victory as 'victory that is worse than defeat' (Oxford Dictionary), then, on the basis of the valid opinions you have expressed, I think you would endorse this view for Third Ypres. I respectfully disagree. If the British Army had actually been defeated in these battles, then British morale would have been worse-off and the Germans would have held the psychological upper-hand - yet another easy defeat of the British to restore their sense of superiority after the blows dealt by Arras, especially but not only the loss of Vimy Ridge, and the capture of Wytschaete-Messines ridge.

I have argued a different definition, based on the outcome of Pyrrhus' 'victory' at Asculum, namely that he was so weakened by the fighting that he was unable to fight on and he returned home. The latter emphasis is very important. The British were weakened, as were the Germans, but they were not out of the fight. And they definitely did not abandon the war.

Robert

[Arnie]

Robert

Swapping thousands of lives for a few yards of blood soaked mud is seen as a victory, no wonder the great war generals got their reputation as butchers. Remember the lives of these men were only on loan to the Generals for the duration and Haig had a duty to use them sparingly

[Arnie]

I`ve never come across this Arnie. Where did you see the references to sleaze at Bemersyde etc.? Phil B

Off hand I think it was Haig's Command by Denis Winter I nearly sure its mentioned in that but I will dig it out

Arnie

[Archer]

According to newspaper reports of the day, 100,000 attended and lined the route for Haig's funeral.

Oi veh. Poor deluded fools.

Arnie, your posts sound so ANGRY to me. What have allegations of sleeze got to do with Haig's ability to command in war?

It seems to me the height of folly to project feelings of sadness at wasted deaths and your anger at terrible conditions onto individuals like Haig, without considering that the war and all the people who fought in it - including the other ranks - were the products of their day and age.

History takes place in a context. Attempts to judge it by modern norms and standards must take this into account.

You think Haig was a butcher. His contemporaries in power thought he was fit to command the BEF in France. He beat his enemy in the field. Whoever it is you think might have done a better job, he wasn't available or wasn't chosen by the people who were there.

History is sad, Arnie - but getting angry about it is the road to new wars and ethnic cleansing.

William

[PhilB]

History takes place in a context. Attempts to judge it by modern norms and standards must take this into account.

You think Haig was a butcher. His contemporaries in power thought he was fit to command the BEF in France.

And there was I thinking that Hitler must have been a really bad man! Goering , Goebbels, Himmler, Heydrich etc (His contemporaries in power) thought he was great, so should I reconsider? Phil B

[Archer]

Don't be so silly dear. It's a fallacy, and you know it.

William

[Arnie]

Archer

Yes your right I have anger at Haig's and his cohorts but I have greater pride in those who fought in the trenches and were the victims of Haig's blood thirsty blunders. It is sad when Generals measure success or failure by their own men's 'butchers bill'. And when things did not go right blamed the soldiers or officers in the field. Some times even going so far as to decide that some misbegotten soldier should be shot to encourage the others.

I have been in the middle of internecine war several times and like most British soldiers always acted correctly.

Haig remained in power only because of his relationship with the King and the Establishment and his ability to get his version of events into the press first.

The effects of WW1 and Haig's leadership had a the greatest effect on the operations of WW2.

There was no rush to volunteer among the working class, some in the middle class did, the upper class as a whole were German sympathisers.

In 1939 - 40 There were never less than 10,000 absentees from the Army and draft dodging among the working class had developed into a fine art and was supported by ordinary people who would never thought of such a thing in WW1

Churchill held a conference early after becoming Prime Minister at the Great Northern Hotel York. The subject was evacuating the armed forces to Canada from northern ports in the event of a successful German invasion. He was told quite clearly by the leaders of the three armed services, that the regulars service men would probably go but the rest would ****** off home to their families.

Later in late '42, Churchill exasperated by the big defeats and the surrender of so many British troops, asked Alan Brooke why are they not fighting? His reply they don't think the countries worth fighting for. You see they were the sons of those slaughtered at the Somme and Passchendaele and had come home to to see their families slide into poverty and deprivation and those Butchers and Bunglers heavily rewarded. This was exacerbated by the reluctance of Generals who had been young officers in the trenches to sacrifice their troops.

How did Churchill and his government solve this problem? They promised no more unemployment and a welfare state. Strangely enough from that point the British never really looked back.

Arnie

I think there is little point in continuing this discussion, you revisionists are like Haig himself could learn nothing and could forget nothing.

[Archer]

I think there is little point in continuing this discussion, you revisionists are like Haig himself could learn nothing and could forget nothing.

It would be a pity if it had to end like that.

William