Haig

[PhilB]

The following appeared on a BBC website.

'Kill more Germans' summarised Haig's strategy as Commander in chief of the British forces in France during most of World War One. His war of attrition resulted in enormous numbers of British casualties and his leadership remains controversial.

I wonder:-
1/ Was this ever "official" policy?
2/ If so, when did it become the strategy?
3/ Could Haig decide on such a policy without the approval of the PM of the time?
Phil B

[AndyHollinger]

I have come to sing to myself the "Haig" song on all Haig related strings:

Haig, Haig, Haig, Haig, Haig ... Horrible (wonderful) Haig! - Sung to the tune of the Monty Python song "Spam" ...

[ the above is not meant to be in ANY way negative to my esteemed collegue (if I may call a noted Lt.Col. that) PhilB]

BBC said "surmmarised" which to me means somebody is interpreting here ... kind of like interpreting Grant's strategy in 1864 to be the same thing ...

What was the context of the "summary?"

[PhilB]

It`s not my intention, Andy, to open up a Haig - pro or con debate. That furrow`s been well ploughed recently! I`m interested in the general principle of commanders being able to decide unilaterally (if he actually did) on attrition as a strategy, bearing in mind the cost to the nation of such a decision. I`d be interested in your view. Phil B

[Max]

It`s not my intention, Andy, to open up a Haig - pro or con debate. That furrow`s been well ploughed recently! I`m interested in the general principle of commanders being able to decide unilaterally (if he actually did) on attrition as a strategy, bearing in mind the cost to the nation of such a decision. I`d be interested in your view. Phil B

Phil

Attrition as a strategy is quite valid and should not necessarily result in horrendous losses, in fact the idea is to do quite the opposite i.e. inflict disproportionate casualties on the enemy whilst minimising your own, and as such is a laudable policy.

Cassius Clay in his prime was the epitome of the attritional boxer. He used all his lightning skills to wear down his opponent with barrages of punches without taking either uneccesary risks or punishment himself , when his opponent was weakened he moved in and finished it.

I don't think for one minute that Haig was a true attritional general as he was more likely to make the grand assault using a battering ram rather than smaller actions designed to wear down the enemys numbers and morale.

Andy

[PhilB]

Attrition as a strategy is quite valid and should not necessarily result in horrendous losses, in fact the idea is to do quite the opposite i.e. inflict disproportionate casualties on the enemy whilst minimising your own, and as such is a laudable policy.

Andy, I think we`re into a matter of definitions here. Strictly speaking, attrition means, I think, sustained attack. In the public mind however, it means not worrying how many men you lose so long as your enemy runs out of men first. Did Haig have in mind the former, the latter or a combination of the two? Phil B

[Jim Gordon]

Phil B

To answer point (1) --- It was never a strategic policy of the British Government to gain victory by attritional means. On the contrary the Government sanctioned significant secondary attacks in other theatres specifically designed to reduce the attritional cost of the fighting on the Western Front.

To answer point (2)--- This is really a non sequiter of Point (1). Although wasn't it Falkehayn who introduced an official attritional approach at Verdun anyway--"bleed the French Army to death etc."

To answer point (3)---The control of the British Government over Haig's supposed nonchalance to long casualty lists was demonstrated by its refusal to send trained reinforcements to France in early 1918 when they were urgently required by the Military.

Regards

Jim Gordon

[Robert Dunlop]

The concept of attritional war arose early on. I don't know Haig's writings at all. Charteris mentions Haig's pessimissm about achieving decisive victory early on in the war, before he became C-in-C. In a meeting with Kitchner (Feb 9, 1916), Charteris writes:

'K came to my office again with Fitzgerald this morning, and stayed for two hours. He was quite himself, went into all the work and discussed everything regarding our possible action. His great point is to work with the French in every way this year, although he did not seem to think we should end the war this next campaign. He said someone from GHQ had been talking about a break-through, and that it must stop. ...I did not know of any such idea at GHQ.

"It is the German people you are fighting. Your eyes should be on them, in the Intelligence, as much and more than on the Army. There will be no break-through. You must lean against the line, press it, hit it as hard as you can, bend it. Some day you will find it is not there, going back, but you will not [emphasis in original] break through".

Immediately K had gone I motored straight to DH and reported the whole conversation to him. DH was, as always, quite unperturbed. I fancy he himself has been using the term break-through to some of the visitors, and it has reached K's ears.'

On May 1, 1916:

'Thus we become for the first time the chief partner in a big attack. But the attack cannot be decisive, even if the Italians and Russians make a big effort. DH looks on it as a "wearing-out", with just the off-chance that it may wear the Germans right out.'

September 1, 1917:

'DH called for a minute on German manpower. The results of the twelve months, September '16 to September '17 are very interesting. In one year, Germany has expended two years of her income in man-power. At the same rate by this time next year, she would be calling up her boys of 15 or alternatively, she would not be able to maintain her present number of units at their present strength. Actually even now her company strength has fallen from 230 to an average of 175 now.'

Charteris even talks of a 'profit and loss account' for German casualties.

I could quote several other passages on this theme. There is no doubt that an attritional war was being waged, with Charteris systematically and routinely analysing the numbers and trends on behalf of DH. Of course there was no way that either Haig or Charteris could articulate this. Charteris talks on several occasions about the strategies he had to adopt in controlling how the press viewed and reported the war. Haig's comments about 'breaking-through' could be interpreted in this light - the need to present an optimistic short-term solution to the politicians, while holding this view on attritional warfare.

The concept of attrition arose because decisive battle was deemed impossible, or extremely unlikely. It is a concept focused on the enemy - systematically wearing them down quantitatively and qualitatively. It bears no relation to the number of forces at your disposal, though you would think the priority would be use of minimal force to achieve results. In offensive warfare, this is not possible. Having said which, Haig did try to maximise those offensive capabilities such as artillery dominance.

Large set-piece battles were not the only tool of attritional war. Constant trench raiding, in the name of 'offensive spirit', was another. So were the terrible cloud gas and Livens projector attacks. Foulke's descriptions of this type of warfare are even more chilling than Charteris' comments about attritional war.

Robert

[GTS]

I'm fairly nuetral in the "Great Haig Debate", and have no wish to add any further arguements either way, because I imagine they have probably been done to death over the years.

But all I would say, is that the thing I often wonder when people call Haig a butcher etc, is exactly what anybody else, without the benefit of 85 odd years of hindsight would, or could, have done differently at the time ?

The reality of the situation on the Western front was that the Germans were entrenched on Franco- Belgian territory and weren't going to leave by their own volition, so it was incumbant on the Entente Powers to attack. Also one should bear in mind that the length and scale of British attacks were often dictated on a strategic level by the actions of French, who were after all, the senior party in the alliance.

I suppose all you could say of Haig was that he was no Marlborough or Wellington, but he was no Nivelle either.

[Guest DNH]

Haig envisaged four stages in modern warfare: the manoeuvre for position; the first clash of battle; the wearing out fight; and the decisive blow.

How long he actually believed each stage to take, and how accurate his beliefs proved to be, I think must remain conjecture, although like an earlier poster to this thread I don't know Haig's papers / diaries well enough to say. It may be that he made public utterances about breakthroughs, exploitation etc as a political manoeuvre, to gain support and boost morale for campaigns in which he had little belief.

Cheers

[PhilB]

A WW1 example of "spin" perhaps? Phil B

[AndyHollinger]

Haig envisaged four stages in modern warfare: the manoeuvre for position; the first clash of battle; the wearing out fight; and the decisive blow.

How long he actually believed each stage to take, and how accurate his beliefs proved to be, I think must remain conjecture, although like an earlier poster to this thread I don't know Haig's papers / diaries well enough to say. It may be that he made public utterances about breakthroughs, exploitation etc as a political manoeuvre, to gain support and boost morale for campaigns in which he had little belief.

Cheers

Thanks for this msg. My question, however, is where did you get Haig's belief ... those classifications work well as a model in almost any war ... but it would be much more germane to the specific question if they are, indeed, Haig's words. This is a sincere question, not some level of taunt.

**************

For any general - other than, perhaps, the German Gen V., to announce a strategy of Attrition would be political suicide. Nobody, not even the WWII Russians, ever said out loud we've got more soldiers than they've got bullets!

[Guest DNH]

My question, however, is where did you get Haig's belief ... those classifications work well as a model in almost any war ... but it would be much more germane to the specific question if they are, indeed, Haig's words. This is a sincere question, not some level of taunt.

That was Haig's point too, that they were necessary stages of (any) war and he had taught them from his time as Chief of Staff India 1909. In his closing despatch of March 1919 he described the battles from the Somme of 1916 to the Sambre in November 1918 as 'one great and continuous engagement'.

The 'wearing out' fight in the Great War could be considered as starting in 1916 with not just the Somme but also Verdun, lasting through 1917 and the first six to eight months of 1918. Casualties will be high on both sides for this is where the price of victory is paid. Add to that the effects of the industrial revolution on arms technology, populations and the financial and agricultural strength that meant armies of millions could be kept in the field for years (again something predicted by Haig when asked to report to Haldane on the creation of a Territorial Army) and casualties will grow exponentially. Haig also said at the end of the war that the victories of the summer and autumn of 1918 directly depended on the stubborn fighting of earlier years.

So Haig believed before the war in these necessary stages, and he analysed the war's end in exactly the same stages. Leave it to the Pals to decide where one stage ends and the next on begins...!

By the way if you're interested in one of Terraine's essays on this subject (a handy reference 'cos it's online and the others I can think of are in books and I would need to look them up) follow this link Terraine on Haig

Cheers

[PhilB]

Is it reasonable to assume, then, that the PM of the time must have been informed that huge losses were inevitable and must have endorsed the wearing out policy, either officially or, more likely, unofficially? I take it that the CinC could not have proceded without political approval. Phil B

[Guest DNH]

I would have laid the emphasis the other way round myself - PM and cabinet declares that a state of war exists between Britain and Germany and tells the BEF to go off and fight it. With 4.5 million heavily armed Germans to evict from North Eastern France and Belgium, with their undoubted great industrial might and military prowess behind them, then casualties are bound to be severe, and the war a long and testing one with uncertain outcome. I think Haig and Kitchener saw this, and set about creating an army of millions. The old British way in warfare of limited continental liabilities was dead and buried, and if politicians did not see this, then they are culpable for entering into a war without due consideration of the consequences. Anyone heard that anywhere else recently?

Cheers

[burlington]

Next year Channel 5 (I think) is running a series on 'Great Leaders'

Guess who is the topic of one of the programmes?

No prizes!

[Jim Gordon]

To answer point (1) --- It was never a strategic policy of the British Government to gain victory by attritional means. On the contrary the Government sanctioned significant secondary attacks in other theatres specifically designed to reduce the attritional cost of the fighting on the Western Front.

May I be allowed to add a little something to the above paragraph of my original post --- While it was not the policy of the Government to pursue victory by attritional means, based on the fighting on the Western Front, it was their policy to pursue it by means of a naval blockade of Germany and what could be more attritional than that. No one demonises The First Lord of the Admiralty for doing his duty by implementing this policy.

The waging of Total War will IMH always lead to attritional tactics.

Regards

Jim Gordon

[michaeldr]

Phil

I don’t think that this answers your original three questions

However Dr. David Payne seems to be in tune with the BBC writer whom you quote

“If we are to associate Haig with a firm belief in 'war by attrition', it has to be by deed rather than actual spoken word. Certainly, the reverses of the first Battle of the Somme, after all the expectations of 'The Big Push' and 'The Breakthrough', led him to continue the campaign long after it was evident to most of those involved that the human cost of continuing the offensive far exceeded any strategic or tactical purpose. Moreover, it was a stratagem that he repeated again to real excess at Passchendaele 1917 and, perhaps, to a lesser extent, in various battles right up to the Armistice in November 1918.

Haig did not freely use the words 'attrition', 'bleeding white' or ' bleeding to death' as did Falkenhayn and others. He preferred euphemisms such as 'wearing out' and 'at all costs' which had the same effect, if not the same clarity of purpose.”

For the full article see

http://www.westernfrontassociation.com/the...kenhaynhaig.htm

Regards

Michael D.R.

[AndyHollinger]

I think we're down to a "war of words" here. Any long conflict has an attritional dimension as the point about the blockade clearly makes. If one side or the other can not tactically or technologically devestate the other (both sides tried - gas, tanks, terror bombing, etc.) then it comes down to which side has either more resources or the higher social committment to use them.

Is this a war of attrition - the philosophers would say so, I guess. Were the Boer War, The Philippine Insurrection and Vietnam wars of attrition?

I think we get down to a matter of degree and intent. VanFalkenhayn seems to be maybe too forthright in his pronouncement - should we say the same of Grant at Petersburg? (well, yes!) But, Grant simply used his superiorities to gain the desired end - Didn't Haig do the same thing - though to a much closer gamble at the end?

We also get to judge commanders in the worst gambit any war leader faces - quit too soon and you can snatch defeat from the jaws of victory ... try too long and there are many "needless" deaths - Some would say the British in 1916 and 1917 are caught in those decisions.

Haig - if he, himself, constructed the model of warfare given above - the stages of conflict was seemingly trying to make sense from a distance of the conflict he found himself in day-to-day, month-to-month.

WWI is, to me, a great example of two "sides" clashing - knowing the single prize is survival and realizing that unless you have to give it everything and push the limits of reasonable behavior (as each society defined it) one could come out the loser - which meant the end of a thousand year history for either side.

Though the answer came to be "sort of attrition" - the blockade, the Americans, the willingness to keep the initiative and offensive in spite of horrendous losses ... the war also showed what technology and the willingness to use it can do. Take, for example, the bombing of civilian London by the Germans - not military but civilian "targets" unlike the fable of the stiff upper lip ... London shut down ... men and machines were recalled ... there was literally terror in the streets ... Had the Germans continued or had more resources devoted to heavy bombers ... it might have been decisive ...

All this comes to say ... Haig led his side to victory over an exhausted Germany ... Attrition? Well, one side was left standing.

[michaeldr]

WWI is, to me, a great example of two "sides" clashing - knowing the single prize is survival ................................

All this comes to say ... Haig led his side to victory over an exhausted Germany ... Attrition? Well, one side was left standing.

Andy,

Would it be an acceptable stretch of that to say:

In a war of where both side employ ‘attrition’ then no one actually ‘Wins’

Only in the end it’s a case of one side loosing?

Or if you prefer

At what stage does a victory become pyrrhic?

[And how close were the allies (USA excepted) to that?]

Sorry for drifting one of your topics again Phil

Michael D.R.

[PhilB]

That`s the first time I`ve seen the word "Pyrrhic" mentioned in forum discussions of WW1 strategies. It seems to fit perfectly, however. It suggests the simple question - Was Haig`s victory Pyrrhic? In fact, was it the most Pyrrhic victory there`s ever been? Phil B

PS Just to make sure we`re talking in the same terms:- New Oxford dictionary of English says "Pyrrhic - of a victory, won at too great a cost to have been worthwhile for the victor".

[michaeldr]

Phil,

I have no ready answer yet as this only just occurred to me as I was actually typing the preceding para

However it does seem to be the next logical question to ask

And I will be happy to learn what others think,

yea or nay

Regards

Michael D.R.

[Jim Gordon]

m13PGB

A pyrrhic victory is one obtained at too great a loss. No one denies that the cost of winning the Great War was enormous but then so was the cost to the enemy. The fact remains the Allies won the War the Germans/Austrians lost. Better a pyrrhic victory any day than a pyrrhic loss ?

Regards

Jim Gordon

[BlackSeptember1918]

look...sorry , this might not actually address the question , but bottom line for me was . Britain had the commanders it deserved . The class system didn't really allow for anything other than upclass underachievers to become top commanders ( Robertson an exception ) , so the unimaginative stategy of " war of attrition " is not so hard to believe . Lions led by donkey's may be stateing it too simply , but nomatter what leniancy you apply to British commanders on their decisions ( and i apply many because they didn't have the benefit of hindsight like us ) in the end you have to admit that lessons weren't learnt quickely and there wasn't much imagination in there idea's .

[AndyHollinger]

look...sorry , this might not actually address the question , but bottom line for me was . Britain had the commanders it deserved . The class system didn't really allow for anything other than upclass underachievers to become top commanders ( Robertson an exception ) , so the unimaginative stategy of " war of attrition " is not so hard to believe . Lions led by donkey's may be stateing it too simply , but nomatter what leniancy you apply to British commanders on their decisions ( and i apply many because they didn't have the benefit of hindsight like us ) in the end you have to admit that lessons weren't learnt quickely and there wasn't much imagination in there idea's .

Both the Phyrric and "The Commanders it deserved" comments elict some reaction ...

I don't think the Allies Victory was Phyrric - Since Russia was out already it doesn't count ... the major Allies - France, Britain and the US were in "good" shape at war's end - at least in terms of their society's ability to function. While it would be easy to say "They lost the peace" that, too, is to quick and simple to say. US isolationism, the compromises of Paris in 1919 and the drift of Capital to the US coupled with the Prtotectionist legislation of the late 20s were the culprit ... and THOSE concept are, indeed, very complex. Would it also be too easy to say that IF Paris had produced a war without reperations Germany would have been OKAY ... if the Social Democrats had not been drawn into their pact with the devil Freicorps ... and truly tried to rule as SDs not some sort of successors to the Imperial throne ... would the victory be Phyrric then?

As with Mass Armies, Mass Democracy was a new thing as well. The soldiers of the first war gave all they could - a "won" war - the Demcratic leaders then took the field and we get WWII ... but, again, all too simple except to say the Allies won and no, I don't believe the military fight to be Phyrric.

***************

Commanders - class system - negatives ... Leadership in battle is a function of the society that produces the Army. I think we can all safely say the British Forces - both of the Home Islands and the Commonwealth were the best led of the war AND produced the only Army not to fail - Americans are excused from the failing comparison because of their short tenure. Class has a lot to do with the quality of the Army. The American Officers were drawn from a mix of "old" military families and new technocrats - but overwhelmed by the National Guard system of local commercial magnates or local fiancial success families - ie an Army leadership based on local standing ... (Hey is that all to different from the origins of the British Army?)

I believe the qualities of leadership are born not made. While technical skills are important - leadership is something inside and simply said, the British population provided that leadership in higher numbers than their French or Russian counterparts - comparable to their German adversaries - who drew their officers from the same class.

It is all too easy to look down our noses at the British aristocracy because most of us are not members ... in my carroll at Grad school, I had a Punch Cartoon showing a group of Engish Soldiers huddled, fighting around a flag with all sorts of wild "savages" fighting and overwheming them ... the caption said "Steady Men, you're led by centuries of in-bred incompetence and ameaturism- finely honed to fox-hunting excellence." Well, maybe so ... but if you look at what more technocratic societies produced - America - I'd rather be led by British Officers than American any day.

Saying that is a bit hard since I am or was an American Officer. But, I can't remember a day in my service or service training where Honor or your personal obligation to society and the leadership role was stressed. The skills and requirements of leadership were taught and the idea that it was a job and you simply qualified - rich and smart enough for college - but nowhere was it brought out that YOU carrried the standard of the country ... that you were the presonal representitive of the country and its history - you were the flag incarnate ... all of the things, I believe, that went on apriori to those British Aristocratic officers ...

The world is now not a place for this and Mass Armies required too many from too deep in the barrel ... But, it would be interesting to study the fragging levels of the British Army in WWI and WWII, in Malasia, Korea and now the Middle East with that of the Americans in their conflicts - Somewhere I read that 12K officers were fragged in WWII and know in Vietnam we had all sorts of training and warnings about it ...

[PhilB]

Reverting to the "pyrrhic" angle, Andy, I suppose one test of whether the victory was pyrrhic would be this:-

If the British (Empire) had been asked to vote whether to enter the war or not, knowing the outcome in advance and that there would be multi-millions of dead, maimed, wounded, missing, widowed and orphaned, not to mention the huge monetary cost, would they have voted "Yes, it will be worthwhile"?

I don`t know the answer (but I suspect I do!) Phil B