Allied artillery at Gallipoli

[RobL]

I'm currently looking at researching the use and experiences of Allied artillery units at Gallipoli, so including British, Indian, French and ANZAC units, with a view to writing a book on the subject - so far i've made a listing of sources at the IWM and AWM, and will soon move onto War Diaries held at the National Archives and contact the Royal Artillery Museum to see what they hold, so will have most of the main sources covered - however I would be interested if anyone is aware of either published works which may be of use (apart from the '29th Divisional Artillery War Record' and 'New Zealand Artillery in the field') that specifically deals with artillery, so would be very grateful for any other tips. Also any other potential research locations - French artillery may be a difficulty to research but would really like to include them if possible despite the language barrier.

I'm a strong believer in the power of artillery in a battle, especially with regards to WW1 land battles, especially being the great-grandson of a Gallipoli Gunner, so would like to do some justice to this side of the campaign

All the best, Rob

[ianjonesncl]

Indian Mountain Artillery 1914-1918

http://archive.org/details/IndianMountainArtillery

The book includes some interesting narratives on the Indian Mountain Gunners.

Gallipoli

The 1^st (Kohat) Mountain Battery and 6^th(Jacobs) Battery landed on the Gallipolli Peninsular 25^th April1915. The last Artillery unit to withdraw from Gallipoli was the 6^th (Jacobs) Battery.

Boiling shrapnel shells to improve their effectiveness,cutting cartridges in two to produce half charges due to the short ranges, and improvising range tables.

Expended 21,383 rounds, sustained casualties of 33 killed and 263 wounded. Mules, 62 killed and 212 wounded.

Battle Honors

The 1st (Kohat) Mountain Battery(F.F.) and 6th (Jacob's)…

"Anzac"- "Landing at Anzac"- "Defense of Anzac"- "Suvla"- "SariBatr"- "Gallipoli 1915"- "Suez C anal"- "Egypt,1915-1916".

[gilly100]

Hi Rob

Good luck with the work. I have some stuff coming on naval and artillery ops for August 1915 from AWM (AWM25 75/5). I will PM you in due course. I am hoping to give some reasonable coverage of artillery for the Hill 60 fighting. 69 Brigade RFA is proving elusive at present.

Cheers

Ian

[Guest]

Rob at risk of stating the obvious, you will need to trawl the Div War Diaries of the relevant Divs at Gallipoli. To date, the only digitised parts of the Gallipoli War Diaries were the Infantry Brigades and battalions. Divisional troops' war diaries have to be studied at The National Archives and most have separate folders with the CRA diaries and battery diaries, although the latter are flimsy.

There is also a decent account by Rettie, (one of the CRAs from memory Edit: not the CRA but a Battery commander) on the Suvla based artillery. I will try and dig up the reference...I think the 11th Div from memory.

Doubtless you will be able to source most of the published books. One that I recently acquired is "With the Cumberland Artillery in the Great War - Papers of Lt Col D I Mason DSO TD of Workington" edited by Thomas Thompson, published by Cumbria's Military Museum, Queen Mary's Tower, the Castle, Carlisle CA1 2HQ in 2009 (although complied in Sep 2007). It is A4 spiral bound and from the quality of the print etc looks privately published. I mention it as I had never seen the title before and it was a chance sighting in a book dealer's catalogue. About a third of the 100 pages are devoted to mobilisation to the end of Gallipoli. Some gritty detail.

Any mistakes are mine. Edited.

MG

[michaeldr]

Rob,

You could also have a look at Appendix I -

STATEMENT ON ARTILLERY BY BRIGADIER GENERAL SIR HUGH SIMPSON BAIKIE, EX-COMMANDER OF THE BRITISH ARTILLERY AT CAPE HELLES which appears in Vol.II of Ian Hamilton's diary; see http://www.gutenberg...-h.htm#Page_279

good luck

Michael

edit: I'd forgotten about the rest; skimming on, I think that you'll find all the remainder of interest too

Edited 10 June , 2013 by michaeldr

[alantwo]

Rob

Martin is quite right that Lieutenant Colonel W J K Rettie's account, which not digitised, is part of the 11th (Northern) Division papers at the NA. He was the commanding Officer of 59th Brigade RFA. It covers the initial landings until 29th September. There are also several hand written pages of his correspondence with Aspinall-Oglander. I have photographed the account and the later correspondence, if you would like a copy, please pm me. I cannot claim the credit for finding it, Martin was good enough to point me in the right direct some time ago.

Kind regards

Alan

[Guest]

There is also a detailed breakdown of Gallipoli gunnery in a volume on the RFA in other theatres. I can't recall the exact title but I have photographs of the relevant pages should you need them. I recall michaeldr pointing me in that direction, so he may recall the title.

CRA 11th Div was Brig Gen E J Granet who met Col Aspinall (author of The OH on Gallipoli) and Col Hankey (Sec of the Committee of Imperial Defence who was visiting from London and reported directly back to the committee and the PM) on the beaches of Suvla and was quite vocal.."Nothing is being done... and it looks as though nothing is going to be done". It would be interesting to track down his papers and and statements made to the Dardanelles Commission as he was co-located with Gen Hammersley whose arguments for not advancing included the lack of Artillery. I suspect the CRA had a few thoughts on that issue on the 7th and 8th August 1915.

Hankey's rather honest views are provided in his "The Supreme Command 1914-1918" and his letter to the PM on the situation at Suvla is given in full in the OH Vol II page 277 as an extensive footnote.

Some of Rettie' comments from his diary are on page 275 of the OH vol II. The full version is, as Alan says, in the 11th Div papers at The National Archives.

MG

P.S. there is a thread on the RFA at Suvla in a dark corner of the GWF. I recall there were small differences in the records of the OH and the records of the RFA.

[alantwo]

Rob

I believe the book Martin may be referring to is the 'History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, The Forgotten Fronts and the Home Base, 1914-18' by General Sir Martin Farndale, KCB. On page 55 Farndale indicates that at the beginning of November there were a total of 94 guns at Suvla, 105 at Anzac and 124 at Helles. I also believe it was Michaeldr who helped me find it.

At the front of the 11th (Northern) Division CRA War Diary is an interesting short letter from Lieutenant Colonel Rettie to Aspinall-Oglander dated 18th March 1931 within which he states:

'Thanks for the chapter XXX which I return. As you sent it to me to peruse and criticise I feel I ought to do something but I really have nothing to say. I think it is a clear concise and vivid account of this doleful day.

You say de Lisle had 55 guns for the show, I suppose that is right. In my diary I find only 58th and 59th Brigades of field guns took part; that would be 32 guns. Perhaps you are counting the Anzac guns.

I don't wonder at Marshall's remark about the bombardment, it was a feeble affair but as far as I can remember each field gun had to cover over 100 yards of front! No special places were told off to us to shoot at only a bit of front.'

Rettie does go on to offer minor corrections but clearly the lack of artillery was something that clearly still irritated him years after the event.

One area you might place some emphasis in your research is the withdrawal of the guns and when the order was given. The decision to abandon the campaign was determined on 7th December 1915 and the order given on 13th December, but it appears that the guns were being withdrawn not long after Kitchener visited the area in mid-November. The 11th Division CRA, which became Right Flank Artillery 9th Corps, War Diary states on 26th November:

'A quiet day except that LALA BABA was heavily shelled twice today by a field gun and a 6" Howitzer. Last night all spare kit, tools, waggons and carts were sent to WEST BEACH for evacuation. One section 10thHeavy Battery *[Handwriting not clear] to be evacuated tonight. Weather cold, bright early turning to gale from S.W. with rain and sleet.'

The entry for 30th November for the same diary reads:

'One section of the 10th Heavy Battery was sent to A Reserve Area to be evacuated also 'C' Battery 55th FAB. The 4th Lowland (How) Battery was brought from CHOCOLATE HILL to LALA BABA. Six hundred rounds were also brought in from 'D' Battery 53rd FAB.'

There is a further reference to the last of the 10th Heavy Battery being moved to the reserve area on 5th December.

The 59th Brigade War Diary for 9th December 18.30 reads:

'D/59 left LALA BABA with four guns, 1 water cart and a cook's cart, left behind 10 Other Ranks: 4 Officers and 77 Other ranks evacuated.'

There is a slight conflict of dates between war diaries, but on either 12th or 13th December one section of 'C'/59 was withdrawn with 1 ammunition wagon and 124 rounds of ammunition and on the same day 1 section 'B'/55 withdrew to the reserve area for evacuation.

Clearly some guns would be withdrawn if they were damaged or put of action, and guns would also be moved for strategic reasons, but the formal withdrawal of the guns from the campaign and when it was decided upon is something that has interested me for some time; hopefully your research will shed some further light on events.

I offer apologises in advance of any misinterpretation of War Diary handwriting.

Kind regards

Alan

Reason for edit: Post editor driving me mad

Edited 11 June , 2013 by alan two

[Guest]

There is also a reference somewhere to some of the guns used at Gallipoli being rather old and the recoil mechanisms breaking. I will try and dig the reference up.

One other point I have often wondered about relates to the comments on the lack of artillery. All sources agree on the lack of artillery and there is clear evidence from the records that some divisions turned up with hardly any artillery or no artillery at all. It would be interesting to compare the amount of artillery available to the divisions at, say, Loos with the amount of artillery available to the Divisions at Gallipoli, particularly after trench warfare had set in after 21st Aug 1915.

MG.

P.S. the gun pits at Lala Baba are still visible and there are a series of very large gun pits walking distance from the Helles memorial. Additionally there are a few artillery maps in various collections. I recall some are at TNA.

[michaeldr]

Not exactly the comparison that Martin wanted, but nevertheless illuminating

From Farndale p.27

“There were not enough guns and there was nothing like enough ammunition...

On 6^th, 7^th and 8^th May, Sir Ian Hamilton had attacked with 20,000 men on a three mile front. 18,500 rounds were fired from all guns, British and French and the ships, much of it was shrapnel which had little destructive impact on defences. Thus for 6,000 rounds per day he advanced 600 yards at the cost of 6,500 casualties. He never closed with the enemy's main positions which were not yet completely wired; he was held up by isolated, unlocated but well coordinated machine guns concealed in natural cover. On the following day, at Aubers Ridge in France, Sir Douglas Haig attacked with 30,000 men (with 25,000 more in reserve) on a two mile front. 500 guns fired 80,000 rounds to support him in one day. This too failed, but had half that force been available to Sir Ian Hamilton they might well have enabled him to drive the Turks from the peninsula ...”

[RobL]

Martin, are they the French gun pits still containing the artillery pieces? If not, very interested.

Think I may have visited the Lala Baba gun pits, two of them at the top of the hill? I did find a photo showing them in 1915, think containing 4.5 inch howitzers

[Guest]

Martin, are they the French gun pits still containing the artillery pieces? If not, very interested.

Think I may have visited the Lala Baba gun pits, two of them at the top of the hill? I did find a photo showing them in 1915, think containing 4.5 inch howitzers

The don't contain any artillery pieces, but there is a separate circular pit with a very large dismounted gun a few hundred yards away from Helles Memorial. This pit is about 200-300 yards from the four gun pits. They are very distinctive, about half the size of a tennis court - rectangular and about 10 feet deep from memory...obviously partly eroded but still very distinctive. I walked them with Eric Goosens on my last trip and they (from memory) are about 300-400 hundred yards apart forming the points of a fairly large rhomboid. I assumed they were gun pits for larger guns - howitzers?. They would have been in the British sector, indeed all was the British sector after the French had withdrawn after Sep 1915.

Grid refs for Google Earth are:

1. 40° 3'24.36"N 26°10'45.52"E

2. 40° 3'9.99"N 26°10'56.09"E

3. 40° 3'3.59"N 26°10'48.24"E ...this is the nearest to the Helles Memorial and 580m as the crow flies NNE on a bearing of 8 degrees

4. 40° 3'14.44"N 26°10'38.90"E

[Guest]

Not exactly the comparison that Martin wanted, but nevertheless illuminating

From Farndale p.27

“There were not enough guns and there was nothing like enough ammunition...

On 6^th, 7^th and 8^th May, Sir Ian Hamilton had attacked with 20,000 men on a three mile front. 18,500 rounds were fired from all guns, British and French and the ships, much of it was shrapnel which had little destructive impact on defences. Thus for 6,000 rounds per day he advanced 600 yards at the cost of 6,500 casualties. He never closed with the enemy's main positions which were not yet completely wired; he was held up by isolated, unlocated but well coordinated machine guns concealed in natural cover. On the following day, at Aubers Ridge in France, Sir Douglas Haig attacked with 30,000 men (with 25,000 more in reserve) on a two mile front. 500 guns fired 80,000 rounds to support him in one day. This too failed, but had half that force been available to Sir Ian Hamilton they might well have enabled him to drive the Turks from the peninsula ...”

Thanks Michael.

"... there was justification to Hamilton's complaint: at the cost of a tenth of the lives and the ammunition that were wasted in the Battle of Loos and Champagne, the Dardanelles could have been won. At least an advance of several miles would have been effected as it was in the West; that achievement entirely valueless in France, would have secured in Gallipoli the main objective of the campaign." from The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918 Vol II The Story of ANZAC" by C E W Bean

[Bryn]

Rob, not allied, but thought you might be interested. There are three Turkish gun pits together out near Anafarata village. Here's one of them.

[alantwo]

Has anyone any photographs of the remains of the gun pits on the Western slopes of either Lala Baba or Chocolate Hill that they could post? Many thanks.

Kind regards

Alan

[Captain Dave]

With regards to the NZEF Adrtillery, I don't think there is any other specific reference except for the one you already have.

[michaeldr]

The view of Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell KCB, from his The Dardanelles – see p.188

The Expeditionary Force's weakness in artillery.—It may not be out of place to refer here to what undoubtedly was one of the contributory causes to bringing about the failure of the Dardanelles venture. Sir I. Hamilton's army was very badly off for artillery not so much perhaps in regard to actual number of guns placed in the field, taking the peculiar conditions of the campaign into consideration, as in regard to the nature of the ordnance employed and in regard to the volume of ammunition placed at the disposal of the batteries. There were obvious administrative objections to the getting together of a great assemblage of guns in arenas of operations such as Helles and Anzac. The demands involved on ship-tonnage, the problem of horses and of their forage and their water on shore, the lack of sites for batteries within the Anzac position, the landing difficulties in respect to disembarking heavy ordnance, all these considerations dictated a reduction of pieces to a minimum. But, on the other hand, that being the case, it became all the more imperative, if there was a limit on the number of guns and howitzers, to ensure that the right types were allotted and that those employed should have ample stores of ammunition at their disposal.

The insufficiency of field howitzers was undoubtedly a serious impediment to success. Tactical operations in the Sari Bair hill mass demanded the comprehensive searching of gullies and the sweeping of steep, reverse slopes with shell, and neither field guns nor the armament of warships was adapted for work of that kind. The Turks, moreover, had evolved deeply sunken trench systems alike at Helles and at Anzac, and to make defences of that character untenable howitzers of some sort were almost indispensable. Owing to the nature of the terrain and to transport difficulties, field howitzers were the class of ordnance especially desirable ; but a very few medium howitzers would also have been a great boon to the invading army. A few, old pattern, 6-inch guns provided by the French and mounted on the right flank of the Helles area proved very useful for counter-battering work across the Straits, and the few 60-pounders landed did good service of the same kind ; but searching fire was lacking.*

In so far as field guns were concerned, the army was reasonably well fitted out with this form of artillery from June onwards, even in spite of the Territorial divisions in some cases having none ; but the ammunition allowance was inadequate throughout. It had been almost inevitable that the Allies should be short of guns in the early days, even had large numbers been detailed to form part of the Expeditionary Force, and in the fights of April and of May a want of guns was much felt. But that would always be likely to occur in the case of a maritime descent upon an enemy's shores. It is at the start that landing difficulties are most troublesome, and in April and May several batteries were kept in Egypt waiting for ship-transport and for the development of jetties, and so forth, at the beaches. But such obstacles had been pretty well overcome before the August operations were initiated, and there would then have been no difficulty in disembarking and in distributing an abundance of ammunition. At the end of July there were 124 guns at Helles and about 70 guns at Anzac, these latter in many cases emplaced in very inconvenient position owing to lack of space and of suitable localities.

As regards trench mortars it should be remembered that weapons of this kind were still in their infancy in the first half of 1915. The improved types of this form of armament that made their appearance in later stages of the European War would have been in- valuable in the Gallipoli Peninsula. The opposing trenches were very adjacent to each other, and, in view of topographical conditions, mobility and lightness were almost a sine qua non in the case of any war material that was to be employed in such a theatre of war.

*A brigade of field howitzers was sent out from the United Kingdom at the last moment under special arrangements late in July, proceeding to Marseilles by rail and being shipped on from thence: but it arrived too late for the critical opening days of the August offensive.

end of quote

[bill24chev]

I have just had a look at the history of the TF Artillery from Bolton.

18 battery landed in July with 19 & 20 Batteries landing at a different location in September.

It seems that when it was decided to withdraw, the TF brigades, with the 15pounder guns, covered the withdrawal, with 18pounder brigades taking their guns with them.

The 15pounders were eventually rendered useless and thrown into the sea. Incidentally the descendent of 3/1 East Lancashire Brigade RFA (53Fd. Regt. RA) also had to abandon their guns at Dunkirk in 1940. I have always wondered if these were the (refurbished) 18 pounders that they finished WW1 with

[Guest]

I spent today at the National Archives.....11th Div Admin box of War Diaries contains much detail in the CRA's War Diary as does the 58th and 59th Bde RFA War Diaries. I photographed most of the CRA and 58 Bde (which formed the Right Flank at Suvla) for Aug and Sep 1915 if anyone is interested in any detail. These diaries have not been digitised and don't look as if they are likely to be soon, given they are still available.

MG

[Waddell]

Rob,

If you are looking for personal accounts I have been reading a book called 'With The Big Guns- An Australian Artilleryman in the Great War' by Lynette Oates (ISBN 1-87643911-4). It is a collection of letters, diary entries, newspaper articles and photos of Lieutenant Ernest Randal Holmes who served with the 1st Field Artillery Brigade. He was sent with the guns down to Cape Helles shortly after the landings and remained on the Peninsular throughout the campaign. He was pretty honest in his letters.

It may be of interest to your project.

Scott

[gilly100]

HI All

I have been reading 'Naval and Artillery support for Operations August 1915' from AWM25 75/5. With regard to operations on 6 August at Anzac we have batteries of the 69th Brigade RFA very active, as well as these two -

4th Battery Lowland (How) Brigade

5th Battery Lowland (How) Brigade

Can anyone add from where did these two battery's come from as in brigade and division.

Thanks

Ian

[rflory]

From the Journal of the Royal Artillery:

1. Cunliffe Owen, Brig. Gen. CB, CMG, "Artillery at Anzac in the Gallipoli Campaign April to December 1915, Journal of the Royal Artillery, Vol. 46, p. 535-554.

2. "Gallipoli Strategy", Journal of the Royal Artillery, Vol. 47, p. 534-543.

[gilly100]

I may have answered my own question, they being the 1/4th and 1/5 City of Glasgow Battery's of the 1/4th Lowland (Howitzer) Brigade RFA - 52nd Lowland Division TF. That was news to me! If you are interested in some of the AWM paperwork Rob, just sing out and I will try to get it scanned and sent, or PM and I can outline what I have with me.

Cheers

Ian

[michaeldr]

Ian,

Farndale's OoB shows them to have been part of the 52^nd (Lowland) Div

and he has the note that “Both 4^th and 5^th Batteries were armed with 4 X 5-inch howitzers. The Brigade less 5^th Battery landed at Helles on 21^st June and the 5^th Battery landed at Anzac on 24^th June.”

Regarding ANZAC, in his text (see p.39) Farndale has “On 27^th July, 4^th (Lowland) Howitzer Battery arrived from 52^nd Division. It had 6 X 5-inch howitzers” At first sight this latter point seems to contradict his OoB Note and therefore it needs to be clarified.*

regards

Michael

* See the next post, No.25, by Alan

The total vehicles going with the Battery being 4 guns and limbers, 4 wagons and limbers and 1 water cart.

Edited 26 October , 2013 by michaeldr

[alantwo]

The landing of the Battery seems to have taken a while.

From the 1/4 Lowland Brigade RFA, 4th City of Glasgow War Diary

Cape Helles

27/7/15 10.30 am

The Battery received orders to embark from 'W' Beach at 9pm for ANZAC. At dusk the unit was moved to 'W' Beach and started embarking aboard the SS 'Black Prince' at 9pm. The four first line wagons and 735 rounds lyddite shells complete were handed over to O.C. East Lancashire Bde and the 3 *.S. wagons with the 14th Siege Battery Amm Col. The total vehicles going with the Battery being 4 guns and limbers, 4 wagons and limbers and 1 water cart. [My note * above looks like 'G' but could be 'S']

28/7/15

Arrived Anzac cove at 2am and proceeded to disembark until 3.30am when the steamer was ordered to move away. Only a portion of the vehicles and stores having been landed these were moved to a sheltered position in a gully 1 mile S.E. of landing stage. where the Battery took up Quarters until all vehicles and stores could be landed.

11pm

SS Black Prince returned with another Battery on board and as the guns and limbers of same had to be landed first; 3.30am, when the steamer again moved away. Under cover of darkness our guns and limbers were run up by hand to the position selected by the Battery, gun emplacements having been prepared previously.

29/7/15 6am

The night work was finished by 6am and all ranks had an easy. until the afternoon, when fatigues had again to be carried on.

10pm

SS Black Prince arrived back and the remainder of the Battery Equipment and stores were landed and removed to the Gully before daylight. During the day the O.C. unit reconnoitred the Enemy's position and at 5pm 'Johnson's Jolly' and Mule Valley were registered 9rds, being fired.

Kind regards

Alan