Is only 1 view of the War now permissible?

[hazelclark]

Hi Simon,

I think that Ian has nicely answered your post. I guess the term "learning curve" means different things to different people.

Incidentally, for my sins, I think I own all of Peter's books, but could not remember who did or said what, in which, if you asked me!

Hazel

[salesie]

It seems to me that it is self-evident that learning curves mean learning from experience. No matter how many S curves (or U Bends) are employed, in the real world learning from experience is an instinctive human trait (for many but, alas, not all). Pete's absolutely right in saying that in WW1 both sides were learning. In a highly adversarial conflict the "learning curve" will apply to both sides and, thus, stalemate will ensue. And the inevitable stalemate will last until the ability to maintain it, by one side or the other, diminishes enough for that side to fail.

So far in this thread , as is usual on the forum, there is a massive focus on purely military matters - but military matters are but one consideration in total war. A narrow focus on military matters gives a narrow view - here's my take on learning curves in WW1, and, for Hedley, a summary of the German economy 1914-18:

Does anyone believe that strategic forces and military operations/tactics can operate in isolation from each other in total-war? If so, they make precisely the same mistake the German High Command did! I do not call the German High Command stupid, but I do believe them to have been geo-political naivetes who grossly misjudged the true strategic situation confronting them, and in doing so failed to recognise how the strategic realities actually impacted negatively on their own strategic, operational and tactical decisions. Do not ignore, as did the German High Command, the strategic context in which WW1 was fought - not if you want to understand the true place of military operations/tactics in total-war i.e. military considerations are but one part, a vital one but just one part nonetheless, of a winning team.

Here are a few of my own thoughts about the strategic realities of WW1 and how they impacted greatly on the military operations:

The Hindenburg Program came into existence in 1916 because it was clear that Falkenhayn's, part military part civilian, Home-Front policies were failing by 1916. Given, with hindsight, that neither Falkenhayn's nor Hindenburg's (de-facto Ludendorff's) socio-economic programs were up to the job of delivering the required industrial production and food requirements to win a total-war, it seems sensible to me to look beyond Germany itself - after all, powerful strategic forces were in play and affecting Germany from outside, so to focus on what Hindenburg (Ludendorff) did in isolation is to ignore the true nature of the situation, what the allies did also plays a vital role in this matter.

The year 1916 was the year that deeper forces began to break-through, these deeper forces being the strategic realities of total-war i.e. military matters in the field being but one consideration; industrial production, food, social cohesion, economic clout and efficiency, access to raw materials, and political stability being other highly significant factors needed to win total-war.

For all its rhetoric prior to 1914, Germany entered the First World War not wholly prepared to put its enormous industrial potential behind the war effort - the result of her military planners' short war fantasies. As an importer of food, industrial raw materials and labour in 1914, the German economy was peculiarly dependent upon international markets, and could ill afford a long war. When the Schlieffen Plan went awry in September 1914, the German war economy was left in a parlous situation strategically, and by 1916, under Falkenhayn, the shortages of raw materials and labour had become acute. Consequently, any policies carried out by the Chief of Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, and the War Ministry were sure to come under intense criticism. This criticism, of course, came from those convinced they could do better; a strange coalition of businessmen, certain they could produce more and better weapons, and members of the German High command. And in August 1916, this coalition had its way, Falkenhayn was removed and a "new order" came in with Hindenburg as its figurehead - in effect, the socio-economic management of Germany went from partial militarisation under Falkenhayn to total militarisation under Hindenburg (de facto Ludendorff), with a few businessmen reaping great rewards from the "new order's" policy of printing "new money" to pay for the war effort (this printing of money almost certainly being the root cause of German post-war hyper-inflation).

This "new order's" policies initially led to greater, but strategically insignificant, war production, and soon ran into trouble just as Falkenhayn's management had. I won't go into any socio-economic detail because that would focus too much on Germany itself, and the main problem for both these differing policies lay outside of Germany, and thus for all practical intents and purposes were beyond German control.

From day one, the allies placed a stranglehold on Germany. The Royal Navy, the most powerfully strategic weapon in the world at the time, blockaded Germany cutting it off from the vitally strategic supplies necessary to fight total-war. And, just as important from a strategic point of view, the Royal Navy was powerful enough to ultimately ward off German attempts with its U-boats to blockade Britain whilst maintaining its virtually impenetrable blockade of Germany. Denied almost total access to the raw material, food and labour imports it relied upon pre-war, Germany was at a serious strategic disadvantage from the outset of war. Whereas, the Royal Navy's domination of the sea-lanes gave Britain ready access to its Empire and foreign markets, thus allowing Britain, particularly after waking up in mid 1915 to what was actually needed to fight total-war, to greatly step-up its own efforts in order to out-perform Germany in all aspects of total-war.

In my opinion, the Hindenburg program was doomed to failure from its outset just as Falkenhayn's policies were i.e. the deeper strategic forces in-play made failure inevitable. Indeed, Wilhelm Groener, the General appointed by Germany's "new-order" in 1916 to head the Hindenburg Program (also Ludendorff's successor in 1918), and sacked as a scapegoat in 1917 when the program was clearly failing, said after the war that the German General Staff never truly understood the strategic and political realities of the war, never really took the consequences of failing to achieve their strategic objectives in battle seriously. In other words, Germany went to war in 1914 grossly overestimating its own prowess whilst seriously underestimating the capabilities of the allies - and it continued under this delusion for four whole years. But the saddest part of all this is that sections of the German military, though the de facto rulers of Germany, had the audacity to claim it had been let down by civilians at home, whilst conveniently failing to mention the true reasons for the Kaiserreich's demise i.e. the allies, Britain in particular, played a strategically astute game - and this lack of reality in the stab-in-the-back scenario led to Germany making exactly the same mistakes some twenty-odd years later.

Consequently, it seems to me that if the Hindenburg Program had not been initiated in 1916 then an argument could be made to say that the German Home Front may have stayed intact a little longer - but, in my opinion, this would be an extremely shallow argument simply because it ignores the fact that control of its war-time economy was virtually taken out of Germany's own control by allied actions.

A prime example of Allied strategic control is the German decision to adopt a defensive posture on the Western Front. I think what is often overlooked is that by 1916 the manpower/war-materials shortage in Germany had become acute, and with the removal of Falkenhayn and the rise to power of Hindenburg (de facto Ludendorff) and the implementation of the "Hindenburg plan" to solve the strategic problems caused by the naval blockade, then the strategic consequences of a lack of such resources had a major effect on German military thinking, and consequently this filtered right down to the operational/tactical levels. In other words, until the manpower/materials shortage was addressed then prudence was the order of the day i.e. shorten and strengthen the line by withdrawing to the Hindenburg line, thus releasing troops for the Home Front (to help ease the industrial manpower shortage) as well as for the East where there were better prospects for victory, and, deal with the Entente in the west when stronger.

It wasn't just German men being transported from the front, there were also many men forced to leave the occupied territories to work in German industry and agriculture - Belgians etc. taken against their will and "exported" to Germany as forced labour (a pre-cursor for the next war). And this attempt by the Hindenburg Program to solve the labour crisis created transport bottlenecks which the Falkenhayn regime had managed to avoid, but Falkenhayn never tried to import "labour" to solve the acute shortages of industrial manpower, if he had then the same problems would have undoubtedly occurred.

In a way, the importation of labour into Germany i.e. soldiers returned from the front as well as forced labour from the occupied territories, had a certain logic to it: 1) Shorten the line by retiring to the Hindenburg line and go on the defensive in the west to release some troops for home service (as well as for the east). 2) Germany was a net importer of labour pre-war, and the acute labour crisis was caused by the allied blockade so why not "import" again, by force, from the external countries Germany did have access to? 3) Forced labour will alleviate many of the problems coming from internal German labour markets created by the Hindenburg Program's own policies (i.e. strikes etc.). (The forced labour move, could explain why the failed German peace feelers put out in late 1916 contained an insistence that Germany retain, by annexation, the captured territories of Belgian and northern France?)

But this "logic" was deeply flawed: The real problem for both Hindenburg's and Falkenhayn's regimes was the acute labour shortage plus the raw materials famine; in other words, the effects of the blockade were two-fold, and both were inseparably linked, making the problem akin to having two diseases where the medicine to cure one disease made the other much worse i.e. transporting huge numbers of men to cure the labour crisis entailed using raw materials that industry could ill afford to lose, and the initial increase in war-material production going out was actually counter productive to the extra labour coming in, and visa-versa.

Germany was in strategic check, and the only way out was to break the blockade - and this strategic necessity applied to both Hindenburg's and Falkenhayn's policies; without breaking the blockade neither approach could possibly work, without breaking the blockade Germany was not in control of its own war economy at the strategic level, and thus any tactical/operational attempts to remedy the situation were mere window dressing.

All of which makes Wilhelm Groener's words, about the German High Command's failure to recognise the strategic and political realities, all the more insightful i.e. Britain had used, to great success, the blockade strategy in the Napoleonic wars - was Germany so convinced in the omnipotence of its army in 1914-18 that it ignored such a vital strategic lesson of history, ignored an almost identical strategic move by Britain which actually made it possible for Prussia, an ally of Britain at the time, to free itself from Napoleon's grip? It seems that the quick-war fantasy, coupled with a grossly inflated belief in its own military prowess, was so ingrained within the German psyche that even when its army failed to win a quick war in 1914, it still ignored an important historical lesson stemming from Prussia's own rise to power.

In reality, the Hindenburg plan created more problems than it solved, which accentuated Germany's strategic problems despite the collapse of Russia; Germany could not escape the strategic "check-mate" situation becoming apparent in, and maturing from, 1916. The need for prudence versus the necessity to attack meant that, whichever way it went, Germany would be in strategic "check" i.e. not enough resources for the do-or-die spring offensives of 1918 to succeed, but no time left to wait; use up resources and lose, wait it out and lose.

The German strategy of defence in the West and aggression in the East was a blunder - but any other military strategy would have been equally flawed. The strategic necessity for Germany was to break the blockade - even the idea of unrestricted submarine warfare was flawed, not enough naval resources to totally blockade Britain and, at the same time, to break the Royal Navy's blockade on itself. Without breaking the blockade, strategic check-mate was inevitable. And, bear in mind, Britain's blockade strategy was not new; it had been used successfully in the defeat of Napoleon when Prussia was an ally of Britain - it seems it was a historical strategic lesson that the Prussian military planners did not learn.

The German high command did not learn a vital strategic lesson from the Napoleonic wars nor from the Franco Prussian War of 1870-71 it seems. Because it was this war that impelled a certain Ivan Bloch to study warfare, and its technological advances, before publishing his work, in 1898, entitled Is War Now Impossible? His work was eerily accurate in predicting how the next Great War would be fought, and Bloch embarked on a tour lecturing to those who would listen to him, including many staff officers in many countries. Here's a review of his work by Dr Michael Occleshaw (British Historian):

"Completed sixteen years before the Great War, Bloch, a Jewish banker from Warsaw, approached his task with an open mind unfettered by theory or by past and inapplicable experiences (he was completely non-military). It took years of solid, painstaking devotion to write and was based entirely upon independent research, receiving neither encouragement nor financial support from any official quarter. Of this monumental labour, only the sixth volume was ever translated into English.

Neither the full version nor the single-volume translation ever seems to have gained any currency amongst the British military hierarchy, although in Russia the Tsar went so far as to make it recommended (but not required) reading for his Staff officers. What the General Staffs would have found was hardly calculated to inspire acceptance, for Bloch's hypothesis was that the war of the future would not be a replay of the Napoleonic Wars or even of 1870-1, to be decided in a matter of hours or days in a single clash on some obscure field of which no one had ever heard. On the contrary, Bloch argued, the array of fearsome modern weapons and the nature of modern society made such an outcome wishful thinking, since the armies would be unable to press their attacks to a conclusion. Instead he foresaw, with an icy logic based on an intensive study of contemporary weaponry, industry and society, a prolonged and devastating struggle which would drag on through ponderous and pitiless years, years in which no ravishingly clever stratagem, or splendidly timed and executed manoeuvre, could ever yield the victory so earnestly sought. The next Great War, he predicted, would not be decided through the struggles of the fighting man, but its resolution would lie in the grim and indifferent hands of famine and social upheaval.

In Bloch's dire vision the soldiers in the line would be more preoccupied with survival than with victory, driven to seek shelter in the belly of the cold earth from the storm of metal which would fill the air and accordingly, 'Everybody will be entrenched in the next war. It will be a war of entrenchments. The spade will be as indispensable to a soldier as his rifle,' with the unlooked-for consequence that the act of fighting would have little in common with the traditional, straightforward contest over open ground in which the soldiers would measure their skill, their physical and moral superiority against each other in the time-honoured way.

It appears extraordinary in its foresight. None of the General Staffs, for all their professional expertise and close concentration on the technical aspects of their profession, could discern the character of the coming cataclysm, with the exception of a few seers like Kitchener and Haig, crying in the wilderness.

Wars between great powers are only won quickly when there is a significant disparity between the opposing powers in society, weaponry, technique or, more rarely, commanding genius. In 1870-1 the decisive disparities lay in the facts that Prussia possessed a mass conscript army, a speedy mobilization and a modern General Staff, and Napoleon III did not. By 1914 everybody had taken urgent steps to ensure that they, too, possessed these attributes, and everybody was on a more or less equal footing."

Please take note of this sentence, "The next great war, he predicted, would not be decided through the struggles of the fighting man, but its resolution would lie in the grim and indifferent hands of famine and social upheaval." It is noteworthy because it was famine and social upheaval in Germany in 1918 which forced it into accepting the Armistice. Also note, the mention of Kitchener and Haig as seers - these two soldiers certainly believed it would not be a quick war, but a long, hard, desperate struggle from the very beginning (sources available if needed).

So, there were lessons to be learnt from previous conflicts but these lessons did not come from military experience but from a non-military mind. My contention is that total-war only comes about when both sides are evenly matched in military power, in economic might, in social-cohesion and, not least, in having an ongoing supply of manpower. Therefore, in a total-war situation, the learning curves in tactics and in the development of new war-fighting inventions and the way these weapons are used is a two-way street - the two sides learn from each other at an equal rate; if you like, similar to Newton's third law i.e. action and re-action are equal and opposite. This military balance will obviously continue until outside factors exert an influence - until the re-action is no longer capable of matching the action, in Bloch's words "its resolution would lie in the grim and indifferent hands of famine and social upheaval."

In my opinion, victory in total-war requires maximum effort from the whole team i.e. in WW1, victory was brought about by a combination of highly aggressive ground forces, the naval blockade and the navy's ability to effectively defeat the U-boat threat, the efforts of British Military Intelligence in their superbly "fought" subversion/propaganda campaign, the wholesale reorganisation of the industrial home-front and the maximum use of the Empire's resources. And, dare I say it, the politicians who, despite the occasional serious internal strife and the delay in realising what was actually needed for victory, kept the whole show on the road, with their diplomatic skills with allies, with their skilful economic balancing act between competing resources, and with their solidity of purpose in pursuing their goal - it was no fluke that the allied "team" out-performed the Germans; effective management of all resources is vital for victory in total-war.

Consequently, I believe that no purely military victory in the field is possible in total-war, no matter what tactics/operational initiatives are employed by any side, that only long-term strategic initiatives bring about victory by destroying one-side or the other's collective will and/or ability to wage war. And that this takes time - that the "military learning curve" in WW1 was not one-sided, that both sides learnt from each other equally and thus forced an inevitable four-year stalemate, which only ended when these other, strategic, forces eventually made their presence felt - that Germany collapsed politically, economically and socially in the summer of 1918 and, as both a cause and an effect, the morale/collective will-to-win of its people and army collapsed along with it.

In the case of WW1, it was almost inevitable that Germany would lose - the German Empire could never hope to match, in a protracted war, the power of the British Empire, with it's overall economic superiority and Britain's greater social-cohesion/political stability forged through centuries of unity not decades, and, of course, its Royal Navy's ability to totally blockade the continent. Germany could never really hope to win, but, of course, Britain could have lost - if it hadn't been willing to make the sacrifices it did.

Cheers-salesie.

[davidfegga]

As I said in an earlier post, my opinions lie somewhere between the donkeys' and the 'curve theorists' I've had a good go at reading some of the latest books , but I can't honestly say that I'm convinced by the argument that the British Army was THE war winning machine in 1918. It was as good as the French and German, but no better. Germany was beaten in the 118 days by a combination of factors (and armies).

I've recently finished reading "Bloody Victory" by William Philpott, but, and this is probably just me! , I 'm not convinced that the Somme was any form of victory. He argues that it contributed greatly to the eventual German defeat two years later, but then again so did the first Belgian resistance in 1914? It's my opinion- and just an opinion- that in the style of the later Red Army, Haig should have been taken out and shot after the disaster that was July 1st . Must be turning into a "Donkeyist" !!

Dave

[Alan Tucker]

I am not sure that Philpott actually means victory in the sense of one side won the other lost. I think he sees it in the context of the fact that the British could take the scale of Somme casualties but when it came to 1918 and German manpower problems they couldn't cope and that began on the Somme.

[phil andrade]

Can three individuals be unique?

Roger

Three in one and One in three ?

Phil (PJA)

[David Filsell]

Whilst the 'curve' was not simply that, more a constantly changing, but mostly upward path, it can quite clearly be measured and its key developments mapped. It is far more recognizable and identifiable fact I would say than theory

[sjustice]

I am not sure that Philpott actually means victory in the sense of one side won the other lost. I think he sees it in the context of the fact that the British could take the scale of Somme casualties but when it came to 1918 and German manpower problems they couldn't cope and that began on the Somme.

...and ended on the Somme and the Lys.

Cheers,

Simon

[phil andrade]

Forgive me if this is an excessively subjective take on the theme we're discussing on this thread. Do you think that the reputation of the Great War is so abysmal that people - and I allude here to the British - have a visceral refusal to see any redeeming feature in it ?

It was tragic; futile; unnecessary and distinguished by slaughter on a stupefying scale. It certainly failed to make the world safe for democracy, let alone to end wars.

I don't like that rendition, and exercise my intellect in refuting it. The Germany of 1914 was culpable for the outbreak of war; the German conduct of warfare was harsh to the point of being atrocious; the aspirations for which the Allies fought were worth the effort and sacrifice...it was, as politicians like to tell us " ....The Right Thing To Do."

But the emotional - in this case - is a powerful opponent of the intellect.

I sometimes wonder whether my endorsement of " Terraine-ism" is really a function of the attempt of intellect to control emotions.

Phil (PJA)

[John_Hartley]

Do you think that the reputation of the Great War is so abysmal that people - and I allude here to the British - have a visceral refusal to see any redeeming feature in it ?

I think you may be right. Popular culture still resonates with the analysis of the past and relates it to the loss of life, etc. However, my partner, who is subject to my indoctrination, that tries to counter popular culture, and who knows more than most members of the public about the facts, will still wander about cemeteries muttering about the "waste of lives" and that it "was all mad".

[Chris_Baker]

Me unique,assuming I'm the correct George?,No!

For the record, the previous posters referring to a unique George were in fact to referring to our friend George Armstrong Custer.

[Chris_Baker]

An amusing thread to say the least. I would like to take us right back to the beginning, and to Dust Jacket Collectors assertion. I asked in post #9 - a mere 177 comments ago - who he/she was talking about and I am not sure the thread has answered it. DJC said

.. the attitude of so-called 'Revisionist' historians towards the expression of any other view of the War other than as a triumph of arms ..

Which historians are being referred to here?

The great majority of War memoirs are routinely dismissed as the ravings of over-sensitive officers & the usual suspects - Carrington, Pollard, Junger, Grenfell, Crozier etc are trotted out ...

I've never seen memoirs dismissed, nor have I seen the above 'trotted out'. Which historians are doing it?

And if I hear another person telling me that as Tommy was only under fire for a few days a month it really wasn't so bad after all, I shall scream.

But who has ever said that?

My opinion (for which I feel no need to produce references) is that the assertion is false. I have not found modern historians doing the things that Dust Jacket Collector suggests. Has anyone else? And if the assertion is false, then the answer to the title question is "No".

[Alan Tucker]

You cannot beat a good caricature off the top of the head! That's the trouble with opinions/wild generalisations - they do not have to be substantiated!

[bill24chev]

I have read that "Tommy" only spent a few days at a time in the trenches but I don't recall it then being said that "he did not have it so bad".

I think that the moral courage required and the psychological effects of returning to the trenches having previously seen the damage that shell, mortar and bullet could do to your mates would have been substantial.

[phil andrade]

To be fair to DJC, I think we do recognise what he's driving at here.

There has bee a kind of pendulum swing in the way the Great War is depicted.

It's important that we countenance the validity of John Terraine's assertions that a kind of pernicious mythology has evolved in regard to the casualties of the Great War. But then we discover that recent assessments have insisted that the casualty rates suffered by British infantry in the Battle for Normandy in 1944 exceeded those sustained in the Battle of the Somme in 1916. This I believe to be false....indeed, in a thread on this forum I hope that I revealed it to be demonstrably false. I'm sure we will agree that it was every bit as dangerous for the infantryman to close with the enemy in 1944 as it had been a generation earlier; but this should not allow for the kind of "spin" that is extant in the sort of claim that I allude to.

There are other aspects of the Great War that we might discuss in this light : I select the casualty figures because I know enough about

them to argue with a degree of confidence.

Phil (PJA)

[Chris_Baker]

Sorry Phil, but I do not recognise whatever DJC is driving at. There is, according to DJC, an assertion that "historians" have an attitude that rejects any notion that the war was anything but a triumph of arms; that they are dismissive of certain memoirs; and that some people are saying it wasn't all so bad after all. I see no evidence that backs up that assertion. Which historians are saying these things?

[stephen peter roche]

Am alone in feeling increasingly annoyed by the attitude of so-called 'Revisionist' historians towards the expression of any other view of the War other than as a triumph of arms. Woe betide any TV or Film producer who dares to show cursing Tommies floundering in the mud of the Somme. They'll be subjected to the most vile outpourings of bile for being out-moded 'Disillusionists'. The War after all was a great British success and any suggestion otherwise tantamount to treason. The great majority of War memoirs are routinely dismissed as the ravings of over-sensitive officers & the usual suspects - Carrington, Pollard, Junger, Grenfell, Crozier etc are trotted out to show that the War was a 'Good Thing'. Meanwhile increasingly desperate efforts are underway to promote many of the War-time Generals to the status of Marlborough & Wellington. We seem to have come full circle - the views being expressed now are much the same as those of the Government immediately following the War. They'd probably prefer it if the first 4 years could be air-brushed out of history. And if I hear another person telling me that as Tommy was only under fire for a few days a month it really wasn't so bad after all, I shall scream. The thought of being in a front-line trench under shell fire for only 1 day a year would have most of us quaking in terror.

I shall now go into a very deep bunker to await the barrage!!

The thinking of these people is bassed on documents released years after and writen by the very genreals/politician's who it seems chose to ignore the lesson's of thing's like the American civel war it may be just muskets balls but remember the type the union had [the mini ball and the gattaling gun], the loses may not have been as bad they where still it seems mounting frontel Bayonet charges into what must have been like machine gun fire and they still say there had not been a war like w,w,1 the warnings where there years before the genreals had learned nothing in Europe or the states .go to your bunker they.ll send in the sappers

[keithmroberts]

Stephen

I thjink you will find that the whole point is that it is NOT about memoirs, but about a careful examination of records, showing both what information was availaqble, what resources could be deployed, and how the developing technology was gradually understood, in a war where two sides were busy changing techniques as well as technology. The documentation being explored now is that from the whole machinery of government as well as the military. The time of the self serving memoirs is gone. Now the records are available, and not just British ones. The one thing that has become clear is that war was never simple.

Sometimes generals started battles where they didn't want them, at a time when they didn't want to launch attacks because of the political imperatives of an alliance, or even the sheer stupidity of politicians, (reference for this - the entire Gallipoli campaign).

None of it is as simple, as your post would suggest. Remember, generals fight wars, politicians start them.

Keith

[Dawley Jockey]

None of it is as simple, as your post would suggest. Remember, generals fight wars, politicians start them.

Keith

I would probably say that Generals plan rather than fight wars in most cases and its the soldiers who fight the war(s) but that could make me look like I was being pedantic.

However I do agree that the people who start wars (politicians etc) are rarely (If ever) the ones who fight it

[phil andrade]

Please put me right if I am off the mark here, but didn't either Carrington or Glubb make a remonstration that refuted the more sensationalist claims about the horrors of the Great War ?

Perhaps a forumite might remember who it was ; IIRC he wrote that those who depicted the experience as nothing but unremitting hell are as unwelcome as those who suggest it was all a big picnic.

Carrington wrote under the pseudonym Edmonds, and was the author of Soldier From the Wars Returning, while Glubb wrote Into Battle.

Both served as subalterns on the Western Front, and, incredibly, survived despite the six weeks of life expectancy that we are told by some was the norm.

Phil (PJA)

[sjustice]

I would probably say that Generals plan rather than fight wars in most cases and its the soldiers who fight the war(s) but that could make me look like I was being pedantic.

<snip>

In normal circumstances it might be considered pedantic to point out that generals are soldiers, but apparently not here.

Cheers,

Simon

[nigelcave]

Memoirs have a weakness because, by definition, they relate to the experiences of an individual; individuals react in ways, again by definition, that are unique. We can choose to draw conclusions from them as we like; alternatively, we can look at other perspectives (ie other memoirs) and we can also look at them against the 'official' record - war diaries, casualties, conditions and so forth. Alexander Johnson's diaries are interesting because he wrote up his diary and made comments but then, when he knew the reasons for an action he was often willing enough to amend his opinion in a later entry.

Generals can certainly plan, but they do so on the understanding that plans rarely survive beyond first contact. Generals also have to deal with means available, which often they do not control - eg the request for more mgs that got turned down on financial grounds (IIRC in 1909). To be fair, that was ultimately a matter, I would imagine, of the army deciding on its priorities within a limited budget and according to the objectives given to it by Parliament. For example, there was no reference at all to the potential role of the army on the continent in the various army estimates etc. pre 1914. The British government's preference with scare resources was to concentrate on the Royal Navy and that was probably justified - but it had consequences.

The casualty rate amongst officers of general rank (or acting general rank) in the campaign mid October to mid November 1914 was very considerable (amongst others, four divisional commanders either killed or temporarily incapacitated, sometimes briefly). The situation was such that it was very difficult for them not to be near or at the sharp end. But it was hardly a desirable situation because generals are there to control and to react and to direct, not to be one amongst a couple of thousand others with a rifle, hopefully in some sort of cover, and consequently in no position to communicate with anyone.

[Dawley Jockey]

In normal circumstances it might be considered pedantic to point out that generals are soldiers, but apparently not here.

Cheers,

Simon

Point accepted Simon, Yes Generals are soldiers.

I was trying to make a point about who actually was doing the fighting

[sjustice]

Point accepted Simon, Yes Generals are soldiers.

I was trying to make a point about who actually was doing the fighting

Phil (PJA) will no doubt be able to explain the casualty statistics and percentages of general officers through the war to you, not just 1914.

In addition to Nigel's worthy explanation of the difference in responsibilities, I'll just mention General Edgar Alan Wood; DSO and three Bars, recommended for the Victoria Cross twice, and Mentioned in Dispatches nine times; Wood was wounded on five occasions, gassed twice and was buried once.

As GOC 55th Brigade, in the thick of the battle for Ronssoy in the Hindenburg Line outposts in September 1918, his orderly was killed but, immediately afterwards, Wood entered a German dugout alone, bringing out seven fully-armed prisoners. Later, again single-handed, he captured a further batch of twenty-two Germans by the simple expedient of pelting them in their dugout with lumps of chalk and old boots. As the divisional history records, in both of these exploits, Wood 'was not only unaccompanied but unarmed, stalking along monumentally, a big cigar between his teeth, the familiar lance used as an alpenstock in his grasp. General Wood’s unconcerned calm in the hottest of the fighting, and the smooth readiness of his decisions, had much to do with the success of the 55th Brigade in the great counter-offensive of 1918' (Info courtesy Prof. Peter Simkins and Dr. John Bourne)

Does that sound like fighting to you?

Cheers,

Simon

[salesie]

And let's not forget that most general officers would have been in the thick of it as subalterns, captains, majors etc. as they climbed their way up the greasy promotion pole. Many in previous conflicts (Smith-Dorrien, for example, was at Ishlandawala), but some in WW1 itself.

Cheers-salesie.

[bill24chev]

Simon

Sounds like a Subaltern's or even Tommy Atkins's job to me, not the business of a General or even a Lt Col.