Is only 1 view of the War now permissible?

[keithmroberts]

Dawley jockey inferred French "castigated SD at the time." Clearly that was not so, at least publicly. We have French's own words for it.

Although Haig was not positioned to remove SD, he manipulated matters, as he subsequently manipulated French's dismissal.

What everybody wrote later has to be seen as reputation salvaging.

Evidence? Regarding the removal of Smith-Dorrien. I would be interested to learn of this new research. You may have read French's comments in 1914, rather different from his initial despatch after Le Cateau. Presumably you do accept the historical evidence that Haig was commander of 1st Army, that Sir William Robertson was Chief of Staff of the BEF at the time, both directly working to French.

You suggest that Haig intrigued for the removal of Smith-Dorrien, I presume you have found some evide3nce to support this

There are certainly many references to Haig's part in the run up to the dismissal of Sir John French at the end of 1915. That evidence been debated and assessed by much better students of the war than I would claim to be, but your suggestion that he was involved in the dismissal of Smith-Dorrien is something that I have never found any suggestion of in my reading so I really would appreciate some references to support this.

Keith

[Old Tom]

While I tend to agree with Keith I have formed the opinion that what might be called the higher direction of the war, certainly in the early part, was far from clear. A FM as S of S, a weak CIGS and generals in contact with the king, or his staff, outside the chain of command and, I suppose, a degree of inter genral competition; it is not surprising that that there were knives in backs all over the place. Haig had told the King that he had his doubts, it may have been stronger, about French as C in C and so on.

Old Tom

[salesie]

Don't know anything about Haig "plotting" against Smith-Dorrien, and suspect it's just heresay (but I'm sure that George will put us straight before too long).

Anyone interested, they can read Smith-Dorrien's memoires (about Mons and Le Cateau) here: http://www.richthofen.com/smith-dorrien/dorrien24a.htm

What I find interesting, is the mention of a telegram to GHQ from Joffre thanking the BEF for, in effect, "saving" the left flank of the French Army with the stand at Le Cateau - a bit different to Joffre's own memoires where he says he spent valuable time at this critical phase of the war doing his utmost to protect the BEF from destruction (perhaps he forgot about the telegram?).

Cheers-salesie.

[PMHart]

Sadly George got bored of arguing with morons who thought their 'feelings' and vaguely remembered 'ideas' equated to cogent arguments and well-documented facts! Carry on up the front!

Pete

P.S. Salesie sending complimentary telegrams is a (very) minor part of the inner workings of any alliance. Perhaps though that is just deep inner feeling that I must be allowed to express without any fear of contradiction by bullying historians...

[salesie]

Steady on, Pete, expressing deep inner feelings can be highly dangerous - only one step away from turning the historical into the hysterical.

Cheers-salesie.

[keithmroberts]

This recent diversion actually takes us back to the original topic. Many events, and political or strategic decisions can have more than one interpretation. Increased access to primary sources, from war diaries to personal and government papers has influenced modern historians to certain viewpoints, which have generally won over most serious students, even if not popular historical attitudes.

We are here amongst other things for debate, but assertion is not debate. Anyone who has followed recent topics on Gallipoli has surely been fascinated and appreciative to see knowledgeable participation from members who are seeking truth, and basing conclusions on evidence that they are willing to have tested, and who have minds that are open to the possibility of further evidence emerging. That is the GWF at its very best.

Most of us have said, or even written something that we later regretted, I certainly have Sometimes it is possible win respect by admitting to error, or even the possibility of error. What is frustrating is to have an original or absolute statement expressed without evidence, and then worst of all, as has happened over the years, for that view to be stoutly defended without any recourse to historical evidence or documentation being offered.

Historians are people too. Books published by former participants in the war sometimes were written to defend actions, or to pass blame to others. I tend to put 1914 for example as fitting both those characterisations. Historians in the 50's and 60's many without that personal axe to grind, didn't have access to much of what is available today. That doesn't invalidate all that they wrote, but it is equally proper to test their work against the evidence that is now available.

That means that the politicians and commanders of the war are now being seen to have tried harder, more professionally,and perhaps generally less recklessly that was though earlier. Its not simple, and it would be hard to believe that any participant didn't make some misjudgements, so I won't be putting anyone on a pedestal. What I will do ir acknowledge the evidence of growing professionalism in British and Empire forces, led generally by the more professional and mature of the commanders.

So, I'm more than ready to consider any argument that can be supported by some evidence. Maybe the academic pendulum has swung too far, if so, there will be plenty of scope for historians to make a name for themselves by proving it. Until then........

Keith

[Alan Tucker]

Having been away I have just caught up with this. The real revisionists are all those from c1930 to c1985 who went over the top with the 'lions led by donkeys' and useless slaughter in a futile war stuff. The modern so-called revisionists are those returning to the general view in the first ten years after the war based on real historical research and not hand me down notions - it was really bad but was a job well done by the end. So unless of a pacifist persuasion those nostalgic for Alan Clark et al have to explain how the war could have been won earlier than 1918, how staying on the defensive on the Western Front to save lives by making no attempt to push the invader back to his own borders would have served any purpose, how it was in Britain's interests to allow the Germans to take France and Belgium. For those of you still stuck in a Oh What a Lovely/ Black Adder groove you need to read Dan Todman's book (The Great War Myth and Memory) which demolishes a lot of myths about futility, up to their necks in mud and bullets, views of veterans, role of the poets etc.

As a history teacher (retired) and historian I have come full circle myself. As a 60s older teenager I imbibed the useless slaughter stuff as there was no alternative - poetry in school, On What a, BBC's Great War, lots of names on my village war memorial etc etc. I was also very opposed to the Vietnam War and this seemed to be another futile war. During a long teaching career I did not explicitly teach the 'lions led by donkeys stuff' but it was probably an underlying assumption when you focused on trench warfare, the Somme for example. This was reinforced by Monocled Mutineer, Black Adder etc. This was to 14 year olds although later on there was some study of women at war and conscientious objection. At 'A' Level there was a study of the causes of the war and setting essays like 'To what extent was Germany responsible for the outbreak of the First World War?' where good students would usually agree but bring in some other contributory factors e.g. role of other countries and general factors like nationalism, pan Slavism etc etc.

But then in 2005 I retired, joined the WFA, read the 'revisionists' of the last 30 years and lots of other important stuff (like Joffrey's War) and can now see that each generation does write its own history but what the current generation is doing is getting its hands dirty in dusty archives and giving us a more balanced view, based on research and not polemic, of what actually did happen. The problem is that we are going to hear a lot of the 'useless slaughterists' in the media for the next five years which will ignore all the work of the 'new historians'. Also after reading 'Sleepwalkers' by Christopher Clark I have also modified my view of the causes and would bring Russia right into the frame on responsibility.

[Stoppage Drill]

Evidence? Regarding the removal of Smith-Dorrien. I would be interested to learn of this new research. You may have read French's comments in 1914, rather different from his initial despatch after Le Cateau. Presumably you do accept the historical evidence that Haig was commander of 1st Army, that Sir William Robertson was Chief of Staff of the BEF at the time, both directly working to French.

You suggest that Haig intrigued for the removal of Smith-Dorrien, I presume you have found some evide3nce to support this

There are certainly many references to Haig's part in the run up to the dismissal of Sir John French at the end of 1915. That evidence been debated and assessed by much better students of the war than I would claim to be, but your suggestion that he was involved in the dismissal of Smith-Dorrien is something that I have never found any suggestion of in my reading so I really would appreciate some references to support this.

Keith

Try "Trial by Fire: Command and the British Expeditionary Force in 1914" by Nikolas Gardner

[keithmroberts]

Perhaps you could elaborate by telling us what Gardner has to say and by referring to his sources. My reading list is sitting downstairs, and it would be months before I get round to looking for him on inter library loan.

Does he have a different set of dates for the removal of sir John French, or the duties of the chief of staff, or has he reported some new evidence that has passed us by? If there is some referenced material that changes historical understanding it would be good to know. The failures and errors of high command are well documented and explored - but Haig's role in having Smith-Dorrien removed remains a novelty to most of us. If you can help us by providing the references to primary sources, they can be examined properly.

Keith

[phil andrade]

Lions led by Donkeys sells : people love it; it's what they want to hear and see. The butchers and blunderers; the shell shocked boys shot for cowardice; the chateau bound generals insisting on moving their drinks cabinet a mile closer to Berlin....all that stuff makes money.

Learning curves and Hundred Days syndrome is too boring.

This has engendered a fervent response from "people like us" who, in their turn, are sometimes guilty of following an orthodox and formulaic appraisal : we can see too much evidence on this forum, when some members feel intimidated by the hostility they experience if they dare to suggest that there was something flawed in the British Generalship on the Western Front.

Phil (PJA)

[IanA]

some members feel intimidated by the hostility they experience if they dare to suggest that there was something flawed in the British Generalship on the Western Front.

Phil (PJA)

I think hostility (aka robust argument) arises not when people 'dare to suggest' anything but when their often nebulous - but firmly held - haverings are unsupported by evidence or reasoning.

[Anthony Pigott]

Perhaps you could elaborate by telling us what Gardner has to say and by referring to his sources. My reading list is sitting downstairs, and it would be months before I get round to looking for him on inter library loan.

Does he have a different set of dates for the removal of sir John French, or the duties of the chief of staff, or has he reported some new evidence that has passed us by? If there is some referenced material that changes historical understanding it would be good to know. The failures and errors of high command are well documented and explored - but Haig's role in having Smith-Dorrien removed remains a novelty to most of us. If you can help us by providing the references to primary sources, they can be examined properly.

Keith

I don't have a copy of Gardener in my possession at the moment (but hopefully will shortly) so I can't give quotes. However, from memory, Gardner is strongly suggestive that Haig 'talked down' Smith-Dorrien at times. In my studies of S.-D., I don't think I've come across any hard evidence of Haig undermining him, but there certainly are instances of Haig criticising units within II Corps / 2nd Army that could be taken as intentional implied criticism of S.-D. This is, of course, a familiar technique that one often comes across today. Given that during The Retreat, neither French nor Haig looked very impressive compared to Smith-Dorrien, Haig may well have anxious to redress the balance. Smith-Dorrien, himself, often praised Haig, especially after the war but then he was always very loyal, for example acting as pallbearer to French.

Incidentally, is there evidence of Haig praising his superiors or peers in any other contexts - some people find it more natural to criticise?

Perhaps this topic is worthy of its own thread. As Keith says, it's an interesting topic not often discussed.

Anthony.

[Simon Birch]

Am alone in feeling increasingly annoyed by the attitude of so-called 'Revisionist' historians towards the expression of any other view of the War other than as a triumph of arms. Woe betide any TV or Film producer who dares to show cursing Tommies floundering in the mud of the Somme. They'll be subjected to the most vile outpourings of bile for being out-moded 'Disillusionists'. The War after all was a great British success and any suggestion otherwise tantamount to treason. The great majority of War memoirs are routinely dismissed as the ravings of over-sensitive officers & the usual suspects - Carrington, Pollard, Junger, Grenfell, Crozier etc are trotted out to show that the War was a 'Good Thing'. Meanwhile increasingly desperate efforts are underway to promote many of the War-time Generals to the status of Marlborough & Wellington. We seem to have come full circle - the views being expressed now are much the same as those of the Government immediately following the War. They'd probably prefer it if the first 4 years could be air-brushed out of history. And if I hear another person telling me that as Tommy was only under fire for a few days a month it really wasn't so bad after all, I shall scream. The thought of being in a front-line trench under shell fire for only 1 day a year would have most of us quaking in terror.

I shall now go into a very deep bunker to await the barrage!!

I went to a talk by Gary Sheffield a while ago. His main point was that the war was worth the cost. When weighing up if something has been worthwhile, you must judge what you have gained by what you have lost. I suspect, in this case, it is simply not possible to do - as it is impossible to weigh the cost. The numbers alone (which are larger then my imagination can understand) to not tell the full story of the terrible suffering involved. I personally think for revisionist read "warping" - but then they have to make a living by saying something.

Simon

[keithmroberts]

Anthony thanks for a helpful post.

My queries refer as you appreciate to the original assertion

"It was Dooglearse who tut the knife in, when he finally had the chance and Wully who brought the news.

" 'Orace, you're for 'ome"

Which still appears to need some serious support for the suggestion regarding the insertion of a knife. I appreciate your measured post, and will be interested to hear more when you have a copy of Gardner to hand, but from your recollection the suggestion is maybe of some critical comments, which would still leave the original comment somewhat in the air. I do have Robertson's memoirs and will see, with all the risks inherent in any memoirs if he has anything to offer.

Keith

[phil andrade]

I think hostility (aka robust argument) arises not when people 'dare to suggest' anything but when their often nebulous - but firmly held - haverings are unsupported by evidence or reasoning.

Yes.

The emotional reacton to the Great War is so intense, the feelings so "visceral", that people find it hard to articulate them, let alone marshall their arguments properly.

There is, I suppose, a form of wilful ignorance in some perceptions : Dirk Bogarde administering the coup de grace to Tom Courtenay in FOR KING AND COUNTRY, and Mel Gibson witnessing the martyrdom of the ANZACS at The Nek in Peter Wier's film is sexy stuff. Monash's rather prosaic description of how to secure battlefield success by adhering to meticulous routines is going to spoil the party.

Phil (PJA)

[geraint]

I went to a talk by Gary Sheffield a while ago. His main point was that the war was worth the cost. When weighing up if something has been worthwhile, you must judge what you have gained by what you have lost. I suspect, in this case, it is simply not possible to do - as it is impossible to weigh the cost. The numbers alone (which are larger then my imagination can understand) to not tell the full story of the terrible suffering involved. I personally think for revisionist read "warping" - but then they have to make a living by saying something.

Simon

Very well put Simon. It crystalises my thoughts as well.The "terrible suffering involved" far far outweighed any justification for winning at all costs and imposing further pain and suffering on a brutalised population.

[keithmroberts]

There can be few who don't think the cost in life and suffering appalling. The problem that I suppose I have with debating that, is whwether the cost would have been any less in defeat. I think our opponents would have a view on that. Once the war had started, there was never going to be an end that did not reflect some form of victory for one alliance or the other.

Rulers and governments were committed - France to defend its territory at a minimum, Britain to honour its treaties and see France and Belgium free of occupation, as well as our traditional opposition to any state gaining European hegemony, and the German state unwilling to compromise. The whole war was a disaster, and a result of governments/rulers adopting irreconcilable positions. Once it had started though, both victors and losers were to pay horrendously. In the culture of the time, those who opposed the war, in Britain or Germany found little support so what can one add to the horror - I suspect it was marginally better to be a victor, but obviously to the relatives of the fallen, and to the war disabled that was no compensation.

Keith

[David Filsell]

Haig was also highly critical of Rawlinson (4th Corps) and Capper (7th Inf Div) at Ypres to French. It doesn't make him wrong, seeking to replace them make him a bad person

[geraint]

Imperial Britain in 1910 was as guilty as any other imperial power of creating war to safeguard its own interests in 1914- defending the British Empire. Britain had no qualms about honouring treaties with anyone if it went against British foreign policy - ie trust no-one and neutralise all foreign powers. Neither Belgium nor France meant anything to Britain. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 created a Belgium as a buffer against post Napoleon France, and a weakish France was to be welcome and kept. Germany was only created in 1870 and was a new European factor - and would be a pivotal focus for Britain.

A war in 1910-14 could have been fought by small professional armies as in the Napoleonic, Crimean, Franco Prussian 1870 and the Russo-Japanean war. Why, in 1914, it avalanched into a citizen army total war was completely un-necessary and never previously experienced nor remotely considered, by any European general, Haig included. The suffering caused was not just "appalling" but in my opinion, un-necessary and unjustifiable.Those responsible for leading those armies were butchering their fellow citizens in ill-thought strategies. It would never happen today - and shouldn't have happened to my grandfather's generation.

[phil andrade]

There...now you've gone and said it ,Geraint !

Brave man.

A quibble : you allude to small professional armies in the Napoleonic, Crimean, Franco - Prussian and Russo -Japanese conflicts.

The French mobilised huge armies in the Napoleonic wars, and suffered casualties on a terrific scale. A million dead Frenchmen in a dozen years...who knows ? And four hundred thousand plus Russians in the Crimean War. In regard to British experience, you're right. But I think that previous conflicts had embroiled Continental armies in massacres on the grand scale : Prussia in the Seven Year's War; France in the Napoleonic...perhaps you're in error in your reckoning of what had previously been experienced and what might have been considered.

Phil (PJA)

[Dawley Jockey]

Geraint, your head is well above the parapet now, brave man

[geraint]

Phil

I do accept your points regarding your quoted casualties, and would say that continental armies have often absorbed heavier civilian input into their armed forces than Britain due to the fact that they are not as insular, nor with as massive an empire, as Britain. Even so; they relied on smaller, regular soldiery, swelled with citizens in times of dire need when an invasive force was literally invading their borders.

By 1903 Britain had been embroiled in smaller scale colonial wars in Africa, Afghanistan, China etc etc since 1815. British military strategy was geared to Empire building and protection. The gun-boat ideal was the Foreign Offices' prefered policy. It worked and, therefore, why change a winning policy? A small task force would and did enforce Britain's self interests wherever throughout the world. In 1914 the situation didn't warrant such a cataclysmic change to this well worn strategy.

[SiegeGunner]

Britain always regarded France as a potential enemy, so the notion of a hostile force on the other side of the Channel was nothing new. I must say that I've always believed that Britain should have confined itself to a naval blockade of Germany, but, having joined the war on land, it should have pursued it to the nth degree and defeated/occupied the whole of Germany. The transformation effected post-1945 could have taken place post-1918.

[geraint]

but, having joined the war on land, it should have pursued it to the nth degree and defeated/occupied the whole of Germany.

But Mick - thats you today in 2013! That was not the way the War Office nor the Foreign Office worked in 1914. A knock-out battle (such as Waterloo) was enough. Britain did not invade and occupy France following Watereloo in 1815. It didn't even consider an occupation of France as they thrashed out the dealings at Vienna and it's subsequent cogresses. It was not even a consideration in 1914. Powers and countries were "balanced" in the scale of power - not crushed nor overpowered.

Between 1914 -18 this deteriorated into needless attrition,

[Guest]

you're brave tonight Geraint. How's the home made wine?

Were the Armies of 1914 much larger than 100 years earlier, and not quite so easy to contain?

There's a place not far from here in Perthshire, called " Waterloo " I thnk it got it's name from men who had fought at Waterloo and had settled in the area. That's as much as I know about Waterloo.

Mike