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Remembered Today:

W.W.1 German 13mm Anti-Tank Rifle


juno-44

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Just realised I got my sums wrong - I was reading lb for kg. Means there was about 5 times the recoil momentum of a normal fullbore round in a rifle roughly 5 times the weight. That would mean the recoil velocity would be about the same, but with the weight of the rifle would deliver 5 times the impact energy to the shooter's shoulder unless restrained. All numbers approximate.

Regards,

MikB

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Here is the British Small Arms Committeec drawing of the 13mm round taken from captured examples.

Post war Britain reloaded both captured cases and new Swedish cases as part of the development that led to the .5 Stanchion rifle that subsequently became the .55 Boys.

Regards

TonyE

post-8515-0-66391100-1355307947_thumb.jp

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No. The shooter was lying prone in the open. Often German antitank riflemen didn't have time to dig the pits, especially when defending against attacks by FT-17s, which could appear quickly in unexpected places.

I find this difficult to credit. German tactical doctrine for the use of the AT rifle was to place them in prepared anti tank forts. They were regarded as primarily a defence against heavy tanks (this is reflected in the instructions as to which part of the tanks they should target). Most French and American actions in which the FT17 was used were against German prepared positions and tank loses appear to have come from mines, artillery and trench mortars used as AT guns (firing horizontally from their carriage). The FT 17 was actually not very quick (about 5 mph ) and much less suited for open warfare conditions than the British Medium A for this reason. I can image in that the German AT rifle might some times be used from a prone position in the open but not "often"

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Centurion,

do You have a source for Your 'German tactical doctrine for the use of AT rifle in prepared anti tank forts'

In reality the AT rifle was used by 2 men teams, one carrying the gun the other the ammunition,

an infantry regiment had only two guns, not many 'anti tank forts' could be built this way

and the recoil was so fearsome that at the end of the war spring loaded shoulder plates were made for the AT rifle

Cnock

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Centurion,

do You have a source for Your 'German tactical doctrine for the use of AT rifle in prepared anti tank forts'

In reality the AT rifle was used by 2 men teams, one carrying the gun the other the ammunition,

an infantry regiment had only two guns, not many 'anti tank forts' could be built this way

and the recoil was so fearsome that at the end of the war spring loaded shoulder plates were made for the AT rifle

Cnock

Yes Copies of German orders re their use were published after the war. Relevant to this discussion is an army order which includes

"In order to increase the efficiency of our anti tank defense the following is ordered: In the forward battle zone anti tank groups under especially energetic leaders are to be formed. These will consist of anti tank guns, machine guns, anti tank rifles and trench mortars.The various weapons of theses groups need not be close together but they must be able to render mutual support within their group. except in the case of the anti tank rifles which must be in groups of four to six."

"For Anti tank rifles Circular sharpshooters trenches about 1.5 metres diameter"

"All works will be constantly concealed with great care from aerial observation even when under construction which will not begin until sufficient camoflage material is available."

Other German documents define the armament of an AT fort as

"Two field guns. Two to three lightweight minenwerfer on flat trajectory carriages. Two to three machine guns. Three to four anti tank rifles. Two portable searchlights."

The guns were manned by two man teams - both trained as AT riflemen as I said earlier. The division is not quite as you said - Both men carried ammunition One man carried the gun and 20 rounds whist the assistant AT rifleman carried 112 rounds.

Now what is your source for the spring loaded but plates?

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Reminds me of a joke about the British Boys' anti-tank rifle (.55 inch). How many men does it take to fire a Boys' rifle? Three, one to pull the trigger and two to make him do it again.

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Reminds me of a joke about the British Boys' anti-tank rifle (.55 inch). How many men does it take to fire a Boys' rifle? Three, one to pull the trigger and two to make him do it again.

The airborne forces version of the Boys AT had an even fiercer recoil. It was never used in anger as the PIAT did the job

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I find this difficult to credit. German tactical doctrine for the use of the AT rifle was to place them in prepared anti tank forts. They were regarded as primarily a defence against heavy tanks (this is reflected in the instructions as to which part of the tanks they should target). Most French and American actions in which the FT17 was used were against German prepared positions and tank loses appear to have come from mines, artillery and trench mortars used as AT guns (firing horizontally from their carriage). The FT 17 was actually not very quick (about 5 mph ) and much less suited for open warfare conditions than the British Medium A for this reason. I can image in that the German AT rifle might some times be used from a prone position in the open but not "often"

Tactical doctrine and the reality of responding to surprise attacks are two different things. By the end of the war the French, British, and Americans had adopted German shock-style assaults launched with short, violent artillery preparation against positions previously reconnoitered. The antitank forts were very conspicuous, so while they were constructed, they were easily seen and avoided.

Most antitank work was carried out by the 75mm Skoda guns, MG08 machine guns on improvised trench mounts and firing armor-piercing rounds, 77mm field guns issued armor-piercing rounds, infantrymen issued steel-cored antitank rifle bullets, 76mm mortars on flat-trajectory carriages, antitank rifles, and grenadiers using concentrated charges of various configurations. All of these weapons were specifically designed to be carried forward at a moment's notice and used in the open if necessary.

Tanks were generally attacked from the rear, not the front. The stationary forts didn't lend themselves to dealing with tanks from the rear. The antitank groups you described above were mobile units.

Additionally, A Survey of German Tactics, pp. 37-38, points out that because tanks frequently broke through, it was sometimes impossible to organize the defense in time. Therefore an order by the Crown Prince Army Group dated August 12, 1918, stated that mobile antitank sections were to be increased.

At Juvigny on August 29, 1918, American troops of the 32nd Division, supported by FT-17s from the French 311th and 312th Tank Companies, attacked German positions heavily armed with all the antitank weaponry described above. Although the French lost twenty tanks, the Allies were able to break through. The report of the German Infantry Regiment No. 165 describes the tanks as the "small, fast Renault type" and credits them with forcing the German main line of resistance to retreat.

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Relevant to this discussion is an army order...
Sorry centurion but can we be clear on this please. You mentioned 'German general order...' and then 'German tactical doctrine...' The reference is to an army order. Is this the German army as a whole or one Army within one of the Army Groups?

Robert

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Tactical doctrine and the reality of responding to surprise attacks are two different things. By the end of the war the French, British, and Americans had adopted German shock-style assaults launched with short, violent artillery preparation against positions previously reconnoitered. The antitank forts were very conspicuous, so while they were constructed, they were easily seen and avoided.

Most antitank work was carried out by the 75mm Skoda guns, MG08 machine guns on improvised trench mounts and firing armor-piercing rounds, 77mm field guns issued armor-piercing rounds, infantrymen issued steel-cored antitank rifle bullets, 76mm mortars on flat-trajectory carriages, antitank rifles, and grenadiers using concentrated charges of various configurations. All of these weapons were specifically designed to be carried forward at a moment's notice and used in the open if necessary.

Tanks were generally attacked from the rear, not the front. The stationary forts didn't lend themselves to dealing with tanks from the rear. The antitank groups you described above were mobile units.

Additionally, A Survey of German Tactics, pp. 37-38, points out that because tanks frequently broke through, it was impossible to organize the defense in time. Therefore an order by the Crown Prince Army Group dated August 12, 1918, stated that mobile antitank sections were to be increased.

At Juvigny on August 29, 1918, American troops of the 32nd Division, supported by FT-17s from the French 311th and 312th Tank Companies, attacked German positions heavily armed with all the antitank weaponry described above. Although the French lost twenty tanks, the Allies were able to break through. The report of the German Infantry Regiment No. 165 describes the tanks as the "small, fast Renault type" and credits them with forcing the main line of resistance to retreat.

I find it difficult to be concise about the errors in the above. let me start with a few.

The antitank forts were very conspicuous, so while they were constructed, they were easily seen and avoided. evidence please. In fact they were very well camouflaged as per the German order relating to AT forts "All works will be constantly concealed with great care from aerial observation even when under construction which will not begin until sufficient camouflage material is available."

Most antitank work was carried out by the 75mm Skoda guns, MG08 machine guns on improvised trench mounts and firing armor-piercing rounds, 77mm field guns issued armor-piercing rounds, infantrymen issued steel-cored antitank rifle bullets, 76mm mortars on flat-trajectory carriages, antitank rifles, and grenadiers using concentrated charges of various configurations. All of these weapons were specifically designed to be carried forward at a moment's notice and used in the open if necessary. 75mm Skodas were only used in very small numbers. The Mg 08s firing armour piercing rounds were on standard mounts and difficult to move in a hurry. In the open they would be sitting ducks. The German General order was that for AT work these should be "in circular emplacements". For field guns used for AT work the same order was "Emplacements arranged to permit fire over the parapet with inclines in rear and front so that the pieces can be quickly moved to neighbouring ground when it is impossible to fire from the emplacement" Ordinary HE was quite sufficient to deal with a tank. Only the minenwerfers were expected to operate in the open and even then with some emplacement " For light trench mortars. Emplacements in the open with places for the ammunition"

Tanks were generally attacked from the rear, not the front. The stationary forts didn't lend themselves to dealing with tanks from the rear. Again evidence please. German instructions for selection of target areas on a tank tend to concentrate on the cab and sponsons - difficult to hit from the rear

because tanks frequently broke through, it was impossible to organize the defense in time. This quote is somewhat selective and misses the point made in German documents that this was because guns were dug in too deep and without the means to shift position - hence the need for the inclines I have mentioned above.

All the German documentation I have quoted from dates from after the Crown Prince's order and reflects a more sober and deeper analysis of the lessons of Amiens. Amongst these are "The scattered engagement of trench mortars, machine guns and anti tank rifles will be avoided. They must be assembled in groups of two or more, the anti tank rifles preferably in groups of six or eight"

The action at Juvigny on August 29, 1918 was not a success nor did the Allies "break through". 4 companies of Renault FTs took part. This was an attack on trenches not open warfare. An American account state " "On the 29th four companies led an attack between Crecy au Mont and Juvigny against determined resistance consisting of great masses of machine guns which had been organised in great depth, The tanks succesfuly crossed the trench system and wiped out a large number of machine guns but were unable to reach all of them. The remaining guns stopped and held the infantry from advancing except in the centre where linited progress was made in the direction of Terny." The tank losses you mention occured in the unsuccessful attack on Cuffies the previous day. It was not until the first week in September until a very limited breakthrough to Terny was achieved and this was halted by street fighting.

However the 165th regiment described them The Renault FT 17 was not fast (unless you count max 5 mph as fast)

I could go on.

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I find it difficult to be concise about the errors in the above.

No errors, my friend. Simple misunderstandings on your part.

I said the assault targets were reconnoitered. I said nothing about aerial reconnaissance. We're talking apples and oranges.

The numbers of Skoda 75s is irrelevant to their mobility, and not all MG08s firing armor-piercing bullets were on standard sleds.

There were both AT emplacements and mobile sections. More mobile sections were created because the emplacements could not deal with tanks when they broke through.

Field guns used as AT Guns were issued the armor-piercing shell (Panzerkopf), not HE. Infantry guns and infantry-accompanying guns used in AT work were, in fact, used in the open. As I've said multiple times now, there were both emplaced weapons and mobile sections. I'm talking about the mobile sections; you keep talking about the emplaced weapons.

Your other questions on tactics need to be addressed to the Germans:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=63474#p570677

You appear be describing a different attack by Renault tanks than I was. In the attack I described, the Germans defended themselves with field guns firing antitank shells, mortars on flat-trajectory carriages, antitank rifles, and concentrated charges. The tanks didn't simply face machine guns.

And again, take up your corrections with the Germans, who stated "[T]he enemy infantry occupied the railway embankment. Thus the attack was successful in pushing back the regiment a few hundred meters[.]" They also said the Renault was small and fast. That's a direct quote.

Otto Fliess, 5. hannoversches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 165 im Weltkriege (Oldenburg i. O.: Verlag Gerard Stalling, 1927) p. 203.

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Tom, thank you so much for posting the exact quote. It makes such a difference in discussions like this. There were multiple views on the use of anti-tank weapons, including the T-Gewher. These views changed over time too.

Robert

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Tom, thank you so much for posting the exact quote. It makes such a difference in discussions like this. There were multiple views on the use of anti-tank weapons, including the T-Gewher. These views changed over time too.

Robert

I wasn't going to do this because it was so hard for me to translate and I didn't want to just give it away for free, since it's in my book, but here's the description of the entire battle at Juvigny on August 29, 1918, as described by Fliess in his history of Infantry Regiment No. 165.

"In the early morning, after a short but violent artillery preparation, the Americans began an attack with only infantry, clearly to take our forward positions to prepare the way for the subsequent tank attack. The attack came under fire from our main line of resistance, which caused heavy casualties among the enemy. The actual main attack followed shortly thereafter, again after heavy artillery preparation. This time several squads [Trupps] of tanks--the feared armored fighting vehicles--accompanied the enemy infantry attack. About six squads of five to six tanks each advanced against the sector held by the regiment. The enemy infantry followed close behind like a swarm of bees, especially in the immediate vicinity of the attacking modern-day war elephants moving in dense herds. Everything took place in the way described to us during the instruction time for tank defense. It may be said without exaggeration that the tanks made a very small impression on our men. After the destructive artillery fire which preceded the attack, the appearance of the enemy--even if he sat behind a tank--was almost a relief. Exactly as was so often impressed on them, the companies on the main line of resistance opened fire on the infantry following the tanks, which soon lay down under the onslaught and suffered heavy losses. The heavy weapons of the regiment--the heavy machine guns and tank rifles--then opened fire on the tanks themselves. The trench mortars, which had laid down defensive fire until the appearance of the tanks, were concealed and took part in the fire upon the tanks. Particularly successful defensive work was carried out by an antitank cannon of Field Artillery Regiment 40 behind the south wing of the sector, in the proximity of the Combat Troops Commander [Kampftruppenkommandeur or K.T.K.]. The excellent, very dashing cannoneers undoubtedly destroyed many tanks.

"Leutnant der Reserve Sauer shot two tanks with the antitank rifle, while Unteroffizier Stockhaus of the Trench Mortar Company took out a tank at 300 meters with a flat-trajectory shot from his trench mortar. Unteroffizier Dudler of the 3rd Machine Gun Company shot up four tanks with his machine gun, while Leutnant Wuttke used a concentrated charge to settle a tank driving along the railway line. On the whole after the attack there were over twenty disabled tanks--all of which were the small, fast Renault type--along the front of the regiment. Nevertheless, some of the attacking tanks managed to break through the main line of resistance. Some of them drove on against Juvigny and others pivoted to the south, in order to roll up the main line of resistance from the rear. While most of the tanks attacking Juvigny turned back or were destroyed, the tanks emerging in the rear of the main line of resistance forced the garrison of the main line of resistance to retreat to the road running westward to Juvigny. The retreat was carried out in quite good order, hardly disturbed by the enemy. The deep ravines crossing the terrain allowed a concealed retreat. Under fire from the junction the tanks soon retreated behind the hill west of the railway embankment, while the enemy infantry occupied the railway embankment. Thus the attack was successful in pushing back the regiment a few hundred meters, but only at a tremendous cost of material and supplies. In addition this modest success was bought with much blood."

The antitank weapons were all taken with the regiment as it retreated. Clearly this is one of the mobile antitank sections I was talking about. While it says the mortars were concealed, there are plenty of references to antitank mortars and infantry guns used in the open. In fact most photos of infantry guns show them being used in the open, and I've seen lots of images of mortars on flat-trajectory carriages used the same way.

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Robert and Tom,

thank You for Your comments!

the last AT rifle I saw was one that was found during excavations at Hellfire Corner-Ypres.

after cleaning and fitting new wood the bolt action worked again

Cnock

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Dont forget the sticky backed plastic :whistle:

No need to sneer - I was talking about making a reasonably realistic machined mockup from mild steel or the like.

I'd think it's either that or accept and hold it without the bolt - replacements are probably unobtainable.

Making a working one would be a challenge, but not prohibitively difficult - except for the fact that the effort would be repaid with considerable legal complications and would also open up the requirement to make any ammunition from scratch. Not worth doing unless you had some prospect of firing it, and the interest to make such an effort worthwhile.

I don't think I'd want to do it, but the possibility's there for someone who does, given some basic machining capability.

Regards,

MikB

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.........Making a working one would be a challenge, but not prohibitively difficult - except for the fact that the effort would be repaid with considerable legal complications and would also open up the requirement to make any ammunition from scratch. Not worth doing unless you had some prospect of firing it, and the interest to make such an effort worthwhile.

I don't think I'd want to do it, but the possibility's there for someone who does, given some basic machining capability.

Regards,

MikB

That is an interesting point Mik.

Although the original weapon benefits from exemption under Section 58(2) of the Act, I am not sure about a new bolt. I suspect as it is new and a pressure bearing part it would fall within Section 1 and require an FAC variation.

In any case, as soon as any ammunition is possessed the Setion 58(2) exemption ceases to apply and the weapon reverrts to Section 1 status.

Regards

TonyE

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That is an interesting point Mik.

Although the original weapon benefits from exemption under Section 58(2) of the Act, I am not sure about a new bolt. I suspect as it is new and a pressure bearing part it would fall within Section 1 and require an FAC variation.

In any case, as soon as any ammunition is possessed the Setion 58(2) exemption ceases to apply and the weapon reverrts to Section 1 status.

Regards

TonyE

Well, I think manufacture of a new working bolt would qualify as intention to shoot and put the gun into S1 as you suggest - that's why it wouldn't be worth doing unless you were thinking about making some ammunition too.

And there don't seem to be many ranges now allowing 10,000+ ft.lb. shooting, so it becomes more problematic still.

So I don't think it would repay the work, in UK at any rate.

But a solid dummy bolt of reasonably accurate appearance could be a practical proposition.

Regards,

MikB

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Tom, here is a précis of the French perspective on the attack of 29th August. It comes from Dutil's book 'Les Chars d'Assaut', which provides a lot of information on the development and the role of French tanks during the war (basically my translation of his sub-title):

"On 29 August, the 5th Battalion (of Renault light tanks) and the 310th [Tank] Company were involved in the extremely tough fighting between both sides that took place between Crécy-au-Mont and Juvigny. Despite the presence of relatively large trenches and the lack of defilade cover, the tanks managed, with great difficulty, to destroy a large number of machine guns. The German machine guns, however, were staggered in depth and stopped all progress of the infantry except in the centre where a limited advance was achieved towards Terny."

The battle on the 29th was part of a series of rolling attacks in the area that took place over several days.

The 5th Battalion's war diary mentions that the 313th Company, which attacked on the left flank, took heavy fire from machine guns, anti-tank guns, and 'minen' (presumably Minenwerfer). It had 9 tanks put out of action and made no progress. The other two companies made progress and lost fewer tanks (4 and 6 respectively). There is an interesting note to the effect that several tanks were unable to continue because the weapons were disabled by armour-piercing machine gun bullets.

Robert

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Tom, here is a précis of the French perspective on the attack of 29th August. It comes from Dutil's book 'Les Chars d'Assaut', which provides a lot of information on the development and the role of French tanks during the war (basically my translation of his sub-title):

"On 29 August, the 5th Battalion (of Renault light tanks) and the 310th [Tank] Company were involved in the extremely tough fighting between both sides that took place between Crécy-au-Mont and Juvigny. Despite the presence of relatively large trenches and the lack of defilade cover, the tanks managed, with great difficulty, to destroy a large number of machine guns. The German machine guns, however, were staggered in depth and stopped all progress of the infantry except in the centre where a limited advance was achieved towards Terny."

The battle on the 29th was part of a series of rolling attacks in the area that took place over several days.

The 5th Battalion's war diary mentions that the 313th Company, which attacked on the left flank, took heavy fire from machine guns, anti-tank guns, and 'minen' (presumably Minenwerfer). It had 9 tanks put out of action and made no progress. The other two companies made progress and lost fewer tanks (4 and 6 respectively). There is an interesting note to the effect that several tanks were unable to continue because the weapons were disabled by armour-piercing machine gun bullets.

Robert

Thanks for that.

German infantrymen were also issued steel-cored rifle bullets for antitank work. From what I understand, it wasn't that the bullets penetrated the armor plate but created spall that either injured or killed the crew or damaged the engine or guns on the tank.

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Juno, the bolt could quite easily be fabricated using the knob/lever from an old milling machine etc. Have a look around for old machine parts dealers, Im sure they will have something similar in size. If you are not capable, Im sure a local tradesman could cut and weld it to a short length of round bar to give the desired effect.

Regards,

Sean.

P.S. if you live in Essex, PM me and I will do it for you :thumbsup:

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For those capable of owning live-fire weapons, there's a few currently offered single-shot .50 caliber (Browning) rifle designs with bolts based on the Mauser.

Since these firms are generally low-production, a T-Gewehr owner willing to pay could probably purchase a bolt body (before final machining) along with the firing pin assembly.

Also, there are motivated machinists to be found -

http://www.practical...n-50bmg-126486/

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"For those capable of owning live-fire weapons, there's a few currently offered single-shot .50 caliber (Browning) rifle designs with bolts based on the Mauser"

Sounds like fun, where exacty can we buy one and how do we get the .50 ammo?

Norman.

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