Haig's achievement.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Am I reading this right?:- is the general consensus that Haig redeemed himself in 1918 compared to the disastrous carnage of 1916 & 1917?

I personally believe that Haig never really cared about casualty rates:-

"The nation must be taught to bear losses. No amount of skill on the part of the higher commanders, no training, however good, on the part of the officers and men, no superiority of arms and ammunition, however great, will enable victories to be won without the sacrifice of men's lives. The nation must be prepared to see heavy casualty lists."

Written by Haig in June 1916 before the battle began….

If this isn't trolling it is an example of someone posting without having given any half-way serious thought to the question. And given 'Kitchener's Bugle's previous 'contribution' to this thread, I know what I think.

You do not have to be an expert on Haig or the First World War to recognise how unsustainable it is to extrapolate from a warning that there will be a high cost in lives for the BEF to carry out the mission given to it by its political masters - ie to render all assistance to the French and Belgians in removing the German invaders from their soil - that the C-in-C issuing the warning "never really cared about casualty rates." Perhaps 'Kitchener's Bugle' will tell us on what evidence he reasons that one follows from the other? Then he can tell us where Haig was wrong in what he stated about the cost of removing the main German army in the field in the main theatre of the war? And he might care to tell us why the Russians went so badly wrong from 1941 - 45 in removing the main German army in the field in the main theatre of the war by paying an even higher price to do so in the Second World War? In other words, 'Kitchener's Bugle', just how do you remove a war machine like the main German army in the field without paying a high cost in lives to achieve that result? If you cannot answer that question, what foundation does your criticism of Haig's honest appraisal have, let alone your ludicrous extrapolation that it somehow means that he did not care about the cost?

" General Davison, replying to criticisms passed on Sir Douglas Haig for continuing the Battle of Passchendaele so long, gave a detailed account of the circumstances in which that battle came to be fought. And a very deeply interesting account it was, and most illuminating, though it was getting rather remote from the main theme. "

It would be interesting to know exactly what Davison said?

Mike, this is what Tavish Davidson said in the House of Commons on August 6 1919:

"I had hoped it would not have been necessary for me to take any part at all in this Debate. I regret very much the turn it has taken. The hon. Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. Hogge) mentioned the subject of war gratuities to the men. I do not see what that has to do with the subject we are discussing to-day. That particular subject was brought up on the Army Estimates last Tuesday, and, if I am not mistaken, the hon. Gentleman was either not in his place to discuss the matter or he did not raise it in Debate. It was raised by hon. Members on this side of the Committee and by the Army Committee, who would probably back him up if he raises it another time. It strikes me that some hon. Members think that an election is not very far off when they begin to mix these subjects up together. I am a new Member of the House, and that is my opinion. I am not going to discuss the merits of the Army commanders, of the Commander-in-Chief or of any of the other officers of the Army who have been mentioned. I should like, however, to point out that Sir Douglas Haig has hitherto refused to accept any honour until he saw that the men and the officers were being properly and adequately treated. The hon. and gallant Member for Newcastle- under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood) mentioned the Chiefs of Staff and of Armies by name, and said that they were very largely responsible for the success of the operations of their Armies.

I do not agree at all. If the Chiefs of Staff of the two Armies were here to-day, they would say that the entire credit was due to their Army commander, and they would support him as much as possible. That is my opinion from close find intimate knowledge of them. I should like to tell the Committee a good many stories about the anxieties and responsibilities of these Army commanders, whom I know very well, but I am not going to waste the time of the Committee in doing that. There is one matter on which I feel it is necessary for me to say something. The hon. and gallant Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme mentioned the battle of Passchendaele. I should like to tell the Committee not only my views but the solid facts. One hears a great deal of discussion of that battle. I have heard it during the last six months all over the country. I am going to tell the Committee the facts of the case, and what I think about it. First, I should like to explain what was the general situation at that time. At the beginning of 1917, just after the battle of the spring, the Russian Army ceased to exist altogether as a fighting force. Then the French Army, to a very large extent, ceased to exist as a fighting force, owing to the troubles they had within that Army. That may not be generally known to members of the Committee. With all respect to the French, I think it is very important that we should ascertain the facts and not hide them up. The French had a lot of trouble inside their Army, and were not really of very much value to us during the summer and autumn of that year. The third point is that the Italian Army was completely out of operation altogether, owing to the attack in the autumn. The fourth point is that America was not in the War at all, and could not give us any assistance. That is to say, in other words, the Allies were of little value to the British during the summer, autumn, and winter of 1917, and the British Army had to bear the whole brunt of the world war.

These are absolute facts, and there is no question about them. Another point which added very greatly to the anxieties and troubles of those in high command was that the Admiralty were extremely anxious about the communications across the Channel. They sent over to the High Command in France, through the ordinary channel, to say that unless the ports of Ostend and Zeebrugge could be brought under our control our communications across the Channel would be very greatly endangered. That was a matter of very serious consideration. The fifth point I have to make is the weather. Normally speaking, the good weather lasts certainly up to the middle of September, and should be quite good enough to go on with operations. The weather broke, as we know, in July or early August, and the operations were carried out under a great disadvantage. Had the weather held from the beginning, I have not the least doubt that we should have brought the ports of Ostend and Zeebrugge within our long-range-gun fire. There is a. strategic principle, with which perhaps the hon. and gallant Gentleman will not agree I have no doubt that he is a great strategist, but there are others—that is, that when all the enemy forces have been released from the Eastern Front, and are pouring over the Western Front, and when your communications […..] I would never have touched on this question at all—I dislike it intensely—if the hon. and gallant Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme had not mentioned it. I was saying that when the enemy's forces had been released by the collapse of Russia from the Eastern Front, and were swarming across, both formed bodies of troops and reinforcements, and when our own communications were in danger, the only thing to do, considering that the British forces on the Western Front were working single-handed, was to attack. I am perfectly convinced that history, when it is written, will say that the right thing to do was to attack, and to stick to that attack as long as that menace existed and until the winter shut down the possibility of the Germans themselves attacking. I believe, seeing that France, Russia, Italy, and America were of very little use during that period, that the action of the British Forces did prevent the War being finished a year earlier, and finished the wrong way. The British came out on top during that period, because they stuck to it in their bulldog way, as perhaps they can do better than any other nation. When the history is written of that period, from June or July, of 1917, until the end of that year, I believe it will be found that it was the most critical period of the whole War, and that the greatest credit was due, not only to this country but to the Commander-in-Chief and his Army commanders, for sticking to it during that time, fully realising the appalling conditions under which the troops were operating. I believe myself that history will prove that, although possibly the hon. and gallant Member on the other side may be able to prove something else in the meantime."

[Crunchy]

Perhaps 'Kitchener's Bugle' will tell us on what evidence he reasons that one follows from the other? Then he can tell us where Haig was wrong in what he stated about the cost of removing the main German army in the field in the main theatre of the war? And he might care to tell us why the Russians went so badly wrong from 1941 - 45 in removing the main German army in the field in the main theatre of the war by paying an even higher price to do so in the Second World War? In other words, 'Kitchener's Bugle', just how do you remove a war machine like the main German army in the field without paying a high cost in lives to achieve that result? If you cannot answer that question, what foundation does your criticism of Haig's honest appraisal have, let alone your ludicrous extrapolation that it somehow means that he did not care about the cost?

Over to you Kitchener's Bugle. Other's have asked the same question of you. I, for one, would be very interested in your explanation.

Chris

[Guest]

Many thanks for posting that George. I'm at a very early stage of my learning, and have much to read, including " Haig: Master of the Field ". (I so nearly wrote Davidson too)

Here's Chris Baker's review Click

One of many I must read. You don't have to have read one book about Haig, to know he cared about casualties. Can there ever have been a Commander who didn't?

Edit Before someone else says it Aylmer Hunter-Weston. Did he really say that?

Mike

[George Armstrong Custer]

Hi Mike. Yes, Tavish Davidson's book is essential reading, and I concur with almost all of Chris's fine review. My own review, for what it's worth, can be found here: https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=119160708150637&set=a.119160694817305.18102.119140851485956&type=3&theater

[Guest]

Thanks again George. Definitely on my list to buy.

Here's Captain John Humphrey Davidson in the 1911 Census Click

Mike

[Kitchener's Bugle]

And he might care to tell us why the Russians went so badly wrong from 1941 - 45 in removing the main German army in the field in the main theatre of the war by paying an even higher price to do so in the Second World War?

I am not so sure that this was a fair comparison. Haig cannot be compared to Stalin.

Stalin was a totally ruthless maniac who killed more Russians than the German’s ever did. He would have stopped at nothing to hold onto power – and he was not appointed or was accountable to anyone. During the early years of the war it was not uncommon for the Russian soldier to have one rifle to every three men, if the man with the rifle was shot then the next man picked it up and so on… behind them was a Political Officer with a pistol who would shoot anyone who failed to attack. The reserves found out this at Stalingrad…. anything and everything to hold onto that wrecked city, regardless of costs.

No definative figures are available for WW2 Soviet Casualties, estimates range from between 7 to 13 Million Military and perhaps 10 to 12 Million Civilians.

The CWGC quote about 1,115,000 casualties (including all colonials) for WW1.

Clearly at the lower end of the Soviet estimate that would be a ratio of at least 15:1 compared to WW1. (or 23:1 at the higher end).

So perhaps you feel that at least 20 Million of your country men being killed is a fair price to pay in removing the main German army from the field? No doubt if you were an average Russian, say a peasant or a conscripted soldier then you might not feel that way.

Back to Haig….

Firstly Haig was not “made” to be C-in-C, he accepted the post of his own free will.

If he knew from the onset that casualties would be very high, then he made a concious decision to be a central part of this. Effectively the buck stopped with him, so he had the power to stop or veto any proposed attack. Take the first day of the Somme, he wrote:-

"Very successful attack this morning... All went like clockwork... The battle is going very well for us and already the Germans are surrendering freely. The enemy is so short of men that he is collecting them from all parts of the line. Our troops are in wonderful spirits and full of confidence."

A Report by Haig on the first day of attack, 1st July 1916

Clearly everyone on this Forum knows that July the First 1916 was the most disastrous day in the history of the British Army. Allowing for communication errors and inferior communication techniques compared to later conflicts – still, just how wrong can you be?. Of course the attack pressed on….. and on…. Regardless of the casualty rates and the completely unrealistic chance of the objectives being met.

Here are another two quotes from Haig:-

"The machine gun is a much over rated weapon.."

Haig - 1915

"The way to capture machine guns is by grit and determination."

Haig - 1915

What no one has mentioned so far is what I believe to be an important point. That is issues relating to Haig’s character and personality in terms of his upbringing and his class.

Senior officers were under no illusion that this was a democratic war which

required them to share the suffering of their men. Along with power went

privilege. The fact that his men slept in muddy holes was no reason for Haig to

decline a soft bed in a luxurious château. Grouse, salmon, fine wines and the

best brandy were sent to him by rich friends at home. Nor did he perceive

anything wrong with sending whole lambs and butter from the army stores to his

wife so that she would not have to endure food shortages. Luxuries were the

confirmation of high authority. In the same sense, extravagant rewards were

perfectly justifiable after the war. Already in 1916, Haig assured his wife that

'a grateful nation will not allow me to have a smaller income than I am

receiving now! So we will be well enough off to make ourselves comfortable.' Few

objections were raised about the luxuries Haig enjoyed during the war, or the

rewards he received after it. These were the accepted standards of his class and

rank. Greater restraint would have seemed peculiar!!.

So how do you remove the main German Army from the field?

Well the answer is, you don’t not in the short term anyway. You build strong defensive positions and let the enemy take the “initiative”. Let the enemy take the heavy losses in trying to capture worthless, scared land and positions that they are not able to, and erode their ability to fight and their morale.

Carry on with an effective blockade of Germany with the long term intention of starving her. Develop new weapons further like the Tank, Aeroplane etc withn a view to using these in a combined stratergy with your allies when Germany is weakened.

Carry on harassing the enemy covertly at every opportunity through political means, espionage and more direct methods like blowing up their fortifications (RE Tunnelling Coy’s).

What you do not do is fling countless men against objectives that you are unable to capture time and time again like in 1916/17.

I will leave the final word to Lieutenant James Lovegrove, veteran of the First World War.

”The military commanders had no respect for human life. General Douglas Haig,

later he was made a Field Marshal, cared nothing about casualties. Of course, he

was carrying out government policy, because after the war he was knighted and

given a lump sum and a massive life-pension. I blame the public schools who bred

these ego maniacs. They should never have been in charge of men. Never”

[Guest]

Googling, I too came up with DeGroot's " Blighty "

I hope to read it some day, whenever I get some time. Have you read it?

Anyway, do you really believe Haig didn't care about casualties. As I said, my reading on subject is limited, but Haig was not universally loathed by the returning soldiers, quite the opposite I reckon.

Mike

[Kitchener's Bugle]

You are right Skipman, a great many of Haigs subordinates respected him. When he died for example as many as 200,000 went to pay their respects. It is difficult to know however (this being only 10 years after the Armistice) whether or not this was a collective grief for what had gone on previously during the war. I suspect it was a bit of both and a good opportunity for "old soldiers" to come together.

There are many examples and quotes from soldiers about very positive things about Haig.

[Guest]

There are many examples and quotes from soldiers about very positive things about Haig.

Indeed.

Worth a search for Haig between the end of the war, and a few years after his death Here

He does seem to have been very popular immediately after the war, and the critcism came later. Some of Haig's speeches after the war make it plain how much he thought of the ordinary soldier.

Cheers Mike

[keithmroberts]

Kitchener's bugle

Don't forget that the initial political purpose of the war was not, to stop the Germans, but to drive them out of France and Belgium. The decisions to launch attacks included the war cabinet. The 1917 battle of Arras for example was fought to support Nivelle's offensive, and was certainly not Haig's choice to make. The Somme was required to relieve pressure on our allies at Verdun. If Haig had decided that there would be no more attacks at that time, he would have been replaced by a commander who would obey the wishes of the British Government. I really think you need to do some more reading about the political as well as the military direction of the war.

I'm afraid your post defies logic, and requires much history to be rewritten before the question of command in the field arises.

It's not simple, and he certainly wasn't perfect, but your suggested alternative would have required different governments in Britain and France for a start. Later Lloyd George took a different view of the campaigns in the second part of 1917, but at all times unlike their German opponents the British generals were acting under the authority of a government that was answerable to parliament.

Keith

Edited 5 September , 2012 by Keith Roberts
clarity

[paul@bolton]

Dear oh dear. I was trying so hard to believe that Kitchener's Bugle wasn't being deliberately provocative but then he lumbers out of the forest waving every red rag that he can lay his hands on.

I was just hoping the soft bed in a luxurious chateau v muddy hole argument could have waited a few more days.

As for the argument about how to remove the main German Army from the field, I wonder how the French would have reacted if Haig, presumably supported by the British government, had suggested that they all just sit back, chill out and wait for Germany to get bored with taking the initiative? Of course, they wouldn't have appreciated this advice initially (being a bit hot headed at times) but I am sure that, once it had been explained to them in a calm and logical manner, they would have seen sense.

Hindsight is such a wonderful thing.

Paul

[Terry_Reeves]

I agree wholeheartedly with Keith's post above. Perhaps KB would like to take a look at this essay below, which is not uncritical of Haig, but is balanced.

http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/rmas_occ_paper_08.pdf

TR

[Kitchener's Bugle]

Kitchener's bugle

Don't forget that the initial political purpose of the war was not, to stop the Germans, but to drive them out of France and Belgium. The decisions to launch attacks included the war cabinet. The 1917 battle of Arras for example was fought to support Nivelle's offensive, and was certainly not Haig's choice to make. The Somme was required to relieve pressure on our allies at Verdun. If Haig had decided that there would be no more attacks at that time, he would have been replaced by a commander who would obey the wishes of the British Government. I really think you need to do some more reading about the political as well as the military direction of the war.

I'm afraid your post defies logic, and requires much history to be rewritten before the question of command in the field arises.

It's not simple, and he certainly wasn't perfect, but your suggested alternative would have required different governments in Britain and France for a start. Later Lloyd George took a different view of the campaigns in the second part of 1917, but at all times unlike their German opponents the British generals were acting under the authority of a government that was answerable to parliament.

Keith

Keith thanks for your comments. I am aware that Haig/the High Command was answerable to the War cabinet and to Parliament. I did make the comment that Stalin was not answeable in this way hence the comparison to Russian Front was not a fair one.

Taking the line that you have regarding the accountability - then it would be unfair to really blame Haig but what you have not said is that it was Haig and his military planners who drew up the battle plan not the war cabinet or Parliament (although I accept that large scale operations would need their sanction). Nevertheless, Haig had the option of saying this will fail without more resources or I resign, but he did not so he therefore is as complacent as the polititians. We can only comment retrospectively and with hindsight.

It was always my understanding that Arras was planned in conjunction with the French High command who were to launch Nivelle simultaneously. The aim being to break through the German defences and force them onto open ground where numerically superior allied forces would strike a decisive blow?

With regard to the Somme, Haig still had the authority to suspend or cancel once it was clear that it was a disaster. Yes he might of been sacked but then again he could have walked away without all of those deaths on his conscience. He again choose not to.

[Kitchener's Bugle]

I agree wholeheartedly with Keith's post above. Perhaps KB would like to take a look at this essay below, which is not uncritical of Haig, but is balanced.

http://www.army.mod....cc_paper_08.pdf

TR

The link does not seem to be working?

[Terry_Reeves]

I'm sorry KB, Haig was duty bound to launch the Somme battle in an attempt to take the pressure off the French at Verdun. Perhaps you could say what more resources were required and exactly what would have been achieved if he had resigned?

The link is working for me but paste this into your address bar which should bring it up:

Haig and the Implementation of Tactical Doctrine on the Western Front

Dr Christopher Pugsley

TR

[charlesmessenger]

Remember that we were the junior ally of the French and the Germans were occupying part of their country. Haig was duty bound to support the French and this was what the British govenrment instructed him to do. French would have thought little of the British if they halted an offensive because of heavy casualties and sadly the nature of the war on the Western Front at that time meant that heavy casualties were virtually inevitable.

Charles M

[George Armstrong Custer]

I fear it's a wasted effort taking the time to post links for KB, Terry. Crunchy, way back on post #48 in the aftermath of KB and Wexflyer's initial posts, posted a couple of useful links for them. One of them was to the 'Road to a Revisionist Damascus', a thread which provides rigorously sourced deconstructions of many of the myths about Haig and the Great War. Including, interestingly enough, Haig's appreciation of the machine gun dating from the 1890's, and the fact that he never called it 'an overrated weapon' in 1915. Yet KB clearly didn't bother to read it or else ignored its content and blithely trots out here the old machine gun calumny.

As I said on my first post on this thread, there really is no excuse in 2012 for anyone coming onto an informed specialist forum such as this and lecturing the initiated or misleading the novices with absolute tripe like KB's latest post. Others have already picked up on his ludicrous non-answer as to how he would defeat the German army on the Western Front, which is so clueless as to the political and military realities as to beggar belief, and doesn't even attempt to explain why this would mean the Germans would be defeated with minimal casualties to the Allies. I'll touch on only one more item from his post. My point about what it cost Russia to shift and defeat the invading German war machine in '41 - '45 was clearly referencing the difficulty and cost of defeating the main German army in the field in both world wars. It really doesn't matter a hoot in hell whether it was Stalin or anyone else who was leading Russia - the given of what it would take to beat the main German army was immutable in both wars.

Frankly I cannot believe I've written as much as I have in response to such an utterly nonsensical string of garbage as KB's last post. If someone had set out to tick all the boxes in a Haig troll they couldn't have done better. I haven't seen the like since 'Arnie' stalked these pages. Keith says KB's latest post 'defies logic' - that's putting it mildly. Frankly I see no point in wasting further time mildly providing correctives to such tosh from someone who is not here to learn - we have been over this very, very basic material numerous times on this forum, and Crunchy provided a link to some of it early after KB's appearance which has clearly been ignored. Yet still it goes on regardless. I'm more than happy to provide accurate information for anyone genuinely seeking it, but have neither the time nor inclination to politely exchange 'views' with someone presuming to 'tell us like it is' from such a position of ignorance or mischievousness ( I don't know or care which) as KB. The fault is mine for having strayed from what I said in my first post here after KB and Wexflyer's one-liners - "This is the kind of wilful ignorance for which, given the available literature today, there is no longer any excuse, and which has led me to no longer waste my time posting anything grounded in sustainable fact here."

[Steven Broomfield]

Well said George.

Arnie, eh. I'd forgotten him.

[tn.drummond]

KB now has 2 threads dedicated to debating his issue. His content on this thread has not provided a cogent or coherent argument, I feel duped.

Time for us all to stop feeding flames.

Suddery

[phil andrade]

George, why don't you unleash your nuclear option on KB, and use your " Oh" ?

When you used it on me, I was so traumatised that I had to have stress counselling from your water carrier.

Phil (PJA)

[phil andrade]

No definative figures are available for WW2 Soviet Casualties, estimates range from between 7 to 13 Million Military and perhaps 10 to 12 Million Civilians.

The CWGC quote about 1,115,000 casualties (including all colonials) for WW1.

Clearly at the lower end of the Soviet estimate that would be a ratio of at least 15:1 compared to WW1. (or 23:1 at the higher end).

No. The Soviet archives were made available, and yielded a definitive figure of 8,668,000 military dead from all causes.

Of these, about 6.3 million were killed in battle, which, on a per capita basis, is not so very different from the battle fatalities suffered by Metropolitan France 1914-1918.

Would you have advocated the course of keeping British casualties lower by " fighting to the last Frenchman" ?

Phil (PJA)

[JimSmithson]

It was always my understanding that Arras was planned in conjunction with the French High command who were to launch Nivelle simultaneously. The aim being to break through the German defences and force them onto open ground where numerically superior allied forces would strike a decisive blow?

By the time the whole thing kicked off I think many French were ready to 'launch Nivelle', preferably on the end of a rocket.

I just finished putting something together repudiating the rubbish about Arras but then took George's advice and decided to forget it.

Sorry Phil, maybe bringing this thread or similar back to life at a later date might be an idea.

Jim

[Kitchener's Bugle]

No. The Soviet archives were made available, and yielded a definitive figure of 8,668,000 military dead from all causes.

Of these, about 6.3 million were killed in battle, which, on a per capita basis, is not so very different from the battle fatalities suffered by Metropolitan France 1914-1918.

Would you have advocated the course of keeping British casualties lower by " fighting to the last Frenchman" ?

Phil (PJA)

The report of Grigoriy Krivosheyev which you talk of does not include the deaths of conscripted reservists captured before being listed on active strength, or Partisan dead or militia dead or the 1M citizens that the Germans considered political POW's actively adding to the material fight for Russia. These groups are teated by the Soviets as Civilian Dead. You will find that the majority of western sources conclude different figures than the Soviets - not surprisingly.

[Kitchener's Bugle]

Anyway, to get back to the original subject of this thread, I am still waiting for Haig's denigrators to provide the answers to two simple questions :-

1 Given the situation Haig found himself in, how would you have done things differently ?

2 If Haig had been relieved of his command, who would have made a suitable replacement ?

Keith

I do not think that anyone on this thread is prepared to to put their head above the parapet and make an effort to answer your two questions Keithjk.... I wonder why that might be then?

[Crunchy]

Kitchener’s Bugle,

The links George refers to are here:

 

and

 

They are well worth reading.

Perhaps you can tell us which books you have read on Haig, and the Great War. We might then understand the very simplistic view you have of the subject. Regarding the political/military relationship in war, it is Governments who actually decide the strategy to be employed. As you say. they do indeed sanction every operation, and sometimes drive for its adoption, as Churchill did `for Gallipoli, or insist on them despite military advice against doing so, as the Britsih cabinet did in response to French pressure, for Loos and The Somme. So who is to "blame" for the casualties in those instances?

Haig’s views on machine guns, where he embraced them as far back as 1898, can be found in David Scott’s The Preparatory Prologue: Douglas Haig Diaries and Letters 1861-1914. Interestingly, contrary to popular perception, my research has shown the British Army embraced the machine gun well before the German Army did. By about 1900 British infantry battalions had two, while the German infantry had rejected them, although the trial guns were placed in Jager units where they were regarded as an impediment. Not until after the Russo-Japanese War had demonstrated their worth, did the German Army decide to incorporate them into four of their brigades in 1907, and in 1911 the Army Bill provided for 113 machine gun companies to phased into the infantry brigades over a five year period. So the old myth that Haig and the British Army were behind the ball on machine guns has been discredited by several sources.

Regards

Chris