Haig's achievement.

[phil andrade]

What a thoroughly unpleasant little man!

Pete

Now...if we're looking for the testimony of one such, how about this ?

Haig was unimaginative. Maybe he was competent according to his lights, but these were dim......Nothing can excuse the casualties of the Somme and Passchendaele.

The author ? Bernard Law Montgomery, writing in 1968. That passsage is from page 498 of his A HISTORY OF WARFARE.

What a pregnant phrase " ..competent according to his lights" !

Phil (PJA)

[phil andrade]

Chris,

Before we accept the contention that the casualty rate at Normandy was higher than that for Third Ypres, we might refer to the data of CWGC registers. These indicate that, in the period July 31 to November 10 1917, more than 75,000 British Empire soldiers died in Belgium. The CWGC figure for Normandy - according to Corrigan - is 19,000. Even allowing for twice as many Americans, it's a bit of a stretch to insist that the Normandy battles entailed a higher mortality rate on a daily basis.

Phil (PJA)

[Jack Sheldon]

Slightly off-topic, but bear with me, because it says something about the intensity of fighting in Normandy. A friend of mine, now deceased, landed with the first wave at La Breche, Sword Beach, at H Hour on D Day as part of the 3rd Division. He was a platoon commander and he led his men through ten weeks of battle. When the breakout finally came, the said friend was one of only three original platoon commanders still on their feet - out of the entire division! During that time some platoons were on their second or third commander and the same applied at battalion level; the rate of attrition of commanding officers being extremely high. In the case of the friend I mentioned, for example, his commanding officer's O Group was mortared while still on the beach and the seconds in command had to take over and get the battalion moving inland. My own view FWIIW is that the sheer strain and terror of operating in the close country of Normandy imposed a terrible load on the individual. If you then factor in the subsequent losses as the advance into Germany proceeded, costing most battalions about 3 x their original complement of officers and 2 x their OR strength, then the physical, mental and emotional toll on the Second World War soldiers is clear.

Was it a worse experience than the Somme, or Passchendaele? I would not venture to judge, but I do feel it was at least as bad. The 'how many thousands of casualties per day' is a matter for higher staffs and their calculations. Watching your mates go down one by one is where the losses really hit home and there was plenty of that to be endured in all three places.

Jack

[Ali Hollington]

I think the point about Normandy casualties versus Somme etc, is that as a percentage of troops deployed/engaged the casualty rate amongst infantry units was at the least comparable.

Kind regards

Ali

PS. The above is from memory, so hence no precise figures or references.

[tn.drummond]

I would have thought that was sensible. We are talking about Haig aren't we? If we agree on certain points why quibble with them? You made the comment Haig was not a military genius, I was just interested in how you came to that judgement.

As to the rest of your post, if I wish to defend George, then I will without your permission.

Chris

If you're coming from the viewpoint that Haig was a genius then you and I need the scope of a book to debate, not a forum.

I have consistently stated that I admire some aspects of Haig but to suggest he is a genius is to go too far. This thread was initially about the discussion of his defensive abilities and sufficient comment about his flaws in this area has already been mentioned. I would add to this his difficulties with delegating to his 'Army' level Generals, this is discussed in detail in "Command on the Western Front - The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 1914 - 18" by Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson.

Finally I strongly recommend, again, "Douglas Haig and the First World War" by J P Harris, a lecturer in War Studies at Sandhurst when he wrote this. After a pretty conventional background biography he analyses each of Haig's campaigns and in a closing summary provides an assessment of key points. You can then draw your own conclusions based on a clear and largely unbiased platform of argument.

He closes his introduction with the following paragraph which should give a flavour of his standpoint;

" Ultimately it (the book) is intended to avoid the stereotypes of Douglas Haig both positive (as the clear-sighted, imperturbable great captain) and negative (as a stupid, callous, unimaginative butcher and bungler) and to reveal a human being of at least average complexity, possessing both considerable capacities and virtues and some fairly serious flaws"

Suddery

Edited 19 November , 2012 by Suddery

[bill24chev]

How did a discussion about Haigh develop into a debate on statistics about normandy 1944.

for what its worth, Haigh must have been doing something right, commanders of other armies that had heavy casualties tended to get sacked. I am thinking of Falkenhyan and Nivelle.

I dont think you can realy compare the Somme, 3rd Ypres or Verdun to Normandy except at the individual soldier level. For the soldies of both conflicts war at the sharp end in an Infantry section was deadly although the tactics equipment in the rifle section of 1944 had developed since 1918. in WW1 the bigest killer was Artillery, it was still a significant killer in WW2 but the fighting in the Bocage of Normandy was at close quarteres where the infantry soldies weapons including Mortars amd Machine guns and the skill and training of the individual soldier played a prominant part especialy with allied casualties. For the Germans allied air power was the cause of many casualties.

These changes had a profound affect on casualty rates, for example in Normandy allied airpower played a more significant role than in 1914-18.

Also inmprovements in medicine by 1944 meant that if you were not killed outright chances of survival was greater.This greatly reduced the number of fatal casualties compared to WW1 although total casualties were still high.

In WW1 no attacking army had a significant superiority of numbers until 1918. For this reason the Somme, Verdun and 3rd Ypres were always going to be slogging matches, the mud of Pachendale made this more likley.This was not the case in the West in WW2 except for the initial phase of the German Ardennes offensive in the winter of 1944/5 the allies could put a potentialy overwhelming amount of material and manpower against the Germans.

Common sense and gut feelings that this superiority should have reduced allied casualty rates or the allied commanders where carless about their losses.

so where Eisenower and Monty donkets/butchers?

Although the skill of the German army was also significant in both conflicts,. heavy casualtie dont happen unless there is incompetence or a well trained, numerically strong enemy.

I dont think that the commanders of WW2 were regarded as incompetant and the view of Haigh as moved to at least a view that he was competant when compared to his peers.

.

[Robert Dunlop]

If you're coming from the viewpoint that Haig was a genius...

Suddery, Chris was not coming from this viewpoint. The question he posed bears repeating. How do you define a 'military genius' please? The definition will help in appreciating why you think Haig was not.

Robert

[tn.drummond]

Suddery, Chris was not coming from this viewpoint. The question he posed bears repeating. How do you define a 'military genius' please? The definition will help in appreciating why you think Haig was not.

Robert

That's not how I read his question and on rereading it still is not:

" You made the comment Haig was not a military genius, I was just interested in how you came to that judgement".

If Crunchy wishes to raise a different question about the nature of Military genius then a new thread would be a more appropriate forum. As it is I've answered his question within the confines of this thread, I'm not going to expound further.

This has been a fairly divisive debate and I think Crunchy should speak for himself on this one, I'd not want further mis-understanding creeping in.

Finally, and very importantly, I am saying "If" coming from a certain viewpoint not stating that he is - the emphasis is very different.

Suddery

Edit P.S.

The use of the word 'genius' is used in reference to a quote made by ES Turner in post 56 and 84. To read them in context may be helpful if you've not already done so.

[Crunchy]

If you're coming from the viewpoint that Haig was a genius then you and I need the scope of a book to debate, not a forum.

I have consistently stated that I am an admirer of Haig but to suggest he is a genius is to go too far. ... his difficulties with delegating to his 'Army' level Generals, this is discussed in detail in "Command on the Western Front - The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 1914 - 18" by Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson.

Finally I strongly recommend, again, "Douglas Haig and the First World War" by J P Harris, a lecturer in War Studies at Sandhurst

Suddery

Suddery,

I don't subscribe to any generals/commanders being geniuses. They all have their strengths and weaknesses, natural human flaws and failures, as we all have, and one has to consider a good many factors, including the circumstances they were fighting under and the capabilities of their enemies. I simply took up your point that Haig wasn't a genius, and assumed you believed generals could be categorised as such. Thus I was interested in what your criteria for a military genius was, and where you felt Haig fell down against that criteria.

Whether or not you are an admirer of Haig is not an issue with me. As I said previously in this thread I am neither pro or nor anti Haig, or for that matter pro or anti any general. I simply accept Haig as a well above average soldier, with character flaws and very considerable capabilities, who was given an extraordinarily difficult task, that none of us on this forum would have even come close to doing any better. He made an enormous contribution to the Allied victory, and he should be recognised for that. What I object to is the false accusations made against him, and the vilification of the man through ignorant and shallow comment, based largely on the issue of casualties alone, (and I consider Lloyd George's self serving criticisms fall into this category). I think they ought to be rejected vigorously, and that is the fundamental difference between us.

As for your recommendations, I don’t think Prior and Wilson, despite their excellent book on Rawlinson, fully understand all the issues Haig faced, and my discussions with Robin have confirmed this. Nor do I subscribe to all of Harris's assessments of Haig, despite his position as a lecturer at Sandhurst. While even the best historians may have a thorough knowledge of their sources, they do not always understand the conduct of operations, how armies actually work, the awful responsibilities of high command or even some of the fundamental issues. Robin’s latest book on Gallipoli makes that abundantly clear. I do, however, welcome the work that has come onto the market which gives a fair and balanced view of Haig.

Regards

Chris

[Crunchy]

Hi Phil,

Apropos your post # 102. I take your point that you were talking about the names on war memorials that shaped perceptions after World War Two in post # 55. I was addressing overall casualties, not mortality rates; one cannot ignore the wounded, or that during the Second World War the medical advances since 1918 reduced the percentage who died of wounds. For Normandy one cannot discount the Americans; for much of the battle they fought under 21st Army Group.

Jack has summed up the point I was trying to make very well. Normandy was a very bloody battle with a high human cost, that in my view was comparable to that at Third Ypres.

Regards

Chris

[Crunchy]

How did a discussion about Haigh develop into a debate on statistics about normandy 1944.

In response to post # 55

[Crunchy]

That's not how I read his question and on rereading it still is not:

" You made the comment Haig was not a military genius, I was just interested in how you came to that judgement".

A small quibble, but Robert is correct. My question, in response to your Lloyd George post (yes I did read it), was "could we please have your views on what a military genius is, and where Haig fell down against your criteria?" (post # 88) The comment you quoted was simply clarifying that we were talking about Haig. (post # 92)

[phil andrade]

.

Jack has summed up the point I was trying to make very well. Normandy was a very bloody battle with a high human cost, that in my view was comparable to that at Third Ypres.

Regards

Chris

Yes, please don't think for a moment that I seek to play down the intensity of the Normandy battles, and surely the casualty rates were roughly comparable with those of Third Ypres. I would take issue with the oft stated claim that Normandy 1944 was the "worse" of the two. What worries me as the tendency of some commentators to put a "spin" on the figures, which others then accept without sufficient circumspection. You mention the 415,000 casualties of the Somme, Chris, and compare them with the 208,000 of Normandy. To do justice to the Somme, we must include the 200,000 or so French casualties of that battle, since the Normandy figure is a total Allied figure. Using that criterion, it's startlingly apparent that the Somme produced a much greater daily casualty rate.

Sorry, mistakenly incorporated all this in the "Quote" instead of the opening paragraph !

Phil (PJA)

[tn.drummond]

He made an enormous contribution to the Allied victory, and he should be recognised for that. What I object to is the false accusations made against him, and the vilification of the man through ignorant and shallow comment, based largely on the issue of casualties alone, (and I consider Lloyd George's self serving criticisms fall into this category). I think they ought to be rejected vigorously, and that is the fundamental difference between us.

Regards

Chris

Chris,

I have held up the quote by Lloyd George as a risiblie example of the type of facile judgement heaped at both Haig and others from the regimental army and cannot see how any of my comments for one moment condone what he is saying. The posting was made in response to Wexfler and Kitchener's Bugle who I disagree with, fundamentally, et al. I do still feel that allowance needs to be made to those new to the forum, they need education and education should be delivered in an acceptable manner, otherwise people just don't listen.

My issue was therefore one of rudeness, something I feel as strongly about as you feel about the ' ignorant and shallow'.

George, PMHart and you have all had fair comment on the former issue, as have I and I don't intend reprising it in this context / thread. We differ.

I don't accept Generals as genii and neither does Turner, I reiterate the quote was said in a context against LLoyd-George not for:

" In all LLoyd George's indictment there is some measure of truth. But it is harsh treatment to put a man in the dock and charge him with not being a genius."

How that can be construed as pro-George and anti Haig I have no idea.

I see little to seperate our viewpoints on Haig.

Regards

Suddery

[Crunchy]

Suddery,

Fair enough. Let's draw a line under this discussion.

Regards

Chris

[Crunchy]

Phil,

I don't disagree with you. I was actually comparing Third Ypres with Normandy, but I accept including The Somme figures, as being worse, probably confused the issue. My apologies.

Regards

Chris

[tn.drummond]

Suddery,

Fair enough. Let's draw a line under this discussion.

Regards

Chris

Agreed.

Regards

Suddery

[phil andrade]

Which was the more daunting task : organising and sustaining the spectacular series of advances that the BEF achieved in 96 days between August 8 and November 11 1918; or holding things together under the colossal pressure of mighty German attacks in March and April of that year ? I incline to the view that it was the latter : the situation faced by Haig was pretty terrifying, and I get rather upset by complacent sugggestions that the Germans were so flawed in their strategic application that their offensives were almost bound to fail. The predicament faced by Haig and his men was more dire than that ; when Haig issued his " Order of the Day" in April he must surely have felt that things were getting desperate. And, of course, in March Petain had remarked that Haig was going to be defeated.

My theme is that too little is made of this defensive achievement. Haig himself argued that it was all part of a formulaic approach to the conduct of war...the wearing out fight, the crisis, the exploitation. This process had been inaugurated, he wrote, by the engagement of the BEF on July 1 1916, which marked the onset of a mighty and sustained battle which raged until the Armistice.

To my mind, the achievement of the man is enhanced if we view him fighting in extremis, with the spectre of defeat looming. To survive such an ordeal is perhaps the greatest test for the C-i-C.

Phil (PJA)

[JimSmithson]

Just to add some substantive meat to the Haig - Lloyd George discussion from earlier. In March 1917 Lloyd George asked Maurice Hankey, as Secretary to the War cabinet, to give his personal opinion with regards to Haig. The reply (in the Hankey Papers CAB63) is interesting as in summary it basically says that Hankey understood the misgivings LG had about Haig but that there was no alternative. I quote:

'On the whole I should sum up this part of my note by the view that the personal considerations weigh in favour of a change in the command. But this is to some extent counter-balanced by the absence of any clearly marked successor.'

Later a political angle:

' Personally I believe that if Haig resigned, the Government would very likely be defeated.'

'On the political side, therefore, the arguments appear to me overwhelmingly in favour of Haig's retention.'

Hankey's take on Haig:

'I consider Haig to be a competent but not an inspired leader'

On the other hand he is very supportive of Haig not wishing to continue with the Arras offensive as one to the north would force the Germans to hold gorund much more than on the Scarpe. As it turns out this was not true but an understandable thught at the time. However, LG could not change plans and had to continue to comply with the French on political grounds which Haig fully understood and looked to make as much as he could from the Scarpe offensive.

Hope this moves the discussion along on a more source based level; you did want some other views of Haig Phil.

Jim

[phil andrade]

Thank you, Jim.

More of this, please.

Phil (PJA)

[phil andrade]

In March 1917 Haig asked Maurice Hankey, as Secretary to the War cabinet, to give his personal opinion with regards to Haig. Jim

Hang on ! Is this a typo, or am I to understand that Haig asked Hankey to give his opinion about himself i.e Haig ?

Competent but not inspired - the same was said of Meade, in the American Civil War, who, in my opinion, was not given sufficient credit for his successful defense at Gettysburg.

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

If Crunchy wishes to raise a different question about the nature of Military genius then a new thread would be a more appropriate forum.

Suddery, a good suggestion. I will start the new thread.

Robert

[tn.drummond]

Suddery, a good suggestion. I will start the new thread.

Robert

Best of luck, Robert.

I'll watch from the 3d seats before throwing a sixpence in.

Regards

Suddery

[JimSmithson]

Sorry, yes a typo - Lloyd George asked the question of course. Post duly edited.

Jim

[JimSmithson]

Just to add a little more on Hankey and his thoughts on Haig. The Conference on February 26th/27th February 1917 in Calais is infamous for the attempts to undermine Haig's position or clip his wings, depending upon ones view of the events. That is not the discussion here but what is interesting is Hankey's diary entry for the 27th and his subsequent remarks in the memo prepared for LG that I referred in the earlier post. To give some background for those not aware, on the 26th the French produced a proposal for taking over command and basically reducing Haig to the equivalent of an Army commander. Hankey saved the day by producing a much more acceptable solution which saved LG's face but at the same time went some way towards limited unified command. He presented this on the morning of the 27th to Lloyd George who:

'[He] read it, accepted it, sent for Robinson, who accepted it with intense relief and took it to Haig, who accepted it after a palaver. (my emphasis).

In the later document to LG, Hankey comments on Haig's reaction to the Calais Conference. He is commenting upon the different approach to the German withdrawal by Haig and Nivelle, supporting Haig, but with a small dig as an aside:

'On the merits of the present controversy, however - leaving aside the foolish reflections on the Calais Conference, and the lack of goodwill in carrying it out - my opinion is that Haig is right and Nivelle is wrong.'

By the way, anyone using Spears' version of the meeting should take care as he was not there and most of his information will have come from General Maurice, who had more than a few axes to grind after the War. Hankey's diaries put much of what is in Spears in some doubt, as do the verbatim minutes of the meeting. Spears, as always, makes colourful reading but one must take care.

Jim