Slow Horses and Fast Women

[Neil Mackenzie]

I haven't read the whole thread but these last few posts have been rivetting and very illuminating.

Thanks everyone

Neil

[phil andrade]

Axes were being ground by politicians and little men who saw a chance to flourish by climbing on the shoulders of great men.

The principal grinder being Lloyd George, with his tirades endorsed by Liddel Hart. And how about Churchill ? Hardly a little man....and, I must say, his criticism of Haig is tempered with respect.

A name crops up which intrigues me : Colonel Boraston. This is how Churchill depicts him :

His work is aggressive to a degree that sometimes ceases to be good natured. It is marred by small recriminations, by an air of soreness, by a series of literary sniffs and snorts, which combine to produce an unpleasant impression on the mind of the general reader.

Why did Churchill take such exception ? He sounds like one of the little men that you allude to, Tom.

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

Why did Churchill take such exception ?

The answer to that one ought to be obvious. Churchill was a discredited 'Easterner.' Boraston vigorously reiterated in print the 'Westerner' position which had won the war in the only theatre where it could be won - the Western Front. Churchill only ceased to be a little man on the world stage due to his admittedly brilliant performance in 1940 -1. In the aftermath of the Great War he was widely regarded by many as either a self-serving political turncoat or a strategic incompetent. As the incumbent MP Churchill had shared the platform with Haig in Dundee whilst the latter was hoinoured with the Freedom of that City in 1919. At the next General Election Churchill's reputation had sunk to such a nadir that he was ousted as MP by a prohibitionist candidate in a city known for its pubs. In 1943 — by a margin of just 1 vote — Churchill was offered the same Freedom of the City as had been accorded Haig nearly a quarter of a century earlier. He refused to accept. When asked to explain by Dundee Council, Churchill responded that "I have nothing to add to the reply which has already been sent"

Churchill's The World Crisis was the figleaf held up to give his own disastrous strategic visions in the late war a specious credibility. Churchill knew that men like Haig would see these volumes for what they were. When, therefore, Churchill was preparing volume three of The World Crisis, and wrote to Haig asking permission for certain passages to appear, he felt obliged to add that “You may perhaps remember I was a convinced and outspoken opponent to our offensive policy at Loos, on the Somme and at Passchendaele, and the argument of the book turns strongly against it […..]” Churchill sent a copy of the published book to Haig with a covering letter, dated 28 February 1927, pleading indulgence: "Although I cannot expect that you will share the opinions this book contains, I believe that you will regard them as the result of reflection devoid of ill will etc [….]” Churchill was right - the impetus behind The World Crisis wasn't malicious. But it was self-serving, and consequently damaging to others.

Haig's reaction to Churchill's book, and the nature of the relationship between the two men, was recalled by his son, Dawyck Haig, who had been a nine-year-old boy at the time:

"The visit of Mr Churchill after a nearby Conservative fete gave an inkling of some of the differences between the two great men.

I remember my father talking with his Chief Gunner, Sir Noel (Curley) Birch, in our car coming back from Floors Castle after the Conservative rally in the summer of 1927. Churchill was trundling along in the car behind because he was coming to tea at Bemersyde. In our car were just Sir Noel, my father and myself, and these two Generals were discussing Churchill's book The World Crisis. The part which dealt with Passchedaele had just come out and these two were absolutely hopping mad and the whole car practically exploded. I can remember my father saying that Winston really didn't know what had happened, what the problems were and what the difficulties were over the French. I can remember a tremedous discussion and this went on for about nine or ten miles between Floors and Bemersyde. On arrival my father got out and then the sun came out and my father was his usual beaming warm self. Although Churchill had opposed my father's strategy, they had worked very closely together in the latter part of the war when my father was Commander-in-Chief and Churchill was Secretary of State fro Munitions. After the war they had been responsible for the demobilisation plans when Churchill was Secretary of State for War and my father was Commander-in-Chief of Home Forces. My father thought Churchill had done a good job over munitions, so in spite of their differences over strategy my father and Churchill shared a mutual respect and admiration."

If Churchill hadn't got his strategic ideas so wildly wrong in the Great War, and sought to disguise that at the expense of the victorious 'Westerners' in his postwar writings, he and Haig would have had few differences. As it was, the central object of Churchill’s The World Crisis was self justification in respect of the discredited ‘Easterner’ position which he’d held. The books of The World Crisis were to plant the idea that, despite the war having been won by defeating the main German army in the main theatre of war, the Western Front, it could have been won more cheaply if only Churchill’s schemes had been given greater backing. I’m not a great fan of Robin Prior, but he was undoubtedly correct when he wrote of Churchill’s volume three that

“It is {..] hard to avoid the conclusion that when Churchill wrote this volume the failure of Gallipoli was still very much on his mind. Thus throughout the first half of the volume Churchill is anxious to demonstrate the immense cost of the war on the Western Front and to point to easier alternatives in the east. For 1916 he actually recommends a second invasion of Gallipoli. In 1917 his major plan consists of a landing in Palestine. ‘The Blood Test’ and Somme chapters are designed to show what the failure at Gallipoli meant in terms of manpower. The section on tanks demonstrates to his own satisfaction the incorrigibility of the military, whom it is claimed were incapable of adapting to this new and cheaper way of waging war.”

To borrow a phrase from Paul Newman’s Butch Cassidy, the explicit motif of Churchill’s history of the Great War is that “I’ve got vision and the rest of the world’s wearing bifocals.” This placing of himself at the centre of his narrative caused A J Balfour to remark that The World Crisis was "Winston's brilliant autobiography, disguised as a history of the universe."

Moving on. Having set out some of the evidence for Haig's personality it might be appropriate to give an example of how that personality came into play as he did his job as C-in-C. An account of the impression made by Haig's personality and professionalism upon an intelligent junior officer in early 1918 is given here: Hemming's account.

George

[phil andrade]

Boraston is cited by Churchill, in footnotes, as a source discrediting Haig's optimistic assertions about the casualty exchange rate on the Somme.

Colonel Boraston has now admitted the miscalculation which was made....

(Churchill II p.917, footnote)

In the light of Churchill's use of Boraston's commentary to support the calculations presented in his August Memorandum, I find the vituperative comments he made (post 152) quite remarkable.

Edit : That story about Haig being amused at Joffre's expense at the Dry Lunch with the King....I wonder why Haig didn't instruct his folks to explain to Joffre the reason why he was going to be deprived of alcohol. It seems that Haig was, in a condescending kind of way, rather fond of Joffre. He comments more than once about the "poor man" losing his composure, especially, IIRC, in May 1916 discussions about the forthcoming offensive and the need to relieve Verdun. Haig seems to have liked Joffre ; it's almost as if the manifestations of emotion by the Frenchman gave Haig a feeling of having the upper hand. They got on well, that's the main thing.

The story makes me think of some wonderful film footage of Churchill lunching with Auchinlek and staff in a tent in Egypt in 1942. There are flies buzzing about, and Churchill looks vulnerable in an endearing kind of way....he's coping with the rough and ready nature of the lunch, but he seems distinctly disappointed to be drinking beer instead of his prefered claret or champagne ! I wonder if that's why Auchinlek got the sack.

You've posted that Hemming account before, George, and I must admit that it's a superb anecdote....the image of calmness and authority - sheer professionalism on the part of the Chief - grabs me by the throat.

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

In the light of Churchill's use of Boraston's commentary to support the calculations presented in his August Memorandum, I find the vituperative comments he made (post 152) quite remarkable.

Why? If Boraston's views were important enough to elicit such a response from Churchill it ought to be no surprise that they were important enough for him to use when he felt they supported him.

George