Lance Bombardier, Bombardier, Battery Commander's Assistant

[johnreed]

Taken from 18 Pr Gun Drill Book. The No 1 ascertains when ordered the Crest vAngle and reports it to the Section Commander. Having been a Commad Post Ack when a round from a Gun clipped the top of a tree and detonated over the Waggon Lines (No injuries Sustained) the No 1 did not do his Crest Clearance drills. A No 1 is responsible for Crests to his immediate front.

John

[ianjonesncl]

Ian - I might have misunderstood info given on previous posts re this, but thought that Bombardier = 1 chevron in WW1, & that Lance Bombardier = 'appointment' (no chevron?). I know this changed after 1920ish.

Ruth

Apologies - I always get this one confused.

Ian

[kenf48]

Taken from 18 Pr Gun Drill Book. The No 1 ascertains when ordered the Crest vAngle and reports it to the Section Commander. Having been a Commad Post Ack when a round from a Gun clipped the top of a tree and detonated over the Waggon Lines (No injuries Sustained) the No 1 did not do his Crest Clearance drills. A No 1 is responsible for Crests to his immediate front.

John

Interesting point but we're (aalegedly) dealing with a Siege Battery equipped (as at post 19) with 6 in Howitzers and not 18 pdr Field Guns.

Do you have similar information for the deployment of heavy artillery, did they employ a similar crew numbering system/responsibility as the 18pdr crew?

As Ruth says I believe the 6 in Howitzer was used on counter battery fire. Would the trajectory of a howitzer shell influence the position of the weapon?

It is yet another inconsistency with the account, one can easily imagine (as I did on first reading) such an accident occurring with an 18 pdr field gun, but perhaps an expert can tell us whether 'crest clearance' is an issue with a 6in howitzer.

Ken

[Ruth Ward]

WW1

One chevron = Bombardier

Two chevrons = Corporal

Post War - sometime in the 1920's

One chevron = Lance Bombardier

Two chevrons = Bombardier

Thank you for the confirmation/reminder, Squirrel.

Ruth

[squirrel]

Interesting thread and excellent contributions - I have read the book in question, one of those which you hope will get better the more you read but does not. I thought that there was very little in it that was not embellished, fanciful or downright fiction. Probably the most unlikely account of a soldier's service I have read.

[Ruth Ward]

RE: I have researched Snow(don)'s promotions & awards in The London Gazette & 94th Brigade War Diary - he did not recieve any award or promotion whatsoever as a direct result of 15 June 1918 - as far as I can tell. He did not have a meteoric rise to the top, but eventually reached Colonel in 1927 - 8 years later than Skirth says he did.

I also could not find the award of DSO in the London Gazette supplement for the period suggested but note in the 94 Brigade war diary for June 1918 a DSO being gazetted on the 3rd June and him being mentioned in despatches in May 1918, so not related to any action on 15th June.

The promotion to full Colonel may not have been until 1927 but he was a Lieutenant Colonel at the Italian armistice - the IWM photographs that you have are titled Lt. Col Snowdon and men of the 293rd etc..., and he was subsequently in command of three artillery brigades.

I've lost track of him after that but always wondered what his family's perspective would have been on the claims made by Skirth.

Hi Sean

Thanks for your comments. Snowdon was awarded the DSO 3 June 1918 (Supplement to London Gazette p.6494). He was made actg. Lt.-Col. 7 Nov 1918 (S toTLG p.14466), & made a Lt.-Col 31 January 1923 (TLG p.1152). (Snowdon was promoted to Lieutenant 16 Feb 1901 TLG p.1150).

I would love to know what Snowdon's family make of Skirth's claims too. I did a quick search on freebmd - seems he got married very late in life in London - after retiring from army, & therefore unlikely to have any children.

Ruth

[Ruth Ward]

Interesting thread and excellent contributions - I have read the book in question, one of those which you hope will get better the more you read but does not. I thought that there was very little in it that was not embellished, fanciful or downright fiction. Probably the most unlikely account of a soldier's service I have read.

Squirrel - Thank you. Wonderful comment ( - can I quote you?)

Ruth

[Ruth Ward]

Interesting point but we're (aalegedly) dealing with a Siege Battery equipped (as at post 19) with 6 in Howitzers and not 18 pdr Field Guns.

Do you have similar information for the deployment of heavy artillery, did they employ a similar crew numbering system/responsibility as the 18pdr crew?

As Ruth says I believe the 6 in Howitzer was used on counter battery fire. Would the trajectory of a howitzer shell influence the position of the weapon?

It is yet another inconsistency with the account, one can easily imagine (as I did on first reading) such an accident occurring with an 18 pdr field gun, but perhaps an expert can tell us whether 'crest clearance' is an issue with a 6in howitzer.

Ken

Thanks, Ken. Am reliably informed that 293 SB had 4 x 6" 26 cwt Howitzers - most of the time.

Ruth

[Rockdoc]

Reading Hogg & Thurston, the 6in Howitzer used in 1918 was most likely the 26cwt version, introduced in 1916, than the earlier 30cwt, which was adapted to take the 6in x 100lb shell. The earlier gun is said to have had a short range as it could only elevate to 35 degrees when on its wheels. If it was fitted to a siege platform the elevation increased to 70 degrees but this was a cumbersome process and was not the norm. The 26cwt equipment had a box trail that allowed the elevation to be increased to 45 degrees. The 30cwt was regarded as being at the top end for horse haulage. The 26cwt weighed slightly more so it may well have needed mechanical haulage.

As others have written, I cannot see that any gun detachment with the slightest experience could have loaded and fired their howitzer at a rock face that was so close that the consequent explosion could significantly damage the equipment. The damage to the howitzer and the deaths of several members of the detachment sounds much more likely to have been a premature.

Keith

[johnreed]

In all Artillery the detachment commander i.e. the No 1 is directly responsible for crest clearance to his immediate front.

John

[Ruth Ward]

Reading Hogg & Thurston, the 6in Howitzer used in 1918 was most likely the 26cwt version, introduced in 1916, than the earlier 30cwt, which was adapted to take the 6in x 100lb shell. The earlier gun is said to have had a short range as it could only elevate to 35 degrees when on its wheels. If it was fitted to a siege platform the elevation increased to 70 degrees but this was a cumbersome process and was not the norm. The 26cwt equipment had a box trail that allowed the elevation to be increased to 45 degrees. The 30cwt was regarded as being at the top end for horse haulage. The 26cwt weighed slightly more so it may well have needed mechanical haulage.

As others have written, I cannot see that any gun detachment with the slightest experience could have loaded and fired their howitzer at a rock face that was so close that the consequent explosion could significantly damage the equipment. The damage to the howitzer and the deaths of several members of the detachment sounds much more likely to have been a premature.

Keith

Keith

Thank you for the information & your thoughts - it's much appreciated.

According to Skirth: "... this ... gun pit ... had a steep bluff rising high in front and very steep rocky crags on either side. ... suppose the gun was fired at a low elevation during the hours of darkness?" (p.179). Accusing Bromley (p.227) he says, "You worked out a gun elevation that made a shell hit the cliff."

Ruth

[Ruth Ward]

In all Artillery the detachment commander i.e. the No 1 is directly responsible for crest clearance to his immediate front.

John

John

Thanks for clarifying this for me.

Ruth

[rflory]

I am not an expert in Great War gunnery but having commanded an American 155mm Howitzer battery for two years in Germany in the 1960's some things that have been stated do not make sense. In the American Army, and I am quite sure that the same is the case in the British Army, the battery commander (BC) is ultimately responsible for finding the battery position and ensuring that the battery can safely fire from that position; the gun commander is responsible for making sure that there is nothing to his immediate front that would negate the safe firing of the weapon, but he would not usually be responsible for a round that hit a crest some distance from the battery position. It is inconceivable to me that a round fired by a howitzer would hit anything to its immediate front close enough to cause casualties to the gun crew as howitzers are designed to fire from defilade, i.e. the trajectory of the round is at a high angle so that the howitzers can be placed in defilade behind a hill or ridge, out of sight of the enemy, and still hit an enemy target on the other side of the hill. Guns, on the other hand, are designed to shoot with a flat trajectory. I also find it rather unusual that a No. 1 would be calculating the clearance of a crest some distance from his gun position. The trajectory of the round in relation to a distant crest should be the responsibility of the gun position officer who is calculating the firing data. I also do not understand Keith's statement that "The earlier gun is said to have had a short range as it could only elevate to 35 degrees when on its wheels. If it was fitted to a siege platform the elevation increased to 70 degrees but this was a cumbersome process and was not the norm. The 26cwt equipment had a box trail that allowed the elevation to be increased to 45 degrees." This seems to imply that the higher the elevation the greater the range but, at least in modern howitzers, you must lower the elevation to increase the range, because raising the elevation raises the angle of the trajectory, meaning that the round goes higher but shorter. Another method of increasing the range is to increase the charge. Just my two cents (pence)! Regards, Dick Flory

[Rockdoc]

Dick, I may have garbled my phrasing somewhat and I have never been in the Army but simple trigonometry would suggest that increasing the elevation up to 45 degrees would increase the range. Beyond that elevation, any further increase certainly would shorten the range again.The difference in range for the two types of mounting for the 30cwt tends to confirm my hypothesis but, if that's wrong, please put me straight.

Hogg and Thurston says that the 30cwt "had a want of range" and the difficulties in assembling it onto its platform meant it was replaced ASAP by the 26cwt.The elevation on the travelling carriage was -10 degrees to +35 degrees and on the platform +35 degrees to +70 degrees. The difference in range would appear to be in the maximum weight of charge. For the 30cwt it was 2lb 8.5oz of cordite but for the 26cwt it was 4lb 11.5oz. The range with the 100lb shrapnel shell for the 30cwt was 5,200 yards on the travelling carriage and 7,000 yards on its siege mounting. The 26cwt fired up to 9,500 yards with the same shell.

Keith

[johnreed]

Crest Clearance

As my understanding to the Crest Clearance problem, there are three problems.

1. In the selection of the Battery position the Battery Commander must ensure that his guns can shoot down the line ordered and that there is an adequate overlap between charges.

2. In the engagements of targets, the Gun Position Officer must ensure that his guns do not fire at such an angle of departure that the shells may hit a crest along the trajectory.

3. In planning when a Commander may require to know the area which cannot be engaged by the guns of his Battery, because of Crest Clearance problems., this usually provided in the form of a Battery dead ground trace.

Responsibility for Crest Clearance

(a) The No. 1 of each gun is responsible that the trajectory will clear any obstacle immediately in front of the gun, e.g. a tree or house.

( The GPO is responsible:-

(i) That the Battery position which he is allocated is suitable from the Crest Clearance point of view.

(ii) For determining the minium safe angles of departure for each charge to clear any crests visible from the gun position

(iii) For determining the minimum safe angles of departure required to clear crests not visible from the gun position.

(iv) For ensuring that the guns of his battery never fire at such an angle that the shells will hit a crest, whether the crest is visible from the gun position or not.

(v) If necessary to prepare a dead ground trace

John

[johnreed]

In 1968 whilst in Libya with 25 Pdrs we were direct firing at a Jebel 2,000 yards away, a Base plate from an HE round came back on to the Gun Position and nearly hit the Signals Serjeant.

John

[ianjonesncl]

In 1968 whilst in Libya with 25 Pdrs we were direct firing at a Jebel 2,000 yards away, a Base plate from an HE round came back on to the Gun Position and nearly hit the Signals Serjeant.

John

John

105 mm Ligh Gun had those as well - Schlater Base plates. Welded on - shell went towards the target, base plate went anywhere but !

Ian

[ianjonesncl]

Crest Clearance

As my understanding to the Crest Clearance problem, there are three problems.

1. In the selection of the Battery position the Battery Commander must ensure that his guns can shoot down the line ordered and that there is an adequate overlap between charges.

John

The other problem is Line to Shoot out to and here comes the problem with Howitzers. As Dick Flory pointed out, the elevation on a howitzer is decreased to increase the range. Consequently as targets arise in depth, or supported arms advance, range to target increases, elevation decreases, and the problem of cresting arises. So when deployed in hilly areas, the howitzers may be well within range - however, as you correctly pointed out there is "dead ground" that can not be engaged due to crests.

Ian

[

[Ruth Ward]

Dick Flory, Keith, John & Ian

Thank you for all this information & discussion - it's fascinating, though I don't quite understand it all, but think I've got the gist.

Could someone just clarify for me if the 'BCA' would be involved in this - the crest clearance issue. Skirth says that Bdr Bromley was a BCA - & it was partly his fault ,along with the BC, (Capt. Evatt was 2nd in command whilst Snowdon was commanding 94th Brigade at this time) that the 'accident' occurred. My grandfather wasn't a Bombardier at this time, but have no proof either way about him being a BCA (although he only had very basic arithmetic skills when he left school).

Thanks again for your help.

Ruth

[ianjonesncl]

This is a Panorama from the Battle of Asiago which gives us an idea of the ground.

[ianjonesncl]

Dick, Keith, John

A few thoughts:

'Our Guns in Italy' (Journal of Royal Artillery 1922?). In it the author says that there were problems siting the guns, finding gun platforms, difficulties making the necessary calculations, having to fell some trees etc. - all due to the nature of the terrain & the need to remain undetected by the enemy

293 SB are deployed behind cover in order to conduct counter battery fire. There are difficulties in establishing gun platforms and the only available possible positions have a local crest problem within 10 – 20 yards, a small rock face. I can equate this to deploying my own Battery in an urban position, local crest problems abound.

In all Artillery the detachment commander i.e. the No 1 is directly responsible for crest clearance to his immediate front.

In that environment the detachment commander would be acutely aware of crest problems. His whole detachment would be looking at where that barrel was pointing. Consequently the tangent elevation may have been correct.

an untested & unregistered howitzer fired a shell

Any corrections for muzzle velocity to the quadrant elevation to calculate the tangent elevation may have been inaccurate or unknown. Consequently the tangent elevation ordered may not have crested the gun, however the angle of departure was insufficient to clear a local crest. I have been on a distant crest where one would have preferred the correct muzzle velocities had been applied in the firing calculations.

And…..

Skirth's account - but to my mind the whole edifice of his conversion falls and is exposed as a fiction if you consider Skirth's rank as a Bombardier.

Skirth is the unit Walt.

[ianjonesncl]

[ianjonesncl]

This may help illustrate the problem. It may also indicate why the observer could be so close to the gun.

[ianjonesncl]

Deploying in mountainous country is still a challenge !

779190_BRtLp-M.jpg]

[ianjonesncl]

Dick Flory, Keith, John & Ian

Thank you for all this information & discussion - it's fascinating, though I don't quite understand it all, but think I've got the gist.

Could someone just clarify for me if the 'BCA' would be involved in this - the crest clearance issue. Skirth says that Bdr Bromley was a BCA - & it was partly his fault ,along with the BC, (Capt. Evatt was 2nd in command whilst Snowdon was commanding 94th Brigade at this time) that the 'accident' occurred. My grandfather wasn't a Bombardier at this time, but have no proof either way about him being a BCA (although he only had very basic arithmetic skills when he left school).

Thanks again for your help.

Ruth

Garrison Artillery Training Vol II (Siege) 1911 (Reprinted, with amendments,1914)

Chapter IV Battery Drill Sct 18 page 34

The battery commander's personnel

1. The battery commander requires a personnel of three men. These are called the "battery commanders assistant". "no.2" and the "plotter" respectively.
2. The battery commander's assistant is a non-commissioned officer selected from among trained observers. He will keep the battery ranging sheet, and with "No. 2" assist the battery commander in any other way that the latter may direct.
3. The special duty of "No 2" is to assist with the director.
4. The plotter is a non-commissioned officer or gunner trained as an observer. He will receive all the information sent in from the observers, manipulate the field plotter if used, combine the observations of the observers, and give the results to the battery commander, and perform such calculations as the latter may direct.
5. When available, an officer will be employed on the battery commander's personnel as an observation officer.

The fact your grandfather was trained in basic arithmetic skills would make him a good candidate for the BC's detachment. It sounds as if he could have been a plotter. I do not think the roles of the personnel would have changed between 1914 and 1918, however, many technical advances in gunnery were made during WW1, so the drills I have in the manual for the calculation of firing data may have changed. The principles were and still are the same.