EEF People

[michaeldr]

Anybody have any views ?

I am not into this aspect as well as you are Dave, but even so, a couple of thoughts do occur to me

Re your "I believe these objections stemmed from Palin himself. Resisting the CIGS in this manner would not have made him any friends" - Palin does not appear to have suffered under the new GoC (Allenby), appointed a few weeks later – e.g; Allenby to the CIGS, Robertson, 19 Oct '17 – "Bulfin has three good Divisional Generals; Palin, Hare and Hill."

Re your "the apparent collapse of this resistance subsequently and the emerging mixed bdes would seem to say that he lost this argument." – perhaps it was inevitable & quite unavoidable, with so much of the original EEF taken to France after the German offensive, and their replacement by (raw) Indian regiments

regards

Michael

[ddycher]

Michael

Would seem that at the time of the formation of the 75th Palin was deemed the resident Indian Army expert in country. He was also instrumental in developing the Indian Army courses at Zeitoun. He was apparently held in very high esteem during Murrays tenure at one time being offered the role of GOC Ismailia.

His appointment to GOC was to be the highlight of his career as far as I can tell at the moment hence my earlier comments. Am now trying to get a sense of his interaction with Allenby and GHQ. Will post as I get a better sense.

Regards

Dave

[ddycher]

Gents

Getting back to the original topic. I have now traced bttalion histories for the 234th Bde through the events at Junction Station. None of which give me a definitive position on Anleys replacement. Potted history below :

11th November : XXI Corps first ordered by GHQ to aggressively push for Junction Station. They order the demolition of the bridge over the Wadi Herrubah north of Junction Station and the clearing of the line as far north as possible.

12th November : TBD

13th November : 234th Bde come through out of divisional reserve. Palin orders them to make a night march on Junction Station. Anley assembles the british officers of his Bde a little after 10pm and tells them he has received urgent orders to "make for Junction Station" at once. He assigns 123rd Outrams Rifles to the advance guard and 2/4th Dorsets to escort the demolition party (apparently commanded by a yet to be identified RE officer). Outram's Rifles were commanded by Lt.Col. G. R. Cassels. Cassels' account of the events of the evening of the 13th / morning of the 14th are quoted in "Outrams Rifles" by H. G. Rawlinson. There is alot of ambiguity in the account and the whole section of the book dealing with the attack on Junction Station reads very defensive again implying some level of external dissatisfaction with the events of the evening. Cassels advances around 10.30pm w/o the demolition party. Led by A Coy (Maj. Kidd) they advance to within a mile of the station. There is immediate ambiguity, in the history of the 58th Vaughan's Rifles Wylly claims that Vaughans Rifles who had been heavily engaged on the right flank of the Bde during the day, and taken heavy casualties, had broken up preperation of a Turkish counter attack on that flank. Wylly subsequently claims that the Bde was 1.5 miles west of the Junction by 11pm on the 13th. Where there was a short engagement with the enemy who quickly retired. After which the Bde dug in.

14th November : Cassels does not agree and states that by 2am Outrams Rifles "a mile or so" from Junction Station. Locke (who was there) in "The History of the Dorsetshire Regiment - PartII agrees with Cassels. Cassels can see alot of activity at the station and sends back request to Bde HQ for the demolition party which has still not reached him. There is then some "traffic" between Cassels and Bde HQ and at some point in the next hour a Staff Officer arrives to determine their true position. Cassels himself then seems to have returned to Bde HQ for some reason leaving the Advance Guard under the command of Maj. Kidd. Between 2 and 3 am Kidd stubles into a Turkish baggage convoy and its escort which he captures. He is subsequently attacked on the right flank. Cassels reinforces Kidd and the attack is beaten off by around 3am.

Cassels claims the demolition party arrived at somtime after 3am ("there is unfortunately no record of the exact hour") having been delayed by the pack animals having bolted. Locke claims that the demolition party failed due to pack mules attached to the RE having bolted. The demolition party is sent to the advance guard under Kidd to carry on with the demolition. Locke however claims it was commanded by Lt Sutherland of the 2/4th Dorsets (there is no ref to the Dorsets at all in Cassels account). Cassels further claims that it was day break by the time the demolition party under Kidd reach the railway line where heavy fire was drawn on them and they were forced to retire.

Soon after Cassels despatches the demolition party he receives orders from Anley to dig in. This must have now been close to daybreak.

However at daybreak an air reconaissance shows that the Turks are evacuating Junction Station, this includes two trains on the as yet undemolished tracks. Cassels is ordered to send two patrols into Junction Station which he does with little opposition. by 7.30 the station is occupied by Outrams Rifles Rifles, Vaughan's Rifles and 2 armoured cars of the 12th Light Armoured Motor Battery. Cassels does state that it was originally thought that Von Kressenstein was aboard one of the trais but that it was subsequently shown he had left the day before by car. He also states that had Anley had artillery support they could have prevented the trains escaping.

All in all the records of the events read like a comedy of errors, show a lack of consistancy and confusion. Although there is no mention in any of the histories of Anley being replaced it is apparent from contemporary histories he was atleast peripheral to events. Colston was to command the 233rd and 234th through 20th-22nd November. Cassels himself a composite force at Bde strength at Nabi Samweil under Maclean where Maclean is shown to be have taken over direct command before the end of 234th Bdes fighting at Nabi Samweil a few days later.

As for other players :

1. Although Cassels does not come over well however no blame seems to have eventually stuck to him and he went on to become Brig.-Gen. commanding the 31st Infantry Bde. Kidd who led the advanced guard went on to be awarded the DSO and was a post war commander of Outrams Rifles.

2. Maj. A. G. Lind who commanded Vaughans Rifles does not seem to have been directly involved.

3. Locke (2/4th Dorsets) was subsequently the first garrison commander at Junction Station.

Would appreciate your views.

Regards

Dave

[ddycher]

A very late addition. The 75th AA&QMG diary mentions this only in passing stating that Anley was evacuated sick. No other references whatsoever.

Regards

Dave

[ddycher]

All

 

More than 10 years after posting the original I have some form of closure on this one.

 

C.P. Manning (then the RE Lieut. referred to in the OH as the demolition party) clarified events in his frank assessment in the June 1978 "The Royal Engineers Journal". A run of mistakes and indecision lead Kydd and himself to failing to blow the train tracks and allowing rolling stock, and perhaps, von Kressenstein to escape. Anley failure to push on and take Junction Station when it was clearly being evacuated is explored as well as the Turks destroying material at Junction station not referred to in the OH. He clearly lays out that Anley's "going sick" (his quotes not mine) along with the Divisional CRE who had by then "well and truly blotted his copy book" was a removal showing Palin not adverse to doing so.

 

Nice when you have a direct ref from the events confirming thoughts a hundred years later.

 

Regards

Dave

[michaeldr]

4 hours ago, ddycher said:

10 years after posting the original I have some form of closure on this one.

 

Well done Dave!

Congratulations on the follow through

[ddycher]

Thanks Michael.

 

Regards

Dave