EEF People

[ddycher]

All

Does anyone have any views on whether Brig.-Gen. Frederick Gore Anley was removed by Palin (G.O.C of 75th Division) after events of the night of 14th November 1917. Anley was at this time commander of 234th Bde but was slammed for pausing before Junction Station and allowing rolling stock (and some say von Kressenstein) to escape. Although he is officially listed as sick on November 19th I can not help but think he was removed - potentially the only Bde Commander in the 75th to have been through its short history.

Comments on his actions of the 14th are fairly common. Little or nothing on the relinquishment of the bde though.

Be interested in anyones views.

Regards

Dave

[michaeldr]

Dave,

His medal and decorations were sold at Spinks [see http://www.spink.com/auctions/pdf/5005.pdf]

Scroll down to item 547 on page 111 (the pdf doc's 113/146) for details, photograph and potted biography which includes;

"Colonel Anley took his command to France with 12 Infantry Brigade, disembarked at Le Havre, 24 August, led his Battalion into action at the Battle of Le Cateau two days later, and formed part of the rearguard in the retreat from Mons; he assumed command of 12 Infantry Brigade 14.9.1914, and led the Brigade at the battles of the Marne, the Aisne, and the 1st and 2nd Battles of Ypres (M.I.D. in Sir John French’s Despatch for the Aisne 8.10.1914); Temp. Brigadier General 20.10.1914–24.1.1917; Colonel/Temp. Brigadier General January 1916; handed 12 Brigade over 5.6.1916 with the proud

boast that he had never known the Brigade during his command to yield a trench to the enemy (Legion of Honour October 1914; C.B. June 1916); after a period of home duty he joined 234 Brigade, 75 Division, Egyptian Expeditionary Force in Palestine and later commanded them at the third Battle of Gaza"

Sorry, but I don't know enough about this to have formed a view, though as I read the OH account, it does not appear too bad. Was Palin the unforgiving/sacking type?

[Philip Wilson]

Well clearly matters did not go according to plan on the 13th November 1917 for there was an expectation that both the 52nd and 75th Divisions would capture Junction Station (that day) The 234th Brigade together with 12th Light Armoured Motor Battery captured Junction Station at 0730 hrs the following day according to Kearsey's 'A Summary of the Strategy and Tactics of the Egypt and Palestine Campaigns 1917-18.

There is no mention of Anley in Wavells 'Palestine Campaigns', there is however a useful precis of what transpired on the 13th in Bruce's - The Last Crusade, pages 150-151.

ISBN 0 7195 54322.

The 234th Bde was strongly counter attacked during the night of the 13th by the Turks covering Junction Station less than two miles distant - as confirmed in 'The Advance of EEF'. The events on the ground being such that it took them until 0730hrs the following day to advance those two miles.

The Order of Battle for the 75th Division clearly shows Anley as being (sick 19/11/17)

whilst in the Advance of the EEF page 71 he is recorded as having relinquished his command of the 234th Bde in November 1917. Its worth you looking at his file but it could well have been weeded.

So far I have found little reference to Anley here other than a useful write up in 'Soldiers of the Nile - a Biographical History of British Officers of the Egyption Army 1882-1925,' which Spink may well have referred to when selling his medals in April 2005.

To return to Junction Station:

Oscar Teichman records in 'The Diary of a Yeomanry M.O.' for the 19 November 1917 'we stumbled in the dark into Junction Station , which had recently been captured and seemed to consist, in the dark, mainly of shell holes and destroyed railway lines. The rain came down in torrents and we (the Worcestershire Yeomanry) spent a very wet night sleeping in the mud.'

[ddycher]

Michael / Philip

Alban Bacon who was on the 75th Divisional Staff wrote in his "Wanderings of a Temporary Warrior" :

"One of our Brigades had captured the station on the preceding night, and, had more expedition been used, should have rounded up a train full of Turks. It was, however, a few minutes too late".

Again implying that events were frowned upon at the divisional level.

Regards

Dave

[Philip Wilson]

Dave - Thanks thats helpful

Dave/Michael - here are some more clues.

http://www.firstworldwar.bham.ac.uk/donkey/anley.htm

Philip

[michaeldr]

There is no doubt that Anley's career had some unusual twists and turns

But is it possible to eliminate the 'official' (or health) question before going on to search for other reasons

His period back in the UK, post June 1916 - was this also for health reasons?

Up to that point his record seems to have been quite good

quote: Colonel Anley took his command to France with 12 Infantry Brigade, disembarked at Le Havre, 24 August, led his Battalion into action at the Battle of Le Cateau two days later, and formed part of the rearguard in the retreat from Mons; he assumed command of 12 Infantry Brigade 14.9.1914, and led the Brigade at the battles of the Marne, the Aisne, and the 1st and 2nd Battles of Ypres (M.I.D. in Sir John French’s Despatch for the Aisne 8.10.1914); Temp. Brigadier General 20.10.1914–24.1.1917; Colonel/Temp. Brigadier General January 1916; handed 12 Brigade over 5.6.1916 with the proud boast that he had never known the Brigade during his command to yield a trench to the enemy (Legion of Honour October 1914; C.B. June 1916)

Bearing in mind his age, health could easily have been a real problem;

or do you think that is what they wanted us to believe

regards

Michael

[Philip Wilson]

Michael he was not that old in comparison to some and was born in 1864 so by 1917 he would be in his early fifties. The only adverse coment I have found so far is in Laffin's book 'British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One - page 23 - when GHQ replaced Swinton with General Anley 'who was ordered to establish discipline among tank crews.'

When starting his job Anley announced he was "not interested in tanks" thus echoing Kiggell who had appointed him.' This comment may have been taken out of context for Anley's main concern was to smarten up what GHQ had seen as scruffy indisciplined tank men, how the tanks worked was another matter.

Sickness may actually be the reason why he relinquished his command of the 234th Bde on 19 November, 1917 for his successor MaClean is also recorded as sick on the 8 April 1918.

Philip

[michaeldr]

Michael he was not that old in comparison to some and was born in 1864 so by 1917 he would be in his early fifties.

Philip,

1864 rings a bell with me iro Gallipoli and Hunter Weston (born that year) who retired sick in mid-campaign. You are correct that today it would not be considered old, but back then, with medicine at the stage of development that it was in that era, then I am not too sure.

Allenby's views regarding age/fitness were quite clear and may possibly have been well known to his commanders down the chain – see his letter to Robertson 26 July 1917

"I would suggest that, if officers are sent here to take active command as Major Generals, they should be young and vigorous men with French experience...

A Divisional Commander in this country has more work on horseback, and lives a harder life by far than a Divisional Commander in France."

Allenby was born in April 1861 – would he have considered someone born in 1864 "young and vigorous"? Palin may have taken his cue from his chief (though actually I think he was the same age as Anley)

An interesting puzzle this one

best regards

Michael

[ddycher]

Philip

Thanks for the photo.

Maclean was in and out of command for the remainder of the war. Never out for very long and not permanently replaced so I had always thought he had been "doing something else" rather than repeatedly ill. Do you have any other views ?

Back to Anley seem to have hit a hard stop with him with respect to Junction Station. Only other comment I have at the moment is that it is interesting to note is that after his period on half pay he was never agaian given a fighting command. Just food for thought.

Regards

Dave

[Philip Wilson]

Michael / Dave

Health may well have been a problem - have you looked at his file or any medical records for the Brigade/Division?

I recall Allenby's views in his letter to Robertson 26th July 1917 which was linked to the proposal thet Major-General E. Montagu-Stuart-Wortley (born in 1857) be sent to the EEF, among others.

What is clear is that Wortley's immediate superior on 2 July 1916 (the Somme) wrote of the disastrous operation- Wortley had shown 'a lack of offensive spirit'......' I therefore recommend that a much younger man and one more physically capable of energy, should be appointed to command the Division.'

To return to Anley, his successor in command of 234th Inf Brigade was a much younger man (born in 1874) It is evident from the 'Orders of Battle of Divisions' that Maclean had several periods of sickness between April and August 1918 when commanding the 234th Inf Brigade.

Physical fitness and stamina is clearly a consideration as is age - the conditions and privations of the war clearly increased the risk of sickness.

Philip

[ddycher]

Philip

Not so sure on Maclean.

What I have on file only shows him out sick for a couple of weeks in April 1918. Before taking command of the 234th he had served throughout Gallipoli and then in Egypt / Palestine as DAA (then AA) and QMG of 52nd Division without any apparent health problems. My thoughts are still that he was holding temporary or acting positions on Corps staff during his time out of the Bde. However have nothing to prove or disprove this at present.

Regards

Dave

[Philip Wilson]

Dave

Yes you are likely to be right - one definate period of sickness - other periods as yet unquantified. See below extract page 124 Order of Battle of Divisions Part 2B.

Philip

[ddycher]

Thanks Philip

Exploring your point re age further shows that the 75th Division was generally led by comparitivey young officers. Both the other 75th Divisions Brig.-Gen's - Huddleston (232nd Bde) and Colston (233rd Bde) - were in their thirties.

Not sure how old Palin himself was but am going to take another look at this.

Regards

Dave

[Philip Wilson]

Dave

From the Graduation of Officers of the British Army, War Office 1909:

page 513 Philip Charles Palin born 8 August 1864

He is listed in 1909 as a Major in the Indian Army effective 28.4.1904.

A check in Debretts 1919 under Companionage page 1654 confirms born 1864 - by then Palin is listed as a Major-General with CB, CMG.

Two useful books to have here at home.

Philip

[ddycher]

Thanks Philip

As you say sounds like two very useful books to have. Will try to get a copy. Still looking into Palin's command style in the 75th Division to try to get a better picture. Will update as I found anything new.

Regards

Dave

[ddycher]

Philip

Have always had a real interest in Palin. He has strong ties to the 1/5th Devons - which is the centre of my study. Apart from being the GOC 75th Division he has very strong links with India and Multan in particular (the 14th Sikhs depot remained at Multan, unbrigaded in the 3rd Lahore Divisional Area) where 1/5th Devons were for a period garrison troops before moving to Egypt.

That said I have struggled to get a clear picture of his wartime experience prior to taking command of the 75th Division. Know he served pre-war with the 14th Sikhs. (Michael I have noticed your historical interest in the forum on the 14th Sikhs...anything to add here ?) Know he commanded and took them to Egypt and then Gallipoli (He was one of only three british officers from the 14th Sikhs not wounded @ Gallipoli).

It is during his time in Gallipoli when the 29th Indian Bde were part of the Australian and New Zealand Division that I have the only indication todate of his personality. He is stated as being an "autocrat" and a stickler for discipline. Michael's comments on Hunter-Weston are timely as Palin served under him in Gallipoli. Hunter-Weston going as far as putting in writing how impressed he was by the way Palin maintained both his trenches and his battalion.

He commanded the 126th Bde briefly between 5th and 24th June. Then after a period sick in August 1915 he returned Gallipoli and took command of the 29th Indian Bde in the September. Know he then commanded the 29th Indian Bde through the evacuation and return to Egypt. His Egypt / Palestine experiences prior to him taking command of the 75th Division I am still very weak on.

Palin remained in Egypt as BGC with the 29th Indian Bde when 14th Sikhs went to Persia and then Mesopotamia. I have some ref's to him having led a TBD column and he was gazetted as a Section Commander of Southern Canal Section on 4th February 1917. He was still BGC 29th Bde when it was broken up to form the initial Indian contingent of the 75th Division.

Although I have no further indication as yet of his personality, those that I have would support him taking a strong reaction to Anleys delays on November 14th (still hanging stubbornly to my theory that Palin replaced him).

Regards

Dave

[Philip Wilson]

Dave

In 'Allenby in Palestine - Selected Military Correspondence' by Matthew Hughes - Palin gets two mentions only:

Allenby to Robertson 19 October 1917:

'......Chauvel, commanding the Mounted Corps has had a bout of fever lately; but is well now, and will probably be all right. If he cracks up, I have George Barrow available. Bulfin has three good Divisional Generals; Palin, Hare and Hill'

Allenby to Wigram 5 Sept(October) 1918 (misdated by Allenby should read Oct):

Contains a very detail report outlining the success of the British attacks of the 19 September - 'The 75th - Palin arriving at El Tireh, stopped and fell into reserve, on Palin's left Shea, with the 60th - swung across from the coast, leaving a gap for the Cavalry; and made for Tulkeram. Everything went on oiled wheels. Staff work was perfect there was not a hitch anywhere'.

Sounds very matter of fact - we well know that war is not as clean and clinical as that - however in the broad scheme of things it went according to plan. Whilst on the ground men lost their lifes in the dust and heat of battle and others suffered from their wounds - many subsequently being cared for by the EEF Medical Services.

Colonel Wavell (Robertson's Liasion Officer with EEF) was well placed to write his book 'The Palestine Campaigns' - he passes no comment on Anley's performance at Junction Station and Palin is merely mentioned in his role as GOC 75th Div. FM Birdwood in his book 'Khaki and Gown' makes no reference to Palin what so ever.

I am inclined to agree with you - Palin may well have had Anley removed but proving it is another matter as I have yet to read anything to confirm this in any published works on the Palestine Campaigns.

Philip

[ddycher]

Philip

Very little in general written about Palin that I can find. 75th being one of the few divisions without a written history doesn't help. Currently working my way through his staff to get a better appreciation of the man. Will let you know if I uncover anything new.

On a side note : Noted with interest your thread on the Leasowe Castle would be keen to swap notes there also.

Regards

Dave

[ddycher]

Philip / Michael

Following up on this. I have been unable to determine who commanded Southern Canal Section on its establishment in November 1916. Palin is not gazetted to command until 4th February by which time the size of the force was greatly reduced. Still trying to find out what exactly it did entail outside of he 29th Indian bde - any ideas ?

Potentially moving away from the original subject matter but still trying to detrmine which staff carried through from 29th bde into the 75th Division.

Appreciate your views.

Regards

Dave

[michaeldr]

Dave,

You may well have checked this already, but here is the relevant part of from Murray's Despatch – it does not tell us much does it

"Arrangements were completed for the abolition of the three sections of the Canal Defences; for the amalgamation of the old Nos. 1 and 2 Sections into the Southern Canal Section; and for the division of the old No. 3 Section into two parts—one being the Desert Column, which, for the time being, was composed of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division and the 42nd and 52nd Divisions, and the other being called the Northern Canal Section and practically forming the lines of communication of the Desert Column. The Northern Canal Section at first extended from the Canal as far east as Romani, and will soon extend to El Arish. I also made preparation for a considerable reduction of the garrison in the Southern Canal Section, and for the withdrawal of the 53rd Division altogether from this area to form the general reserve of the Eastern

Force. All these preparations were completed during the first half of November, and took effect between the 22nd November and 5th December, by which time the whole of the 42nd Division had been relieved from its line of communication duties and concentrated at Mazar. The 53rd Division was concentrated in reserve at Ismaiha and El Ferdan, while the Desert Column and the Northern and Southern Canal Sections were formed as above described."

The old Nos. 1 and 2 Sections had previously comprised (in July 1916, see map below)

No. 1 = 54th Div., [less 163rd Brigade], 20th Indian Brigade, 29th Indian Brigade, Etc (whatever Etc means)

No. 2 = 53rd Div., [less 158th & 159th Brigades], 163rd Brigade

regards

Michael

[michaeldr]

Reading on in Murray's Despatch I see that

"By the 13th January the 54th Division had been withdrawn altogether from the Southern Canal Section, and was concentrated at Moascar, ready to move north as soon as might be required."

Does this mean that after mid-Jan 1917 the Southern Section comprised only 20th & 29th Indian Brigades, and the 'Etc.'?

[michaeldr]

Reading on a little further

"The main body entered Nekhl at dawn on the 18th [Feb 1917], and the Southern Column from Suez reached the town at 9 a.m. The latter column, which included detachments of Indian infantry, had marched from Bir Abu Tif (20 miles south-east of Suez) through the difficult W. Abu Garawid pass to Ain Sudr and thence to Nekhl. The total captures at Nekhl were 11 prisoners, one field gun, a number of rifles, 16,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 250 rounds of gun ammunition, and a quantity of stores and explosives. These well executed and carefully-organised operations gave one more proof to the enemy of the mobility of our mounted troops, and of their power to strike over considerablestretches of waterless desert. The excellent arrangements for the Nekhl operation reflect great credit on Brigadier-General P. C. Palin, C.B., General Officer Commanding, Southern Canal Section, and his staff."

The latter column, which included detachments of Indian infantry - Alas no indication who else (the Etc.s) was there together with the detachments of Indian infantry. Does the OH throw any light on this?

[ddycher]

Thanks Michael

Basically I have the following :

Palin BGC 29th Indian Bde in no.1 Section - had led the Bde prior to the evacuation of Gallipoli.

No.1 and no.2 Sections being amalgamated to form the Southern Canal Section which was under constant reduction almost from the moment it was formed.

Palin was appointed Section Cmdr on the 4th February 1917. I dont know who commanded before that.

75th Division effectively grew out of Southern Canal Section after the 53rd had left. 232nd being part of the Section on its formation on Apr 14th. The Southern Canal Section at this time consisting of :

G.O.C. -

Brevet Colonel (temp. Brig.-General) P. C. Palin, C.B. (in addition to his duties as G.O.C., 29th Indian Brigade).

Mounted Troops -

4th (A. and N.Z.) Battalion, Imperial Camel Corps (less 15th Coy., attached 3rd Bn. and 16th Coy., attached N. Canal Section, and with 13th Coy. from 3rd Bn. attached).

Engineers -

14th Army Troops Company, R.E.

496th (Bent.) Field Company (less detachment).

Infantry - 232nd Infantry Brigade.

G.O.C. - Major (temp, Brig. General) H.J. Huddleston, D.S.O., M.C.

2nd Loyal North Lancashire Regiment (serving w/ Eastern Force);

1/4th Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry (serving w/ Eastern Force);

1/5th Devonshire Regiment;

2/5th Hampshire Regiment.

29th Indian Infantry Brigade.

2/3rd Gurkhas;

3/3rd Gurkhas;

123rd Rifles;

Brigade Signal Section (British);

123rd Indian Field Ambulance;

Indian Brigade Supply Column.

49th Indian Infantry Brigade.

G.O.C. - Lieut. Colonel (temp. Brig General) E. R. B. Murray.

58th Rifles;

1/101st Grenadiers;

1/102nd Grenadiers;

110th Indian Field Ambulance;

1st Garrison Bn., Notts and Derby Regiment (less 2 companies);

1st Garrison Bn., Northampton Regiment.

A.S.C -

No. 900 Company, A.S.C. (Auxiliary Horse Transport Company, Ismailia).

Cyprus Detachment.

1st Garrison Bn., Royal Scots.

(Detail from Official History)

29th Indian Bde was disbanded and its Bn's distributed among the new 75th Division Bde's as they were formed.

Palin was given command of the 75th Division on the 25th April. Division was not "constituted" though until 21st June.

Dont have the dates for the disbandment of the Southern Canal Section as yet but am currently assuming late june.

Having real problems tracing what was to become the 75th Divisional Staff back into the Southern Canal Section and beyond.

Regards

Dave

[Philip Wilson]

Dave

I am not sure if this helps but here is reference to the 29th Indian Inf Bde commanded by Br.-Gen H.V.Cox in 1915 -see page 119 Order of Battle of Divisions - Part 1.

I have recently acquired part 4 of the Order of Battle of Divisions which covers The Army Council, GHQ's, Armys and Corps 1914-18. The Southern Canal Section is commanded by Br-Gen P.C.Palin from 4th February 1917. Send me a pm if you have not already got copies of E.E.F. GHQ pages.

Philip

[ddycher]

Gents

Bringing this one back up again.

Have been reading this weekend of Palins conference at GHQ on the 25th May 1917. EEF GHQ having been ordered by the CIGS to build the 75th from mixed Indian and British troops in country. GHQ called Palin (as the senior Indian Bde commander in the force) into conference to discuss how this should be done. He apparently resisted and GHQ tried to maintain two reduced (only 3 Bn's) british brigades and one Indian pulling in the 29th Indian Bde for this purpose.

Reading between the lines, and some wild guesswork, I believe these objections stemmed from Palin himself. Resisting the CIGS in this manner would not have made him any friends and the apparent collapse of this resistance subsequently and the emerging mixed bdes would seem to say that he lost this arguement.

Anybody have any views ?

Regards

Dave