Desmond7 Posted 17 April , 2004 Share Posted 17 April , 2004 Folks - I have hunted the net, libraries and bookshops for a trench map showing the positions of the 12th Royal Irish Rifles/9th Royal Irish Fusiliers in the 'bloody angle' north of the ancre and bordering the divisional boundary with 29th Division on 1st July 1916. There are a few recently drawn maps in a few publications but they are sparse on detail. For the main 36th Ulster Div. attack south of the Ancre from Thiepval Wood towards the Schwaben there seems to be plenty of good detailed maps. But 'my' boys in the 12th Rifles seem to be 'cut off' in most publications. I assume this is due to the 'succes' south of the Ancre and the more typical 'failure' in the little portion north of the Ancre. I'd love to see a contemporary map - or any map for that instance! I can't offer anything in trade really. But willing to try and help anyone with NI matters. Yours hopefully - Des Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Robert Dunlop Posted 17 April , 2004 Share Posted 17 April , 2004 Des I believe this is the area that you are after Robert Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Desmond7 Posted 17 April , 2004 Author Share Posted 17 April , 2004 Robert - many, many thanks! I can see the triangular area of trenches which were the target for 12th RIRifles in at the top left of the map. Greatly appreciated - and formula one speed! Des. And now I look closer 'Y' ravine! Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Desmond7 Posted 9 December , 2004 Author Share Posted 9 December , 2004 Now that I'm older and a little bit wiser, I wish to re-examine aspects of this action on July 1. However, for further clarity, I need some forum help! The war diary of 12th RIRifles on this day mentions a 'Railway Sap' attacked and entered by elements of B coy for a short period. Can anyone (a) enhance and annotate to show me its position? From reading the diary, I believe it must have been fairly close to the Ancre Swamp in the bottom right section of the map above. Thanks Des Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Ralph J. Whitehead Posted 9 December , 2004 Share Posted 9 December , 2004 Hi Des, I believe I have a period German map of this area. I am off to work at the present but when I return let me see if I can find it, scan it and put it into the forum. The railway line and station were just along the Ancre on the northern side, the area you are referring to. Hopefully it might help. Ralph Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
bmac Posted 9 December , 2004 Share Posted 9 December , 2004 I don't know if the attached is any use. It covers part of the the area you describe and is an overlay of trench maps onto the current Blue Series maps. I have done this for various parts of the 1st July battlefield but haven't done the area immediately covering the Ancre yet (amongst others!). Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Desmond7 Posted 9 December , 2004 Author Share Posted 9 December , 2004 Ralph - cheers and to B-mac ... nice job - love to see more. I know 'my boys' plus 9th RIrish Fus. were in this area between the 'William' and 'Mary' Redans. Mary is obviously clear on B-mac's section. I have pasted on the 12th RIRifles war diary for the day which is a chillingly factual account of how many men can be lost in a very short period of time. It may also help those who have a fair idea of what was happening to 29th Division further to the left and the main portion of 36th (Ulster) across the Ancre at Thiepval. The more I read of this piece of documentation, the more horrifying it becomes and this is why I would love as clear a picture as possible. Thanks again. And, as I say, you get older and wiser ... and to have to do re-writes!! THE ‘War Diary’ of the 12th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles is a no-nonsense, objective description of the fate of the battalion. It is written in military language, far removed from emotion and legends which have come to be associated with that horrific summer day in July 1916. It was written by Lt. Col. G. Bull on 8th July, five days after the Ulster Division had been relieved from the Somme front. 12th (S) Bn. Royal Irish Rifles 1st July 1916. The bombardment, which had lasted seven days without ceasing reached its climax at 6-25 a.m. on the morning of the 1st July, and from 6-25 a.m. until 7-30 a.m. the German trenches were treated to a perfect hurricane of shells. The companies, who had already been in the trenches (Hamel Sub- Sector) two days, were in the following order: - 'B' Company had one platoon (No. 8) on the right made responsible for the marsh. Immediately on its left was another platoon (No. 6) responsible for the Railway Sap. The other two platoons of 'B' Coy. were in support behind the 9th Royal Irish Fusiliers. The 9th Bn. Royal Ir. Fus. were in between 'B' Coy. and 'C' Coy. 'C' Coy. Being on their immediate left. 'C' Coy. had 'D' Coy. on its left and 'A' Coy. was on the left of 'D' Coy. Starting from platoon on the right, the attack, as far as it has been possible to gather from the information of eye witnesses remaining went as follows:- RIGHT PLATOON During the last ten minutes or so of the intense bombardment, No. 8 Platoon under. Sergt. Hoare left the Crow’s Nest (a ‘forming up point in the British trenches) and lay outside their own wire. At zero, and under cover of the barrage of smoke put up by the Trench Mortar Officer they commenced the advance. This platoon was divided into three parts, one under Sergt. Hamilton who went to the left, one under Sergt. Bennison who went to the right and one under Sergt. Hoare who remained in the centre. This platoon was very heavily shelled going out and while out were under very heavy machine-gun fire from both right and left, and Sergt. Hoare's party soon all became casualties. The left party under Sergt. Hamilton also suffered very heavily but he managed to get into the German Sap with three or four men, but owing to the heavy machine-gun fire were unable to remain and had to leave the Sap. On the right Sergt. Bennison was killed and this party with its Lewis Gun came under very heavy Machine-gun fire from the right and were unable to get forward at all. The casualties were heavy, and Sergt. Hoare sent back a man to Lt. Col. Blacker for orders as he could not advance. He received orders to retire; he did so with what was left of the Platoon. No.6 PLATOON This platoon was under Lieut. Lemon and was made responsible for the Railway Sap. The platoon left our own trenches before zero at the same time and on the right of the 9th Royal Ir. Fus. but before reaching the Ravine the whole Platoon with the exception of Lieut. Lemon and twelve men were all casualties. On reaching the Ravine Lemon looked for some supports, but as none were available he advanced with his twelve men to enter the Sap. When he reached. the Sap he had only nine men left, but he entered the Sap at the Railway bank. L.Sergt. Millar and three men moved to the right to bomb down the Sap, but, these were soon all casualties. Lieut. Lemon and the remainder of the men advanced up the main Sap. The thick wires running into the first large tunnel was cut by Rfmn. Gamble who was the first bayonet man. There was a machine- gun firing across the sap from the small tunnel. Lieut. Lemon, however, climbed above the small tunnel with some bombs in order to catch any Germans who might come out and sent the men on. Lieut. Lemon was then shot by two German officers who fired their rifles at him from the top of a dug out which apparently led into the tunnel. The two German officers were afterwards killed by a bomb which exploded right at their feet. The remaining men got cut off between the 1st and 2nd German line and only two of them escaped. 7 AND 5 PLATOONS No. 7 Platoon advanced behind. the 9th Royal Ir. Fus., but as the Fus. were held up, this platoon only got just beyond our own wire. No. 5 was the carrying platoon and did not leave our own wire. Capt. C.S. Murray was in command of these two Platoons, but was wounded at the very start. The two Machine-guns which caught No. 6 Platoon so badly were right outside the German trench and the shelling was also very severe in the Ravine. The Lewis Gun Team which was with No. 6 Platoon became casualties before reaching the Ravine and the gun was put out of action by shrapnel. Corpl. Burgess and Rfmn. McNeilly were the two men who escaped from the Sap. Rfmn. McNeilly lost Corpl. Burgess on the way back and reported to two N.C.O.'s of the 9th Royal Ir. Fus. 'C' COMPANY's ATTACK Before zero, 'C' Company who were on the left of the 9th Royal Ir. Fus. left our wire and immediately came under very heavy machine Gun fire. At zero the company advanced led by No 10 Platoon and followed by No. 11. No. 10 were held up by the wire, which had only two small gaps cut in it at this point. No. 10 Platoon at once split in two, each half going for a gap. Some of this party succeeded in getting into the German line, but as there was a German machine-gun opposite each gap the casualties were very heavy. No 11. Platoon immediately reinforced No. 10 and at once rushed the gaps and a few more men succeeded in getting through. The casualties were very severe, but Captn. Griffiths collected Nos. 9 and 12 Platoons and gave orders to charge. He was killed immediately he had given the order. At the same time an order came to retire. The remaining men retired with the exception of Sergt. Cunningham, Corpl. Herbison and L.Cpl. Jackson who remained and fired at the Germans, who were standing on their parapet firing and throwing bombs at our men. They killed or wounded at least ten Germans. Rfmn. Craig with a Lewis Gun kept up a good fire by himself, all the rest of the team having been killed or wounded. L.Cpl. Harvey then rallied all the men he could find and rushed the gaps again but had to retire for the third time. The Company had then to retire to the SUNKEN ROAD. Sergt. Cunningham and Corpl. Herbison again did good work by helping wounded men to get cover in the Sunken Road. The road was being shelled very heavily all the time. 'D' COMPANY'S ATTACK 'D' Company's attack was led by 2/Lieut. Sir Harry E.H. Macnaghten Bart., and No. 16 Platoon. Sir Harry was on the right of his Platoon and Sergt. McFall on the left. At zero this Platoon rushed the German front line and entered it. Sergt. McFall found some dugouts on the left and detailed two bombers to attend to each . The German second line was very strongly held and the machine-gun fire from the salient on the left (Q.17. was very heavy. The Germans stood up on the parapet of their second line and threw bombs into the front line, while they kept a steady fire up against the other advancing platoons (13, 14, and 15) These suffered very heavily as they approached the German wire and line. No 14 Platoon lost half its men before No. 16 had gained the German front line. An order to retire was shouted out and Sir Harry got out of the trench to order the men not to retire but to come on and just as he got out he was shot in the legs by a machine-gun only a few yards away, and fell back into the trench. Rfmn. Kane who was quite close to Sir Harry bayoneted the German who was firing the machine-gun. 'D' Company then fell back behind the ridge and were at once reassembled with the remains of 'A' Company by 2/Lieut. Dickson, who ordered a second charge at the German trenches. He was very severely wounded almost as soon as he had given the order, but carried on for a time until he fell, and then Sergt. McFall at once rallied the companies and they advanced a second time. The Machine-gun fire from the Salient was very severe, and they had to eventually fall back on our own trenches. 'A' COMPANY'S ATTACK 'A' Company who were on the extreme left of the Battalion front, were in touch with the 29th Division. They left their new Trench before zero and assembled along the Sunken Road. At Zero they began to advance, and at once came under very heavy Artillery and machine-gun fire. No. 4 Platoon led the attack, and were badly cut up, but what men remained entered the German front line. They were closely followed by No. 3 who at once reinforced them. The wire was well cut here but there were two machine-guns on each side of the gap and three or four in the Salient, as well as a German bombing party. Lieut. McCluggage at once collected his men and tried to rush on to the German second line but was killed in the attempt. The Germans in the front line it was noticed all wore caps while those in the second line wore helmets. The German second line was full of men and there was a very considerable number at the back of the large mound on the left. All these men fired at Nos. 1 and 2 Platoons while they were advancing and threw bombs at Nos. 3 & 4 while in the German front line. The men of Nos. 3 & 4 Platoons bombed three Dugouts and shot a good many Germans. All these four Platoons suffered very heavily from exceedingly intense Machine-gun fire. An order to retire was passed along, and as there were no supports on the spot 'A' Company did so. Lieut. T. G. Haughton had been wounded in the leg soon after leaving our front line but led his Platoon on. He was wounded a second time during the retirement and killed. The Company then retired to the SUNKEN ROAD when 2/Lieut Dickson, who was the only officer left assembled the men there and ordered another advance. The men advanced again but were met with a terrific fire from all the Machine-guns in the Salient (Q.17.B.) and had to ultimately retire to the New Trench. Rfmn. McMullen, being the only man left of his team of Lewis Gunners, entered the German line with Lewis Gun and two magazines and fired from his shoulder at the Germans in the second. line. He retired with the company and brought the Gun with him. All companies had now been badly cut up, and had very few men left. We were ordered to attack again at 10-12 a.m. with what men we could collect. Major C.G. Cole-Hamilton D.S.O. took command of the front line, collected all the men he could find (about 100) and assembled them in the New Trench and prepared to launch the attack. Sergt. McFall and Sergt. A Smith of 'D' Company and L.Cpl. W Harvey of 'C' Coy. were conspicuous for their coolness and skill under a very heavy fire in helping Major C.G. Cole-Hamilton D.S.O. to form up the men and carry out the attack. The attack was made under very heavy shrapnel fire from the time of the assembly and was finally stopped by Machine-gun fire. When in advance of the Sunken Road, the same three N.C.O.s did magnificent work in steadying the men, while L.Cpl. Harvey brought a wounded man in on his back. About 11 a.m. another attack was ordered for 12-30 p.m. in conjunction with the 29th Division. Every available man was collected and assembled in the New Trench. The total number this time was 46. The men went forward before 12-30 p.m., and were lying in cover by 12-30 p.m. Major C.G. Cole-Hamilton D.S.O. , finding that 29th Division did not launch an attack at 12-30 p.m. and not having a sufficient number of men to carry out an attack, sent a message to the Commanding Officer to this effect. The Commanding Officer ordered the men to be brought back and the front line to be re-organised and held. Sergt. McFall, Sergt. A. Smith and L.Cpl. W Harvey again did splendid work in getting the men back and re-organised under very adverse conditions. By 2 p.m. all the men were back and sentries were posted all along the line. This state of affairs continued until the few men who were left in the line were relieved by the York and Lancs at 6-30 p.m. G Bull Lieut. Col. Commanding 12th (S) Bn Royal Irish Rifles. Field 8th July 1916 Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Ralph J. Whitehead Posted 11 December , 2004 Share Posted 11 December , 2004 Hello Des, The maps I have of this area are difficult to read. They were prepared by the 8th Bavarian Reserve Regiment and the originals are not very clear. I tried a bit of photo correction to see what would happen. The results are only partial as it would take several hours of additional work and my hand is not the steadiest when using the mouse. Hopefully from this map you can get an idea of the German defenses. The Biber Kolonie is literally the Beaver Colony as the dugouts, shelters, etc. were built above ground as the swampy terrain prevented any digging. I will continue my efforts to post a map that is clear, hopefully however this will help you a bit. Regards, Ralph Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Desmond7 Posted 11 December , 2004 Author Share Posted 11 December , 2004 My thanks Ralph - I'll blow up and do some comparisons. One more thing, is the 'Vallee Saillant' marked on Bmac's map the site of the 'ravine/gully' mentioned in the 12th RIR war diary? Des Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Ralph J. Whitehead Posted 11 December , 2004 Share Posted 11 December , 2004 Des, My guess is that the section just under B7 on the map I posted is the ravine as it is front of the German lines along the railway and the Ancre and the German map sows a sap extenson just to the north of this spot. Sorry if I am a bit slow answering, I believe I fractured a bone in my right hand at work and it is painful to type, pick up objects or make a fist. Regards, Ralph Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Desmond7 Posted 11 December , 2004 Author Share Posted 11 December , 2004 Cheers Ralph - take it easy ... Des Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Robert Dunlop Posted 11 December , 2004 Share Posted 11 December , 2004 Sorry if I am a bit slow answering, I believe I fractured a bone in my right hand at work and it is painful to type, pick up objects or make a fist. Ralph Ouch! If the pain is in the wrist, make sure you get an x-ray. If it is the scaphoid bone that is fractured, you will want to have it properly plastered to ensure it heals ok. Cheers Robert Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Ralph J. Whitehead Posted 11 December , 2004 Share Posted 11 December , 2004 Thanks Robert, The pain is in the knuckle of the small finger, any side or top pressure is quite painful. I am having it checked Monday, in the meantime taking it easy. Ralph Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Robert Dunlop Posted 11 December , 2004 Share Posted 11 December , 2004 Phew, that's not so bad - though still painful! Best wishes for a speedy recovery Robert Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest 2contemptable Posted 12 December , 2004 Share Posted 12 December , 2004 Hello Des, The Somme Heritage Centre sells reproduction maps of the British front line as of October 1916. While the lines might have changed slightly the topography and main points of interest in the Thiepval area remain unchanged. Regards James. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Desmond7 Posted 12 December , 2004 Author Share Posted 12 December , 2004 Thanks for that James - my idea is eventually to draw up a map on a scale which would allow me put pictures of the various men mentioned in the diary into the section of line where they fought and in some cases died. Des Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest 2contemptable Posted 12 December , 2004 Share Posted 12 December , 2004 Cracking idea Des, it sounds ambitious. It would seem from what you have said that the experiences of the 12th Rifles mirrored that of the 9th Fusiliers. It appears that the difficulties in advancing up the steep ravine might have been underestimated. The Fusiliers diary mentions a small party attempting to make their way towards Beaucourt station at about 2.30pm on the afternoon of the 1st July, they were never seen again. Regards, James Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Desmond7 Posted 13 December , 2004 Author Share Posted 13 December , 2004 James - Re 9th RIFusiliers. Can you shed any light on the exceptionally high fatal casualty statistics given by Tom Johnstone in 'Orange, Green and Khaki' for this day? I believe, from memory, he gives KIAs in excess of 250 for both 12th RIRif. and 9RIFus.?? I asked about this some time ago and the best people could do then for 12th RIRifles at least was in the region of 150 KIA? I have since found a lot of men who went 'missing'on July 1, being recorded as KIA on that day but only reported as such about one year later. There also seems to have been many men who received really bad wounds which resulted in their deaths at home up to two years later. Do you think Johnstone took these into account when he came up with his figures? Do you have similar worries about his KIA figure for 9th RIFus. on 1st July? Thoughts appreciated. I believe the term Johnstone uses on this occasion is 'north of the ancre these two battalions had literally ceased to exist' ... Des Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Desmond7 Posted 13 December , 2004 Author Share Posted 13 December , 2004 James Re Beaucourt station - have read about the party 'never seen again' but had always thought this was early in the attack. See diary below? 9th Royal Irish Fusiliers Report on their action Composition and Format for attack The Battalion moved at 12.5 a.m. from MESNIL to take up its position for the attack, in the Right of the HAMEL Sector, no special assembly trenches had been prepared, and existing trenches were occupied. The Battalion was on a 4 Platoon front in the following order:- Right Company "A", Captain C. ENSOR, Right Centre Company "B", Major T.J. ATKINSON, Left Centre Company "C", Captain C.M. JOHNSTON, Left Company "D", Captain J.G. BREW, each Company being on a platoon front, making 4 waves: each wave advancing at 60 yards distance. The two leading waves assembled in the front line trench. The 3rd wave consisting of supporting platoons in communications trenches. The 4th wave consisting of consolidating Platoons in 2nd line trench. Lewis Guns accompanied the leading wave. 2 Stokes Mortars accompanied the second wave. 5 Vickers M Guns accompanied the third wave. The Battalion was reported in position at 3 a.m. Between which hour and the hour it moved out the Battn suffered some 50 casualties from large H.E. shell. Four lengths of Bangalore tubes accompanied the leading waves of each Company. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Objectives The German 1st, 2nd, and 3rd line trenches from Railway Sap to A 25 in 1st line - BEAUCOURT STATION and the Trench N of it and some detached houses near this station, the left boundary being a line drawn from A 25 to one of these detached houses thence S.E. to the RIVER ANCRE. Troops on flank of Battalion. 2 Platoons of 12th R.I.R. on Right flank. 3 Coys of 12th R.I.R. on Left flank. 2 platoons 12th R.I.R. in support of 9th R. Ir. Fus. Apparent effect of Artillery Bombardment in Enemy's position (a) Wire cutting was well carried out and effective lanes were cut. ( The enemy's trenches composing the objective of both 9th R. Ir. Fus and 12 R.I.R. did not suffer materially from the previous bombardment. Nature of the ground The opposing lines of trenches were approximately 400 yards apart with a Ravine some 70 yards in width about half way between the opposing tenches, the banks of which were 15 ft to 20 ft high in places and steep. The whole terrain sloping towards the RAILWAY SAP. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Advance Owing to the distance to be traversed and the necessity of the leading wave being within 150 yards of the German line at Zero time (7.30 a.m.), the 1st wave crossed the parapet at 7.10 a.m. 2nd wave crossed the parapet at 7.15 a.m. 3rd wave crossed the parapet at 7.20 a.m. 4th wave crossed the parapet at 7.30 a.m. The 1st wave suffered little loss getting through our wire, lanes in which had previously been cut, but during the advance to the Ravine casualties were numerous, more especially to the left, from M.G. fire from the flanks. The 2nd wave suffered more severely crossing our wire, and also came under the M.G. fire from the flanks. The majority of the Officers of the 2 left Companies were casualties before reaching the Ravine, where the two leading waves were reorganized in one line and the advance continued. The 3rd and 4th waves were caught by severe M.G. fire both frontal and flanking, and also by an artillery barrage which the Germans had now placed between our wire and the Ravine, and were practically annihilated. Some 150 yards from the German line the assaulting line again came under heavy M.G. fire and suffered severely: notwithstanding this, small bodies of men of the Right and the two left Companies reached the German wire and charged he trenches, in places the Germans held up their hands to surrender, but realising there were no supporting troops resumed the contest till there were only a handful of our men left. The Right Centre Company appears to have suffered less severely, and was seen to penetrate the 3 German lines and a small body of them was reported to have reached BEAUCOURT STATION. Owing to the intensity of the fire only 1 Runner got through, he came from the Left Centre Company Commander, from a spot about 30 yards short of the Ravine, with the message "Cannot advance without support". The supporting platoon of the 12th R.I.R. was sent out but was wiped out. Information Previous to the attack the Intelligence Officer Captain MENAUL and 5 Battalion Scouts proceeded to SHOOTERS HILL whence a view could be obtained of all the attacking ground up to the front line, except on the extreme right. This officer kept Battalion H.Q. accurately informed of the progress of events by means of his Scouts acting as Runners from 7.30 a.m. to 4 p.m. this information was at once passed on to Brigade H.Q. by telephone as soon as received. Action by the enemy. The main features of the Enemy's defence were the handling of his M. Guns whereby he brought an accurate cross fire on the lanes cut in our own wire and on the gaps made by our artillery in his wire and subsequently the artillery barrage he placed between our front line and the Ravine. Action against possible counter attack by the enemy When the extent of our casualties was realized every available man left in the Battalion was sent under the command of Major PRATT to hold the front line: the situation was reported to Brigade H.Q. and a request made for reinforcements, and 2 Coys York & Lancs Regt were sent up to assist in holding the line against a possible German counter attack. Action subsequent to July 1 During the night of July 1st - 2nd the remnants of the Battalion were withdrawn into the village of HAMEL, the front line being held by 2 Coys 5/6 York & Lancs Regt. Several parties were organized to search NO MAN'S LAND to bring in casualties, their search was continued by parties sent up to HAMEL on nights of July 2/3, 3/4, 4/5. On July 2 while carrying out this duty Lieut & Adjt G CATHER was killed. Early on 2 July orders were received to hand over the line to the 87th Bde and for he Battalion to withdraw to MARTINSART. General remarks The outstanding feature of the day were the fine leading by the Company Officers, and the gallant spirit and magnificent dash by the men which carried them on in spite of the severity of the casualties. Strength The numbers advancing to the attack were Officers Other Ranks 15 600 (approximately) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CASUALTIES Officers Captain Johnston C.M. Killed in Action 1st July 1916 Lieut & Adjutant Cather G. St. G. S. Killed in Action 2nd July 1916 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Captain Brew J.G. Wounded 1st July 1916 Captain Ensor C. H. Wounded 1st July 1916 Lieut Jackson H.E. Wounded 1st July 1916 Lieut Gibson J.E. Wounded 1st July 1916 Lieut Shillington T.G. Wounded 1st July 1916 Lieut Smith E.M. Wounded 1st July 1916 2nd Lieut Barcroft G.E. Wounded 1st July 1916 2nd Lieut Andrews A.A. Wounded 1st July 1916 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Major Atkinson T.J. Missing believed killed 1st July 1916 Lieut Townsend R.S.B. Missing believed killed 1st July 1916 Lieut Hollywood A.C. Missing believed killed 1st July 1916 2nd Lieut Montgomery R.T. Missing believed killed 1st July 1916 2nd Lieut Seggie A. Missing believed killed 1st July 1916 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2nd Lieut Stewart W.J. Missing 1st July 1916 2nd Lieut Craig G.D. Shell Shock 1st July 1916. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Other Ranks Killed 56 Wounded 303 Missing 159 518 Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Ralph J. Whitehead Posted 13 December , 2004 Share Posted 13 December , 2004 The account of the attack by the 119th Reserve Regiment defending the area in question makes no mention of any group making any headway toward the railway station Beaucourt. Without further review of all materials I doubt that the reports were as accurate as they sound. The observation that one section managed to make it through 3 seperate trench lines and advance toward the station would have drawn some attention from the defenders of the area as well as those across the Ancre providing support with M.G. fire. I will look through all of the records I have at present to see if there is any possibility this occurred but in the meantime in my opinion it did not. Ralph Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest 2contemptable Posted 13 December , 2004 Share Posted 13 December , 2004 Des and Ralph, I will try and dig out the reference to the timing of claims that a small group of men attempted to reach the station. I would suggest that Ralph is probably correct in his assertion regarding the likelihood of this being noticed by the defending regiment. My own thoughts are that when some pockets of men became isolated during the action, they found themselves facing the uneviable choice (if that is the correct term) of having to decide whether to move towards the German line and their objective with no chance of survival, or to retire and in doing so face ridiculous accusations of cowardice. My grandfather told me that his greatest fear on the 1st July was to be seen 'stopping'. He did stop momentarily to urge his friend on, the friend in question had stopped, he was crying beside his brother who was lying screaming in pain, both his legs had been blown off. It would be very interesting to see what Ralph has in the 119th records, as I have never seen or read any German accounts of the action of 1 July, it must make fascinating reading! Des: I will check the casualty stats, perhaps the best best record appears in a private letter written by Lt. Col. Blacker, this was not for public circulation and he specifically asks his friend not to let the contents fall into the hands of the press. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Desmond7 Posted 13 December , 2004 Author Share Posted 13 December , 2004 James and Ralph - believe it or not, I was rummaging through some stuff given to me recently. One of the items was 'Ulster's Role in the Battle of the Somme etc' - on the back of the edition I have is a very good blow up of the section in question with trenchlines very well marked! Talk about stuff being under your very nose!! The scale seems to be half an inch to 500 yards (I'm at work now so can't be entirely sure) but is does demonstrate just how small the actual area was and one wonders what no-man's land was like in the immediate aftermath of this attack. Pure carnage. Having re-read the diary and thought hard about the whole episode, the attackers (as a cohesive force) must have been mown down in a matter of minutes. Sniping and rescue attempts may have continued for some time, but in unit terms, it must have been all over in a very short period of time. Chilling to read the diaries and see how 'a platoon all became casualties' or 'by this time there were three men left' etc. Des Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Ralph J. Whitehead Posted 13 December , 2004 Share Posted 13 December , 2004 While I do not possess many of the original German reports, documents, etc. for much of the fighting on 1 July I have translated the regimental history that was drawn from these records as well as from original reports and the history of the 26th Reserve Division to which the 119th Reserve belonged. The problem faced by so many people trying to explain all of the different accounts of the fighting from generally one side of the battle is almost impossible. Times given by each participant is different, perception of distance, time passing, etc. all differ from one person to another and while one man might feel he was fighting for hours it could be a matter of minutes in reality. Now that many researchers are looking at the opposing side to see if there is additional details missed in the past we only add to the number of different accounts, times etc. that can really frustrate someone trying to pin down specific events that occurred over 88 years ago, long before most if not all of the forum members were born. As to the 119th Reserve Infantry Regiment, a Württemberg unit that formed part of the 26th Reserve Division, XIV Reserve Corps. Just what did they experience on that fateful day? How did these ordinary soldiers react to the attack? From reading the regimental history the main interest was directed toward the mine explosion on Hawthorne ridge, one that can be seen in historic film records as well as visit to this day, a gaping hole in the ground atop a ridge. It is not filled with the remnants of war, from screw pickets to unexploded ammunition and the slopes are covered with trees of varying size. 88+ years ago this section formed part of the German defenses that looked down a steep slope and could observe almost every movement the ‘enemy’ made. By this point in the war the 119th Reserve had taken over the sector just to the north of the Ancre, the 121st Reserve was positioned further to the north, just below Serre while the 99th Reserve Regiment, the only Prussian regiment in the XIV Reserve Corps, occupied the Thiepval Sector. Both sides of the Ancre had excellent views of the opposite bank and supporting fire was common from both sides of the steep slopes that led to the swampy Ancre ground. The 99th Reserve had formerly occupied the sector north of the Ancre and as many of the men in this regiment were miners in peacetime they had set about with a will to dig as many deep tunnel complexes as possible including the maze of underground works in the Leiling Schlucht (Y Ravine) as well as throughout the rest of the position. The steep slopes along the Ancre were perfect for tunneling and many shelters were carved into the hillsides. In fact, one such complex on the southern bank of the Ancre near St. Pierre-Divion was capable of housing 1,000 men, supplies, equipment, etc. and was safe from even the heaviest enemy shells. The following will provide a brief idea of what the men of the 119th Reserve reported for the fighting on 1 July 1916 along the Ancre, an area known as Beaumont-South. The 7 day bombardment from 24 June to 30 June had caused a great deal of damage to the German lines near the Ancre as many of the trenches were open to enemy observation and the subsequent shelling could be directed with greater accuracy. The ‘ball mine’, the British 2 inch trench mortar bomb known as a toffee apple was among the most feared due to the intense destructive force of the explosion. Despite the immense number of shells fired at Beaumont-South as well as to the rest of the front held by the 119th Reserve Regiment the total regimental losses had only been 20 killed, 83 wounded, a number that only supports the German faith in deep dugouts and well-constructed defensive works. When the final bombardment had finished the officers and Other Ranks were ready, fully equipped and awaiting the moment to man the trenches. When the firing shifted to the rear the German trench sentries could observe dense waves of British soldiers climbing from their trenches and moving down into the hollow that ran in front of the German lines by the Ancre and then proceed up the opposite slope toward the German lines. At this moment the German garrison opened fire with rifles and machine guns. Red light signals and telephone calls called up barrage fire that was set to place an impassable wall between the first waves of attackers and those that followed while shelling enemy trenches and reserve positions with heavier guns. According to the regimental history “The infantry and machine gun fire mowed down the attackers so that the attacker soon hesitated and threw themselves down.” The regimental history reports that small groups of ‘Englishmen’ (Almost every enemy soldier was described as an Englishman) succeeded in penetrating the trench at individual places only in B5 (See maps listed earlier in this posting). The garrison of the 2nd trench that ran parallel to the front line immediately attacked these groups in a frontal attack and threw them back while at the same time capturing two Lewis guns that had already been brought into position. The enemy had also penetrated into the Ancre ground, the area along the river, where they came across the Tal Stellung in front of the transverse tunnel gallery. From what I can deduce this would be located on the map at Sector B7, the trench running north near the Biber Kolonie (Beaver Colony). This is parallel to the rail line running toward Beaucourt Station further to the rear. A hand grenade battle arose between the attackers and defenders “that was swiftly decided in our favor”. Now the enemy was reported to have taken up positions in individual shell holes and opened fire against the German lines while new waves came across from the British trenches. The new waves came under heavy and devastating artillery fire consisting of 7.7cm field guns, 10.5cm light field howitzers and any available minenwerfer, erdmörsers, etc. The regimental history continues: “The German artillery fire was placed there and brought disorder into the English ranks. Everyone looked for protection in the hollow that ran to the Ancre stream, now the fire from the erdmörser struck them down. The attackers now escaped back to their exit position. At 10 o’clock (9 a.m. British time) the attack upon the I Battalion had been repulsed. The following list shows the fatal casualties suffered by the I Battalion, 119th RIR during the fighting on 1 July 1916; a total of 35 men. Naturally the number of wounded would be much higher but I have not had the opportunity to list them at this time. I hope to have a complete picture some time in the near future. The number designates the company. Aichele, Hermann Musketier 1 Allmendinger, Erhard Landsturmmann 1 Roller, Emil Reservist 1 W.I.A., died 8/4/1916, Reserve Hospital, Cöln. Schroth, Gottlieb Reservist 1 Spohn, Karl Gefreiter der Landwehr 1 W.I.A., died 6/10/1917, Reserve Hospital 9, Stuttgart. Werner, Eugen Vizefeldwebel, Offiz. Aspir. 1 W.I.A., died 7/2/1916, Reserve Field Hospital 17, Frémicourt. Hammer, Jakob Reservist 2 Müller, Paul Vizefeldwebel, Offiz. Aspir. 2 Münz, Wilhelm Unteroffizier Kriegsfreiwilliger 2 Ruth, Heinrich Vizefeldwebel, Offiz. Aspir. 2 Wörner, Karl Landwehrmann 2 Burk, Friedrich Unteroffizier der Reserve 3 Eichenbrenner, August Ersatz Reservist 3 Frech, Otto Leutnant der Reserve 3 Frick, Heinrich Musketier 3 Haag, Wilhelm Musketier 3 Huonker, Georg Musketier 3 Losch, Karl Vizefeldwebel der Reserve 3 Stahl, Heinrich Reservist 3 Strocke, Ernst Gefreiter der Reserve 3 Sütterlin, Karl Leutnant der Reserve 3 Vogel, Albert Musketier 3 Wurster, Friedrich Reservist 3 Becht, Gottlob Reservist 4 Bott, August Reservist 4 W.I.A., died 7/7/1916, Res. Field Hosp. 17, Frémicourt. Hafner, Christian Gefreiter der Landwehr 4 Hettich, Gustav Musketier 4 Kern, Friedrich Landwehrmann 4 Leibold, Ernst Reservist 4 Merkle, Jakob Reservist 4 Merkle, Karl Landsturmmann 4 Rapp, Wilhelm Reservist 4 Schneider, Berthold Ersatz Reservist 4 Schwarz, Gottlieb Reservist 4 Zink, Karl Landsturmmann 4 Considering the terrain, the amount of smoke and dust in the air as well as the number of German trenches between the front line and the railway station it is possible that the men observed heading toward the Tal Stellung were thought to have gotten further or it is possible the men being observed were German reinforcements. I doubt we will ever know the answer to this question, we can just interpret the information as best we can. Still, it is fascinating to look at every piece of the puzzle in minute detail in the hope of making sense of the confusing number of accounts from both sides of the wire. Ralph Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Desmond7 Posted 13 December , 2004 Author Share Posted 13 December , 2004 Many thanks Ralph - great insight for me. This may sound a stupid question, but I would love to know ... if the 119th Reserve Inf. remarked on the Hawthorne Mine does it necessarily mean that 'my guys' on the British side would have seen/felt its impact too? Just as a matter of interest. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest 2contemptable Posted 13 December , 2004 Share Posted 13 December , 2004 Ralph, Thanks very much for that, I'm sure Des found it as interesting as I did. This account of when the attack began to break down can be corroborated with some of my own sources which describe men form both Irish battalions lying in shell holes trying to re-group while fending off German counter attacks. Some describe being given the opportunity to surrender, however the Ulstermen declined the offer in rather colourful language, perhaps a tad too colourful to print here Thanks again, James Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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