Smith-Dorrien-French controversy

[Luc Pozières]

Hi,

Does anybody knows one book or article about the controversy between Sir. H. Smith-Dorrien and Sir J. French during the Great War? When and why began his unfriendly relationship?

I've read 1914 by Sir J. French and 48 years of service ... by Sir H. Smith-Dorrien, but I'd prefer something less personal, more neutral.

Regards,

L. Pozières

[George Armstrong Custer]

Two suggestions:

The Man Who Disobeyed: Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien and His Enemies, by A. J. Smithers, (1970).

The Judgement of History: Lord French, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien and 1914 , by Ian Beckett, (1993).

ciao,

GAC

[Anthony Pigott]

The origin of the problem seems unclear. The two books mentioned in the earlier post suggest that it dates from 1909 relating to S.D.'s attitude towards cavalry training at Aldershot. I suspect that it's more complex.

Interestingly, Gen. Sir Beauvoir de Lisle, in his book 'Reminiscences of Sport and War', 1939, says that it was his fault.

Anthony

[armourersergeant]

Anthony,

You can't just leave it there you sod!

Regards

Arm

[Anthony Pigott]

Anthony,

You can't just leave it there you sod!

Regards

Arm

Patience!

I'll try to scan the relevant bit - it's too much to type.

Anthony

[Jonathan Saunders]

The origin of the problem seems unclear. The two books mentioned in the earlier post suggest that it dates from 1909 relating to S.D.'s attitude towards cavalry training at Aldershot. I suspect that it's more complex.

I have always understood this to be the cause. I believe amongst other changes, S-D had the cavalry training as dismounted troops during his time at Aldershot.

Happy to be told this is wrong if thats the case.

Regards,

Jonathan S

[truthergw]

I had a notion that is what it was, too. There may have been more to it. How tall was S-D?

[Jon Haslock]

French took S-D's changes at Aldershot as personal criticisms. He was, apparently, a rather insecure character quick to take offence at imagined slights.

[ianw]

Notwithstanding the pre-war animosity, I suspect that French would have similarly fallen out with Haig had he been the Corps commander at Le Cateau and had he fought with similar success because of the contrast with French's performance in the opening months of the war.

[Anthony Pigott]

I have always understood this to be the cause. I believe amongst other changes, S-D had the cavalry training as dismounted troops during his time at Aldershot.

Happy to be told this is wrong if thats the case.

Regards,

Jonathan S

Certainly, S.-D.'s insistence that the cavalry were properly trained in musketry and his telling them that the days of 'knee-to-knee' charges were over did not go down well with S.J.F. (although there's evidence that he was coming round to that way of thinking himself). I don't think that's the whole story though - probably an accumulation of many things as they were very different men.

Anthony

[Anthony Pigott]

I had a notion that is what it was, too. There may have been more to it. How tall was S-D?

I don't have a figure but from photos., probabably about average height for the time. Definitely taller than S.J.F. though!

Anthony

[Anthony Pigott]

Notwithstanding the pre-war animosity, I suspect that French would have similarly fallen out with Haig had he been the Corps commander at Le Cateau and had he fought with similar success because of the contrast with French's performance in the opening months of the war.

Maybe, but he did seem to be generally much more sympathetic to Haig during the Retreat. I can't remember, did he still owe Haig money by then?

Anthony

[Anthony Pigott]

Patience!

I'll try to scan the relevant bit - it's too much to type.

Anthony

Here it is. It's from Chapter XXII 'Some Men of Marked Personality'. Apart from the main issue, it gives some insight into the relationships between de Lisle, S.-D. and French.

Anthony

" In 1910, when I returned from commanding the Royals in India, I was appointed G.S.O.I. to the 2nd Division at Aldershot, where I was under Smith-Dorrien as C.-in-C. There everyone loved S-D, as he was called, and he was a most lovable man in spite of his quick temper which bubbled up in a moment and as quickly subsided. It was a pity he and Sir John French had quarrelled before the Great War. I was particularly distressed about this because I was the cause of this disagreement.

Before I finished my command of the Royals, when on leave in 1909, I called on Sir John at the Horse Guards, as he was Inspector-General, and asked him about my future prospects.

He was very complimentary about my work in South Africa, and said I could count on any appointment I wanted suitable to my rank, "but not in cavalry."

"You are a strong man, de Lisle, and if you get promoted in cavalry you may want to go further than I think desirable and might upset things."

"Do you find I've upset things in the Royals?" I asked.

"On the contrary," he said. "I am told by all that the Royals is the best cavalry regiment in India, and I know this is due to you, but, de Lisle, I am afraid of you."

He knew that Lord Roberts had transferred me to cavalry because all the senior cavalry officers refused to realise that fire power should be recognised as their first weapon, and the sword as subsidiary.

After being passed over by a junior officer for the command of a cavalry brigade, I went to S-D and asked him if I could be considered for an infantry brigade.

"But of course, de Lisle," he said, "you will get a cavalry brigade when your turn comes."

I had to tell him of my interview with French, and also that I had been passed over for a cavalry brigade. He was most indignant and, said when a brigade next fell vacant, he would press my claim, and if defeated would insist on my getting command of an infantry brigade with accelerated promotion.

A month later, a cavalry vacancy occurred unexpectedly, and S-D recommended me for it. French opposed the appointment and I was told by one who was present that the quarrel at the selection board was most unpleasant. Finally S-D insisted on the two names submitted being put, to the vote of the members of the board, and my name gained five votes to three.

In 1915 S-D was sent home most unfairly for recommending a most necessary withdrawal from an impossible salient at Ypres after the German first gas attack. His place in command of the Second Army was taken by Sir Herbert Plumer who was at once directed to carry out the identical move S-D had proposed.

On more than one occasion French was unnecessarily rude to me. The last time was early in 1915. The first time I went on leave from France for a few days, I reported myself, in accordance with orders, to the Secretary of State. Kitchener, whom I knew well, discussed several matters and finally asked me if I could suggest any way to ensure a better return of all the arms and equipment of casualties.

I told him that I thought the best plan was for every unit to make a dump at its headquarters. Every day when the ration wagons called with supplies, the empty wagons should return with the collected equipment.

"Sit down here, de Lisle and put that on paper," he said, and when I had done so he told me to see this custom was established the day I returned to France. I pointed out I had no authority to do this, and that it should be issued from the War Office. In his impulsive way Kitchener replied, "You don't leave my office, de Lisle, until you promise to ensure that your plan will be adopted the instant you return." I promised to do my best but pointed out that I might be asking for trouble.

On my return to France, I went to see General Sir Archibald Murray, the C.G.S., and explained how I had been forced to interfere. A few days later I was sent for by General Sir Neville Macready, the Adjutant-General, who told me the C.-in-C. was highly annoyed with me; that it was serious, and that it meant a single ticket to England.

"Well," I said, "I had better go across the road and see the 'little man'," as he was often called.

"See him," said Macready, "you can't see him. He is like a mad dog."

I explained the whole story to the Adjutant-General who smiled and said, "Don't you know Murray is under a cloud and not on speaking terms with his chief?" I was unaware of this, and under difficult circumstances, I felt I had done the right thing. Macready agreed but for the fact that French was tired of his C.G.S. In the end I dictated the story to Macready, who took it across the road with my request for an interview. He returned saying the chief would not see me as he had to go to meet the King of the Belgians but that my single ticket to England had been cancelled.

I considered the matter closed and was exceedingly annoyed the next day, on being sent for to Cavalry Corps H.Q., where General Allenby told me he had been told by the C.-in-C. to give me a reprimand. I told Allenby I had been refused an interview and condemned unheard, contrary to the British justice as well as the King's Regulations, adding I must insist on seeing French. Allenby tried to make me alter my decision but I refused. Finally he asked me as a personal favour to let the matter drop, for he added, "You know the little man."

"Before I agree," I said, "I must ask you one question. Are you satisfied with the fighting qualities of my 1st Cavalry Division and with me as its leader?"

Allenby smiled and said, "Why, that is the very question the C.-in-C. asked me this morning, and I may as well tell you the answer I made. I said, 'I looked on my 1st Cavalry Division as my best fighting troops, and wherever I have a difficult job on hand I select de Lisle to do it'."

After that I could only agree to let the matter drop; but my plan for the recovery of equipment was adopted, not only in France but wherever British troops were employed throughout the War.

French never forgave S-D, and until after the war he never forgave me. The last did not matter, but I am sure his attitude towards S-D, after Le Cateau until he was relieved of the command of the Second Army, was due to S-D's loyal support of an officer of his command whom he thought was not receiving full justice."

[Jonathan Saunders]

Here it is. It's from Chapter XXII 'Some Men of Marked Personality' ...

Thanks for posting that - I havent come across this story before.

[squirrel]

Thank you for posting this - most informative.

[Luc Pozières]

Two suggestions:

The Man Who Disobeyed: Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien and His Enemies, by A. J. Smithers, (1970).

The Judgement of History: Lord French, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien and 1914 , by Ian Beckett, (1993).

Thank you ...,

Regards,

L. Pozières

[Luc Pozières]

Hi,

Searching I've found this in Cassar's book, The Tragedy of Sir John French:

"When Smith-Dorrien succeeded French at Aldershot he wasted no time in putting his own ideas into force. He abolished the "pickets" that had patrolled the streets at night in search of drunken soldiers. He rescinded an order that had forbidden soldiers engaged in maneuvres from entering public houses [...] In matters of training he insisted [smith-Dorrien] that the cavalry learn to fight dismounted.

French could not understand why Smith-Dorrien would to transform an institution that he had left in good order. What upset him [French] most was that his pet theories had been discredited by a man who was after all a mere infantry soldier.[...]"

CASSAR, John. The Tragedy of Sir John French. Cranbury, NJ. : Associated University Presses, 1985. p. 96.

Regards,

L. Pozières

[Anthony Pigott]

There's also some background in Richard Holmes' book on French, The Little Field Marshall. There's a thread about it somewhere on the forum.

Anthony

[armourersergeant]

Anthony,

Many thanks for that bit of very interesting information as Jon says I had never come across that before in all my research and as discussed here and previously had been under the assumption that it was to do with the cavalry and fighting methods. So this is a great bit of extra to go in my SD file.

Regards and thanks

Arm

[truthergw]

Extremely interesting quote. Thank you very much. This is the sort of stuff of which the authors and editors of the OH were well aware and which must have coloured their every perception. Sir John really does not stand up to close inspection, does he?

[George Armstrong Custer]

An interesting thread, to which I can perhaps add further evidence of the bitterness between the two. I recently purchased photographs, letters and other ephemera which had belonged to Major General John Vaughan. My interest was primarily that Vaughan was a close friend of Douglas Haig from his 7th Hussars days, and my main object was a rather splendid photograph of the two taken at Capetown during the Boer War which Haig specifically mentions in a contemporary letter to his sister. But there is also a hand written letter to Vaughan from Smith-Dorrien from June 1919. In this letter Smith-Dorrien is clearly apoplectic at French's recently published memoir '1914,' in which he repudiated the contents of his Despatches from 1914 to re-spin the story to Smith-Dorrien's detriment. Smith-Dorrien's letter to Vaughan is clearly part of an ammunition-gathering exercise from eyewitnesses to the events of 1914 in preparation to challenging French's version. Here is the text of his letter:

Government House

Gibraltar

14.6.19

My Dear Vaughan,

You will probably have seen that Lord F, repudiating his original dispatches, is holding me up to the public as the <i>fons et origo</i> of all his difficulties in 1914. Amongst other things he states that I fought at Le Cateau in spite of General Allenby's warning that if I did so my force would be surrounded on the morning of 26th Aug.

At <u>about</u> 1.30 or 2 am on the 26th you came into my H.Q. at Bertry with General Alllenby & the following is what <u>I say</u> took place -

Gen^l Allenby told me his Division had had an exhausting time that 2 1/2 Brigades were around Catillon & 1 1/2 B^des about Caudry & Ligny & that he could get no orders from G.H.Q. whereupon I asked him if he would act under my orders if I decided to fight & he agreed - as a matter of fact it was General Allenby's report of the scattered & tired state of the Cavalry Division which was the deciding factor as to whether I should attempt to go on with the retreat or not - my impression is that General Allenby was relieved by my decision - & certainly did not argue that I should go on retiring -

I shall be so much obliged if you will tell me whether you think my account agrees with your own impressions - as I have asked for an enquiry & must be prepared - I will promise not to make use of anything you say without your permission.

I hope you are none the worse for the 5 years of strenuous work you have done for the Empire -

Yours V. Sincerely,

H. Smith-Dorrien

I don't have Vaughan's original response but he gave Smith-Dorrien permission to use it to refute French, as Smith-Dorrien's Memories of Forty-Eight Years Service notes:

The following extract from a letter, which he allows me to publish, from Major-General John Vaughan, dated 24th June 1919, gives the cavalry point of view as to the necessity for fighting and the results of the Battle of Le Cateau:

"I remember accompanying General Allenby when we visited your H.Q. at Bertry. I also remember the situation as it appeared at the time to Allenby and me, your setting forth the reasons which determined you to fight, and the fact that Allenby thought you were right in doing so. In fact both Allenby and I were much relieved that you had determined to fight as, inter alia, it gave us a chance of getting hold of our scattered brigades again.

" I also remember the action of the French Cavalry under Sordet, who attacked the German right in the evening.

" To my mind this was a very opportune action on Sordet's part, as he had got outside the German flank—and their subsequent advance gave us [british Cavalry] no trouble at all. Prior to your action at Le Cateau the German Cavalry outflanked us via Tournai and Denain, and was a very serious menace.

" Feeling, most strongly as I do, that it was your action at Le Cateau, combined with Sordet's outflanking move that made the rest of our retreat possible and easy, I should certainly wish to give any evidence I can in support of this theory.

" From the British Cavalry point of view I consider that the Huns gave us no trouble at all after Le Cateau, as we were always able to fight delaying actions and retire at our leisure, once the German outflanking movement had petered out. " I am quite sure that the above is also Allenby's view."

[keithmroberts]

Just to add my thanks to Anthony.

I had read a few printed items, including 1914 and the Smithers and Becket volumes, but the additional information provides a fascinating insight into the story.

Keith

[truthergw]

Sir John French's son wrote , I believe , two books seeking to support his father's actions while CiC. I have not read them but would be interested in hearing from anyone who has. How do they report the relationship between Sir John and S-D, what is said of these matters ?

[keithmroberts]

Here is the list of titles relating to French from the Birmingham University Centre for WW1 Studies Bibliography

French, Field-Marshal John Denton Pinkstone

Sir John French by Cecil Chisholm (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1915)

Field-Marshal Sir John French by Walter Jerrold (London: W A Hammond, nd)

The Life of Field-Marshal Sir John French by Major the Hon Gerald French (London: Cassell, 1931)

French Replies to Haig by Major the Hon Gerald French (London: Hutchinson, 1936)

The Little Field-Marshal, Sir John French by Richard Holmes (London: Cape, 1981)

The Tragedy of Sir John French by George H Cassar (London: Associated University Presses, 1985)

The Judgement of History: Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, Lord French and 1914 by Ian F.W. Beckett (London: Tom Donovan, 1993)

Apart from the books quoted earlier they have only one additional title on Smith-Dorrien

Smith-Dorrien by C.R. Ballard (London: Constable, 1931)

Keith

[David Filsell]

The dispute is outlined also in the new book "gentlemen we Will Stand and Fight - see thread. As an aside both French and SD were short tempered quite apart from anything else. Lord Esher wrote of bering asked to lunch with SD to check out his temper such was the man's reputation. Esher passed him as suitable. A variety of causes for their dispute have been raised, but the key fact seems to me to be that French just didn't like the man and dislike turned really nasty. Not least he didn't want SD to take over II Corps after Grierson's death. Such grudges were not in the least unusual in the pre 1914 army - or probably at any other time. As just one example the brothers Gough studiously avoided anything to do with Wilson because they felt that he had not supported them over the Curragh Incident. The problem was very little different to that which I have seen in business - in which directors and Chief Execs would form the most peculiar hatreds for all of each other's works to the point that it would adversely affect business. French has, almost certainly correctly, been harshly judged but the fact is that all in the senior ranks in 1914/15 they were all learning a new game and reputations then were far more jelously guarded than ever they can be now