Was there a solution?

[Garde Grenadier]

One thing you will frequently come across is the 'what if' scenarios. Examples include 'what if':

i) the British had pressed on at Neuve Chapelle

ii) cavalry had occupied High Wood on 14 July 1916

iii) the forces landing at Y Beach or Suvla Bay, Gallipoli had pushed inland

...and there are MANY more.

Writers often suggest that had these mistakes been avoided, the war would have been shortened. No. Breakouts were hard to maintain on the Western Front because defenders trains could move reinforcements faster than attackers could advance.

It took four years of blockade and constant attrition before German forces began to give way. Even then, it was not a rout and the Allies could not outflank the Germans.

What if?

What if the Germans had pressed on instead of letting happen the "Miracle at the Marne" in 1914 (in my opinion paralleled by Dünkirchen 1940)?

One always does see clearer in hindsight and even then huge debates can evolve.

Regards

Daniel

[Dikke Bertha]

Dear Garde Grenadier

I don't understand what you mean when you say

"What if the Germans had pressed on instead of letting happen the "Miracle at the

Marne" in 1914"

Are you suggesting that there was an alternative. I had never considered it.

[AndyHollinger]

In December, 1916 Bethmann-Hollweg published a "peace-note". I assume extending a olive branch to the Entente. Where was this note published? Is there anyone familiar with the nature of the proposal? Did Germany see itself in the "drivers seat" of any potential peace negotiations at this time? What terms may have been workable at this time (again, if any)?

One thing you've got to remember is Germany was an Empire almost of the old school. The powers at be considered the "civilian" gov't a mechanism to support the policies (mostly military or naval) of the Emperor et al. Some of the most telling research available now two decades ago, but at the time, almost revolutionary was that the War and it's timing were essentially a German Military decision. This was the last time they could muster their superiority over their enemies before the Entente would out-number and diplomatically out manuver them. Essentially, they'd planned this war for a decade and it was now or never in 1914.

By 1916 the Military essentially delivered their judgement to the Emporer that they would not win on the Western Front and the Eastern Front was both bogging down and dangerous poltically. At this point the military was not defeatist, but decidedly delivering the msg that over time, they'd lose and not much more could be gained. So ... as they did in 1918, they threw the ball to the Civilians saying ... "now that we've mucked it up" let's give you a try ... and, oh, BTW, don't give up anything we've gained."

BH was given an impossible mission to accomplish and his note did little ... German War Aims at the time were to keep what they'd won and turn Belgium into a Vassal state ... Of course it failed ... but it also fueled the belief inside the Allies that attrition was the answer.

This very summarized answer is from two books I read in Graduate School ... The Best of which is V.R. Berghahn Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 and the other was German War Aims during the First World War (and I can't remember the author) Hey, it's been 30 years!

As to your mismanagement thesis ... very old and very argued ... we always look to leaders for brilliant ideas to "save" our situation. See the US and the economy now ... "SOMEBODY's got to pay for the (fill in your favorite issue)" The simple fact is the powers at be saw situations to which they responded through the channels of the power available to them at the time ... French and British governments and commanding soldiers did what they thought they could. It is not as simple as it seems. Everybody's got a boss and every boss is beset with a thousand demands ... I have never commanded anything larger than a tank platoon - and that not in combat. I can tell you it's harder than it looks. For every brazenly new revolutionary idea a commander/politician in power must judge and decide whether this is a foolhardy waste of people, resources and time or the secret to winning. Those who are successful we call visionary ... those not are blamed. So it goes ...

[Edward_N_Kelly]

QUOTE (Robert Dunlop @ Thu, 4 Mar 2004 22:23:11 +0000)

At the outbreak of the war, the German high command had wireless for communications at the highest levels, particularly on the more mobile right flank.

Was not "Schnell" Heinz Guerdian attached to one of the wireless units for this advance ?

Edward