Was there a solution?

[Guest Weldboy]

This is my first post at this forum and I am sorry if I am rehashing an old debate.

One of the standard themes of WW1 literature (at least that which I have read) is that Haig, Foch, Joffre- in fact the high command of all beligerent nations, were generally unimaginative, dullwitted and often blustering fools. They were inadequate to the task of breaking the trench stalemate. I am personally unsure of the extent to which this is true.

My question to this forum is - What in your opinion could have been done (if anything) by either side militarily or politically that would have (a) broken the stalemate, or ( ended the conflict given the political and military realities of the year 1916? I am not limiting my question to those fighting along the western front but the Entente and Central Powers generally.

Thanks

[paul guthrie]

Short answer, no. And welcome to the forum, you are likely to get lots of replies on this one.

[John_Hartley]

Hi and welcome to the Forum.

Short answer is also no.

A slightly longer answer would suggest that many of the books writtemn some time ago did indeed view the generals and the conduct of the war in the way you describe. More recent analysis, however, draws attention to the developments in weaponry and tactics which brought modernisation to the the "art of war". With it came the successes that are, in fact, very well documented over, say, the last 12 months of the conflict.

Perhaps the first two years of war were of the "old type" but, by the summer and early autumn of 1916, the new tactics could be seen. The start of the "creeping barrage", much greater use of aircraft, the introduction of tanks, etc.

John

[Robert Dunlop]

One thing you will frequently come across is the 'what if' scenarios. Examples include 'what if':

i) the British had pressed on at Neuve Chapelle

ii) cavalry had occupied High Wood on 14 July 1916

iii) the forces landing at Y Beach or Suvla Bay, Gallipoli had pushed inland

...and there are MANY more.

Writers often suggest that had these mistakes been avoided, the war would have been shortened. No. Breakouts were hard to maintain on the Western Front because defenders trains could move reinforcements faster than attackers could advance.

It took four years of blockade and constant attrition before German forces began to give way. Even then, it was not a rout and the Allies could not outflank the Germans.

[andigger]

Welcome to the forum Weldboy, and your question and manner are well appreciated.

The simple answer is no as the others said above. One opinion on the topic is The Donkeys by Alan Clark. The book scrutinizes the major battles of the year, with a particular focus on those in command– French, Rawlinson, Watson and Haig among them – whose orders lead to many thosands of casualties. It is a quick read, but offers great insight into the war in 1915.

[paul guthrie]

Andy the book has been greatly & justly criticized, Clark makes no pretense of objectivity.

[Guest Weldboy]

In December, 1916 Bethmann-Hollweg published a "peace-note". I assume extending a olive branch to the Entente. Where was this note published? Is there anyone familiar with the nature of the proposal? Did Germany see itself in the "drivers seat" of any potential peace negotiations at this time? What terms may have been workable at this time (again, if any)?

[Robert Dunlop]

By the end of 1916, I think the Germans realised that the war in the West was not winnable, in the sense that they would not be able to fully conquer France. They did believe that the allies could be forced to stop the war on terms that would suit Germany - particularly the retention of the captured French territory. Even the German 1918 Spring Offensive was seen largely as a mechanism for capturing more territory, further depleting French and English forces before the Americans got too involved, and thereby forcing the allies to seek an armistice.

I am not familiar with the peace-note.

[Somme1916]

One thing you will frequently come across is the 'what if' scenarios.  Examples include 'what if':

i) the British had pressed on at Neuve Chapelle

ii) cavalry had occupied High Wood on 14 July 1916

iii) the forces landing at Y Beach or Suvla Bay, Gallipoli had pushed inland

...and there are MANY more.

Writers often suggest that had these mistakes been avoided, the war would have been shortened.  No.  Breakouts were hard to maintain on the Western Front because defenders trains could move reinforcements faster than attackers could advance.

I echo what Robert says except I'd add one thing.

What I'd add is this: They should have kept the tanks out of battle, studied how best to employ them and then use a large number (500+) in one mighty well planned push. Have the tank spearhead supported by well trained assault troops and have massed Cavalry & Infantry formations that were equipped for open warfare (also add in some armored cars) ready to push through the gap once the tanks and assault troops broke through and cleared the area of resistance.

The tanks & assault troops would have ruptured the front, the follow on formations would have exploited the breach and the defenders would have been forced to fall back quite a ways before they would have been able to restore the front. Of course as Robert stated they would have been falling back on their trains and would have been able to reestablish their defenses but by the time they did so the tanks & assault troops could have been re-equipped and brought back up to do it all over again. Each time this was done the subsequent defensive zones would have been less well prepared than the one just breached. Which means that eventually open warfare would have resumed.

Welcome to the Regiment and remember hindsight is 20/20.

Jon

[duckman]

Hi Weldboy, and sorry to hijack your thread,

Somme1916 - Jon, you've mentioned massed tanks on a few threads before, and I've been meaning to ask. If you thesis is correct, why is it that even when tanks were available in relatively large numbers in 1918, they were found to be more effective when used in an infantry cooperation role - "penny packeted" out?

Seems to me that cavalry and tanks did not work together particularly well when tried in the Hundred days, and tanks alone would be cut off and destroyed. Without mechanised infantry support - well beyond the reach of any army in 1918 - tanks could do little more than help infantry overcome local strongpoints. Fantasically useful in their limited way, but not capable of 1940 style breakthroughs. With a typicall daily loss in combat of 60% (30% breakdowns never making it to the fighting, and 30% being knocked out) how long could such a push be sustained?

cheers

Frank

[ArmyOfficer]

tanks in 1914-1918 couldn't have operated effectively independent from infantry. no nation had the parts of the system to allow it. First, they didn't have the means to control tanks. A tank (any mechanized force) is only useful if it can be controlled...and that takes radios. They didn't have radios on board that would allow them to be controlled at operational depths. As well, without radios they had no means to coordinate artillery/aviation support at depth. Compounding this problem was a lack of mobile command posts; a Division Commander in WWI couldn't just leave his fixed headquarters and remain "in control"; he didn't have the comms or means to maintain situational understanding and modify their maneuver in order to take advantage of opportunities.

Next, they didn't have means to support them. You've got a tank that can move cross country as long as it has gas but if you don't have recovery, maintenance and fuel/ammo trucks that can match that mobility it does you no good.

the russians in the 1920's figured this out. guys like Svechin and Tuchachevskii saw the potential of operational maneuver with mechanized forces in order to force decisive results and avoid stalemate. looking at both eastern and western fronts they designed what we now know as modern (still current) operational theory in order to avoid what they saw as failures of stalemate in 1914-1918. the real military significance of WWI really lies in our adoption of theory and doctrine created in its wake....

[Somme1916]

Duckman (Frank), ArmyOfficer, other Pals, Ladies & Gentlemen of the board,

Tank Warfare During the Great War.

By CPT Jon Holland

So as not to highjack this thread further and as this may become quite long I will prepare my Thesis and present it in another tread. I hope to have this posted before too many more days.

Cheers,

Jon

[Robert Dunlop]

Tanks without infantry (and decent artillery support) suffered two problems. The first was in the open country, they were vulnerable to German anti-tank artillery. As the threat of tanks increased, the Germans took to placing a proportion of their field guns in forward areas. They were tasked with attacking tanks in direct fire mode. Cambrai illustrated all too well what could happen if tanks tried to advance unsupported against unsuppressed field artillery, notably in the valley behind Flesquieres. The other awful example was the MkV* tanks that got hit in the flank during the Battle of Amiens. In 1918, aircraft were often also tasked with attacking AT guns to prevent these occurences.

In built-up areas, the Germans would isolate tanks by allowing them into the village and then attack from behind and above, placing bundles of stick grenades against tracks, firing into the various apetures and otherwise knocking out the tanks because they could not manouvere or use the guns in the sponsons.

Cavalry were just too vulnerable. It only took some obstacles, a few machine guns and/or artillery and they were mince-meat - literally. Yes, they could pursue to maintain contact when the Germans retreated but they just could not break out on the Western Front. Haig never grasped this fact.

The most interesting examples of what 'might have been' were the armoured cars and whippets. The Battle of Amiens showed what you could do if a passage could be created across the devastation of a battlefield and then let loose armoured vehicles on the rear areas. As pointed out above, resupply was the problem. Time and again, advances had to be halted or slowed because of the problems of resupply. Be it petrol, SAA, shells, whatever, there just wasn't the logistical support capabilities in WW1 once you got any distance from the railheads.

[duckman]

Tank Warfare During the Great War.

By CPT Jon Holland

Looking forward to it, Sir.

To go back to Weldboys question, the only real alternative I can see would have been to establish a defensive position on the Western Front (as the Germans did) and retire too it - although the political implications would have been profound.

The materiel saved could have been shipped to Russia to help them stay in the war (did Murmansk exist as a port at that time?, oh well, Arkhangelsk did).

Ramp up Anti-Submarine efforts.

Perhaps then ALL the entente countries could have stayed in the field long enough to starve Germany out by oooh, about November 10th 1918....

Would have saved some British and French lives (at the expense of MORE Russian ones), but it wouldn't have made a lot of difference.

Other theatres? Other tactics? Other weapons? Seems to me these are all much of a muchness.

*Note: IF the Dardenelles campaign could have been won, that would have made a difference

[RodB]

I don't have an answer to this but I have a question...

When did it become apparent that most men could be more use to a war effort serving behind the lines e.g. in industry, mining, labour battalions, transport etc. rather than as frontline combat troops, leaving the fighting to an extremely well-supported "first echelon" ? I'm thinking of the Bevin Boys in WWII... they were fully engaged in the war.

Following Duckman's thought, if the Kitchener millions were first used to construct honking great defences across the front line, and then the whole manpower of the British empire turned over to war production and support rather than direct fighting.... what then ?

[Dikke Bertha]

Hello

I think that Weldboy has posed a very good question which should stimulate a good debate. When you consider the costly campaigns on the Western Front I am sure that the generals and politicians at the time asked themselves the same question.

Does anybody know if there were any attempts by the allies to get the Netherlands to join them. Would it not have been possible then to land a force around Antwerp and turn the German sea flank. Amphibious landings were conducted at Gallipoli so the know-how was there. The liberation of Antwerp would have allowed the supply of a large force (just as in WW2).

Could this not have broken the trench gridlock especially if the allies could march freely across to Maastricht. Certainly the Germans would have had to evacuate Belgium in a hurry.

[Guest Desmond6]

Excuse my scientific ignorance - but when was radio i.e. wireless communication discovered?

I'm asking because - if the rudiments of this method of communication had been known preWW1 it would have made great military sense to provide funding/scientists to develelop it. How many times have you read in war diaries that communications broke down and thus reinforcements could not be brought to bear at vital sectors?

Another of the vast number of 'what ifs?'.

[Ed Matthews]

Certainly the strategic importance of Antwerp was recognised early on in the War; troops of the Royal Naval Division landing in October 1914 in a belated attempt to bolster the defence of the town by the Belgian Army.

Ed

[Guest Weldboy]

Desmond 6,

Wireless was introduced along with the wave of technology at the end of the 19th and beggining of the 20th century. Certainly by 1905 and perhaps several years before. "Spark Gap" transmitters were used to transmit morse signals. Voice communications were possible with the advent of the vacuum tube, which the RAF utilized in some of their aircraft on the western front by 1918.

[Robert Dunlop]

Just finished reading Yigal Sheffy's fascinating book on British military intelligence in Palestine. Wireless communications were important to the Turkish army, particularly in areas where telegraph cables were sparse. The British had several wireless interception and direction finding teams who could pick up messages and pinpoint wireless units (they could even detect signals from Zeppelins over the UK). This gave invaluable information about the location of HQs and reinforcements. They also listened to the wireless communications of German pilots, gaining information about targets for example. The British never deciphered the codes used by the Yildirim Army group.

The navies made extensive use of high power wireless. The German wireless stations dotted round the world were used to communicate with Berlin and with naval ships. They were an early target for the Allies in the Pacific and Africa. Naval intelligence units were used to intercept messages from land and sea sources.

At the outbreak of the war, the German high command had wireless for communications at the highest levels, particularly on the more mobile right flank.

The first British use of wireless for artillery spotting by aerial observation was during the Battle of the Marne I believe. It was one way - air to ground. By the end of the war, two way voice wireless was available to some aircraft.

Wireless units played a vital role in coordinating the advance into Mesopotamia. In fact, the British commander was so concerned to maintain control that the cavalry units had to stop frequently to report.

Wireless was tried on the battlefield. Sets were carried forward but they required several men to lug them about and the aerial was a problem. Nevertheless, I have read a personal account of this happening on the Western Front as early as April 1917 for definite. Possibly even during the Battle of the Somme but I can't be sure. Some tanks were rigged for wireless, with enormous aerials projecting upwards.

Wireless sets were issued to secret agents on the Western and Palestine Fronts. Most sets were large but some examples of very short range sets were capable of being hidden in tins.

Just some random examples.

[MartinWills]

Excuse my scientific ignorance - but when was radio i.e. wireless communication discovered?

I'm asking because - if the rudiments of this method of communication had been known preWW1 it would have made great military sense to provide funding/scientists to develelop it. How many times have you read in war diaries that communications broke down and thus reinforcements could not be brought to bear at vital sectors?

Another of the vast number of 'what ifs?'.

Desmond,

You need to remember that radio was in it's infancy during 1914-1918 and radio sets were far from portable.

Telegraphy (morse dots and dashes) were the order of the day and wireless telephony was only really to become effective after the war.

Much research was done at the time, though this is an aspect of the war that remains little known and remarkably "hush-hush" even to this day. The key unit was the Wireless Experimental Establishment at Joyce Green (and later moved to Biggin Hill). One of the leading lights there, by the name of Eckersley, went on to become Chief Engineer of the BBC. The work of this unit - an RFC/RAF unit was heavily supported by officers seconded from the RE.

At the time, however, radio was easily intercepted and telephony was not "scrambled". As a result it would not necessarily have had as great an impact as we might think.

If anyone has any detailed info on the W E E please shout - I have a particular interest.

[Guest Desmond6]

As a non-techno ... thanks for the information.

I do not feel remotely qualified to debate on geographical/strategic solutions. Is it fair to say for instance that the mentality of the senior commanders with regard to the development of new weapons/tools was largely detrimental to the conduct of the war?

Perhaps some of you guys could come up with examples of forward-thinking officers who stood out from the herd in this respect. The development of the tank is an obvious starting point.

And why did it take so long to develop the tactics of combined arms which eventually led to the 'Black Day of the German Army'?

[Chris_Baker]

I'm not so sure it was "so long". The war was just over four years long. I think the development of technologies, economies, fighting methods etc was quite extraordinary in a period so short!

And just on one other point. There was no way the Allies could have stood on the defensive in France and found somewhere else to attack, given the political situation of France. France was the leader of the ground war. Until after Nivelle's discredited offensive in 1917, France called the shots in terms of what the armies did. And it wanted Germans off French soil.

You might well ask why France went to such lengths to keep huge numbers of Allied troops bottled up in Salonika: this appears to have been entirely for French political advantage.

[Dikke Bertha]

Hello

Getting back to the original question....

Dear Ed - I am aware of the 1914 attempt to hold on to Antwerp. I mentioned Antwerp as there would be no value in taking that port once the Netherlands remained neutral as all shipping would have to go through Dutch waters.

However upon reflection Rotterdam would be a better choice as there would have been no fighting to get into it and all the facilities were intact.

Does anybody know if the allies approached the Netherlands?? It seems inconceiveble that they did not at least discuss it.

[paul guthrie]

You might well ask why France went to such lengths to keep huge numbers of Allied troops bottled up in Salonika: this appears to have been entirely for French political advantage.

Chris you are going to have to explain that one. I completely accept that original purpose was primarily to keep Serbia in the war & it worked after a fashion, after they escaped to Corfu through Albania in one of the great epics of the war - have never seen a book on this, too bad, they got back into war.

French did need a place for republican, anti or non Catholic general like Sarrail & sent him there.

I think it also kept Bulgarians from joining fight v. Russia tho I do not remember reading that as a reason.

Seems to me few to no French votes by keeping an army there so if you have a case it must be army politics, not politics politics.