Jutland: Whose victory?

[AndyHollinger]

I think you have to realize we've been discussing the battle and the Naval war ...

The British won the battle because they kept the Germans from their tactical and strategic goals and in thus doing kept the advantage for the home team. The conduct of the naval war could go on which was in the British favor ... so they win... Counting casualties or ships doesn't count. Winning is what counts.

In terms of the discussion of the Naval War and HSF ... again, it doesn't matter what the reasons were ... the HSF lost ... and it's being NOT used was the reason for this loss ... Essentially the only thing the HSF did was keep a certain number of British men from being used by the Army.

Net: If you have a weapon, use it ... especially if you are in the situation that if it's lost there will be little difference in the out-come. IF the HSF had constantly gone out and got lucky ... the war could have gone differently.

[egbert]

The Hochseeflotte should have been named the Nordseeflotte, because it was never designed to fight outside those waters.

I would like to hear/read the source where it says the German fleet was never intended to sail and fight overseas.....to my contrary knowledge the German fleet was build to these standards, because Imperial Germany had own colonies to protect in Asia, Pacific, S.Africa.

Whose victory?? Simple answer: in Germany they say German victory, in GB they say Brit victory. What the heck even some thousend poor souls deep in the water don't know the exact answer. Right or wrong - my country ; is it that? I am over this....

[paul guthrie]

Egbert I do not think there is any disagreement between naval historians that HSF ships were built & designed for North Sea use.

[Guest Biplane pilot]

The HSF essentially had nowhere else to go other than the North Sea. With only one overseas base (in China!) the German navy was necessarily focused on European waters (Coronel notwithstanding.) The doctrinal dispute around the turn of the century, regarding trade warfare, became moot when Berlin realized that building first-class commerce raiders (cruisers) accomplished little. That's why Tirpitz insisted on producing as many battleships as possible.

[duckman]

Egbert - I'd be happy to post some data that will illustrate the point if you are interested. Let me know if you are not quite "over this"...

Andy - I agree up to a point. But if your argument holds good, then the Germans had lost the naval war long before Jutland. Part of the problem was that the Kaiser had decided the war would be won by the army and the navy did not need to be risked.

In November 1914, the Germans had 20 capital ships available. The Grand Fleet, depleted by ships under repair, ships not yet ready for action and forces detached to hunt for Spee was down to 22 available. More came onstream soon afterwards, restoring a lead that Germany could not overcome.

Nevertheless in December Beatty (4 battlecruisers) and Warrender (6 battleships) were dispatched to intercept Hippers raid on Scarborough. They came within an ace of running into the full strength of the HSF, as Ingenohl was supporting Hippers ships. Ingenohl was presented with an opportunity to win a famous victory, but he feared the squadron he contacted in the pre dawn light was just the vanguard of the GF, and reined in by the Kaisers command, fled back to port. Between dawn and a storm that blew up at midday, he would have had 4 hours to destroy this force, which I would argue was quite possible, given events at Jutland (and other actions).

By the time the HSF got the leadership it deserved, Britain had built, repaired and recalled enough ships that there was no chance of Germany equalising the balance through "little victories" - which I guess is what they thought Jutland was.

One other thing about the HSF's ability to "constantly go out and get lucky" - Britain had the lead in the intelligence war - access to codes, their own security etc - and were usually much better informed of the HSF's movements than the Admiralstab were of the GF's movements. That makes getting lucky even harder.

Biplane pilot - You are right about Germany's focus, but they actually had colonies all over the world, many with some level of naval support. Tsingtao was the most important in the Pacific - with good naval facilities (and a brewery that still makes a decent lager) - but there were also stations at Samoa (taken by NZ) and in the Bismarck Archipelago (taken by Aus, and now part of Papua New Guinea) amongst others. I don't know much about their African colonies (Cameroons, SW Africa, Tanganyika etc), but I assume some facilities existed.

[AndyHollinger]

Great thoughts ... thanks

[RodB]

(RodB @ Sat, 28 Feb 2004 07:10:36 +0000)

"The Germans did NOT "almost win" at Jutland, they took a pounding, many of their ships were sinking hulks that only got home because they didn't have far to go 

Just a few factoids that might shed some light on this discussion...

According to figures I have - source to follow when I get back to the library - repairs for ships hit by heavy calibre shells were completed as follows:

Rheinland...........10/6

Helgoland...........16/6

Westfalen...........17/6

Nassau...............10/7

Grosser Kurfurst..16/7

Markgraf.............20/7

Konig..................21/7

Ostfriesland.........26/7

Moltke.................30/7

Von der Tann.......2/8

Seydlitz...............16/9

Derfflinger..........15/10

I presume that RodB includes the Moltke in his list of "sinking hulks" yet it took only 8 weeks to repair. It must also be remembered that limited German dry-dock space meant some ships had to wait before repairs were started. It must also be remembered that the German Battle Cruisers were heavily engaged. Lutzow (which sank), Seydlitz and Derfflinger took over 20 hits each. (This compares to perhaps 5 each for the Queen Mary, Indefatigable and Invincible).

The comparative figures for British ships:

Malaya............24/6

Tiger...............2/7

Barham...........4/7

Warspite.........20/7

Lion................20/7 - as a three turret ship. Repairs to Q turret were not completed until 23/9

Princess Royal.21/7

Marlborough.....2/8

Colossus and New Zealand completed repairs without needing to be docked.

So apart from Seydlitz and Derfflinger, the figures are pretty much the same.

Some other random grabs:

Fleet in being? Well Scheer did try again. The fleets came out an would have engaged on 19/8/16 if they could have found each other. As it was they missed, but the HMS Nottingham and HMS Falmouth were sunk by submarines.

Design issues? There is a convention in the military of "fit for purpose". The British ships were not vulnerable particularly because they had "design flaws". In large part it was because they were designed for a different purpose. British ships had a greater radius of action that the Germans, in line with their purpose of controlling huge areas of ocean. The Germans were able to sacrifice range and improve armour, flood control and seaworthiness. It was these last two that allowed the "sinking hulks" to make it back to port. With the fleets facing off across the confines of the North Sea, the German designs were superior. But they should have been - they were designed for that sort of environment.

And such design flaws as the British ships had, were conditioned in part by the propellants available. If the Derfflinger had been using British propellant she would have unquestionably blown up. But in magazine conditions, fires caused German propellant to burn rather than explode.

The dry dock periods do seem to indicate parity of damage, either that or faster repair workers !

... limps back to port to study "Jutland The German Perspective" by V E Tarrant, before next sally.

[duckman]

... limps back to port to study "Jutland The German Perspective" by V E Tarrant, before next sally.

Just been studying that myself, actually. Very readable. Best explication of the night fighting that I have come across.

Tarrant cites John Campbells "Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting" as a valuable source for his book. The dates I provided are from Campbell's book.

[AndyHollinger]

Maybe this is the way for Military Historians ... geesh, there's no "Maybe" about it ... we all love to pour over stuff and provide opinions about winning and losing ... and the string is doing some great service about giving me (at least) more facts than I had before upon which to base my opinion ...

But ...

In the final analysis all we can do is look to history about "who won" ... Battles are just periods of action in a larger and longer process which we call war. These periods change the course of actions in wars. I believe we should judge "winning and losing" in light of what happened after.

A case in point is the battle of Antietam or Sharpsburg ... the battle raged and both sides inflicted heavy casualties. The ANV was not broken nor did the Union gain the field. Lee inflicted greater casualties on the Union but took casualties he could not replace - ever. More importantly, his offensive into the North ended and Lincoln used the battle to cover the Emancipation Proclamation which ended forever any hope of foreign recognition.

As much as this son of Lee hates to admit it, the South lost. Not because of the ANV's actions, but because of what happened after the battle.

The blood in the lane, much like the sailors drowned in the North Sea that day didn't win or lose Jutland. The fact the BN still held the HSF at bay and did so in such a way that for a variety of reasons it was never contested again meant the Blockade went on and the idle sailors consumed resources and participated in the German morale disaster that was late 1918 ... Britain mainted forward progress toward their victory conditions and war aims while Germany did not.

We can, and do, debate the relative merits of British ships, gunnery, tactics and the commanders' actions visa-vie the Germans. It makes for great conversation and debate. But the result was a "victory" for the British. We can go off in "what ifs" and understand or theorize the Germans "could" have done things ... but, in the final analysis, we know what happened.

It has always amazed me that Trafalgar was so decisive ... the French rebuilt fleets before ... but they didn't. If they had could have the Sea Dogs have done what the fallen Nelson had? I don't know - maybe. But the fact the French didn't gave Britain the seas for a century ... Lee retreated after giving Virginia a break for part of the campaigning season ... the HSF spent the rest of the war in boredom ... like races or soccer/football matches victory and defeat is easily measured ...

We can go back to examining details or comparing lists of stuff ... but Victory or Defeat ... the answer to this one is clear.

But, I could be wrong....

[Hooter]

Just a few factoids that might shed some light on this discussion...

According to figures I have - source to follow when I get back to the library - repairs for ships hit by heavy calibre shells were completed as follows:

Rheinland...........10/6

Helgoland...........16/6

Westfalen...........17/6

Nassau...............10/7

Grosser Kurfurst..16/7

Markgraf.............20/7

Konig..................21/7

Ostfriesland.........26/7

Moltke.................30/7

Von der Tann.......2/8

Seydlitz...............16/9

Derfflinger..........15/10

I presume that RodB includes the Moltke in his list of "sinking hulks" yet it took only 8 weeks to repair. It must also be remembered that limited German dry-dock space meant some ships had to wait before repairs were started. It must also be remembered that the German Battle Cruisers were heavily engaged. Lutzow (which sank), Seydlitz and Derfflinger took over 20 hits each. (This compares to perhaps 5 each for the Queen Mary, Indefatigable and Invincible).

The comparative figures for British ships:

Malaya............24/6

Tiger...............2/7

Barham...........4/7

Warspite.........20/7

Lion................20/7 - as a three turret ship. Repairs to Q turret were not completed until 23/9

Princess Royal.21/7

Marlborough.....2/8

Colossus and New Zealand completed repairs without needing to be docked.

So apart from Seydlitz and Derfflinger, the figures are pretty much the same.

A little bit of analysis would suggest that these figures show a significant difference.

From these figures, the total number of ship-days lost to the GF was 304, whereas the HSF lost 654, substantially more than twice as many.

The (fewer) British ships took an average of 43 days to return to service, the German ships took an average of 55 days - a quarter as long again.

Put another way, at the beginning of July, the GF was 3 ships to the good, by the middle of the month 4 ships better off, and still 2 ships up at the start of September.

And all of this is in the context of a single British ship being a smaller fraction of the GF than a single German ship was of the HSF.

[duckman]

Interesting analysis ChrisH.

How do you factor in the loss of three battlecruisers to one, in saying the GF was three ships to the good?

Andy - I agree with you. Jutland was a British victory. I do believe though that there are many misconceptions about the nature of that victory*. My numbers were just to refute RodB's statement about "sinking hulks".

*not, I hasten to add, that I claim to have all the answers...

[paul guthrie]

Duckie your post on the amount of time it took to fix ships was most helpful as was further analysis of the data. Frankly the Germans were back to normal sooner than I thought.