Jutland: Whose victory?

[Alec McCudden]

I am fairly clear why a great sea action was so important to the British. They clearly needed to retain domination of the North Sea. However, I am less clear about the value of such a big-ship action to the Germans. It must have been clear to them that they could not hope to win a total resounding victory against the Grand Fleet.

I know that Scheer's startegy was to lure out small chunks of the HSF and destroy them piece-meal.

But why? What long-term benefits were there for them?

Forgive me if this topic has been discussed ad-nauseum or if you consider the question stupid.

Alec

[Jonathan Saunders]

For one thing, the psychological value and how a British Naval defeat would rock the morale of the British public.

[paul guthrie]

It's interesting & does not seem rational;they built enough to make UK very suspicious, even hostile, but not nearly enough to win and they would have been no better comparatively if war had started few years later.

They won a tactical victory at Jutland in sunk ships and KIA but were worse off in damaged ships & changed nothing.

May be an example of a stupid leader imposing irrational war like policies on his nation for no good purpose. It happens and Kaiser Bill was not a clear thinking man. Your question assumes a rational reason, I do not think there was one.

[AndyHollinger]

First I believe the reasoning is true of almost any military culture ... you've got the toys and there's a war on, you want to USE them.

But, there is more to it than that.

A decisive action in the North Sea in which the British were worsted, sigificantly, would put a huge damper on how the British divided their resources in terms of Army and Navy ... reducing their committment to the BEF. Secondly, while you can build an Army in a matter of months, a Navy takes years and is much more expensive ... if the Germans could have done real damage to the RN, and the German Navy retain it's or most of its size and speed ... the next action becomes easier and deadlier. In short ... if the Germans could win a series of tactical victories with enough margin to chip away at the RN, they gain more freedom and more initiative ... hence the ability for more victories ... and maybe, to lessen the blockade.

If you challenge the people who "could lose the war in an afternoon" enough, and get lucky, you're bound to win sometime ... and it would only take once.

- Can you image what even the LG gov't would do if the HSF could bombard the Thames estuary at will? How about Troop ship crossings? A series of HSF victories could have taken Britain out of the war ... much faster than the terror bombings of WWI - too little, too late ...

If we start with the whole idea of a German fleet - that big was a mistake and it, almost alone, brought Britain into the war ... Once I've done that, I've got to use it.

Now the reality was the Brits didn't lose Jutland ... they won. Kind of like McClellan won Anteidem - Lee DID go South ... we can argue over statistics ... but the Germans went back to Wilhelmshaven, never to return ... The German error was this fact alone. If the Germans had returned the next week and the next ... and lost more battles like Jutland ... they might have won in the long run ...

The real question was ... other than to keep the expensive toy afloat ... if you're not going to risk it - why have it? A couple of more victories like Jutland the the RN would have been on the ropes ....

What follows is a polemic statement:

Much like the loss of will on the part of the German Military to simply lose in 1918 and hand it over to the politicans to take the fall ... the German Naval establishment should take the fall for lack of will and lack of aggressive spirit all the money their toys took to build. Yes, the Kaiser can be blamed ... but that only goes so far ...

[paul guthrie]

The real question was ... other than to keep the expensive toy afloat ... if you're not going to risk it - why have it?  A couple of more victories like Jutland the the RN would have been on the ropes ....

The HSF was in no condition to go back after the British after Jutland, while they had sunk more ships their own surviving ships were in need of more repair than the British who were in much better shape & wanted to continue the battle then & later. The HSF certainly could not go back the next week.

[Guest Desmond6]

As Paul notes, the Royal Navy's famous signal that they were 'ready to sail' was quoted extensively at the time.

Contemporary British newspapers also make great play of '200 merchant ships' being able to leave the Baltic and northern ports in which they had been sheltering because the danger previously presented by the High Seas Fleet before Jutland had been removed.

Why did the HSF seek battle? Because they thought they could fight it and win it on their terms and with their chosen tactics. Instead, it proved to be their last major foray.

Psychologically, I think the HSF commanders and crews were 'up for a scrap' and having had millions of marks spent on it, the German Navy was a very tough opponent indeed. They were almost duty bound to strike a blow for the Kaiser's honour and to show all those who chipped in to build the fleet that it was not just for show.

Much too simplistic - but that's how I've always read it ...

[Hooter]

You have to go back to the start of the war to see the point of the HSF. The idea was that the GF would impose a close blockade, allowing the Germans to erode it significantly with minefields, torpedo boats etc. Only when this 'levelling of the playing field' had occurred would the HSF sail out to do battle with some hope of achieving some kind of victory.

The problem was, as soon as it became clear that Britain would impose a distant blockade, the German strategy went up in a puff of smoke - and with it much of the point of having a battle fleet. There afterwards, the best that could be said of it was that as a 'fleet in being' it occupied the attention of the Royal Navy - sailing out and risking a major action put even this limited benefit at risk.

[Guest Biplane pilot]

Much overlooked in the naval scheme of things is/was the Flanders flotillas. Destroyers and torpedo boats at Ostend & Zeebrugge posed a constant threat to RN light forces which in turn were concerned with keeping the net and mine "barrages" intact as a bar to U-boats. Frequently the Belgian-based subs accounted for 1/4 or more of tonnage sunk, so that was an important factor. There's a theory that had Scheer (or whomever) allotted more DDs and PTs to the Flanders MarineKorps, the extra pressure on the RN might have been significant. As it was, recall that Passchendale was mainly about Flanders.

[Alec McCudden]

OK

These are very persuasive replies so far. However, it still doesn't really answer why Germany threw almost everything they had at Jutland (and very nearly won!) only to totally reverse their tactics and bottle up the fleet for the rest of the war.

Was there a shortage of raw materials and manpower to repair the Jutland damage? Did the Kaiser refuse to allow his precious fleet into danger again? (this I can't believe), or did he simply lose his nerve?

As has been suggested, if they had gone back again and again, they may have been mauled but in the long run they just might have won.(?)

If Jelicoe had turned into the torpedo attack rather than away from it, we may be having a very different debate about Jutland today!

Alec

[Jonathan Saunders]

If Jelicoe had turned into the torpedo attack rather than away from it, we may be having a very different debate about Jutland today!

Which is one reason why I dont understand why Jelicoe's reputation has suffered for doing exactly the right thing in the circumstances.

[Hooter]

These are very persuasive replies so far. However, it still doesn't really answer why Germany threw almost everything they had at Jutland (and very nearly won!) only to totally reverse their tactics and bottle up the fleet for the rest of the war.

The HSF sailed out with the intention of overwhelming a small portion of the GF, for instance the Battlecruiser Squadron, but found itself up against the whole fleet. Both sides were well aware that such an encounter, if fought to the bitter end was only going to end one way - hence Scheer's determined efforts to extract himself from the situation, even if needs be at the price of his own battlecruisers (the "death ride").

The main thing that the Germans learned from this experience was that they could not send their fleet in to the North Sea without a significant chance of encountering the entire Grand Fleet and thereby risking total destruction. Faced with this prospect, the 'fleet in being' option was more attractive.

[AndyHollinger]

If Jelicoe had turned into the torpedo attack rather than away from it, we may be having a very different debate about Jutland today!

Which is one reason why I dont understand why Jelicoe's reputation has suffered for doing exactly the right thing in the circumstances.

I am intregued ... what do you mean by this?

Andy

[AndyHollinger]

These are very persuasive replies so far. However, it still doesn't really answer why Germany threw almost everything they had at Jutland (and very nearly won!) only to totally reverse their tactics and bottle up the fleet for the rest of the war.

The HSF sailed out with the intention of overwhelming a small portion of the GF, for instance the Battlecruiser Squadron, but found itself up against the whole fleet. Both sides were well aware that such an encounter, if fought to the bitter end was only going to end one way - hence Scheer's determined efforts to extract himself from the situation, even if needs be at the price of his own battlecruisers (the "death ride").

The main thing that the Germans learned from this experience was that they could not send their fleet in to the North Sea without a significant chance of encountering the entire Grand Fleet and thereby risking total destruction. Faced with this prospect, the 'fleet in being' option was more attractive.

I must admit, I don't know the research on this however:

Sheer should have run ... his job was to land punches and cripple the GF, not try to stand there and take it ... However mauled it seems to me there is a true lack of understanding on the part of the German High Command as to the value of their weapon and its cost of staying in port. More, it didn't need to be a surface vrs UBoat all or nothing ... they could have done both ...

Seems to me they KNEW they had speed, accurracy and armor on their side ... if they came out again and again, threw some punches and retreated either they'd get lucky enough to have someone chase them back (minefields and submaries) or establish a close blockade ... or be forced by an angry British Press into becoming too audacious and committing a horrible mistake ...

OR they could have been caught and sent to the bottom ... and what would have changed inside Germany or for German war aims, success, strategies .... nothing ...

But, bottom line that would have been better for Germany than sitting pretty at Wilhelmshaven ... Where they became an icon for defeat, a threat to no one and a breeding nest for bolshevicks...

This may be contreversial but I lay the "blame" at the feet of the German High Command ... who, much like their army friends didn't have the stomach for the real hard stuff. Luddendorf and Hidendburg lost their will, deserted their Kaiser and their armies to socialist politicians after ignoring them (politicians) for years ... It is they, sea and land, that started the myth of "stabbed in the back" ...

enough ... where is that soap box?

[Hooter]

OR they could have been caught and sent to the bottom ... and what would have changed inside Germany or for German war aims, success, strategies .... nothing ...

This leads to a fascinating 'What if...?' If the the HSF had been effectively wiped out, would the RN have been able to adopt a new strategy - close blocade and bombardment of the german ports? Of course minefields and torpedo boats would still have been a problem, but much easier to deal with without the continuous threat of the HSF rolling out at a moments notice.

Under such circumstances, could the U-boat threat have been strangled at its bases? Would access to the Baltic have been possible, and with it the opportunity to get aid to Russia?

I'm not sure that these are entirely realistic options, but wouldn't the Germans want to keep their 'fleet in being' just to avoid the possibility?

[AndyHollinger]

Actually, I think the tp boats and Uboats would have greatly expanded making them more dangerous ... Baltic and Russia still out ... Close blockade - why?

No expense and hassle with a Navy .... But they might also have won which they could never do sitting in port ...

[alfie]

They won a tactical victory at Jutland in sunk ships and KIA but were worse off in damaged ships & changed nothing.

Surely it was the British who had the tactical victory by disuading the German Fleet from returning to the North Sea?

[Jonathan Saunders]

If Jelicoe had turned into the torpedo attack rather than away from it, we may be having a very different debate about Jutland today!

Which is one reason why I dont understand why Jelicoe's reputation has suffered for doing exactly the right thing in the circumstances.

I am intregued ... what do you mean by this?

Andy

Scheer detailed his destroyers to make a full scale torpedo attack whilst his ships turned away form the Grand Fleet to run for their home base. To protect his ships from this threat Jellicoe turned his ships away from the torpedo destroyers, thus presenting them the somewhat smaller target of their sterns. This in itself was successful as all torpedos missed. However as a result of a combination of Jelicoe turning away, the German Navy's lack of stomach for a fight and the mist that then covered the German withdrawal, the battle ceased at this point and a conclusive victory (as was the tradition of the Royal Navy) was not won.

As Jelicoe's actions were deemed somewhat less than Nelsonian, his reputation has been heavily criticised ever since. Specifically many of his critics stating he would have made his ships as difficult a target by turning his bows to the enemy rather than his stern, and thus being bale to maintain contact with the High Seas Fleet. However with the Grand Fleet steaming towards the German torpedo destroyers, the opportunity for a more succesful torpedo attack would have ensued by virtue of the distance between the Grand Fleet and the destoyers being that much less.

[AndyHollinger]

Thanks! Andy

[RodB]

The Germans did NOT "almost win" at Jutland, they took a pounding, many of their ships were sinking hulks that only got home because they didn't have far to go. The fact that 3 RN battlecruisers blew up was due to design flaws and powder handling errors (the Germans had already rectified similar errors after Dogger Bank, the RN would learn and correct these errors after Jutland) rather than anything the Germans did. The battlecruisers shouldn't have been in the line, and their presence there was irrelevant.

These mistakes would not have been repeated, and any subsequent action would have ended with the annihilation of the HSF.

Scheer himself stated he would have lost more ships if the RN hadn't fired so many dud shells. This would also be rectified.

The RN could only improve, whereas the HSF had done all it could.

Jellicoe had already informed the Admiralty that, in view of modern German "nuisance" weapons such as submarines, mines, torpedo boats, he may not always be able to "engage the enemy more closely"... hence his circumspection at the end of the battle.... he was fighting in the enemy's back alley. He wasn't going to get his fleet sunk by sucker punches.

So... why did the HSF start the fight ? Why did the Japanese bomb Pearl Harbor ? Why did Germany start the war ? It's always clear in hindsight, the loser always appears to have started something he shouldn't have. My guess is they simply underestimated the power of the RN, perhaps seeing themselves in the role of the Japanese vs the Russians at Tsushima, the last great naval action.

[Tim Birch]

I don't know what proportion of the armed forces were tied up in the RN, but if after Jutland, the Grand Fleet had been secretely mothballed at Scapa Flow and their crews released to serve with the RND in France, would the increase in the size of the BEF have been significant enough to have been decisive? Such an action might have been difficult to keep secret, but if it had been possible the perceived threat to the German Navy would have continued, whilst the larger Army dealt the knockout blow in France.

Speculatively

Tim

[paul guthrie]

The Germans did NOT "almost win" at Jutland, they took a pounding, many of their ships were sinking hulks that only got home because they didn't have far to go

Exactly. That's the point I made at the start of the thread. To understand why HSF did not come out for another go with hope of real damage ot RN in light of the fact they had sunk more & killed more the next week - and a hell of a lot longer - is they could not! They had more badly damaged ships with a smaller navy, British were ready, they were not, an easy one.

[duckman]

(RodB @ Sat, 28 Feb 2004 07:10:36 +0000)

"The Germans did NOT "almost win" at Jutland, they took a pounding, many of their ships were sinking hulks that only got home because they didn't have far to go 

Just a few factoids that might shed some light on this discussion...

According to figures I have - source to follow when I get back to the library - repairs for ships hit by heavy calibre shells were completed as follows:

Rheinland...........10/6

Helgoland...........16/6

Westfalen...........17/6

Nassau...............10/7

Grosser Kurfurst..16/7

Markgraf.............20/7

Konig..................21/7

Ostfriesland.........26/7

Moltke.................30/7

Von der Tann.......2/8

Seydlitz...............16/9

Derfflinger..........15/10

I presume that RodB includes the Moltke in his list of "sinking hulks" yet it took only 8 weeks to repair. It must also be remembered that limited German dry-dock space meant some ships had to wait before repairs were started. It must also be remembered that the German Battle Cruisers were heavily engaged. Lutzow (which sank), Seydlitz and Derfflinger took over 20 hits each. (This compares to perhaps 5 each for the Queen Mary, Indefatigable and Invincible).

The comparative figures for British ships:

Malaya............24/6

Tiger...............2/7

Barham...........4/7

Warspite.........20/7

Lion................20/7 - as a three turret ship. Repairs to Q turret were not completed until 23/9

Princess Royal.21/7

Marlborough.....2/8

Colossus and New Zealand completed repairs without needing to be docked.

So apart from Seydlitz and Derfflinger, the figures are pretty much the same.

Some other random grabs:

Fleet in being? Well Scheer did try again. The fleets came out an would have engaged on 19/8/16 if they could have found each other. As it was they missed, but the HMS Nottingham and HMS Falmouth were sunk by submarines.

Design issues? There is a convention in the military of "fit for purpose". The British ships were not vulnerable particularly because they had "design flaws". In large part it was because they were designed for a different purpose. British ships had a greater radius of action that the Germans, in line with their purpose of controlling huge areas of ocean. The Germans were able to sacrifice range and improve armour, flood control and seaworthiness. It was these last two that allowed the "sinking hulks" to make it back to port. With the fleets facing off across the confines of the North Sea, the German designs were superior. But they should have been - they were designed for that sort of environment.

And such design flaws as the British ships had, were conditioned in part by the propellants available. If the Derfflinger had been using British propellant she would have unquestionably blown up. But in magazine conditions, fires caused German propellant to burn rather than explode.

[egbert]

the German designs were superior. But they should have been - they were designed for that sort of environment.

It's that simple: Made in Germany

[duckman]

It's that simple: Made in Germany

Yep, I guess it is that simple. Better shell hoists, better propellant, better shells, better rangefinders etc etc.

Of course, spineless leadership negates a lot of that. Like the old FIAT advert. Designed by computer. Styled by Italians. Driven by morons...

To clarify my point on design: British ships had to be able to cruise around the world and engage whoever and whenever required. That means space for bunks, for fuel, for rations etc. The Hochseeflotte should have been named the Nordseeflotte, because it was never designed to fight outside those waters. British ships were about as good as they could be, they just weren't as optimised for the battle (as it transpired) as the German ones.

And the German ones were greatly improved by the support of superior industries outside the Navy's control (optics, chemicals, steel etc)

[healdav]

With the actual conduct of the battle, you have to do a big cultural change.

There was no Radar, and Jellicoe was very badly served by Beatty who, I think should have been courtmatialled for sheer incompetence rather then being promoted. After all, he consistently tried to use his battlecruiers to have a go at the HSF rather than as reconnaissance craft, which is what they were and consistently failed to tell Jellicoe what was going on.

When I was at Staff College 30 years ago the battle of Jutland and the signalling failures were still being used as a dreadful example of how not to do it. The absolute necessity of telling the commander where you are, what you are dojng and where the enemy are and what they are doing was rammed down out throats all the time and all with reference to Jutland.

There was one instructor at the College who told us that his instructor at the College had once been at a lecture given by Jellicoe who said that his entire problem was that he didn't have a clue what the Germans were actually doing, and once the fog came down he was literally in the dark.

All his movements were based on intuition and a logical analysis of what he thought the he would do if he was the German commander.

Incidentally, it was the command failures at Jutland that led to the founding of a proper Staff College and the teaching of all these things (and many more). As out instructor put it, 'up until that time it had been the doctrine that until a ship's captain and officers reached the rank of admiral they would obey orders without any thought to the strategic or tactical situation. Once admiral, it was assumed that the mantle of Nelson would descend upon their shoulders from heaven and they would automatically be transformed into all seeing strategic and tactical geniuses'.