So who was the dummy that didn't do their homework?

The Gallipoli campaign gets more tragic as more of this research comes to light.

Regards

Kim

So who was the dummy that didn't do their homework?

The Gallipoli campaign gets more tragic as more of this research comes to light.

Regards

Kim

Kim,

Chasseud's new book (with Peter Doyle), Grasping Gallipoli is pretty close to the top ofthe list to read nest. I will let you know but my guess is ultimately Hamilton was at fault but most certainly his Staff were.

Jon

Jon I would be interested to hear/read what you get on this angle as it may prove or disprove my opinion on Hamilton and Braithwaite.

I sit in hamilton guilty camp on command not just as he was ultimately the senior officer but more so that Braithwaite showed later that he had the capacity to learn and adapt and became a good/reasonable commander on the western front. Whilst that does not say he could not make mistakes early on and learn from them it just seems to me that Hamilton had no grip (in my limited reading) on events.

regards

Arm

I sit in hamilton guilty camp on command ...

regards

Arm

Arm

This is an interesting development, as a matter of interest rating out of 5 with 5 being very guilty, where would you place C-in-C of the various war theatres in relation to various failures which occurred under their respective commands?

Back to Grasping Gallipoli and I can offer you this quote from the Introduction:

" ... this book demonstrates that this myth [viz lack of up to date intelligence], perpetrated by Hamilton himself among others, is a gross distortion of the truth. While there were problems in London with strategic policy and planning (or lack of it) at the highest level, the WO (And Admiralty) possessed a great deal of previously collected terrain information, maps and charts, covering the topography and defences of Gallipoli and the Dardanelles, much of which was duly handed over to Hamilton and his Staff, either before they left London or subsequently."

and in Chapter 3 ...

"... we can state with confidence that various intelligence agencies were supplying strategic, topographical,operational and tactical intelligence; in fact a deal was available in various forms and in various departments. Whether it was properly used is a different matter. The mounting of the Gallipoli landing operations was a classic example of intelligence being available in various forms but not being properly collated, analysed, evaluated, distributed or used operationally."

Jon,

Ultimately I think all failures are the responsibility of the C in C theatre. Be it Haig or Hamilton or any other come to that. My axe with Hamilton is this myth that surrounds him that he was so out done by the factors surrounding him.

The poor intel available to him ( you seem to say this was not ness so) and the lack of troops and the ground and so on.

Then there is the well it was Braithwaite's fault, he was the bad egg in the basket, no adaptability or wont to learn. a by the book staff officer.

I realise you are trying to snare me into a Haig trap here and I will probably walk into it but my beef is not that Hamilton was useless but that the myths seem to keep a shining star around him and blame the conditions and tools he had to work with.

Yet with old Dougie the conditions and tools were different but just as hard to learn and adapt and yet he gets no halo to wrap around his reputation.

That said I have read very little in depth on Gallipoli so my knowledge is sketchy. i come at this from defence of Braithwaite rather than a get Hamilton angle.

Hamilton is seen as a couragous, as he was, commander with a good brain. Yet he does not seem to have controlled his command. He needs like Haig to take the blame for the failures as Haig should for those on the western front.

That said Hamilton was not given the luxury of a long command and the time to adapt to a new warfare and 1918 to redeem his reputation.

Its late so that may not have made any sense but......

Arm

Then there is the well it was Braithwaite's fault, he was the bad egg in the basket, no adaptability or wont to learn. a by the book staff officer.

Arm

Arm,

I am not sure Hamilton was ever given a halo although he was given a sort of dispensation of some areas of responsibility for a couple of reasons such as lack of new drafts, artillery and ammunitions etc and incorrectly I believe, over intelligence, which it would appear he lied about and said he hadn’t had. But it hasn’t been my experience that Hamilton’s reputation came away from Gallipoli that well. That said the “living” conditions were far worse than in France or at least this appears to be the consensus of those that served in both theatres. I cant remember the exact quote but something similar to "the Western Front being a holiday compared to Gallipoli" was certainly the opinion of one veteran I read.

With regard to braithwaite, Travers (p 204) states ... "Kitchener tried to protect Hamilton by recalling the CGS Braithwaite and replacing him with Kiggell ... but Hamilton defended Braithwaite, and so they were both brought home." I think Hamilton and Braithwaite later fell out about evidence given to the Royal Commission into the Dardanelles/Gallipoli campaign. (I will be able to tell you for sure when I have finished the book). Hamilton was certainly colluding with Birdwood, Godley and others from 1916 onwards to protect his reputation and trying to lead the responses so as to tie their reputations to his. I know he and Braithwaite fell out on certain points in this regard.

OK so I tried to snare you on the Haig debate but as you know I am not grown up enough to completely dismiss the "lions led by donkeys" theory. I wanted to be clear if you were applying reason to Hamilton’s command, then you apply the same reason to Haig’s command, but it was a bit of a trap I guess.

So I'll be upfront about the next one. I know you reflect upon these issues and you might be able to help me on something that I was mulling over last Friday after watching that very poor quality programme on Haig. It does have some seriousness to it: Do you think the phrase “learning curve” is synonymous with the word “incompetence” but with a touch of white-wash?

I was trying to distinguish between the two and I came to the conclusion that any incident of incompetence could be argued to be a process in a learning curve. I felt the difference was if you improve your future conduct based on your past experience then you can look at the past as a learning curve, so for example if you do something wrong on 1st July, you reflect upon this and improve what you do on the 3rd July. Of course the learning curve can be argued to continue for an undefined period ... much more than the 2 or 3 days I gave, and eventually you would expect some lessons to be learnt.

Jon,

In reply to your question to incompetanance and learning curve being a white wash. I have to say that this could be used as a cover for anyone making a mistake.

I tend to think that the learning curve is more of a walk, up and down dale than a steady climb up a hill. Of course this is possibly how we all learn. how often do I say to myself oh ye I forgot that?

What made an impression on me was the reading of the Rawlinson command and control book. I read this and expected to see an officer who learnt steadily, but I got an impression of a man almost at times walking blindly ahead, not always seeming to learn, least not the first time.

The fact that rawlinson's reputation does recover somewhat is perhaps more to the fact that he was still around in 1918 to gain some glory during the hundred days. I have said and mused before that I wonder what Gough's reputation would be like had he still commanded an Army during the hundred days and he had been able to belong to a success.

I also admit that some did experience and learn from this learning curve. Like Currie who made errors at 2nd Ypres (debatable), Monash at Gallipoli(so I am told), Maxse in 1914(believe he was sent home!) and obviously countless others, from 2nd Lt to General but eventually learnt and grew.

The problem lies in distinguishing the blanket "oh a mistake so its a learning curve" not incompetance and I am sure as much as the donkeys attribute mistakes to donkeydom so to do revisionists attribute incompetance to learning curves.

So to sum up I think that revisionists are very likely as Donkeyists are all too ready to use these terms to suit there requirements.

regards

Arm

So to sum up I think that revisionists are very likely as Donkeyists are all too ready to use these terms to suit there requirements.

regards

Arm

Arm - we can agree on this. I have yet to find a balance - it is either one extreme or the other. If we can recognise success, lets be honest and forthright about failure as well.

Arm - we can agree on this.  I have yet to find a balance - it is either one extreme or the other.  If we can recognise success, lets be honest and forthright about failure as well.

Agreed,

Though failure is perhaps the wrong word, failure can be because the enmey got lucky that mistakes happened delays etc, things out of the control of the commander.

What we have to look at is Good strategic and tatical acumen,( personal bravery does not really have a bearing in this IMO nor does the characters persona) and on the other hand Incompetance and repeated inability to learn from mistakes and experiences.

What hinders this accessment is the fog of time, the myths that have grown on both sides and especially IMO hindsight which as i say is the killer of all battlefeild analysis. It is so difficult to put aside all we now know and suspend our modern concepts as we try to imagine what it must have been like to be a regular Victorian/Edwardain officer and all that meant.

Maybe when we collect our pensions and go off down the local we may be somewhere near to the truth. But I doubt it.

regards

Arm

Though failure is perhaps the wrong word, failure can be because the enmey got lucky that mistakes happened delays etc, things out of the control of the commander.

regards

Arm

But this is where we differ as my impression is it wasnt so much that the Germans "got lucky" as that our High Command were extremely naive and to be honest unprofessional - and I am not thinking from hindsight but from the basic considerations they should have made. For example by throwing over 1.7m shells and deciding on the basis of no practical evidence that that would be enough to destroy German wire, German morale and German artillery - infact intelligence reports of the time suggested at least two of these - wire and artillery - were not destroyed in certain sectors. Also High Command was aware from past experience (Loos) that a certain proportion of these shells would be duds so the real figure would be far less than 1.7m etc.

I leafed through Prior and Wilson's The Somme this lunchtime. I was impressed with the write up and have commented on it in my Blog under Books to Read. The suggestion is it is quite scathing of Haig's command during the battle and you would expect Prior and Wilson to back up their findings with good investigative work and facts rather than being purely an excercise to demonise him.

Finally, I picked up a Daily Express in the coffee bar today and came across an article on OFFLISH: "the language of avoidance, hoodwinking, of half truths and outright lies". Included amongst the chosen phrases was "learning curve", the usage of which, is described as "managers in a new role foolishly admitting to difficulties; managers lipsmackingly revelling in a new colleague's inadequacies". I think we get the message.

But this is where we differ as my impression is it wasnt so much that the Germans "got lucky" as that our High Command were extremely naive and to be honest unprofessional - and I am not thinking from hindsight but from the basic considerations they should have made. 

Finally, I picked up a Daily Express in the coffee bar today and came across an article on OFFLISH: "the language of avoidance, hoodwinking, of half truths and outright lies".  Included amongst the chosen phrases was "learning curve", the usage of which, is described as "managers in a new role foolishly admitting to difficulties; managers lipsmackingly revelling in a new colleague's inadequacies".  I think we get the message.

I was talking in general to mistakes, not specifics to the Somme battle or any other. Of course a mistake at the Somme could be a learning curve, if repeated at 2nd ypres and later could be classed as incompetance!

Offlish, never heard of it! Nice to see the learning curve is still in existance!!

regards

Arm