Command on the Western Front: A reminder for me to re-read the 27th - 29th Sept 1918 attack around St Quentin Canal. Consider Prior & Wilson's comments in view of Terraine's argument that Haig improved. Also in view of my own concensus that Rawlinson generally learnt from his mistakes.
Battle of Loos – The Untold Story by Nick Lloyd
NL offered a reassessment of Loos, traditionally the battle for which Sir John French has been condemned as missing an opportunity because of the placement of the Reserves (XI Corps). NL puts forward that Douglas Haig was solely responsible for the plan and conduct of the battle and that he either misinterpreted or acted against French’s instructions.
The battle characterised by immediate British successes followed by strong German counter-atta
I really wanted to post something about this on the Forum but I ducked out as it would probably cause unintended controversy. The Blog attracts less viewing (if any these days )
The Somme by Peter Hart p 333/4
"The only conclusion that can be drawn from the repeated failure of attacks on Guillemont is that something is wanting in the methods employed. The next attack must be thoroughly prepared for in accordance with the principles which have been successful in previous attacks which are
I came across these notes today. I jotted these down when reading Horne's ageless The Price of Verdun earlier this year and before the April visit. Unfortunately they only cover the period up to 6 March 1916, but they will be worth keeping and should turn out useful at some point in the future:
• After 1871 France (de Riviere) reorganised and modernised army and defensive ring of forts in preparation for the next war
• By 1915 half of French regular officer corps had either been killed or di
Command and Control by Niall Barr
NB outlined the problems associated with command and control in 1914:
• New strains on command as a result of static warfare
• Potential of new technology not fully understood
• Warfare on a much larger scale than ever before
• Basic communication – mainly by runner. This was haphazard at best and in some instances information was relatively out of date by the time it had been passed on. (Didn’t the Germans have a form of radio contact as early as 19
First Ypres by Ian Beckett
Sir John French thought by obtaining move to the northern sector for the BEF that he would be able to act independently of the French army. Whilst Joffre wanted the BEF under his own command so as to maximise their involvement.
German forces were also moving north in strength with objective to secure Antwerp. However the German army around Ypres (“The Innocents”) generally lacked teh required instruction and training and can be regarded as poor quality troops.
Two thirds through Hart's The Somme and very impressed. Also have Sheldon The German Army on the Somme to fit in quite soon but I flicked through a copy of Prior and Wilson's latest offering and it looked quite good.
Noticed on the inside cover that "responsibility for tactical mistakes actually belonged to the High Command and the civilian War Committee. Field-Marshall Haig, the records show, was repeatedly deficient in strategy, tactics, command, and organization" and it would be good to ge
The RFC in 1914 – Simon Moody
SM gave some background information:
• Observation from the air was not a new concept. The first example of a balloon being used for military observation was at Fleurus in August 1794. The first time a balloon was used by the British army was at Bechuanland in 1874.
• Aviation – first controlled manned-flight in 1904.
• S.F. Cody (with Capper?) had been developing aviation under a Government contract at Farnborough. However the W.O. were not greatly int
Haig the Corps Commander – Gary Sheffield
At the outbreak of war Haig was of the opinion that the BEF should not be sent to France until they were fully prepared and provisioned and Haig believed a delay of 3 months was optimum. Haig subsequently changed his view and GS used this as evidence of Haig’s flexibility – an important component of Battlefield Leadership.
Haig was junior to Smith-Dorrien and thus “not even the most senior Corps Commander in 1914”. From memory this was a suggestion
The Mounted Troops of the BEF in 1914 were arguably the most modern European cavalry. Whereas the French and Germans were still utilising cavalry in their 19th C role as shock troops, the British had learnt from the Boer War that such men could be used as both the traditional shock force and as mounted infantry. (They did not fire from hortseback!!)
During the Boer War horse losses amongst the cavalry regiments had averaged at 8%. 70% of these losses were due from exhaustion or disease rath
The French Army of 1914 – Bill Philpot
The reality of the French army in 1914 was romantic rather than professional:
• There had been a lengthy debate on updating the uniform prior to 1914. This led to the ideological assertion that “red trousers ARE France”. (Britain had converted to khaki field dress in 1908 and Germany to field-grey in 1910).
• There was a pre-occupation with how to avenge the defeat of 1870 at all costs.
• A propensity to confront one’s enemies by suicidal bayonet
I found these notes from the NAM Conference 6/7.11.2004, on my hard drive and thought they would make a good addition to the Blog. I dont think I typed up my other notes but have them in longhand somewhere. Will have to dig them out and add them to.
The Schlieffen Plan – Bob Foley
Ongoing debate by historians as to whether a plan actually existed.
Zuber argues that Germany never intended to fight an offensive war in 1914.
German Foreign/War Policy set as a result of the Russo-Japanese
Is it me or is there a reoccuring theme in Travers about the out of date maps?
This has of course gone down in history as a contribution to the Allied failure but as I recall accurate maps and intelligence was readily available and Hamilton's Staff had been given relatively free access to this information.
Here are my notes from Chasseud's presentation at the RM Museum Gallipoli Conference 28/4/2005:
Peter Chasseud said his new book, Grasping Gallipoli, will blow away some of the intellige
I got to the end of 1st July chapter in Hart's THE SOMME last night and my first disappointment.
Not much on why the French could view the 1st July a success when Britain failed so catastrophically in so many parts of the Line.
One point Hart did make that I hadnt considered was the experience of the French soldiers compared to the relatively green British troops.
The other reason is of course their superior shelling of German artillery positions. The French 75 was regarded as probably
I finished Travers chapter on Suvla this morning. My reading of it has been a bit patchy and spread over the last few days so I thought it a good idea to reflect from memory the reasons why I believe Suvla failed between 7 – 12 August (see how much I remember).
First and foremost, poor communication. This starts at the very top with Hamilton and his Staff. Stopford neither requested clear instructions from Hamilton or gave clear orders to his Divisional or Brigade Commanders. Objectives we
[/i]Further to the task I set in my posting 5:45am - 1 July 1915 (just south of Mametz)
Today I searched through various books on Haig, the Somme and the Artillery. My notes follow:
Haig had originally wanted a short preliminary bombardment. Rawlinson was in favour of a long sustained shelling campaign and was supported by Birch (MGRA).
The Artillery was inexperienced - as with the Infantry, many were new army men and they needed the experience of real combat conditions.
Many o
No time for much reading yesterday but I did flick through Haig's Diaires last night and made a mental note of two contrasting entries:
28 May 1915. During an inspection of troops by KGV, he was thrown from his horse. Haig was much "perturbed" by this.
2 July 1916. Haig reports in his diary that the early casualty estimates for the first two days fighting was 40,000, and noted "this cannot be considered severe in view of numbers engaged and length of front attacked" [or words to that eff
Another of those quotes I need to tuck away for future consideration:
p 109 of Peter Hart's THE SOMME
"5.45am ... we do not yet seem to have stopped his machine guns. These are pooping off all along our parapet as I write. I trust they will not claim too many of our lads before the day is over."
source: Captain Charles Campbell MAY.
May led "B" Coy/22 Manchesters into action and was killed later that same day, aged 27. Buried Danzig Alley. Son of Major and Mrs. C. E. May, of New Z
By this I really mean the British and Imperial Forces Command.
I am about half way through Travers for the second time and it seems to me (and probably to many others) that irrespective of any other issues such as disease, difficulty of supply, minimal reinforcements, lack of artillery/shells etc, that there are two primary reasons why the Gallipoli campaign was not successful:
1) The quality of the Turkish command - in particular the shrewd decisions taken by Liman von Sanders and the i
by James J. Cooke on WHS online at £64.
ISBN: 0275947688
"The Rainbow Division (42nd Infantry Division) was the premier National Guard division to fight on the Western Front in World War I. This is a history of the Division, from its arrival in France in December 1917, to its service in the Army of Occupation after the end of the war in 1918."
Will this tell me whether G/G/Uncle Frank Mower served with The Rainbow Division?
The final dozen pages or so of Travers, Ch 5 (Fighting at Helles ...) are particularly damning on Hunter-Weston, which is no great shock. Contemporaneous quotes used by Travers are worth noting now incase they will be useful to reflect upon in the future:
Godley (p 105) "... with all his faults Hunter-Weston was a gallant soul ... At the same time, one is rather thankful to think he will not be (as he calls it) 'blooding' Freddy Stopford's [iX Corps] reinforcements against Achi Baba".
[Note
Travers / Gallipoli 1915:
p 103 – re Second Krithia
“On 8 May, in the late afternoon, Hamilton desperate after realising the failure of three days of fighting, reverted to an antique concept of warfare. The whole line was to fix bayonets, slope arms and move forward en masse … Hamilton also quaintly wished for bands to play, or a display of colours, or at least a strong show of bayonets in order to encourage the French …”
Can this be true?
p 86 of Hart's THE SOMME "The importance of the counter-battery role in destroying or subduing the German guns was frequently demonstrated when they opened up in retaliation. Every German shell that landed was a reminder of the destructive power that any surviving German batteries would have if they had not been dealt with before the moment the infantry went over the top."
My understanding was that the allied bombardment concentrated on the various trench lines and not the German guns. Howev
Was re-reading the Travers chapter on 25 April this morning. Keyes comes in for a lot of criticism for various reasons. This is a serious dent to the esteem I held him in - not quite the Nelsonian figure I had thought, or at least not at certain stages of the Dardanelles campaign and specifically not the action surrounding 25 April. Capt Lockyer of the Implacable on the other hand does appear to embody the Nelson spirit. Further reading on these items necessary.
