I found these notes from the NAM Conference 6/7.11.2004, on my hard drive and thought they would make a good addition to the Blog. I dont think I typed up my other notes but have them in longhand somewhere. Will have to dig them out and add them to.

The Schlieffen Plan – Bob Foley

Ongoing debate by historians as to whether a plan actually existed.

Zuber argues that Germany never intended to fight an offensive war in 1914.

German Foreign/War Policy set as a result of the Russo-Japanese War Feb 1904 – Sept 1905

This war showed that Russia was not an effective force. Changed v.S perception of Russian army as a threat. However v.S had to continue to plan for a war on two fronts as seemed inevitable that Russia and France would remain allies.

Germany wanted to create a new alliance system (irony that Republican France was an ally to autocratic Russia against autocratic Germany)

Entente Cordial system of alliances was perceived by Germany as a threat against them for which they had to put in place a preventive strategy. One fear was attack from sea – viz Japanese surprise attack against Russian Fleet. This was a major consideration when Germany increased size of their Fleet.

However v.S saw the outcome of any war as being on land (in France) and therefore Germany created a conscription army (was this already in place?)

v.S was preoccupied with how best to threaten France through fear of attack. France improved the fortifications (ring of forts) of 1871. v.S devised plan to outflank France but concerns of available man-power also meant an increase in heavy artillery production. Although this was achieved at some cost, it was appreciated too few artillery pieces were available and as a contingency they concentrated on the outflanking manoeuvre. It was evident that this would necessitate passage (granted or forced) through Belgium. At this time (first decade of 20thC) Belgium had close links with Germany (Belgium had no army of any consequence).

Zuber argues that Germany never intended to invade Belgium but evidence (notes and maps) of the period suggest otherwise.

v.Molke inherited v.S Staff and German strategy. The Global position had not changed to any extent that required v.M to create a new strategy that may have been resisted from within.

v.M was responsible for developing rail communications along Franco-German border (under knowledge of Allied intelligence).

v.M also aware that French army was strengthening as were defences (did Germany view this as an act towards war)? The improvements in the French fort system effectively rendered the threat of German artillery redundant.

Also Russian army had been rebuilt since 1905 – much French investment in technology and railways had assisted internal development/modernisation of Russia (another act towards war)? Projections indicated at the then current growth rate, Russia would be unbeatable if a war had not broken out by 1917.

Despite more credence associated with Russian military machine, v.M still believed France was the key. If he attacked Russia, then the Russian army could retreat into their hinterland with no decisive blow.

Zuber believes German intention was to draw in France and allow her to invade Germany before encircling the French army (what evidence exists for this)?

Belgium defences remained weak.

At outbreak of war early German successes in part due to underestimation of German war machine by France and Britain, especially the speed (v.M railway network) at which the German army moved.

Germans made a feint in the south with Sixth and Seventh armies keeping key French forces engaged away from the real battles in the north. To some extent this was also a drain on German resource as Germany had planned for Italian troops to support them in the south and threaten French borders. The Italian alliance did not materialise.

In conclusion:

From 1905 German war policy had been to fight offensively.

Aim to defeat France quickly required moving troops through Belgium and outflanking French army.

v.S plan based on optimism of what the Germany army could achieve.

Whilst the Germany army moved quickly, once initial supplies were exhausted they could only move at walking pace, therefore v.S plan was always prone to possible disaster.

v.M was forced by events to turn army away from Paris thus missing the opportunity to destroy France quickly.

In the Allied offensive over the Marne the Germans were surprised with how well the BEF and French army fought.

Whilst v.S was driven by Russian weaknesses, v.M was driven by increasing Russian strength.