Percentage died in accidents?

[fetubi]

Kevin,

I'd be doing a bit of Time Team type landscape analysis if you haven't done it yet. Find a contemporary map (Internet). See if he could have "landed beside the church" (sounds just a little improbable, but the map would tell you). Assess where he would have taken off, maybe in what direction. If he needed to make a turn to be on his way by far the greatest cause of crashes - for any pilot, but certainly inexperienced ones - was to attempt a turn before sufficient height and flying speed had been reached. It probably killed McCudden. A pilot with 13 hours would be very susceptible to this flying error. "Low stall on turn, spinning nose dive, crash.." summarises literally hundreds of fatalities in training.

In Wastell's case, again given his lack of experience, you might be able to add a lack of "situational awareness" as well. Not necessarily a lack of skill, this, more a lack of experience. The "veering" could simply have been the movement of an aircraft banking and side slipping during a low turn as I have described above.

The poor quality timber used in construction of some DH6s I've read about, and other machines also suffered as a result - possibly the DH5 fighter in the early days, when it's wings folded on a handful of occasions. You can't discount it.

Finally, mist on the 23rd. You could see what operations were happening in the area that day. Mist would tend to keep most aircraft on the ground. By the way, which village is it we are talking about?

Trevor

[Kevin Mears]

Trevor.

The Town is St. Ives in Huntingdonshire (now Cambridgeshire) and the Church was All Saints. He landed across the river from the Church in Hemingford Meadow. The Meadow is still there today. I'm afraid I can't post any maps etc., as I just don't have the technical knowledge to do that. Your comment about mist is telling. I would also have expected that flying would not have continued in such conditions unless the mist rolled in after he had taken off. Again, the only mention of mist is on the casualty card.

People who have looked into this before, it's quite a famous incident in Cambridgeshire, seem adamant that he was indeed carrying an unauthorised passenger, described as an RFC Sergeant, whom he dropped off in Hemingford Meadow for a night out in St. Ives. This makes sense for a couple of reasons which I'll try to explain. Please bear with me, I'm not always as good with words as I could be.

1. The Court of Inquiry blamed Wastell for a lack of judgment. "The Court having duly considered the evidence and also visited the scene of the accident are of the opinion that - The aeroplane and engine were in perfect condition and that the accident was caused through an error of judgment on the part of the pilot." From the Casualty Card, which has the date of the report being received as 26/3/18, comes the following as to nature and cause of accident - "Collided with Church steeple in mist." That is the only reference to mist I can find.

2. Local theory is that the mist story was concocted to save the family the anguish of knowing that he had taken an unauthorised passenger, landed when he shouldn't and then collided with the spire for any one or all of the reasons you have mentioned. If that is the case, and the RFC wished to cover up the fact that he had done this, why then would the CoI damn him for a fool rather than for a damned fool who had broken any number of KR's? Neither outcome is going to spare the family anguish.

3. Consider this. Let's accept for a moment that he DID carry a passenger and landed in Hemingford Meadow. Let's also assume, for the moment, that the Harland and Wolff built DH6, C5453, was one of those constructed with inferior materials. Is it not entirely possible that the weight of a passenger when landing in an unprepared field might have caused or precipitated a structural failure? He was seen to be 'tinkering' with his engine. Was that just the routine necessary to restart the engine or had something gone wrong and he was looking for a problem? Not a conspiracy theorist by any means but is it possible that this was a cover up of the fact that the Air Board, RFC and CoI were all aware that Dh6's were suffering structural failures? How, after the aircraft had collided with the spire, which it demolished, then fallen through the roof to destruction, be described as being in perfect condition? How, could they possibly tell without the long drawn out process of accident investigation as we know it today?

4. It's like he never existed. No mention of him on local War Memorial, nothing in the local press, not even a death notice as I can find. Nothing. His body was not even returned home to Birmingham.

I know, it all asks more questions than it answers. I'll keep plugging away and your help is really making me think and basically recheck my thinking.

Thanks again for all your help.

Regards,

Kevin Mears

[Dolphin]

I've now managed to have a better look at the AFC's fatal casualty list, based on the CWGC records, plus one who somehow wasn't included, and they indicate the following:

50 pilots and trainee pilots died in training accidents, including a few who lost their lives after the Armistice: 16 were in Sopwith Camels, 10 in RE 8s, 10 in Avro 504s, 5 in Sopwith Pups, 3 in BE 2 variants, 2 in SE 5as, 2 in Maurice Farmans, and 1 each in a Martinsyde G102 and a Sopwith 1½ Strutter .

44 pilots were killed in action: 11 in Sopwith Camels, 8 in RE 8s, 5 in SE 5as, 5 in DH 5s, 4 in Sopwith Snipes, 4 in Bristol Fighters, 2 in BE 2es, 1 in a BE 12a, 1 in a Caudron G.III and 1 in a Martinsyde G102, and 1 each in a Sopwith Pup and a Sopwith 1½ Strutter while seconded to the RFC.

32 men died during the Influenza Pandemic of 1918-1919.

28 men died from various causes, including illness, motor and other accidents, etc.

19 men other than pilots were killed in action, 9 were observers in RE 8s, 6 were killed during action on the ground, including by artillery fire, 3 died in Bristol Fighters and 1 in a BE 2e.

19 pilots died in flying accidents on the Western Front: 7 were in Sopwith Camels, 5 in RE 8s, 3 in SE 5as, and 1 each in a DH 5 and a Sopwith Snipe; in addition, 2 Bristol Fighter pilots were killed in accidents on the Palestine Front.

11 men other than pilots died in flying accidents: 5 in RE 8s, 2 in Bristol Fighters, 2 in Avro 504s, and 1 each in a Sopwith 1½ Strutter and a BE 2e.

7 men died in captivity as Prisoners of War following the fall of Kut-al-Amara.

3 men died while participating in the England to Australia Air Race in 1919.

The AFC was obviously much smaller than the RFC/RNAS/RAF, and it didn't have bomber units, or operate on fronts other than the Western and Palestinian, but the proportion of fatalities in training and in combat may be roughly the same. If nothing else, the numbers confirm that Camels were dangerous aeroplanes.

Gareth

[fetubi]

Kevin,

A couple more points for the melting pot as regards Wastell and his DH6 crash in March 18:

I had to think of him as I read an article in the latest C&C journal that has just been published which was about a contemporary set of rules/advice issued to pilots embarking on cross-country flights. One point said that upon making a landing during a cross country flight that you should immediately check over your machine and engine. Can’t help thinking that his “tinkering” could be just this – checking over his machine after a landing, as he had been taught to do.

More relevantly, as I was reading the article it crossed my mind that cross-country flying was of course absolutely the norm for a pilot at this time – his meat and drink – just as learning to land in strange places en route was a key part of his training. Developing skills in judging where he should land, and then getting down and safely off again were part of his basic flying instruction and development as an aviator. This is what the article was about.

The point is, landing in a field was an occupational consequence constantly met with. The problems really only escalated for a pilot when it was a forced landing. Then the options became greatly reduced and more dangerous for him.

Without the facts being known you can’t rule out that some engine or structural damage might have occurred as he landed, but landing in a field for whatever reason, as long as it was planned, was a reasonably normal occurrence. It doesn’t directly explain why he crashed after taking off, but to me these two points make it slightly less likely, on balance, that either structural or engine matters were involved.

Trevor

[Adrian Roberts]

Gareth

The AFC was obviously much smaller than the RFC/RNAS/RAF, and it didn't have bomber units, or operate on fronts other than the Western and Palestinian, but the proportion of fatalities in training and in combat may be roughly the same. If nothing else, the numbers confirm that Camels were dangerous aeroplanes.

The AFC figures probably provide a representative sample of KIA vs other ways of dying, but I wonder if we can interpret these as proving the Camel to be especially dangerous.

As to the sixteen men killed while training in Camels: is there any way of knowing the proportion of Camels in training units as compared with Pups and SE5as, so that we can know if the accident rate was higher in proportion to the numbers in service? Having seen information on these casualties, I get the impression that most of these Camel casualties were in the second half of 1918 - had the Camel supplanted the Pup as the principal Advanced/Combat trainer by then? And not many of these accidents appear to be attributable to the notorious rotary/gyroscopic effect - in several instances the wings collapsed while pulling out from dives: was the Camel more susceptible to this than other types? Or was it just that its performance compared with the trainers these men had graduated from encouraged exuberant flying?

Of the seven men killed in Camel accidents on the Western Front, three were killed in a single three-way collision while in formation. This could happen to any aircraft - or could it be that the difficulty in speed control with the crude rotary-engine throttle arrangements, the need to fly hands-on to keep straight, and the assymetric turn characteristics made formation flying more difficult in a Camel?

And given that there was one AFC Camel squadron and one AFC SE squadron on the WF, why was the Camel casualty rate in action higher? Was this reflected in RFC/RAF figures? Did the Camel's characteristics encourage dog-fighting to a greater degree? Or did 4 sqdn operate its Camels (and then Snipes) for longer than 2 sqdn operate SEs? Should we add the DH5 figures to the SE figures?

The RE8 doesn't appear to come out well in the accident rate, but again possibly the sheer numbers involved made this inevitable. Then again, I believe that although it inherited stability and docility from the BE2c/e, isn't it true that if pushed too far it had nasty bite, especially spinning characteristics, like the DH6?

I think its time to give up on this and go to bed....

Adrian

[Dolphin]

Adrian

No 68 (Australian) Sqn RFC/No 2 Sqn AFC went to France on 21 September 1917, and No 71 (Australian) Sqn/No 4 Sqn AFC went there on 18 December 1917, so the DH 5 & SE 5a unit was at the Front about two months longer than its Camel & Snipe counterpart. The combat losses for the two units were 10 and 15, with 4 and 7 lost in accidents, respectively.

Perhaps Camels were dangerous in that their use put their pilots in unhealthy places. I think that the higher casualty figures for the Camel squadron probably partly reflect the aeroplane's notorious handling characteristics, but also indicate the dangers of the period during the German Kaiserschlacht offensives when Camels spent much time at low level attacking ground targets - putting the aeroplanes in range of lots of weapons fired from the surface.

Three of the four Snipe fatalities occurred in one fight: on 4 November 1918 when the Snipes had a bad encounter with the veteran pilots and Fokker D.VIIs of Jasta Boelcke.

Regards

Gareth

[fetubi]

Sopwith Camels vs SE5as.

Well if you look at the fighting squadrons in France (RFC RNAS AFC RAF IF) between April 1917 and Nov 1918 this is what the fatality numbers tell you:

497 deaths on Camels, of which 21% were accidents.

240 deaths on SE5as, of which 16% were accidents.

Numbers of these two types at the Front? Well of course these varied tremendously over time, i.e. both considerably grew in numbers, and at different rates.

If you look at 1918 there were, in broad terms, about 1.45 Camels for every SE5a. Note, though, this ratio could vary as much as from 1.8 in February to 1.1 in September.

In the same year there were 423 deaths on Camels compared with 195 on SE5as. This is a ratio of 217%.

To summarise – many more deaths on Camels relatively than on SE5as.

I agree with Dolphin when he says a big factor in this was where events put the Camel pilots at various times. The fact that more accidental deaths occurred on Camels than on SE5as along the active front also does tell you something.

First time I've worked this out. I find it quite interesting.

Regards,

Trevor

[Starlight]

I am certainly not surprised at the number of accidental deaths on Camels when compared with the SE5a. Just imagine coming out of training after a few hours flying a conventional non-rotary aircraft. Imprinted in your mind would be how to make steep turns: left rudder, left aileron and stick back for left, right rudder, right aileron and stick back for right. Not a problem if you move into a SE5a – sure, lots more power but everything you’ve learnt you can still apply to the new aircraft with certainty. But what if you’re assigned to a Camel squadron? Not only do you no longer have a throttle but instead have to use the magneto setting or blip switch to control the speed of the propeller, you now have to re-learn turns in a totally different and unstable aircraft with a huge gyroscope spinning at the front. Steep left turns are now full left rudder, left aileron and slight back stick (too far back and it’s stall/spin/goodnight) and right turns are right aileron, moderate LEFT rudder and stick hard back. How confusing would that be to a novice.

I clearly remember taking my PPL flying test 30 years ago (after flying the minimum number of hours dictated by the authorities – and probably twice what the average WW1 pilot would have done to get his wings) and the thought of jumping from a docile Piper Cherokee into something akin to a Pitts special with strange handling characteristics would have filled me with terror. And to be expected to fly this strange aircraft in combat - - - - the mind boggles.

[fetubi]

Fantastic summary Steve. I'd put a plug in for Yeates' Winged Victory once more for anyone wanting to know what it was like to fly the Camel.

Another aside about training working up onto Camels - I've just put together something for a friend about 77 Sqn in the Great War - essentially this was a night training squadron in all but name. They flew night fighter versions of the Avro 504K from early 1918. This was achieved by fairing over the front cockpit and fitting a Lewis gun over the centre section mounted on a semi-circular sliding Foster gun mount. Given a Le Rhone rotary engine this configuration could usefully reach 18,000 feet.

All the Northern Group home defence units, it was decided, would receive these conversions. Quite apart from its performance and ceiling comfortably outpacing the FE2b which a number of HD units had been using, it was the facility this machine now gave night flying pilots to train with a rotary engine which made it such an invaluable stepping stone towards flying the Sopwith Camel. It was the Camel which would spearhead night fighting in France in 1918.

Regards,

Trevor