Captain Charles Fryatt

[liverpool annie]

I came across this some time ago when I was researching the SS Brussels !

Churchill's orders for mercantile marine Captains said:

1: All British merchant ships to paint out their names and port of registry, and when in British waters to fly the flag of a neutral power.(preferably the American flag) (source: World crisis vol 2 p.283)

2: British vessels are ordered to treat the crews of captured U-boats as "felons" and not to accord them the status of prisoners of war.(source: Simpson. Lusitania p.36)

3: Survivors should be taken prisoner or shot whichever is the most convenient.

4: In all actions, white flags would be fired upon with promptitude. (Source Richmond diaries 27-2-15)

Churchill continued: "The first British countermove made on my responsibility was to deter the Germans from surface attack. The submerged U-boat had to rely increasingly on underwater attack and thus ran the greater risk of mistaking neutral for British ships and of drowning neutral crews and thus embroiling Germany with other Great Powers." (Source Churchill World crisis. p.724-725)

He then gave very specific orders to civilian mercantile marine captains, he ordered them: "to immediately engage the enemy, either with their armament if they possess it, or by ramming if they do not" and he continued then: "ANY MASTER WHO SURRENDERS HIS SHIP WILL BE PROSECUTED". (Source: ibidem). With this order, civilian captains had but one choice, to become a franc-tireur with the risk to be executed by the Germans, or to be executed by their own landsman for cowardice in the sight of the enemy.

Ironically, the captain of the German U-33 who stopped the SS Brussels that day in March, handled in accordance with the so-called international cruiser rules. He surfaced, ordered the SS Brussels crew to leave their ship before firing his torpedo. Suddenly, Fryatt ordered full-ahead and tried to ram in which he was partly successful.

The Germans were aware of Churchill's orders after they stopped in February 1915 the British freighter Ben Cruachan (Ben-Lines) and found a copy of these orders.

The Board of Trade, Marine Department had government responsibility for merchant seamen. The correspondence can be found in the MT 9 series where Prisoner of War pieces are marked with the text “Code 106” in the National Archives Catalogue entries. A few additional items are listed under Code 32 “Deaths” and Code 48 which has two files related to the death of Charles Algernon FRYATT, the captain of the SS Brussels who was executed by the Germans.

In order to share information with a long list of interested parties including government departments, ship-owners, unions, associations and Journals, the Board of Trade printed a list of all merchant seamen held prisoners and their location.

http://yourarchives.nationalarchives.gov.u...C_Merchant_Navy

Annie

[ph0ebus]

Hi all,

Sorry for the delay, came down with a fever last night and did not feel much like doing anything other than sleep.

Indeed, what the Admiralty was saying in public about their instructions ro CAMS and what the orders actually were are two very different things. Captains were indeed ordered to ram any u-boat should the opportunity present itself. This is of course at odds with the laws in force at the time. A good read on this is also 'Defensively Armed Merchant Ships and Submarine Warfare' by A. Pierce Higgins. You can get this book as a free downloadable pdf via Google Books.

Of course, things that further muddy the waters are the facts that DAMS, in addition to being armed, often were carrying contraband, if not war supplies outright. Then, factoring in that these same DAMS often were carrying fare-paying civilians, things get cloudier still.

I will see if I have other reading to recommend, but the two items I have already mentioned (and the other sources cited by others in this thread) are pretty good, in my humble opinion.

-Daniel

[bob lembke]

A lot of interesting stuff here. The topic of the thread has broadened (usefully) somewhat from Capt. Fryatt.

I have never been much of a student of the war at sea, but years ago, before I studied the Great War at all seriously, I came across, probably in a used book shop, Colin Simpson's book The Lusitania, not surprisingly about the sinking of the Lusitania. This of course was the key merchant shipping vs. U-boat incident of the war. I found the findings of the book rather remarkable, and in greater part heavily referenced, all of the business of the collusion of British and US officials (two sets of manifests) to conceal the shipping of ammunition and explosives; information on the (possible) armament of the Lusitania; drafting a Belgian officer passenger who, having expertly heard munitions sequentially explode on the doomed ship, sued for his lost household effects; he was supposedly drafted into the British Army (???) and sent to the Front and was quickly dead. Most explosively (pun intended), five of the most dramatic claims; that the hull was supposedly lined with burlap bales of a form of gun-cotton that explodes on contact with sea-water; That the Lusitania was ordered not to zig-zag, and was directed by radio, without escort, to exactly where the Admiralty knew that the U-20 was; that comments by them just before the event suggesting that Churchill and the King were very curious about US reaction if the Lusitania was torpedoed; the Royal Navy first hindering would-be rescuers from sailing out from nearby Ireland, perhaps to enhace the "butcher's bill"; and finally the dramatic trial of the captain, framed into being held responsible for the sinking, using cooked evidence, and when a radio operator came forward with an unofficial set of radio logs proving the lie (I think it was stated that the original logs were destroyed prior to the trial, I think thaat the key point was the radioed orders to cease zig-zagging), the captain was acquitted, and the judge hearing the trial resigned from the bench, stating: "I no longer wish to administer His Majesty's justice." (I have to state that I read the book 25 years ago, but that I think the above recital of the key points is largely accurate.)

This came up once a year or so ago in a thread in the Forum, but I don't think that there was much of a response to Simpson's allegations. Many of them, with a little "shoe-leather", could be corroborated or proved false, other key points are probably harder to corroborate. Has this book, by a British investigative journalist, been conclusively demolished, or corroborated, or perhaps just largely ignored?

Bob Lembke

[per ardua per mare per terram]

Captain Bell's restored headstone. Aplogise for poor quality of photo as I took it on my mobile phone

Thanks for posting it, a magnificent job.

[per ardua per mare per terram]

There were several occasions during the war at sea when civillians were killed. In addition to torpedoing ships without warning, the German Navy shelled towns such as Whitby. Presumably on the grounds that all the residents were potential franc-tireur.

[CGM]

Captain Bell's restored headstone.

Congratulations. You must be feeling very pleased!

Regards

CGM

[bob lembke]

Just saw this while scrolling thru a file of communiques from the German Highest Army Command, looking for something entirely different. The daily communique was published all through the Central Powers.

Der Kapitän des englischen Dampfers "Brussels" als Franktireur erschossen

Berlin, 28. Juli. (Amtlich.)

Am 27. Juli fand in Brügge die Verhandlung des Feldgerichts des Marinekorps gegen den

Kapitän Charles Fryatt von dem als Prise eingebrachten englischen Dampfer "Brussels" statt. Der Angeklagte wurde zum Tode verurteilt, weil er, obwohl nicht Angehöriger der bewaffneten Macht, den Versuch gemacht hat, am 28. März 1915 um 2 Uhr 30 Minuten nachmittags bei dem Maas-Feuerschiffe das deutsche Unterseeboot "U 33" zu rammen.

Der Angeklagte hat ebenso wie der erste Offizier und der leitende Maschinist des Dampfers seinerzeit für sein "tapferes Verhalten" bei dieser Gelegenheit von der britischen Admiralität eine goldene Uhr als Belohnung erhalten und war im Unterhaus lobend erwähnt worden. Bei der damaligen Begegnung hat er, ohne sich um die Signale des U-Bootes, das ihn zum Zeigen seiner Nationalflagge und zum Stoppen aufforderte, zu kümmern, im entscheidenden Augenblick

mit hoher Fahrt auf das Unterseeboot zugedreht, das nur durch sofortiges Tauchen um wenige Meter von dem Dampfer freikam. Er gab zu, hiermit nach den Weisungen der Admiralität gehandelt zu haben. Das Urteil ist bestätigt und am 27. Juli nachmittags durch Erschießen vollstreckt worden.

Eine von den vielen ruchlosen Franktireurhandlungen der englischen Handelsschiffahrt gegen unsere Kriegsfahrzeuge hat so eine zwar späte, aber gerechte Sühne gefunden.

To (roughly) translate the enboldened text: "although not a member of an armed force, made the attempt on 2:30 PM 28 March 1915 to ram the German U-boat U 33 by the Maas lightship." and "One of the many dastardly franc-tireur actions of the English merchant shipping against our warships that actually occurred lately, but found the correct expiation." Not 100% comfortable with the wording of the last translated phrase, but the sense is OK.

Bob Lembke

[per ardua per mare per terram]

So much for the concept of self defence.

Any explanations why the civilians of Whitby et al were shelled?

[bob lembke]

Any explanations why the civilians of Whitby et al were shelled?

It probably served to dilute and divert British blockading forces, but it still was improper. It probably had more military utility than the RAF bombing of a children's circus in Cologne, killing 64 children.

I have seen estimates of the number of already weakened German civilians who died of malnutrition due to the blockade being continued for many months after the November 11 Armistice as amounting to several hundred thousands.

Sorry to be edgy, but for two years, when I was 5 and 6 years old, I was beaten in front of the class by my teachers for being German-American (I am also Danish-American, English-American, and Scottish-American), although my family had been in the US for 20 years. My family finally had to take me out of public school (US-style) and put me in a private school for my own safety. My mother and I were almost put in a camp in 1943, while my father was doing important work for the US Navy in a combat zone. (We were saved by the naval base commander, who valued my father's work.) So about 15 years ago I became a bit more cranky about gratuitous digs.

Bob Lembke

[bob lembke]

Can I assume that Clio's response was just deleted?

Bob Lembke

[per ardua per mare per terram]

... gratuitous digs.

Possibly I didn't make myself clear. In the context of following a post containing an official explanation for the execution of Captain Fryatt, I wanted to know if there was a similar official explanation for the shelling of civilian ports.

It probably served to dilute and divert British blockading forces, but it still was improper. It probably had more military utility than the RAF bombing of a children's circus in Cologne, killing 64 children.

I didn't realise that the RAF was a naval unit, nor that it existed in 1914. I'm aware that the RNAS were involved in bombing campaigns against the Zepplin sheds in Cologne in that year. If the above incident occured in the Great War perhaps you could provide details or start a thread in the 'War in the Air' section.

[bob lembke]

Possibly I didn't make myself clear. In the context of following a post containing an official explanation for the execution of Captain Fryatt, I wanted to know if there was a similar official explanation for the shelling of civilian ports.

I think that the shelling of British ports in the opening weeks of the war is quite a different legal question than the prosecution of Captain Fryatt, the topic of this thread. But here goes. I am quite innocent of knowledge of the specifics; I am guessing in the opening weeks or months of the war several times German destroyers or cruisers raided some ports and shot them up somewhat, I saw one description of such a raid and I think that something like six civilians were killed. As to the legality, I would think that it could easily be argued that the dock facilities, wharves, etc. will certainly be at least occasionally used for military purposes in the course of the war, and so shooting them up might be considered a military strike. If there was shelling deep into the town, killing greengrocers' wives at their ironing boards, that would be an incorrect application of military force harming a civilian population without a legitimate military purpose (or excuse).

Although I know little about the several raids on British seaports in the opening of the war, I know considerably more about the frequent shelling of Belgian seaside towns by ships and monitors of the RN all thru the war. I have seen a number of photographs of badly battered centers of town, wrecked seaside hotels, etc. This activity seemed to go on all thru the war. If the Germans shelled British civilian ports (no port is 100% "civilian" during such a war) three or four times, the RN shelled Belgian ports, the one I saw a civilian sea-side resort, 100 or 200 or 300 times in the course of the war. I think we are venturing into really useless and sterile ground here. Such shelling is nasty work and probably is narrowly defensable legally. I would imagine that the Germans were trying to capture a few headlines and force the diversion of blockading naval resources, with a rather thin legal justification. My wife, who I am sure is smarter than you and I put together, by quite a margin, scoffs at such arithmetic and hair-splitting, simply calling all war a "war crime".

Bob

[Longboat]

On landing the body was taken by gun carriage with full military honours to St Pauls for a national memorial service.

Just by chance I found this today http://www.britishpathe.com/record.php?id=77461

regards Stuart

[Gibbo]

The German Navy bombarded Yarmouth on 3 November 1914 and Scarborough, Whitby and Hartlepool on 16 December 1914. My understanding of the rules of war is that it was then permissable to bombard a town provided that it was defended. Military facilities in an undefended town could be attacked, but only after a warning had been given and the inhabitants invited to destroy the facilties themselves. The latter stipulation was unrealistic in the 20th century and unlikely to be obeyed by belligerents.

On that assumption, the Germans were entitled to attack Yarmouth, which was the base for a small squadron of obsolete destroyers, and Hartlepool, which was a significant shipbuilding and manufacturing town defended by coastal artillery, some old cruisers and destroyers and a submarine, and a territorial infantry battalion. There was a coastguard station at Whitby but no defences and no warning was given. Scarborough was an undefended holiday resort; vol. II of Naval Operations, the British official history says [p. 31 and footnote 3] that Scheer claimed that the Germans believed that it was defended by a battery, but argues that the attacking German ships, the battle cruisers Derfflinger and Von der Tann, would not have approached to within a mile of the town if they believed it to be defended.

The reason for the attack was to draw out the Grand Fleet and to weaken it by catching an isolated part of it. At the time, 2 British battle cruisers had been detached to the South Atlantic in order to deal with von Spee's squadron.

[centurion]

My understanding of the rules of war is that it was then permissable to bombard a town provided that it was defended. Military facilities in an undefended town could be attacked, but only after a warning had been given and the inhabitants invited to destroy the facilties themselves. The latter stipulation was unrealistic in the 20th century and unlikely to be obeyed by belligerents.

On the contrary exactly this happened at Alexandretta in December 22nd 1914 when the British cruiser HMS Doris offered the Turks the option. A situation worthy of the pen of W S Gilbert then resulted as a problem occurred in that the Turkish authorities had no dynamite with which to destroy the facilities in question so the Doris offered to supply sufficient gun cotton but the Turks had no experience of this explosive. The cruiser then offered the services of its torpedo officer but protocol said that the demolition had to be carried out by an officer in the Turkish navy so the local authorities bestowed a temporary commission in the Turkish navy on the officer in question who then acting strictly as part of the Turkish navy and not a RN officer carried out the demolition.

[bob lembke]

Centurion;

Fantastic story! Truly worthy of G & S! Shows that in 1914 at least some people were still performing the nicities of war.

In 1914/15 a German Pioniere=Offizier reported that, among the deficiencies of the Turkish pioneers they were attempting to train to a higher technical standard, was almost no skill in blasting, due in part to their not having had any explosives to train with. in part due to the tremendous loss in materiel of the Turkish Army in the Balkans Wars, much of which had not been replaced. For example, it was reported that the Turkisk pioneers had absolutely no bridging equipment (pontoons, et al), it all having been left in the Balkans, and never replaced.

Bob

[per ardua per mare per terram]

This came up once a year or so ago in a thread in the Forum, but I don't think that there was much of a response to Simpson's allegations. Many of them, with a little "shoe-leather", could be corroborated or proved false, other key points are probably harder to corroborate. Has this book, by a British investigative journalist, been conclusively demolished, or corroborated, or perhaps just largely ignored?

If you have a serious interest in the subject, I'm surprised that you don't post on a thread dedicated to Lusitania. I'll confine myself to one comment within this thread if she was directed to "exactly where the Admiralty knew that the U-20 was" then their ability to pinpoint Uboats was better in 1915 than it was in 1918; or during most of WW2.

[per ardua per mare per terram]

Although I know little about the several raids on British seaports in the opening of the war.

I'm sorry I thought I had clarified that I was interested in the official explanation rather than what you think or you're wife's homilies although; these are fascinating. In post #29 you posted some detail from German Highest Army Command communiqués and I'm interested in anything from a similar source.

[bob lembke]

If you have a serious interest in the subject, I'm surprised that you don't post on a thread dedicated to Lusitania. Actually, I don't; I read the Simpson book 20-25 years ago and never came back to it. I'll confine myself to one comment within this thread if she was directed to "exactly where the Admiralty knew that the U-20 was" then their ability to pinpoint Uboats was better in 1915 than it was in 1918; or during most of WW2.

I will quote from Simpson, page 128: "Since September 1914 the Admiralty had been in possession of the German naval cyphers and from February 1915 a chain of interception and direction-finding stations established around the English and Irish coasts, had enabled Naval Intelligence not only to read almost every German naval signal but also to pin-point from where it came. Marked on the great map, and changing as each fresh signal was intercepted, located and decoded, were the approximate positions of almost every unit of the German Navy, together with the ships of the Allied navies.This was known as the plot."

On page 127 Simpson explained that something called "the grid" was also laid out; this being a grid used by the German ships to report their position with a cryptic "south east section Square T 14" or the like; this having been dredged up from a sunked German ship on the Dogger Bank. All of this was in the "great map room of the Admiralty".

Page 129 has Admiral Oliver briefing Admiral Fisher on the day before the Lusitania was sunk, in the map room. "Admiral Oliver dealt with each operational area in turn. When he came to the western approaches he pointed out the red squares marking the U-30 and the U-20: the former headed north and by now well to the north of Ireland, and the latter sighted shortly at 9 a.m. a few miles to the north of Fastnet." The text goes on to tell what Oliver told Fisher about the U-20 and how their cruisers were re-deployed because of its activities.

Simpson goes on to say that the Lusitania was directed right over where the U-20 was known to be, the cruiser Juno, which was supposed to escort Lusitania, was sent away, as it was felt to be vunerable in the presence of submarines, and the Lusitania was not warned about the presence of the U-20. I have not looked for it, but my memory from 25 years ago also said that the Lusitania was radioed and told not to zig-zag, and the radio logs were destroyed before the captain was put on trial for not zig-zagging.

Lot of stuff there, other material in this vein, like a Commander Kenworthy of Naval Intelligence, who was present in the briefing in the "great map room" with Oliver, Fisher, and Churchill, and who wrote in 1927 in his book The Freedom of the Seas: "The Lusitania was sent at considerably reduced speed into an area where a U-boat was known to be waiting and with her escorts withdrawn." Simpson went on to say that Kenworthy's draft read "was deliberately sent", but that the Admiralty complained to Kenworthy's publishers, Messrs. Hutchinson, and the offending word was deleted from the published text. This on page 131.

Again, not my area. But I am surprised that this book and its extraordinary assertions has not been carefully assessed and either proven or disproven.

So it seems that the British, in 1915, did have a much better idea about where U-boats were than in WW II.

[bob lembke]

I'm sorry I thought I had clarified that I was interested in the official explanation rather than what you think or you're wife's homilies although; these are fascinating. In post #29 you posted some detail from German Highest Army Command communiqués and I'm interested in anything from a similar source.

Post the dates of these shellings and I will be happy to dig up the OHL communiques describing these attacks. The daily communique of the OHL seems to have had a good reputation for accuracy, they imparted their spin not by telling tall tales, but by selective inclusion or exclusion of engagements, etc. I have a letter from a Yank "3 star" to General Pershing in which they discussed German claims in the communique and the letter simply took the German claims (of Americans taken prisoner in a German attack) at their face value and as accurate.

So give me the dates and I will see how the attacks were described.

Bob

[bob lembke]

Noticed Gibbo's dates posted above, looked in the archive of the Wolff Telegraphic (Press) Bureau.

Report for 4/11/14 included one press report from London and two from Amsterdam. London report had the coast at Yarmouth shelled, most shells in the water, some on the coast, the cruiser Halcyon lightly damaged, 1 man badly wounded, 4-5 lightly wounded. Amsterdam report called the Halcyon a gunboat. No mention of civilian damage or casualties.

Report for 16/12/14: Berlin, Chief of the Admiralty Staff v. Pohl: the "fortified coastal locations" Scarborough and Hartpool shelled. London report: Hartpool over 20 dead and 80 wounded, gas facility burned, the Fortress West-Hartpool shelled. Scarborogh 2 churches damaged, at Whitby a historic abby damagef, the population fled inland.

Wolff Report 17/12/14 - Berlin: Clash with 4 DDs at Hartpool, one sank, one badly damaged, then Hartpool shelled, destroying the batteries and a gas facility, also 3 fires in town. Scarborough coast guard station and waterworks destroyed. Whitby coast guard and signal stations destroyed. German ships hit by a few shells from coastal batteries.

London Reuters report: Scarborough 25 dead, Hartpool 48 dead, 130 wounded. Civilian or military not specified. Mention of six wounded sailors taken off of a ship. 2nd London report: Hartpool, 55 civilian dead, 115 wounded.

Interesting that more of the reports are from British and neutral sources than German. I can remember reading a source from a civilian source in occupied France early in the war, and at a German HQ in a town the Germans were posting both the German daily communique and also the Allied communiques, for both the Germans and the French civilians to read. In the last months of the war these reports included the Allied communiques reporting very large hauls of German POWs.

I have a surprising letter that my father sent from Verdun to his father, a staff officer; he reported that they were going to carry out a large attack in the next morning, and accurately described the plan and scope of the attack (they had rehearsed the attack carefully for several days - I know the battle well, I have about 30 pages written on it, two published books describe my father saving the life of a wounded officer during the assault, before he was wounded himself.). I imagine that the letters were embargoed until the attack occurred. That a private knew the overall plan of the attack in detail before the attack is very surprising to me. My father added in the letter that his father could read about the battle later in the OHL communique for the day.

So the German communiques refer to shelling batteries and "fortified coastal locations", but most of the reporting was from British and Dutch sources.

Bob Lembke

[ph0ebus]

Hi all,

Having visited Whitby some nine years ago, I am sorry I did not know more about what had happened there in the Great War. Was the historic Abbey damaged the big one on the hill (is it called St. Bridgid's?):

If I may be so bold as to veer off topic for a moment, I would humbly ask that you please say a prayer, if you are so inclined, for my pal and NYC Firefighter Mike Roberts, who at this moment eight years ago was fighting the fires of hell high up in Tower 2 of the World Trade Center. His remains were never found. God bless him.

-Daniel

[auchonvillerssomme]

It was Henry VIII that did the damage, although it was shelled I don't think there was much damage, other than to the West Portico.

Mick

[per ardua per mare per terram]

1) The text goes on to tell what Oliver told Fisher about the U-20 and how their cruisers were re-deployed because of its activities.

2) Again, not my area. But I am surprised that this book and its extraordinary assertions has not been carefully assessed and either proven or disproven.

3) So it seems that the British, in 1915, did have a much better idea about where U-boats were than in WW II.

1) The text continues: 'the Orion's departure from Devonport had been cancelled and the Colossus out on station in the North Atlantic had had her recall cancelled as she would have been likely to have crossed the path of either of the two U-boats then to the west of Ireland.'

Which is a complete fabrication! Neither Orion nor Colossus were cruisers,they were battleships. Orion's departure from Devonport was on 4th May 1915, she was at sea on the way to Scarpa Flow, arriving on the 8th. ADM 53/53690. Colossus out on exercises etc at Scarpa Flow until she weighed at 8:30pm on 5th May and headed for Devonport, 'stopped engines in Plymouth Sound' at 12:33am 9th May and 'received news of the sinking of RMS Lusitania' at 12:39am. ADM 53/38236. So the Admiralty with this brilliant plot and grid ensured that two BATTLESHIPS 'crossed the path of either of the two U-boats then to the west of Ireland.' This at a time when the Grand Fleet was still coming up to strength, and the Germans were dreaming of ways to isolate units and sink them.

2) How do you know it hasn't; why not post on a Lusitania thread?

3) Not good enough for them to keep a couple of battleships out of the area!

[per ardua per mare per terram]

I have seen estimates of the number of already weakened German civilians who died of malnutrition due to the blockade being continued for many months after the November 11 Armistice as amounting to several hundred thousands.

Tens of millions of people were weakened due to the strains resulting from both the U-boat campaign and the RN blockade; both were contributing factors to the high mortality from the Spanish flu pandemic.

The German failure to plan for feeding their population during their over 20 years of preparing for war, was just another example of their flawed system.