Bombing Theory

[PhilB]

Most of us will be familiar with the policy statements on bombing by the RAF in WW2 and who devised them. Was there an analogous policy for bombing in WW1 and who would have formulated it - just Trenchard?

Is this reasonable? :-

The bombing of cities remained a moral issue throughout the war. But no one ever believed that cities were off limits for bombing; they had too many industrial sites and government offices that were potential targets. At times, the innocent would be hit by mistake. But the lure of military targets in cities, combined with the psychological power gained by urban bombings meant that they were inevitable. Nothing could make a government and an army look more helpless than to have enemy aircraft descending upon its capital buildings or castles.

[Guest]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Oct 1 2007, 06:20 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Most of us will be familiar with the policy statements on bombing by the RAF in WW2 and who devised them. Was there an analogous policy for bombing in WW1 and who would have formulated it - just Trenchard?

Is this reasonable? :-

The bombing of cities remained a moral issue throughout the war. But no one ever believed that cities were off limits for bombing; they had too many industrial sites and government offices that were potential targets. At times, the innocent would be hit by mistake. But the lure of military targets in cities, combined with the psychological power gained by urban bombings meant that they were inevitable. Nothing could make a government and an army look more helpless than to have enemy aircraft descending upon its capital buildings or castles.

Hi

The RNAS bombed Cologne railway station in October 1914 as an alternative target to the zeppelin shed which was the primary target. Quite a while before Trenchard had such thoughts.

Regards Duncan

[per ardua per mare per terram]

Samson, Longmore, Churchill, Seuter et al were years ahead of Trenchard and the RFC. The first bombing raid in enemy territory was 22 September 1914. The second raids on 9 October 1914 were against Dussledorf (Zeppelin shed successfuly attacked) and Cologne.

RNAS policy was to hit sheds hoping to catch the Zeps on the ground and in the air before they could get to England. Resulting from their experiences in 1914 Samson and Seuter requested a "bloody pulveriser" that spec turned into the Handly Page 0/100, which initially was deployed by the RNAS for long range bombing.

The development of 'strategic bombing' was seen by the Admiralty (from at least April 1915) as an extension of bombardment fron the sea, indeed it was more accurate. The Germans engaged in that against the East Coast coastal towns, those were terror raids with little strategic value. For example they shelled Lowestoft, not the fishing fleet.

[PhilB]

One is surprised at the inaccuracy of early WW2 bombing which presumably encouraged area bombing. Perhaps WW1 bombing, being from lower altitude and from slower aircraft was more accurate? Did night bombing become necessary and did that change the target emphasis?

[centurion]

One of the big problems for the British night bombers of WW2 was simply finding the target and in the early years a substantial number of bombers hit the wrong city let alone being able to hit a specific target such as a factory. One of the 'attractions' of a carpet bombing attack was once the initial path finders had started fires etc it was much easier for subsequent waves to find the target. However as radio and radar navigation aids developed precission became easier (just in time for the pre D day raids on the communications infrastructure where this was necessary). In WW1 the distance flown by most British night bombers was much smaller, at lower altitude and flown slower so 'getting lost' was less frequent. Dead reckoning navigation can be used more easily in such circumstances. It may also be no coincidence that most of the targets were cities on rivers.

Its worth remembering in comparison that the Zeppelins flying longer distances at higher altitude frequently became hopelessly lost.

[centurion]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Oct 1 2007, 06:20 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

The bombing of cities remained a moral issue throughout the war. But no one ever believed that cities were off limits for bombing; they had too many industrial sites and government offices that were potential targets. At times, the innocent would be hit by mistake. But the lure of military targets in cities, combined with the psychological power gained by urban bombings meant that they were inevitable. Nothing could make a government and an army look more helpless than to have enemy aircraft descending upon its capital buildings or castles.

By the middle of the war there was a trend towards concentration on tactical bombing and it looked as if orders for the O/100 would be curtailed and the O/400 abandoned. It was the successful German daylight raids by Gotha bombers (and the consequential need to divert 'modern' fighters such as Camels and SE 5as) from the Western Front for home defence ( rather than relying on the motley collection of older aircraft that had sufficed for anti Zeppelin work) that turned the tide in British thinking and amongst other things enabled the creation of the Independant Airforce dedicated to strategic bombing.

[Adrian Roberts]

3 Wing RNAS, on its re-formation in June 1916 was AFAIK the first British unit specifically tasked with strategic bombing.

In his autobiography, Richard Bell Davies VC states: "Its task was to carry out reprisal bombing raids on German towns in revenge for the Zeppelin raids. I was to be appointed to the reformed wing. I disliked the idea of reprisal raids. Two wrongs do not make a right. Most of us believed that Zeppelins set out to bomb military targets, only bombing towns and villages when they got lost in the dark" [Was he being naive here?]. "I composed a letter expressing these opinions...." He then recounts how he sent a revised version of that letter, which was well received and in the orders eventually given to 3 Wing there was no mention of reprisals.

Of course this is a personal and possibly sanitised account of the issues; whether his letter genuinely made a difference is somethat that would need more research. The first major operation of 3 Wing, using Sopwith 1 1/2 Strutters and Breguets and operating with French Farmans, was the Oberndorf raid of October 1916 targeting the blast furnaces of that town.

And having said all that, the Imperial Russian "Squadron of Flying Ships" [E.V.K] would have been the very first Allied Strategic Bombing Unit, starting in 1915 with its Sikorsky Ilya Mourometz bombers

[PhilB]

I believe blast furnaces were popular targets as they could be seen and identified from far away at night.

[centurion]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Oct 4 2007, 09:40 AM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I believe blast furnaces were popular targets as they could be seen and identified from far away at night.

Although many of the initial raids on them were in daylight. I suspect that visibility was a bonus. Germany was experiencing difficulties in producing enough of certain types of steel from mid WW1 and knocking out any blast furnaces could have a major strategic impact. Given the relatively small sized bombs the earlier bombers (like the 1 1/2 Strutter) this was a good target to maximise the effect of the bombing

[PhilB]

What is the difference between strategic and tactical bombing? Does strategic = industrial/civilian targets and tactical = miltary?

[centurion]

Tactical bombing is in support of a particular army (or navy) objective whereas strategic bombing is independent of specific army objectives (hence the Independant label for the bombing force 1917/18) and targets things that will afect the enbemy's general ability to prosecute the war. Thus bombing a bridge to stop the enemy bringing up reinforcements to counter a particular offensive would be tactical whilst bombing a bridge to damage the enemy's ability to bring in vital raw materials to its armaments industry would be strategic. To use a WW2 analogy when bomber command was hitting German cities that could be described as strategic and when it switched to hitting the German communications prior to D Day that was tactical. In WW1 hitting the German steel industry would definitely be strategic.

[Guest]

3 Wing RNAS, on its re-formation in June 1916 was AFAIK the first British unit specifically tasked with strategic bombing.

In his autobiography, Richard Bell Davies VC states: "Its task was to carry out reprisal bombing raids on German towns in revenge for the Zeppelin raids. I was to be appointed to the reformed wing. I disliked the idea of reprisal raids. Two wrongs do not make a right. Most of us believed that Zeppelins set out to bomb military targets, only bombing towns and villages when they got lost in the dark" [Was he being naive here?]. "I composed a letter expressing these opinions...." He then recounts how he sent a revised version of that letter, which was well received and in the orders eventually given to 3 Wing there was no mention of reprisals.

Of course this is a personal and possibly sanitised account of the issues; whether his letter genuinely made a difference is somethat that would need more research. The first major operation of 3 Wing, using Sopwith 1 1/2 Strutters and Breguets and operating with French Farmans, was the Oberndorf raid of October 1916 targeting the blast furnaces of that town.

And having said all that, the Imperial Russian "Squadron of Flying Ships" [E.V.K] would have been the very first Allied Strategic Bombing Unit, starting in 1915 with its Sikorsky Ilya Mourometz bombers

Hi,

The only reprisal raids mounted by 3 Wing were the two raids on Freiburg on the 14th April 1917. When messaged were dropped stamped on pieces of aircraft fabric stating that the raids were in reprisal for the sinking of the Hospital ship Asturias off Start Point. One such piece of fabric is held by the Fleet Air Arm Museum. Incidentally I have been researching the story of 3 Wing for a number of years and hope to publish a book telling the story of 3 Wing in the near future.

Regards Duncan

[Adrian Roberts]

Incidentally I have been researching the story of 3 Wing for a number of years and hope to publish a book telling the story of 3 Wing in the near future.

Duncan

That I would be interested in; let us know when it is finished. Are you covering its initial incarnation in Belgium in 1914(where I believe it was referred to as a squadron) and in the Dardanelles, or just its mid-1916 reformation?

Adrian