Churchills most major blunder

[Kurt1959]

I assume, that this theory will cause some discussions. However, I am more than sure, that this incident happened and caused the whole tragedy of Gallipoli - a desaster for all sides.

I guess everybody in this forum knows about the importance of the German cruisers GOEBEN and BRESLAU, which changed the force ratio in the Black Sea but, much more important, gave the German political interests a tool for their power projection and finally caused with the attack against Russia the entrance of Turkey on the German-Austrian side. But how those important ships were able to arrive Constantinople?

The Mediteranian Sea was dominated by the Alliied Fleets - no doubt about it. But at the 4th August 1914 Admiral Souchon gave the order to attack Phillippeville with the intention to delay the shipping of French tropps from Algeria to France. Almost at the same time he got the order from Berlin: "Coalition confirmed with Turkey. GOEBEN and BRESLAU immedeately go to Constantinople". He then lead this small German fleet under the observing eyes of the Allied Fleet through the Med Sea. The Allied Fleet at that time had 15 line ships, 3 battle cruisers, many smaller cruisers and armoured ships, 8 destroyer flottillas and submarines available. The German fleet was followed by a British cruiser of the WEYMOUTH class but the British units were never able to stop the German fleet.

But - is that true? Were they really not able or simply ordered not to stop them? The "Jäckh-Papers" are stating somethingelse...

Admiral Milne as CINC of the Allied MedFleet later was not punished and was stated as not guilty to let the Germans through - however, he just obviously only followed Churchills orders, which was stated by the Swedish ambassador 1915. The reason was to give the ottoman navy some capable warships in order to balance the forces in the Black Sea. Churchill never thought, that this decision would cost so many Commonwealth soldiers around Gallipoli.

I would like to share and discuss this theory with the forum

Best regards

Shahin

[truthergw]

Hi Shahin. You are suggesting that Churchill deliberately allowed the German ships to join the Turkish navy, in order to balance the forces in the Black Sea. Is this correct? If so, what would Britain gain from this? Would it not have been in Britain's best interest to keep Turkey as weak as possible? Allowing the German ships to reach Istanbul was a bad error but it is hard to see why it would be a deliberate move on Churchill's part.

[DaveMurphy]

Shahin,

The best opportunities to stop the Goeben and Breslau occured before hostilities had commenced. The 'Fog of War' also played a part.

The French missed an opportunity to intercept them after the bombardment of Phillippeville after making a wrong assumption about Goeben's next move.

Indomitable and Indefatigable passed within 8,000yds of them with guns trained, but the English and Germans were not yet at war. Whilst you assert the 'Churchill let them go', Churchill pushed for an engagement to sink the Breslau and whilst Asquith was willing, the cabinet refused to authorise an act of war prior to their ultimatum to the Germans expiring that day (4 August) at midnight.d

Thereafter followed a series of misguesses by the British which ultimately ended up with them falling in Turkish hands.. the rest is history!

Dave

[per ardua per mare per terram]

Churchill’s major blundesr with regards to the Dardanelles/Gallipoli were to send the battleships to force the straights, on their own without support and then delaying weeks before sending in the land forces. Short of sending messages to the Turks saying “we are going to attack here” there was nothing much else they could do to alert the defences.

Troubridge was courtmartialed; ok so both he and Milne were acquitted but they did not hold positions at sea again. If Milne had done so well his master’s bidding then he would have been a candidate for CinC Grand Fleet or First Sea Lord to replace Battenberg, but got neither reward. The Mediterranean is bigger than you imply and remember that the British declaration of war on 4 August, so you are expecting them to snap from peace to war efficiency in hours. It takes skill to co-ordinate and then concentrate the forces required to engage ships of that power; especially with the primitive communications available and Milne demonstrated that he didn’t have that skill; he was the only one with sufficient force. Gloucester did shadow, but had to break off to coal ship. Troubridge made contact with 4 helplessly outclassed ships, 3 of which were sunk at Jutland. Unlike Craddock against Graf Spee, he followed his orders about engaging a superior unit. Do you think his fate would have been any different if he had engaged?

Goeben and Breslau might have altered the balance in the Black Sea, but what did they do to affect the outcome of Gallipoli?

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

"Goeben and Breslau might have altered the balance in the Black Sea, but what did they do to affect the outcome of Gallipoli? "

I can think of only one way they effected the fighting on the ground that was by the use of MG gunners from the ships surporting the turkish ground forces.

There wasa lack of trained MG crews and MG's with in the Turkish Army at gallipoli. These German sailors helped the defence during the vital opening battles and help force a stalemate there for the next eight months.

Purhaps we should also mention the the gunnery officers from these ships who were used to train the turks and help fight with the batteries in the straits.

Cheers

S.B

[Adrian Roberts]

I've never been clear as to why, or whether the arrival in Turkey of SMS Goeben and Breslau brought that country into the war on Germany's side. Surely the presence of just two vessels wouldn't have frightened the Turks into joining the Central Powers? As to being a propaganda coup resulting from the RN's inability (or worse) to stop them: this might have impressed the Turks but surely wouldn't have been enough on its own? Surely the truth is they were going to enter the war in any case, and the incident was merely the final nudge. Or am I missing something?

Adrian

[DaveMurphy]

I think what he may mean is that they affected the balance at Gallipoli in a strategic and not a tactical sense.

The argument being that if Goeben and Breslau had not made the dash, the Turks may not have been in the War at all.

Dave

[Kurt1959]

I will respond to two arguments:

Firstly - I don't assume the MedSea is a little lake and that it was easy to catch Souchon and his MedFleet. I also know, that the British Navy Command had considerable technical problems with their communications and their C2 structure. However, they could easily assume, that Souchon had only two choices - steam back through Gibraltar or head towards the Straights.

Churchills idea to give the two German battle ships to the Turks was in line with an old British fundamental imperial behavior in this region: "devidere et impere". If you see the British reactions in almost all wars between Turkey and Russia the idea was to keep Russia down and the Ottoman Empire strong enough to protect the Bosporus and Dardanelles. As soon that balance was endangered he British fleet showed up, as it happened 1878 or 1909.

In 1912 the cruiser GOEBEN the first time showed up in Constantinople - but as a part of an international fleet to protect the Straights. When the German commander, Admiral Trummler met on 1st April 1913 Admiral Milne on his flagship INFLEXIBLE, Milne gave the advice for a permanent German naval presence in front of the coast of Syria. In October 1913 the first time Germany undertook talks to sell battleships (MOLTKE) and probably the GOEBEN to Turkey, which was well known in the international diplomatic community - therfore Churchill could calculate, that Souchon would head towards Constantinople.

Churchills idea was logical from his strategic point of view: he confiscated the two, almost ready Turkish battleships in the British docks and at the same time he wanted to lock to major German battle ships behind the straights and this fleet was not longer available in the MedSea but also not in the North or Baltic Sea. He didn't assume that he would loose influence of the Turksh navy, which was still under British control of Admiral Limpus. With this idea he assumed control of the Bosporus and counter-balanced Russia - in good old tradition.

To loose the German fleet was not easy because the GOEBENs engines were almost broken and it couldn't steam full speed. Finally there were almost always one or two allied ships visible from the Goeben, but the attemps for a battle were unrealistic weak - it was a fake.

Secondly - what is the relation between this German fleet and Gallipoli? Well, without this fleet Trukey would never enter the war on the German-Austrian side. It is a separate story how the German High Command but in person Admiral Souchon did everything to draw Turkey into the war. The support of Enver Pascha was crucial but major parts of the Turkish government were neutral or against such an engagement. Finally Souchon left Constantinople with is fleet but very vage orders and started the attack against four Russian harbours.

On the other hand the Germans started immedeatly after their arrival to strengthen the fortifications of the Dardanelles, brought artillery specialists, material and started to build up a complete ammunition production in Constantinopel under captain Pieper. In the same time the German Military Mission under General Liman von Sanders, who arrived in December 1913 to train and rebuild the Ottoman army, continued to train the troops. The Turkish miltary was in a German grip and control. Souchon became Commander of the Turkish fleet, Admiral Limps was sent home and almost all Turkish ships were - more or less - under training control and command of Germans.

The attacks of the 18th March would probably not fail, if the German minelaying plans, mobile artillery on both shores (under command of LTC Wehrle), and the German sailors and artillery gunners wouldn' t done their work as they did.

After the 18th March General Liman von Sanders became CINC on the peninsula and the rest is well known. The machine guns of the Landungsabteilung of the GOEBEN and BRESLAU were crucial but only one part of the successful defence of Gallipoli. But this is another chapter as well...

Best regards and thanks for the fruitful discussion

Shahin

[Adrian Roberts]

think what he may mean is that they affected the balance at Gallipoli in a strategic and not a tactical sense.

The argument being that if Goeben and Breslau had not made the dash, the Turks may not have been in the War at all.

Dave and Shahin, Yes, I understand that this is the argument.

But what I am asking is, was the presence of these ships really so decisive as the bring Turkey into the war and necessitate Gallipoli?

Troubridge and Milne were court-martialled for failing to stop them arriving, but that doesn't mean the arrival was itself decisive. Merely letting two enemy ships escape would have ensured the court-martial - national pride was at stake.

What I am saying is

1) Did the arrival of two cruisers really impress the Turks so much that they came into the war on the German side?

2) There are many reasons why Gallipoli failed but the presence of the cruisers was surely not one of them. The use of their gunners in the land war was no doubt helpful was it decisive? Goeben and Breslau were fairly ordiniary vessels and if they had steamed out to attack the invasion force, they would have been massively outnumbered by the Allied warships.

Germany undertook talks to sell battleships MOLTKE and probably the GOEBEN

Moltke was a battlecruiser not a battlehship, so was Goeben

[Justin Moretti]

Troubridge made contact with 4 helplessly outclassed ships, 3 of which were sunk at Jutland. Unlike Craddock against Graf Spee, he followed his orders about engaging a superior unit.

Yeah, three were sunk at Jutland, but under conditions where they were being shelled by an entire division of Scheer's fleet - not taking on the enemy with a four-to-two advantage. With one to distract "Breslau" and three to take on "Goeben" and force her to split her fire, or two and two, it might have been more like the River Plate, not Jutland.

[James A Pratt III]

It's been awhile since I have read a on this incident but there is a book "The Two Ships That Changed the World"? which really blasts the French Navy for being unbelievably inept to put it mildly. "Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Volume 2 by A Marder really blasts the RN for this whole mess. Besides the 4 armored cruisers didn't the RN have 1 or 2 light cruisers and several destroyers avaliable? The G & B would have had real problems trying to engage all these ships at once. If damaged and their speed reduced they could have been finished off by the British Battlecruisers who were some distance away but, might have been able to catch up with them.

[Kurt1959]

Adrian,

I don't think that the cruisers GOEBEN and BRESLAU had any direct impact on the outcome of the landbattle of Gallipoli. If any impact just indirect by the preparations from the navycrews for the defense and the machine guns from the Landungsabteilung.

But there is from my view no doubt about it, that without the GOEBEN and BRESLAU, Turkey wouldn't enter the war. It was the unfavourable and unhealthy constellation of the very ambitious German ambassador von Wangenheim, who did his part and was the perfect transmitter from Berlin to use (and abuse) the Turkish side. (Very interesting the records from the American ambassador Morgenthau about this time and the influence of Wangenheim). Wangenheim also organized the Military Mission contract for Liman for Sanders in 1913, signed the contract between Germany and Turkey 2nd August 1914 and had a clear picture, that Germany needed Turkey on the German side. He also did the diplomatic work to bring the two cruisers under Souchons command towards Constantinople.

When Souchon arrived with his ships, which got Turkish names (Yavus and Midilli) but always stayed under German command, he became commander of the Turkish fleet and used immedeately his influence to bring additional personal from Germany to rebuild the Turkish fleet. Britain lost his influence and Admiral Limpus navy mission had to leave Constantinople.

The third important person was Enver Pasha, who was very much in favour of the German "war machine" and wanted also the war urgently.

Nevertheless - all three persons needed just two months to prepare and use the Turkish navy and started the war without any official permission from the Turkish government. The war diary of the MedFleet Mittelmeerdivision and all other official German records, which I read are clear - it was a Coup d ´etat by Enver and the help of the Germans. There is nothing to be proud of and a sad chapter of history.

Churchill didn't expect this outcome and, as I think, was guided by his historical thinking and experience. Yes, finally it was a huge blunder but initially his idea was not bad to get rid of the whole German MedFleet, let them do the work to balance Russia and keep two new build Turkish ships under British control.

The crews of the GOEBEN and BRESLAU became officially members of the Turkish fleet and probably you know this picture of the officers of the BRESLAU in Constantinople. Interesting is one officer - first row left sitting - who is 2nd Lt Dönitz, who stayed some two years at the Bosporus as a crew member and in different functions. He also married there the daughter of General Weber, who was a member of the German military mission. Dönitz further career is known and finally he signed the German capitulation in 1945 as Großadmiral...

Regards