Why did the RFC persist in using the BE2?

[per ardua per mare per terram]

Why did the RFC/RAF keep using the BE2 and its variants long after it was obsolete?

[MartinWills]

One of the flying characteristics of the BE2 was it's stability - fighters like the Camel needed real hands on control to keep in trim, or whatever. The BE2 was so stable it would virtually fly in a straight line with the pilot flying "hands off". This clearly helped make it an easy target for enemy aircraft, but also made ideally suited for aerial photography/reconaissance. It will be interesting to see how the replica undergoing rebuilding at Sywell flies - it should be in the air for next year.

[Adrian Roberts]

I taken a while to compose an answer to this but here goes:

The simple, but probably simplistic, answer to why the RFC had to use the BE2c is what has already been said. The Royal Aircraft Factory (RAF) was a state-owned organization. The British government has never let fitness for purpose stand in the way of politics when procuring equipment for the Armed Forces. We are not allowed to discuss modern politics on this forum but I’m sure we can all think of much more recent examples. Also, when circumstances such as their product being shot out of the sky suggested a need for change, a nationalised industry such as the RAF took much more time to respond than private enterprise did - but again I’m in danger of getting political.

But was the BE2c all that bad? Why did it become Fokker-fodder? Lets apply some Revisionist thinking here.

There is no doubt that it’s stability made it a very good reconnaissance platform, and surely the factory were loth to change it for that reason. But surely its high casualty was due to the fact that until May 1916 the Allies had no fighters that could counter the Fokker EIII and therefore protect the BE2cs. Take the Sopwith 1 ½ Strutter. This was a much more manoeuvrable two-seater than the BE2c and appeared to be much less of a death-trap in combat. But when it was introduced in Summer 1916 the Allies had air superiority in fighters, and the Sopwith was partly responsible for this. But by Spring 1917 the 1 ½ -Strutters were being shot out of the sky like the BE2c had been before them. Their manoeuvrability was not enough to protect them against the latest German fighters with their superior speed and firepower - but even more important than this was the fact that the Allied fighters no longer had air superiority. Boelcke’s and Immelman’s victims around April 1916 included the much more manoeuvrable Moranes as well as BE2cs: the Morane was an inferior reconnaissance platform but its manoeuvrability did not always save it. (It would be interesting to know the casualty rate per numbers on the Western Front of the two types).

The fact is that for any two-seater, the deficit in speed and manoeuvrability put it at a disadvantage against single-seaters. The fact that in some cases the deficit was greater than others made little difference. This effect was even more marked in WW2 - the casualty rate among the Blenheim squadrons made a BE2c look positively safe. In WW1 the only two-seaters that could just about hold their own in a dog-fight were the Bristol F2B, maybe the RAF FE2b in its early days before the Albatrosses came along, and possibly the French Salmson. A DH4 could sometimes outrun its attackers. Otherwise, the only thing that could protect the bombers in either war was a decent fighter escort, and the BE2c’s heyday was at a time when this did not exist.

Meanwhile the Royal Aircraft Factory replaced the BE2c with first the BE2e and then the RE8, which were somewhat more manoeuvrable but still erred on the side of stability. I’m not about to say the RE8 was a wonderful aircraft; I don’t doubt the crews would rather be in FK8s or whatever, but it wasn’t as bad as it is sometimes portrayed. (This was discussed on the Forum not long ago). Von Richthofen is recorded as saying that a well-flown RE8 should be treated with respect. So the Factory did learn some lessons.

The most seriously incompetent decision in all of this was the production of the BE12, a fighter version of the BE2c that was supposed to counteract the Fokkers. It was a single-seater with a more powerful engine and a forward-firing machine-gun; otherwise unchanged. Fortunately Trenchard ordered its withdrawal after a month in service.

Adrian

[per ardua per mare per terram]

The BE2c remained active on the western front well into 1917 and was still in frontline service (in Egypt) until the middle of 1918, which seems way over the top to me.

[per ardua per mare per terram]

If I recall correctly the 1 1/2 strutter was odered by the RNAS, good thing they weren't tied to the supply chain.

[Adrian Roberts]

The BE2c remained active on the western front well into 1917 and was still in frontline service (in Egypt) until the middle of 1918, which seems way over the top to me.

By 1917 no-one was under any illusions about the BE2c's shortcomings, but it was a question of what was available, in a supply chain that needed time to react. The RE8 needed some redesigning as a result of early experience [e.g. enlarged fin to reduce a tendency to spin] and this slowed production.

As for Egypt, there was little fighter opposition there so the BE2c was perfectly adequate, and its simplicity was an advantage maintenance-wise. Throughout the inter-war years, the further from the UK a squadron was the more obsolete its equipment was likely to be because it was easily maintained in primitive conditions.

If I recall correctly the 1 1/2 strutter was odered by the RNAS, good thing they weren't tied to the supply chain.

The RNAS were always more innovative and independent than the RFC. They ordered the 1 1/2 strutter first, but were always short because when the RFC caught on they pinched a lot of the production.

[Dolphin]

One further point on the BE 2 saga is that the defects of the BE 2c were recognised by the RFC hierarchy and there was an effort made to improve the design, primarily by the use of unequal span single-bay wings. This resulted in the BE 2e, which was slightly more responsive to the controls and which also had provision for dual control (a great help if the pilot was incapacitated) but retained the BE 2c's seating pattern of having the observer in the front cockpit, from where defensive action was extremely difficult.

See: http://www.earlyaviator.com/archive/images3/BE2e.jpg

It was hoped that the BE 2e would be far superior to its predecessors and large numbers were ordered. In addition, BE 2cs and BE 2ds under construction were modified to BE 2e standard and re-designated BE 2f and BE 2g. The BE 2e would be the most produced BE 2 variant: total production of the BE 2, BE 2a, BE 2b, BE 2c and BE 2d totalled 1793, while the RFC used 1801 BE 2es, with the RNAS having some as well.

In practice, the BE 2e proved to be not much of an improvement over the BE 2c, and was unpopular in service, as aircrews distrusted the overhanging upper wing and suspected structural weakness. W M Lamberton wrote in Reconnaissance and Bombing Aircraft of the 1914-1918 War: "Nevertheless, the type was available in quantity and there was no satisfactory alternative; over twelve months were to elapse [from mid-1916] before better aeroplanes could be obtained. The fine work carried out by the BE 2e can be credited to the men who flew it, not to the quantities of the machine itself."

However, the type soldiered on into 1918 in training units and on lesser fronts.

Gareth

[per ardua per mare per terram]

Harry Golding 'Wonder Book of Aircraft' revised 4th Edition, no date but the records and achievements etc in the back go up to Sept 1920:

“One point which may be made about the R.N.A.S. is that it did more for the improvement of the flying machine than any other body in the world. Being a semi-independent body, built up from remarkably small beginnings, with no preconceived notions to clog its energies, it obtained, experimented with, discarded, and again took up machines of every make and kind. If a machine were tried and found wanting, it was scrapped without the slightest hesitation, and on the other hand if a machine were found good, although it had not official approval, there was no reason why the Service should not give it a trial. If it answered requirements, the designer and maker were encouraged, machines of this particular type were ordered, and suggestions made for its improvement. Within three years the R.N.A.S. obtained, through intelligent foresight and enterprise, machines that proved on the whole better than those possessed by any other flying force. Allied or enemy."

The Sopwith Pup, Triplane & Camel were more of their contributions.

[MikeW]

Harry Golding notwithstanding, the RNAS did use the BE2 quite successfully - they recognised its limitations and used it appropriately. Hence they did not suffer the enormous losses experienced by the RFC.

[EdStevens]

Part of the problem was the great advantage gained by the Germans with the advent of two-gun fighters, starting with the Albatros D.I and D.II in the fall of 1916, followed by the D.III at the start of 1917. The British were not able to truly match the firepower of these fighters until the advent of the Camel in the summer of 1917. The S.E.5a, while a two-gun fighter and a fine machine, began to appear in the spring of 1917, but was not available in numbers until the summer.

The period of greatest inequality lasted from the fall of 1916 to the early summer of 1917. If the fighters were seriously outclassed, two-seaters were almost hopeless. The British were caught flat-footed in a situation where they lost aerial superiority in a significant way and did not have the means to regain it for many months. Replacements for the B.E. were limited from any manufacturers and were hampered by the lack of synchronizing mechanisms and powerplants that would allow an armed reconnaissance machine to hold its own. Although the design of the R.E.8 began late in 1915, production did not start until August 1916 (using deflector plates for the forward-firing Lewis gun at that time) and deliveries were not until November.

The B.E. was indeed hopeless against the Albatros fighters, but what was the practical replacement? Even the Sopwith Pups, Nieuport 17’s and SPAD VII’s of the R.F.C. were at a serious disadvantage with only one gun, and of those only was a British design. And the Pup soon had to be used for high-altitude combat, where its light wing loading allowed it some measure of superiority over the Albatros. There's a great diary entry in "No Parachute" where Lee describes the frustration of the Pup's "pop pop pop" of its single gun versus the ripping sound of twin Spandaus.

[Adrian Roberts]

of the Pup's "pop pop pop" of its single gun versus the ripping sound of twin Spandaus.

.....which was due to the inefficient synchonising gear. This was rectified (to the extent of becoming comparable to the Germans) when the Constantinescu hydraulic gear was introduced in early 1917.

[centurion]

The BE2c remained active on the western front well into 1917 and was still in frontline service (in Egypt) until the middle of 1918, which seems way over the top to me.

The Be2 (2c and 2e) had some significant characteristics - it was comparitively rugged and easy to maintain in the field. It was also quite tolerant of poor landing strips. Because of this it was retained in theaters where there was no serious airborn opposition as it was often possible to keep them flying when more advanced aircraft had become unuseable. Egypt in 1918 was hardly front line so it would be quite sensible to keep the old stager in service there. The Bes were also retained as nightfighters as, being stable and relatively forgiving, pilots had a better chance of surviving night landings in them (sometimes in any old field and not on their proper landing strips) and the stability allowed the pilot to concentrate on working out just where they were and spot Zeppelins. Given that most casualties in the night time air defence of Britain were caused by crashes not direct enemy action this was quite a valuable set of characteristics.

The last Bes in service on the Western Front in June 1917 were not Be2c but Be2e s converted to a single seat configuration and used as bombers. The Be2e was a little more manouverable than the 2c but still not ideal for the task.

The fact that the BE2 series were well suited for mass production and tended not to deteriorate so rapidly in poor weather as many other types was initially an advantage but latter a curse as they lasted and lasted when they should have been replaced.

[centurion]

I taken a while to compose an answer to this but here goes:

The simple, but probably simplistic, answer to why the RFC had to use the BE2c is what has already been said. The Royal Aircraft Factory (RAF) was a state-owned organization. The British government has never let fitness for purpose stand in the way of politics when procuring equipment for the Armed Forces. We are not allowed to discuss modern politics on this forum but I’m sure we can all think of much more recent examples. Also, when circumstances such as their product being shot out of the sky suggested a need for change, a nationalised industry such as the RAF took much more time to respond than private enterprise did - but again I’m in danger of getting political.

I don't know about political but I think your making a fundemental mis interpretation here. the RAF did not manufacture anything except protoypes, they were expressly forbidden by statute to do so. All production BE2s (a, b,c,d,e and g) were built in private sector factories. By the time the BE2s were being shot out of the skies the RAF were trying to develop its replacement in the face of some significant opposition from a) Trenchard who valued quantity over quality and didn't want the supply of aircraft disrupted and the people who had nice fat contracts to manufacture large numbers of Be s

When O'Gorman as superintendant of the RAF, initiated the design of the original Be 1, Be2 and Be2a he got the best designer of the time (and subsequent times) to do the job. This was Geoffry DeHaviland who was later to be responsible for the spectacular Dh 4, the Dh Comet racer and the WW2 Mosquito bomber and fighter. DeHaviland met the requirements specification he was given right down to the letter and produced an aircraft suitable for the conditions that existed in 1914/15. It had to be capable of mass production - it was. It had to give the observer a superb view forward and downwards - it did (putting the observer in the front seat level with the wing leading edges). It had to be reliable and rugged being capable of being maintained in the open on forward airstrips in most weathers - the later problem was that shooting down Be s was about the only way to get rid ot them. It had to be inherently stable to allow the pilot and observer to concentrate on the ground - it was so stable that it later made a poor trainer as even poor pilots could fly it. It had to be able to fly when most aircraft of the day would have been grounded, speed, manouverability and the ability to mount a gun were not part of the requirement in 1914.

When one has ago at the RAF establishment one should remember that this outfit produced the SE5a fighter that helped decimate the Albatrosses and Triplanes of 1918. They could produce good, even brilliant, designs given the right remit.

[Adrian Roberts]

I don't know about political but I think your making a fundemental mis interpretation here. the RAF did not manufacture anything except protoypes, they were expressly forbidden by statute to do so. All production BE2s (a, b,c,d,e and g) were built in private sector factories. By the time

Centurion

You make some very good points, and I hadn't taken into account the fact that actual production of RAF types was by private contractors.

But note that I said this was a "simple, but probably simplistic" answer. The point I was making was precisely that a simple reading of history blames the Royal Aircraft Factory and the design of the BE2c & e. I get the impression that many use this as another way of knocking the British Establishment, as incompetent and uncaring about deaths, with the implication that we know better these days.

The BE2 series were in many ways very good aircraft, and I try to make the point that no two-seater would have fared well when the enemy single-seaters had Air Superiority (to use an anachronistic term).

The only other point I would make is that the main reason why the observer was in the front seat was for centre of gravity reasons. If flown solo, the pilot would balance the weight of the engine, and the observer would be at the c of g so that his presence or absence made no difference to balance of the aircraft - just as a Tiger Moth is always flown solo from the rear seat. If you look at at a close-up photo of an RE8 which had the observer in the rear where he could use his gun, there are instructions stencilled on it about adding ballast if flown solo.

Adrian

[centurion]

the main reason why the observer was in the front seat was for centre of gravity reasons. If flown solo, the pilot would balance the weight of the engine, and the observer would be at the c of g so that his presence or absence made no difference to balance of the aircraft - just as a Tiger Moth is always flown solo from the rear seat. If you look at at a close-up photo of an RE8 which had the observer in the rear where he could use his gun, there are instructions stencilled on it about adding ballast if flown solo.

Adrian

Although the BE2d had the pilot in the front seat and the observer and gun in the rear. However relatively few 2ds were in service. I suspect that the reason was that there wasn't that much advantage as the fuselage was too narrow to fit a Scarff ring and the observer still had problems in bringing his gun to bear.

Its also worth remembering that in 1914 ALL tractor two seaters of all nationalities had the observer in the front cockpit. Typically he was a commissioned officer and in command and the pilot was often an NCO (especially in the German and KuK forces) and regarded a bit like a flying chaufeur

[LowNslow]

An interesting correspondence, which is why this forum is such a good thing.

As one of those rebuilding the BE-2 replica at Sywell, I hope we'll be able to vouch for the BE's stability which was exceptional for the era and equally to allay some of the comments about its lack of manoeuvrability.

Just as in 1914 we hope to be a bit sharper than Boxkite, Farman or Bleriot - although clearly we'll never be a match for a Fokker!

The BE was effectively a 1912 design that was designed well in advance of the need to carry defensive guns. Simply no-one had predicted that "field of fire" would ever come into the equation.

It has to be said that private companies such as DH/Airco and Sopwiths responded much faster that the Royal Aircraft Factory in meeting these changes. Certainly inertia among those supplying the front line was a major reason why the BE-2 stayed in service well after its sell-by date, although we're looking at the situation with the benefit of 90 years of hindsight.

I suspect the Royal Aircraft Factory and RFC, or the Army general staff for that matter, were probably not that much less efficient than the people sending our soldiers out in Afghanistan or Iraq in inadequately armoured vehicles today.

The comment about the lower casualties in the RNAS is of interest. Their mandate was from the outset very different from the RFC. The Army required their aeroplanes as "aerial cavalry" to support their field activities in France.

The RNAS were generally required by the Admiralty to operate from British bases in observation duties over the Channel, North Sea and Western Approaches, in support of the fleet. They simply didn't meet many aeroplanes doing this. One day when I find the time, I think some research might be of interest on this oft-overlooked area of operations........

Anyway, we're on target to complete work on the BE fuselage in the next few weeks, then we start rebuilding the wings.... A first flight early in the New Year looks a viable proposition!!

[centurion]

I remember when I was a small boy being taken to Sywell to see another DeHaviland design flying from that field - the Mosquito. Some of RAF's last operational Mozzies flew from Sywell in the late 1940/early 50s, it would be nice to see the BE2 fly there - please post when you will be making public appearances.

There used to be a BE2 fuselage and some other bits tucked away in one of the workshops at the Mosquito museum near London Colney. Has this played any part in your reconstruction?

[LowNslow]

I remember when I was a small boy being taken to Sywell to see another DeHaviland design flying from that field - the Mosquito. Some of RAF's last operational Mozzies flew from Sywell in the late 1940/early 50s, it would be nice to see the BE2 fly there - please post when you will be making public appearances.

There used to be a BE2 fuselage and some other bits tucked away in one of the workshops at the Mosquito museum near London Colney. Has this played any part in your reconstruction?

The BE-2 fuselage and other components at London Colney went (I think) to Norway, where it formed the basis of the non-flying rebuild by the RNoAF Museum at Kjeller.

Of course, we'll be delighted to let you know when our BE replica is in a position to be seen in public. In fact I'd love to be able to predict the first flight date myself, but old aeroplanes will only fly when they are ready!

You can get regular updates on our progress on our website www.biggles-biplane.com In the meantime, here's a taster!