Gallipoli & the Dardanelles

[Will O'Brien]

Churchill is often lambasted for the failure of the Dardanelles campaign, both its conception & application....................However, I have been reading 'Churchill A Life' by Martin Gilbert which puts a different slant on the matter.........Accordingly to Gilbert, Churchill favoured an offensive on the North Sea coast, seizing Borkum or perhaps attacking near the Kiel Canal. Gilbert states that the other members of the war council also had their own agenda's. Lloyd George wanted to pursue a landing at Salonika or on the Dalmatian coast, F.E. Smith suggested attacking the Turks at Smyrna & most interesting of all Kitchener advocated a campaign in the Dardanelles.............................Firstly, how accurate is Martin Gilberts version & secondly would any of the other suggestions been more successful if opted for instead of the Dardanelles campaign which took place.

Comments Please

[armourersergeant]

My knowledge is limited in this area, though I do believe that Churchill attracts some unfair criticism in this area as if he was solely to blame for this operation. I may be wrong but I beleive it was in part Kitcheners choice to force a landing at Gallipolli.

That said Winston did have a childish attitude on occasions to war and a rather unrealistic stance on military matters best summound up by Allan Brooke in his diaries many times.

Arm.

[Will O'Brien]

That said Winston did have a childish attitude on occasions to war and a rather unrealistic stance on military matters

Arm............I would agree, this even comes through in Gilberts writing.....although some of Churchill’s observations on military matters appear to be very astute

[Guest Pete Wood]

According to the book, Kitchener, by John Pollock, some of your information is confirmed. Churchill wanted a two prong attack on Borkum (off the coast of Holland) and from there an invasion of Scleswig-Holstein. The plan was for General French to land at Dunkirk and advance up the coast, with the help of the navy, to retake Ostende and Zeebrugge before the Germans could turn these places into submarine bases.

Kitchener rejected the scheme because the New Armies were not ready and Sir John would need more guns than were then available.

LLoyd George's idea relied on making a base on Salonika which required the consent of Greece (then still neutral). Without this consent it meant a landing on the Dalmation coast of the Adriatic - and that meant building a long railway through the mountains to link up with the Serbs.

Kitchener wanted to go straight for the attack - against the Turks, as the Ottoman Empire had sided with the Germans. Kitchener wanted to land at Alexandretta and cut the railways betwenn Baghdad and Palestine. Kitchener would often quote how poorly the Turkish soldiers were at fighting and cited the fact that when HMS Doris had carried out a raid on Alexandretta, the Turkish soldiers had helped the Royal Navy blow up the Turkish guns using British dynamite. Kitchener was also convinced that if an attack was made at Alexandretta, the Christian Armenians would rise up against the Turks.

After the war, General Sir Gerald Ellison wrote that with the help of the Indian army, ANZAC, and a small contingent of British troops, the war in the east would have been won by the end of 1915 - without the costly waste of Gallipoli and the Dardanelles.

Anyway, Churchill had previously suggested a joint naval and military attack up the Dardanelles. Again this idea was axed by Kitchener because of the lack of trained troops.

It was only when Churchill raised Admiral Carden's plan for a navy attack on the Dardanelles, seconded by Balfour, that Kitchener agreed to the plan - because no troops were thought to be required.

Kitchener was also reeling from an attack, in the house of commons, made a week before this meeting (by Lord Curzon) who wanted Kitchener to make a decisive decision.....

[Will O'Brien]

hmm.........so the book on Churchill lays the decision at the feet of Kitchener & the book on Kitchener lays the decision at the feet of Churchill..........I'll quote from the book.

'Kitchener came to see him (Churchill) at the Admiralty. 'Could we not for instance make a demonstration at the Dardanelles' he asked. Churchill replied that a naval attack alone would be ineffectual. A combined military & naval assult might be another matter. Kitchener went back to the war office to consult with his advisors but they were adamant that no spare troops were available for such an action. 'We shall not be ready for anything big for some months' Kitchener told Churchill but he went on to express his conviction that the only place where a demonstration might have some effect in stopping reinforcements going east would be the Dardanelles, particularly if reports could be spread at the same time that Constantinople was threatened. Churchill summoned his advisors to discuss a possible naval demonstration at hte Dardanelles.There was general scepticism which he (Churchill) shared

This would suggest that the initial idea of the naval only operation came from Kitchener......of course when this failed to deliver, troops were comitted as Churchill had preferred, but in insufficient numbers.

[Guest Pete Wood]

This would suggest that the initial idea of the naval only operation came from Kitchener......

Not so.

Carden suggested the Naval attack (without troops). Churchill merely raised the idea.

"All the tiredness of this long meeting [Churchill only told of the Carden's plan at the end of it] was forgotten - and Kitchener embraced the idea." Only Fisher remained quiet at the meeting. But he later changed his mind and "went in the whole hog - totus porcus."

As stated earlier, Kitchener has always wanted to attack the Turks - but couldn't see how this could happen without troops. A naval attack was the best alternative.

Kitchener was so impressed, and convinced that a Naval attack could work, that he took advice from Captain Wyndham Deedes who knew the Dardanelles well - and had previously been seconded to the Turkish Police. Kitchener wanted to know if the Gallipoli peninsuar could also be taken by the Navy. Deedes told Kitchener that he did not think a Naval attack, without troops, would work. Kitchener told Deedes that he "did not know what he was talking about" and ended the interview. Nine months later, Kitchener sought out Deedes and apologised (according to Rhodes-James).

Churchill laid most of the blame of the Dardanelles failure on Kitchener at the later investigation, when Lord K was dead and unable to defend himself.

All of them: Churchill, Kitchener, Carden, and even Fisher thought that it would work. Kitchener rubber-stamped it.

[michaeldr]

Will,

Such a big pie and so many different fingers in it!

As early as 1909 Fisher had made the proposition that in the event of war with Germany, there was a 10 mile strip of hard sand on the Pomeranian coast only 90 miles from Berlin, which, if sized and entrenched by the British army, could provide occupation for a million Germans. This may have been the germ of the subsequent ideas for intervention along the Belgian coast, which would have been coordinated with the Russians, who would land on Germany's Baltic sea-board. For some reason the French did not like the idea,fearing that the British would stay in Belgium, on their flank indefinitely.

As a side issue some of the admirals thought that a provocative occupation of the island Borkum might push the German fleet into coming out for a decisive, once and for all, action.

Lloyd George preferred the out-flanking move to be via the Adriatic coast of Austria-Hungary, while on 26 August 1914, Admiral Limpus the British adviser to the Turkish navy, suggested a landing between Smyrna and the Dardanelles.

Turkey declared war on 29 Oct 1914

2/3 November 1914, Churchill signalled Admiral Carden, C-in-C Med., to bombard the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles. "without risking the ships...."

28 Dec 1914, Hankey produced a paper for the War Council outlining the benefits of knocking Turkey out of the war. Russia could be re-suplied all year round via the Black Sea. Russian grain exports to the allies could also be made from these same ports. Greece and Bulgaria could be persuaded to join the alliance.

Russia's C-in-C being hard pressed, sent a telegram on 1 Jan 1915 asking for a demonstration in the direction of Constantinople. Next day, 2 Jan 1915, Kitchener replied "steps will be taken.........."

3 Jan 1915 Fisher writes to Churchill, describing the bombardment of the Dardanelles as futile and instead proposes landings for the British at Alexandretta with the Greeks going for Gallipoli. Russia vetoes this because of the last point. On the same day, Churchill signals Carden "Do you consider the forcing of the Dardanelles by ships alone a practicable proposition?..........Let me know your views." Carden's reply of 5 Jan 15 is very cautious, however Churchill asks him for an outline plan.

8 Jan 1915 the War Council meets and Kitchener gives his opinion in favour of an attack at the Dardanelles saying that they offered a most suitable military objective. Significantly he thought it would take only about 150,000 men, BUT he offered no troops, said that none were available and he wanted to see a plan first.

25 Jan 1915 Fisher writes a memo to Churchill stating that he is against the Dardanelles operation. Sometime about now a second appeal is made by Russia for a demonstration and Asquith takes up the Dadanelles operation

28 Jan 1915 At the cabinet meeting Asquith over-rules Fisher, who is at last persuaded to come on board

One would be forgiven for thinking that like Topsy 'it just grew' and that in fact no one was in charge, however for better or worse, it looks as if it was Churchill who drew all the various threads together [a classic example of the perils of war by committee?]

These notes are 'borrowed' from a lecture "Ends and Means" by Prince Philip on 7 May 1987 in the Gallipoli Memorial Lecture Trust series. The papers in that series were published in book form as 'The Straits of War - Gallipoli Remembered' Suton Publishing Ltd 2000. Well worth getting hold of. Many sides took part; French, British, German, Turkish and Australian. Representing many aspects; Navy, Army, Church, Political etc. Appart from HRH, other speakers included Gen Sir Hugh Beach, John Grigg, Prof Robert O'Neill, Osman Olcay, Prof. Jean-Charles Jauffret, Prof Michael Sturmer, Martin Gilbert etc etc [you can miss-out the one by Ted Heath though]

Regards

Michael D.R.

[Guest Pete Wood]

It was when the Navy started to fire at the Turkish guns, that Churchill 'pushed' Kitchener into the Gallipoli debacle. 'Churchill immediately issued a triumphant communique whcih caused a sensation in Constantinople and throughout the East.' Churchill effectively gave away the plans of the naval-only operation. 'The publicity had committed the allies; there could be no going back.'

Kitchener had his hand forced by Churchill. But Churchill was the person, at the time (March 1915), taking the credit for the decision. That is why I believe that Churchill was held responsible (in later years)

Kitchener was against using the 29th Division, wanting to hold them as reserves for France, while Churchill made strong arguments for using them.

Kitchener wanted to use only the ANZAC armies; Birdwood was initially given command of the land invasion. But when Russia promised to send (but failed to deliver) an army in support of the 'British' troops, that was when Kitchener decided to go all the way and commit a regular (29) division - and replaced Birdwood with Hamilton.

Again, it would appear that Churchill had made the 'right' decision, with his argument from the start to use 29 Division. Again, Churchill let eveyone know that he had always wanted British troops to support the ANZAC and French armies.

Incidentally, none of Birdwood's proposed landing plans were even looked at by Hamilton's staff.

So while I agree that Churchill 'appeared' to be in the centre of all the decisions, other events were taking place affecting/forcing Kitchener into making plans or uttering words that K must ultimately be responsible for.

[Will O'Brien]

I see that uniform opinion is going to be difficult to obtain on this subject.........as Michael says 'too many fingers in the pie'.................in which case lets switch to the second part of my question........would any of the other ideas mooted at the same time the Dardanelles Operation was being considered have been feasible, & what would have been the likely effect of them..........

1. Churchill's idea of an attack on the North Sea/Baltic coast & possible involvement of Holland.

2. Lloyd George's idea of landing at Salonika or attacking the Dalmatian coast

3. Smith’s suggested attack on the Turks at Smyrna

[michaeldr]

Will, regarding your point no.1

I think that the idea for an attack on Germany's northern or north-eastern flank goes back to Fisher's plan of 1909. When he returned to the Admiralty under Churchill in 1914 he continued to press for this option. What I find remarkable about Fisher proposals is that they seem to illustrate a philosophy based on the Senior Service running any British involvement in the conflict; as if Britannia Rules the Waves and everything else will be ok

When he first made his proposal in 1909 he went on to declare that to despatch British troops to a continental war would be an act suicidal lunacy and that the British Army should be run as an annex of the Navy! On 25 Jan '15 when he sent his memo to Churchill expressing reservations about the Dardanelles he returned to this theme. He suggested Zeebrugge as an alternative and made the point that [in his opinion] the first function of the British Army was to assist the Fleet in obtaining command of the sea. He further complained that "The English Army is apparently to continue to provide a small sector of the allied front in France, where it no more helps the Navy than if it were in Timbuctoo."

If Fisher's prophecy about British involvement in a continental war being suicidal lunacy was very nearly correct, then should we give more weight to other aspects of his philosophy, which at first sight seem so outrageously out of date, even for 1914?

Regards

Michael D.R.

[Will O'Brien]

Michael..............I have serious reservations about Fisher. It appears that during 1914-15 his moods & support for individual projects would swing on way then another. Decisive & supportive one moment, vague & unhelpful the next. Even Churchill, who had done the most to secure Fisher's position, expressed concerns at this. I think he was seen as somewhat of a liability & this I'm sure reflected badly on Churchill who championed his appointment. I see Fisher's comments on British involvement in a continental war being suicidal lunacy being prophetic in nature only with the benefit of hindsight. My guess would be it was said purely to support his 'strange' idea that the Army should play a supporting role to the Navy. Do I think we should give more weight to other aspects of his philosophy?............. I don't think so.

[michaeldr]

I see Fisher's comments on British involvement in a continental war being suicidal lunacy being prophetic in nature only with the benefit of hindsight.

Will,

Aren't prophecies, by their very nature, always judged with hindsight? I take your general point however about Fisher; like a flag flapping in the wind, first one way and then the next.

To what extent can a similar argument be used about Kitchener in 1915? RT has already pointed out that he changed commanders for the expedition after Birdwood had begun planning, and he later he did the same thing again; "he sent a message to Birdwood on 3rd Nov '15 that reflected a certain instability in kitchener's character. 'Decipher yourself. Tel no one' he cabled. Kitchener then proposed a new combined naval and military operation at Gallipoli, including a landing at Bulair, with Birdwood in charge." [Travers 'Gallipoli 1915']

Birdwood (for a time) became GOC Gallipoli and Munro was given command of Salonika. A few days later Kitchener toured the battlefield and reluctantly agreed to an evacuation, but that left the commands to be sorted out. Monro was made commander of the Mediterranean theatre, minus Egypt. Birdwood was to command Gallipoli and Maxwell, Salonika. Does this not also seem to indicate slight case of 'flapping' or if you like, headless chicken syndrome?

Regards

Michael D.R.

[Will O'Brien]

Aren't prophecies, by their very nature, always judged with hindsight?

...........Didn't explain myself very well there did I!!...........what I meant to say (but made a hash of it) is that a prophecy is by definition an astute insight into the future............I don't think Fishers comments were based on any such act of foresight. He made the comments to back up a particular idea which held water about as well as a sieve.............it was coincidental that he was nearly correct in his comments.

I take your general point however about Fisher; like a flag flapping in the wind, first one way and then the next. To what extent can a similar argument be used about Kitchener in 1915?

I think there were very real similarities between Fisher & Kitchener on this score.............However, I think Kitchener's premature death when HMS Hampshire was sunk, allowed him, on the whole to escape this criticism because it wasn't the done thing to criticise someone who was unable to defend himself.

A few days later Kitchener toured the battlefield and reluctantly agreed to an evacuation, but that left the commands to be sorted out. Monro was made commander of the Mediterranean theatre, minus Egypt. Birdwood was to command Gallipoli and Maxwell, Salonika. Does this not also seem to indicate slight case of 'flapping' or if you like, headless chicken syndrome?

It certainly shows an inability to act in a decisive manner & a lack of direction.............About sums up the campaign as a whole.

[andigger]

Not sure I can add more detail or information to what has already been said, other than I would recommend Alan Moorehead's book Gallipoli. As part of a book group we just read it, and everyone agreed it is a very readable account of the greater ideas behind the naval and land attacks as well as an exellent description of the personalities involved.

One of the bigger themes in Moorehead's book is that there was really a lack of focus and goals of the operation. We brain stormed the idea if the attack was focused and successful would the aid sent to Russia really have changed the course of the war significantly enough to justify the cost in lives and material?

Andy

[Guest Simon Bull]

Bearing in mind that a substantial French force was involved, how much input did the French have into the decision as to where this attack should be launched?

[paul guthrie]

Excellent thred guys. How in the world were they going to do an amphibious operation in Pomerania w/o decent landing craft? Was is reasonable to assume total surprise, little German opposition for a few days? After all they were rather busy.

[Will O'Brien]

How in the world were they going to do an amphibious operation in Pomerania w/o decent landing craft? Was is reasonable to assume total surprise, little German opposition for a few days? After all they were rather busy.

Paul............Unfortunately the books I have read on Churchill only provide information as to the genesis of the concept rather than any intimate planning or execution of it...................He wrote to Fisher in general terms 'Borkum is the key to all northern possibilities, whether defensive against raid or invasion, or offensive to block the enemy in or to invade either Oldenburg or Scheswig-Holstein. An infantry division should now be assigned by the War Office to the capture of Borkum' - source Churchill a Life by Martin Gilbert

[andigger]

Simon.... My knowledge on the subject is limited only to Alan Mooreheads book. However based on his analysis, I would not consider the French forces (naval and land) to be 'substantial'. They supplied a few ships (two initially, and then replacements when these were sunk) and a diversionary landing force on the Asiatic coast at Kum Kale (aka Troy).

There involvement was important because it kept the Turks busy guessing if the main thrust was on the Asian or European side. However compared to the Commonwealth numbers, the French forces were not as large. Alan Moorehead does not go into French involvement in the planning stage though. Andy

[michaeldr]

Bearing in mind that a substantial French force was involved, how much input did the French have into the decision as to where this attack should be launched?

Simon,

French in-put began in late Jan 1915 with ministerial visits by Millerand (War) and Augagneur (Navy) to London. Both sides had been planning independently up to this point; the French favoured a landing at Salonika, then a move through the Balkans and on up the Danube, while the British were thinking of the Dardanelles. Churchill’s persuasive powers seem to have won the argument and the French agreed to support the British plan in exchange for the promise of an extra 5 divisions to prepare for the Champagne offensive.

The French ideas for taking the war to the east were supported by the politicians and by some of the army, notably Generals Gallieni and d’Esperey. The latter produced a memorandum (for President Poincare and Prime Minister Viviani) on 6th Jan 1915 which contained what was, according to Jauffret*, eventually “the scheme for the victory of Sep-Oct 1918 in the Balkans.” Joffre, on the other hand was mainly concerned with the enemy’s occupation of the homeland and when he finally agreed to send French troops to the east he ensured that they were taken from anywhere but the WF.

* Jean-Charles Jauffret, “Gallipoli: A French Perspective” (Lecture 23 April 1996 reproduced in ‘The Straits of War’)

Paul,

Fisher had been planning for some time and had been building what might be considered the first ‘landing craft.’ These were the ‘Beetles’ which were eventually used at Suvla.

Regards

Michael D.R.

[Chris_Baker]

In his excellent book "Gallipoli" (no prizes for innovation title-wise, but a very authoritiative work), Robert Rhodes James says this:

"The age-old question of forcing the Dardanelles was re-opened in London by Sir Louis Mallet himself. [Mallet was British Ambassador in Turkey]. Mallet, on the information at his disposal, had no doubt that a squadron could shoot its way through, but urged that examination should be given to providing an army to occupy the Dardanelles area after the fleet has passed through. ...

On 31 August [1914], the subject was discussed by Winston Churchill and Lord Kitchener. On September 1st, Churchill asked the CIGS to examine and work out with two officers of the Admiralty a 'plan for the seizure of the Gallipoli peninsula, by means of a Greek army of adequate strength, with a view to admitting a British fleet to the Sea of Marmora'.

Two days later the DMO, General Callwell, reported that a force of 60,000 would be required to effect its capture, but the attack 'is likely to prove an extremely difficult operation of war', and he drew Kitchener's attention to the decision of the Committee of the Imperial defence of 1907 that the only possibility was a combined operation. Callwell subsequenetly wrote 'and I think Mr Churchill was disappointed'.

by 6 September, Churchill was urging Grey, the Foreign Secretary, to ask the Russians for an army corps to join in the attack. ...

When the War Council held its first meeting on November 25th, Churchil at once brought forward the desirability of a joint military and naval attack on the Dardanelles. Kitchener pointed out..that there were simply not enough troops available to be diverted to another front".

[healdav]

Were the French really successful in getting troops 'from anywhere except the western front'?

I ask as I have come across several dead in the Dardanelles who were in the Moroccan Division and more particularly the Foreign legion. They were most definitely engaged on the western front.

[michaeldr]

Healdav,

Jauffret gives the following explanation

“The eastern expeditionary corps (17,000 men), under General d’Armade’s command, was formed of two brigades whose distinctive feature was that they were not taken from the armies engaged in the west. The Metropolitan Brigade, under General Vandenberg’s command, had a regiment from the active list created for this purpose (on the model of the Madagascar expedition of 1895). It was the 175th Infantry Regiment formed in the Dauphine region: there were men from Grenoble, Saintes and Varennes-sur-Allier depots. This brigade had a second regiment from the army stationed in North Africa. Five Zouave and one Foreign Legion battalion formed that 1 March African Regiment. No Algerian infantryman was recruited because a holy war had been proclaimed by the Sultan-Caliph of Constantinople; the Algerian component consisted only of French settlers. The cavalry came from the 8th Regiment of African chasseurs. The second brigade, under the command of Colonel Rueff, was colonial, comprised of four battalions of Senegalese infantrymen and two regiments, one of which, the 6th Infantry Regiment, was formed of Europeans, most of them from Indo-China.”

Regards

Michael D.R.

[mcderms]

With regard to the possibility of landing troops on another beach, the Allies had the technilogy and tactics to do this. The 'beetle' was an armoured troop carrier used sucessfully at Suvla. Also the River Clyde idea was sound - the failure was due to inadequate cover fire and the the fqailure of the second vessel to get into position.

IMHO, the Gallipoli campaign failed thanks to weak generals who deferred to the cabinet in London as if they were the C in C and the lack of proper equpment and priority. This includes Kitchener. This was further complicated by the ambitions of Churchill and Kitchener who were equally to blame. Churchills silver tongue persuaded the Navy to get involved but not to sacrifice the ships he believed were expendable. Kitchener didn't have a clue how to fight a world war or organise a campaign of this scale. Churchills reignation and Kitcheners conveneint death spared them both from some awkward questions whilst the Somme put the losses into perspective.

Finally, an almost total lack of suitable heavy artillery saw suicidal charges preceded by weak shrapnel barrages. When the Germans started to move heavy guns via Bulgaria, the days of the campaign were numbered. Anyone who has been to the battlefields will tell you that the landscape would never have stood up to sustained heavy bombardments.

[n cherry]

I've read all of these interesting comments but want to try and ask people's opinion about had the landings worked, how were the troops going to get to Instanbul to knock Turkey out of the war-walk?

I seem to recall reading that the initial plan was for the Navy to sail up to Instanbul bombard the only two Turkish munitions factories and cut off their supply of ammunition and force them to surrender....

This of course failed and it meant the Army landing around Helles to knock the batteries out allowing the Navy up the Dardanelles to do the munitions factory thing while the Army followed on behind...how they would have supplied the Army is something I don't know, but perhaps someone has done some research into this...

[Guest Abdul Hadi Pasha]

IMHO, the Gallipoli campaign failed thanks to weak generals who deferred to the cabinet in London as if they were the C in C and the lack of proper equpment and priority.

This is a frequent opinion on this matter. I don't suppose it occurs to anyone that perhaps the reason the attack failed was due to a rather unexpectedly brilliant performance on the part of the Ottoman 5th Army.

I don't see how the British were particularly incompetent at Gallipoli; this was certainly the most ambitious and difficult amphibious offensive ever attempted, and the British did as well as could be expected. Yes, there were numerous errors, as is the case in every other campaign that has ever been engaged in. This is just one case where the enemy made very few. It is hard to imagine how one could improve upon the Ottoman 5th Army's performance, given the severe limitations under which it had to operate.

If a strong criticism is to be levelled, it should be against the strategic decision to invade there in the first place. Even if the attack had been successful, what then? Could a large fleet be supplied in the enclosed Sea of Marmara, where one enemy submarine? How about mines? If one, teeney, slow minelayer (Nusret, which ironically means "Divine Victory") could with just 26 mines laid sink three battleships, how well would things go for the rest of the way to Istanbul? How do the troops get from Gallipoli to Istanbul? They would have to go through the Chatalja Lines, which were far more heavily fortified than Gallipoli, and the Ottomans would have a huge advantage in hospital facilities operating just 20 miles from the capital.

I think perhaps the British were viewing the Ottomans as equivalent to African tribesmen; a show of force, and the enemy melt away. Also, up to that point, the British had been facing Arab levies, not Anatolian regulars, leading to a serious underestimation of what the Ottomans could do. Also, unlike in a colonial war, the Ottomans had a fully developed staff system, and were in fact considerably ahead of even the Germans in tactical organization, having adopted the triagular divisional structure 10 years ahead of anyone else (thanks to von der Goltz) and in general having greater organizational flexibility, partly due to a lack of centuries-old unit traditions.

In any case, even if Istanbul had been taken, this would not knock the Ottomans out of the war, as the government had plans to withdraw to the safety of Anatolia. It would be necessary to occupy the entire Straits zone, on both the European and Asiatic shores, to allow supply of Russia, and this would require a huge manpower committment; I don't see how this would have been worth the effort invested.

It seems to me that the place to go would have been Alexandretta; from there communications with Syria and Mesopotamia would have been cut, making the position of the armies there untenable, and the Entente would have had the facilities of Cyprus from which to operate. This might have been fatal to the Ottomans.