1920 Revolt Iraq

[James A Pratt III]

Are there any books out dealing with the 1920 revolt in Iraq?

[zooloo]

INSURRECTION IN MESOPOTAMIA 1920

Lt. Gen. Sir Aylmer L Haldane

Never read it so can't say if any good and all that.

[James A Pratt III]

I read it Jun 2003. the book was okay sadly, parts of it sound like they were written about modern day insurgeny in Iraq. It includes some good information on the Order of Battle of British forces there. It took a good sized force to put the revolt down. There is an internet artical about this called "Only by the Sword: British Counter-insurgency in Iraq 1920" I think it's in a section called Warfighter Review.

[Pete1052]

America's most wanted (book, that is)

Richard Barry

Tuesday December 9, 2003

The Guardian

It's Iraq. The Sunnis, Shias and Kurds are at each other's throats, only cooperating long enough to attack the foreign army that is occupying their country. The army is tasked with nation-building, and is running into serious difficulty. The man in charge is... no, not America's Paul Bremer, but General Sir Aylmer Haldane. The year is 1920.

Published in 1922, Haldane's book, Insurrection in Mesopotamia 1920, long ago vanished into the dusty fastnesses of antiquarian booksellers. But not any more. We hear that Sir Aylmer is required reading in Washington these days. Evidently, the Pentagon and state department are snapping up all available copies - the price on the web has hit $250 and is rising. Why?

Iraq (or Mesopotamia, as it then was) is a totally artificial country. One glance at the map tells you that its borders were fixed using the BOGSAT technique (bunch of guys sitting around a table) at the Versailles peace conference in 1919. It is a technique that often causes ethnic problems and Iraq was no exception. The Brits took on the responsibility for making the whole ramshackle set-up work properly, and Sir Aylmer ended up as the man in charge. Yet even against violent opposition he did succeed in building a viable nation that lasted a generation - from 1920 to the revolution in 1958.

Washington wants to know how he did it. I'd like to know too. I'm fortunate to live in a town with many excellent antiquarian bookshops. But can I find an affordable copy of Insurrection? Not a hope. A friend lends me his. Wow, talk about deja vu all over again - to use Yogi Berra's famous aphorism. What is the main lesson?

At the end of his book Sir Aylmer says: "I regret that on my arrival in Mesopotamia I was too much occupied with military matters, and too ill-informed regarding the political problem." Not hard to see why Rummy wants his own copy.

[themonsstar]

In the book on George Stuart Henderson VC By R.King-Clark. There is a very good write up on the 2nd Battalion Manchester Regt, & the Arab Insurrection in (Mesopotamia) Iraq 1920.

[Chris Henschke]

America's most wanted (book, that is)

Richard Barry

Tuesday December 9, 2003

The Guardian

Published in 1922, Haldane's book, Insurrection in Mesopotamia 1920, long ago vanished into the dusty fastnesses of antiquarian booksellers. But not any more. We hear that Sir Aylmer is required reading in Washington these days. Evidently, the Pentagon and state department are snapping up all available copies - the price on the web has hit $250 and is rising. Why?

I am not sure if this is your statement or a news article from 2003 - there are no quotation marks. But it seems hard to believe when Battery Press sell them for about $50.

Chris Henschke

[Pete1052]

The article is commentary that appeared in the Guardian in 2003 and the author as well as the place and date of publication have been clearly identified. I'm inclined to think that the author exaggerated how scarce the book is to make the point that history is repeating itself in Iraq.

[James A Pratt III]

I think Arnold T Wilson, the Acting Civil Commisioner in Iraq 1918-1920 is a better comparison to L Paul Bremer. They both ran the country like Vicroys and really got a lot of Arabs "upset". Sadly, it appears no one who read Haldane's book had any influence until recently when it was finally decided to send more troops to Iraq. Wilson wrote two books of memoirs on what he did in Iraq "Loyalties" and Clash of Loyalties".There are also two bio's of the famed Colonial Officer Gerrard Leechman "O.C. Desert" and "Paladin of Arabia".

[bob lembke]

Sadly, it appears no one who read Haldane's book had any influence until recently when it was finally decided to send more troops to Iraq.

I will venture a brief comment on recent events, hopefully taken as a comment on military planning and not learning from prior history in Iraq, not on politics.

A month before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, three prominent Iraqi-Americans were ushered into the White House to brief someone initialled "GWB". They left astonished, as "GWB" had no idea that there were two groups of people in Iraq that could be classified as "Shi'ia" and "Sunni". Seemingly no knowledge of that slight detail. A major planner and architect of the invasion, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, did seemingly know, having planned the invasion since 1982, but in 1996 had stated that the existence of the Shi'ia was no problem, as they "were not religious".

But, of course, as shown by the repeated leaks from Blair's office, the military decision to invade had been made long before the problem was studied, if it ever was.

This underlines the usefulness of studying military history. Fredrick the Great stated: "Some people say that experience is the best teacher. I prefer to learn from other peoples' mistakes."

Bob Lembke

[Pete1052]

T.E. Lawrence's period of influence with HMG came to an end during the troubles in Mesopotamia in the 1920s. If I recall correctly he published a critical newspaper article in London about the situation there that challenged the official version of events. After that Whitehall mandarans got rid of him and it was shortly thereafter that he began his strange period as an other rank in tanks and later the RAF.

[bob lembke]

"Spear the messenger!"

[Pete1052]

A Report on Mesopotamia by T.E. Lawrence

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Ex.-Lieut.-Col. T.E. Lawrence,

The Sunday Times, 22 August 1920

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[Mr. Lawrence, whose organization and direction of the Hedjaz against the Turks was one of the outstanding romances of the war, has written this article at our request in order that the public may be fully informed of our Mesopotamian commitments.]

The people of England have been led in Mesopotamia into a trap from which it will be hard to escape with dignity and honour. They have been tricked into it by a steady withholding of information. The Baghdad communiques are belated, insincere, incomplete. Things have been far worse than we have been told, our administration more bloody and inefficient than the public knows. It is a disgrace to our imperial record, and may soon be too inflamed for any ordinary cure. We are to-day not far from a disaster.

The sins of commission are those of the British civil authorities in Mesopotamia (especially of three 'colonels') who were given a free hand by London. They are controlled from no Department of State, but from the empty space which divides the Foreign Office from the India Office. They availed themselves of the necessary discretion of war-time to carry over their dangerous independence into times of peace. They contest every suggestion of real self-government sent them from home. A recent proclamation about autonomy circulated with unction from Baghdad was drafted and published out there in a hurry, to forestall a more liberal statement in preparation in London. 'Self-determination papers' favourable to England were extorted in Mesopotamia in 1919 by official pressure, by aeroplane demonstrations, by deportations to India.

The Cabinet cannot disclaim all responsibility. They receive little more news than the public: they should have insisted on more, and better. They have sent draft after draft of reinforcements, without enquiry. When conditions became too bad to endure longer, they decided to send out as High Commissioner the original author of the present system, with a conciliatory message to the Arabs that his heart and policy have completely changed.*

Yet our published policy has not changed, and does not need changing. It is that there has been a deplorable contrast between our profession and our practice. We said we went to Mesopotamia to defeat Turkey. We said we stayed to deliver the Arabs from the oppression of the Turkish Government, and to make available for the world its resources of corn and oil. We spent nearly a million men and nearly a thousand million of money to these ends. This year we are spending ninety-two thousand men and fifty millions of money on the same objects.

Our government is worse than the old Turkish system. They kept fourteen thousand local conscripts embodied, and killed a yearly average of two hundred Arabs in maintaining peace. We keep ninety thousand men, with aeroplanes, armoured cars, gunboats, and armoured trains. We have killed about ten thousand Arabs in this rising this summer. We cannot hope to maintain such an average: it is a poor country, sparsely peopled; but Abd el Hamid would applaud his masters, if he saw us working. We are told the object of the rising was political, we are not told what the local people want. It may be what the Cabinet has promised them. A Minister in the House of Lords said that we must have so many troops because the local people will not enlist. On Friday the Government announced the death of some local levies defending their British officers, and say that the services of these men have not yet been sufficiently recognized because they are too few (adding the characteristic Baghdad touch that they are men of bad character). There are seven thousand of them, just half the old Turkish force of occupation. Properly officered and distributed, they would relieve half our army there. Cromer controlled Egypt's six million people with five thousand British troops; Colonel Wilson fails to control Mesopotamia's three million people with ninety thousand troops.

We have not reached the limit of our military commitments. Four weeks ago the staff in Mesopotamia drew up a memorandum asking for four more divisions. I believe it was forwarded to the War Office, which has now sent three brigades from India. If the North-West Frontier cannot be further denuded, where is the balance to come from? Meanwhile, our unfortunate troops, Indian and British, under hard conditions of climate and supply, are policing an immense area, paying dearly every day in lives for the wilfully wrong policy of the civil administration in Baghdad. General Dyer was relieved of his command in India for a much smaller error, but the responsibility in this case is not on the Army, which has acted only at the request of the civil authorities. The War Office has made every effort to reduce our forces, but the decisions of the Cabinet have been against them.

The Government in Baghdad have been hanging Arabs in that town for political offences, which they call rebellion. The Arabs are not at war with us. Are these illegal executions to provoke the Arabs to reprisals on the three hundred British prisoners they hold? And, if so, is it that their punishment may be more severe, or is it to persuade our other troops to fight to the last?

We say we are in Mesopotamia to develop it for the benefit of the world. All experts say that the labour supply is the ruling factor in its development. How far will the killing of ten thousand villagers and townspeople this summer hinder the production of wheat, cotton, and oil? How long will we permit millions of pounds, thousands of Imperial troops, and tens of thousands of Arabs to be sacrificed on behalf of colonial administration which can benefit nobody but its administrators?

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*Sir Percy Cox was to return as High Commissioner in October, 1920 to form a provisional Government.

[bob lembke]

Pete!!!

Fantastic!!! I just pasted it out in a little newsletter that I send to friends in which I inform them about current affairs, mostly the botched "War on Terror". I pointed out that the Brits only pulled out 39 years after Lawrence's comments. Who said that "If you do not learn the lessons of history, you are doomed to repeat them."?

Now Somalia is suddenly going bad, and we may start to bomb a real power. With luck we may lose four wars at once to peanut powers.

This is OT, as it vividly illustrates the dangers of having historically illiterate leaders guide our foreign policy.

Bob Lembke

[Pete1052]

Who said that "If you do not learn the lessons of history, you are doomed to repeat them."?

"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."

George Satayana

Spanish-American philosopher

1863-1952

[Pete1052]

1 September 1922

Winston S. Churchill to David Lloyd George

I am deeply concerned about Iraq. The task you have given me is becoming really impossible. Our forces are reduced now to very slender proportions. The Turkish menace has got worse; Feisal is playing the fool, if not the knave; his incompetent Arab officials are disturbing some of the provinces and failing to collect the revenue; we overpaid £200,000 on last year's account which it is almost certain Iraq will not be able to pay this year, thus entailing a Supplementary Estimate in regard to a matter never sanctioned by Parliament; a further deficit, in spite of large economies, is nearly certain this year on the civil expenses owing to the drop in the revenue. I have had to maintain British troops at Mosul all through the year in consequence of the Angora quarrel: this has upset the programme of reliefs and will certainly lead to further expenditure beyond the provision. I cannot at this moment withdraw these troops without practically inviting the Turks to come in. The small column which is operating in the Rania district inside our border against the Turkish raiders and Kurdish sympathisers is a source of constant anxiety to me.

I do not see what political strength there is to face a disaster of any kind, and certainly I cannot believe that in any circumstances any large reinforcements would be sent from here or from India. There is scarcely a single newspaper - Tory, Liberal or Labour - which is not consistently hostile to our remaining in this country. The enormous reductions which have been effected have brought no goodwill, and any alternative Government that might be formed here - Labour, Die-hard or Wee Free - would gain popularity by ordering instant evacuation. Moreover in my own heart I do not see what we are getting out of it. Owing to the difficulties with America, no progress has been made in developing the oil. Altogether I am getting to the end of my resources. I think we should now put definitely, not only to Feisal but to the Constituent Assembly, the position that unless they beg us to stay and to stay on our own terms in regard to efficient control, we shall actually evacuate before the close of the financial year. I would put this issue in the most brutal way, and if they are not prepared to urge us to stay and to co-operate in every manner I would actually clear out. That at any rate would be a solution. Whether we should clear out of the country altogether or hold on to a portion of the Basra vilayet is a minor issue requiring a special study.

It is quite possible, however, that face to face with this ultimatum the King, and still more the Constituent Assembly, will implore us to remain. If they do, shall we not be obliged to remain? If we remain, shall we not be answerable for defending their frontier? How are we to do this if the Turk comes in? We have no force whatever that can resist any serious inroad. The War Office, of course, have played for safety throughout and are ready to say 'I told you so' at the first misfortune.

Surveying all the above, I think I must ask you for definite guidance at this stage as to what you wish and what you are prepared to do. The victories of the Turks will increase our difficulties throughout the Mohammedan world. At present we are paying eight millions a year for the privilege of living on an ungrateful volcano out of which we are in no circumstances to get anything worth having.

From Martin Gilbert, WINSTON S. CHURCHILL IV, Companion Volume Part 3, London: Heinemann, 1977, pp. 1973-74.