Major General Frederick Hammersley, Suvla Bay.

[Tony Lund]

Major General Frederick Hammersley, (1858-1924)

Why does the Dardanelles Commission report state that Major General Hammersley's health had in the past been such that it was dangerous to select him for a divisional command in the field? Was this poor health a mental health problem? A number of Holmfirth men were killed serving with the 11th Division and probably would have been no matter who was in command, but I would like some more information on their Divisional Commander.

Joined Army 1876.

Sudan 1884-1885.

Nile expedition of 1898 where he fought at the Battle of Khartoum.

South African War 1899-1900 severely wounded at Talana Hill.

Gallipoli campaign of 1915, where he commanded the 11th Division at the landing at Suvla Bay on 6 August 1915.

Dardanelles Commission report: conclusions:

7. - The operations at Suvla were a severe trial for the force consisting of troops who had never been under fire, but we think that after taking into consideration and making every allowance for the difficulties of the attack and the inexperience of the troops, the attack was not pressed as it should have been at Suvla on the 7th and 8th August, and we attribute this in a great measure to a want of determination and competence in the Divisional Commander and one of his Brigadiers. The leading of the 11th Division and the attached battalions of the 10th Division, which constituted the main body of the attack, was not satisfactory. As explained in paragraphs 108 and 109, the orders given by General Hammersley were confused and the work of his staff defective. Major-General Hammersley's health had in the past been such that it was dangerous to select him for a divisional command in the field, although he seemed to have recovered. We think that the defects that we have mentioned in his leading probably arose from this cause. General Sitwell, the senior Brigade Commander, did not, in our opinion, show sufficient energy and decision.

Any insights will be welcome.

Tony.

[michaeldr]

From 'Gallipoli' by Col Michael Hickey

page 263

"Hammersley had been commanding a brigade at Aldershot in 1911 but then 'disappeared for a time. He subsequently claimed to have suffered no more than a severe nervous breakdown; but his contemporaries, including de Lisle, all knew that he had been so disturbed that he had required physical restraint when undergoing treatment."

regards

Michael

[Chris Best]

From 'Gallipoli' by Col Michael Hickey

page 263

"Hammersley had been commanding a brigade at Aldershot in 1911 but then 'disappeared for a time. He subsequently claimed to have suffered no more than a severe nervous breakdown; but his contemporaries, including de Lisle, all knew that he had been so disturbed that he had required physical restraint when undergoing treatment."

regards

Michael

And they named a barracks which now houses physical training instructers after him. Hmmm, word association

Chris

[Tony Lund]

Strange that I can only find the bit quoted above about this. I would have thought that people writing one of those books which set out to criticise the generals would have jumped on something like this. Still, just because I have not seen it mentioned anywhere except the above quote does not mean it is not described in detail somewhere. Maybe something will turn up.

I have taken the Michael Hickey book out from the library, but I have not read through it yet. It may add more.

Thanks,

Tony.

[horatio2]

Hammersley's unsuitability for this command seems to have been quite apparent. According to LA Carlyon in his "Gallipoli":

"Hammersley came with a caution from Kitchener: 'He will have to be watched to see that the strain of trench warfare is not too much for him." Hammersley had suffered a 'nervous breakdown' (a phrase used in 1915 to describe everything from mild exhaustion to frothing lunacy) before the outbreak of war."

Yet another example of Kitchner depriving this campaign of everything: from artillery shells to timely reinforcements and competent commanders. Had he not died in 1916 he would have had much to answer for to the Dardanelles Commission.

[michaeldr]

Quote: "Had he not died in 1916 he would have had much to answer for to the Dardanelles Commission."

That's a point well worth making Horatio

The government appointed none less than the Attorney-General F. E. Smith [later Lord Birkenhead and undoubtedly one of the finest legal brains of his generation] to represent the deceased K at the Dardanelles Commission. They weren't taking any chances were they?

Regards

Michael

[Tony Lund]

A shell landed in Hammersley's beach headquarters on August 7th? and killed several of his staff.

According to Alan Moorehead’s “Gallipoli” 1956 reprinted 1963 price 4 shillings; Major General Frederick Hammersley was on August 23rd: “Taken off the peninsular in a state of collapse”.

Tony.

[Tony Lund]

An interesting quote from General Patton:

“At Suvla Bay, it was not the Turkish Army which defeated the British – it was von Sanders, Kemal Pasha, and Major Willmer who defeated Hamilton, Stopford, Hammersley, and Sitwell. Had the two sets of commanders changed sides it is believed that the landing would have been as great a success as it was a dismal failure.”

G.S. Patton, Jr.

Lt. Col., General Staff

Headquarters

Hawaiian Department,

Fort Shafter,

August 31, 1936

[Guest gustavus]

Hammersley's unsuitability for this command seems to have been quite apparent. According to LA Carlyon in his "Gallipoli":

"Hammersley came with a caution from Kitchener: 'He will have to be watched to see that the strain of trench warfare is not too much for him." Hammersley had suffered a 'nervous breakdown' (a phrase used in 1915 to describe everything from mild exhaustion to frothing lunacy) before the outbreak of war."

Yet another example of Kitchner depriving this campaign of everything: from artillery shells to timely reinforcements and competent commanders. Had he not died in 1916 he would have had much to answer for to the Dardanelles Commission.

Seems Ok for Officers to suffer from 'battle fatigue' but not the enlisted men, they in general were not relieved and sent home. They had to stay and in most cases die!

[horatio2]

I do enjoy a sweeping generalisation! Probably tens of thousands of ORs were invalided home with 'neurasthenia' a.k.a. "battle fatigue". It was widely recognized that men who had broken down were a liability not an asset. Foaming lunatics at HQs were also unhelpful to the battle strategy.

[Rob B]

We are discussing a General here who has his experience of war from 1884 onwards, lets remember there were millions or other Officers and Soldiers who did not fall apart-so less of the blanket bombing, one officer does not then become All Officers.

As said a bit of a sweeping generalisation.

Rob