90TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BATTLE OF MAGDHABA

[TerryK]

After defeating the Turks at Romani, General Murray’s next objective for the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) was El Arish. He gave orders for the village to be captured as soon as the railway was close enough for his infantry and mounted troops to be deployed and supported. Preparations were not complete until 20 December – too late. RFC reconnaissance on that day advised that the enemy had apparently abandoned the village. Hoping to catch at least some Turks, Murray decided to push his mounted troops forward quickly, leaving the infantry behind. The Anzac Mounted Division and the new Imperial Camel Corps (ICC) Brigade were ordered to advance on El Arish that night. A ring of outposts was established around the village, but a New Zealand patrol reported that El Arish was empty of Turks. A few captured prisoners told interrogators that the garrison was heading inland along the Wadi el Arish to Magdhaba.

On the morning of 22 December, the 3rd (Auckland) Squadron and some engineers were sent up the Wadi el Arish to Bir Lahfan to report on the water and wells there. For the rest of the horsemen, the day passed quietly. As they sat eating the last of their rations, General Chetwode arrived by sea and ordered a pursuit to be launched. Chauvel was placed in command of the force, which consisted of the Anzac Mounted Division (less the 2nd LH Brigade) and the ICC Brigade, supported by two batteries of horse artillery and a mountain gun battery.

After dark on 22 December, the Anzac Mounted Division concentrated near the wadi about eight kilometres south of El Arish. Chauvel believed that the Turks at Magdhaba possessed the only known water in the area. It was imperative that the position was captured quickly so that the horses could be watered. If he failed to capture the wells at Magdhaba, the horses would face a fifty-kilometre trek back to El Arish before they could have a drink (unless water was found at Bir Lahfan).

The column made good time, riding forty minutes, leading ten minutes, and halting ten minutes in every hour. At 4.50 a.m. the column halted and dismounted in the open about six kilometres from the village, within sight of the enemy camp-fires. Dawn broke as the men and their horses and camels breakfasted. Chauvel took his commanders forward to reconnoitre the enemy position.

The enemy position was centred on the tiny village of Magdhaba, which straddled the dry bed of the Wadi el Arish. The position consisted of a number of strong redoubts and a few connecting trenches. Four mountain guns were sited on higher ground behind the forward positions. The redoubts were well-sited to provide overlapping fire for each other. The dry wadi was up to eight meters deep, with many side-gullies, and this also afforded excellent cover for the garrison, which consisted of about 1,600 men of the 80th Regiment, 27th (Arab) Division.

Chauvel decided to concentrate his attack on the hard flat ground to the east of the wadi, where the mobility of his mounted troops could be used to best advantage. He intended to seize the two eastern redoubts and the village with its wells, cutting off the three western redoubts from water. He would then cut off their retreat towards the railway and force their surrender. The attack was to begin as soon as the assault forces and the guns were in position, and it was to be pressed home remorselessly.

Brigadier General Chaytor was allocated the 3rd LH Brigade in addition to his own NZMR Brigade, and ordered to attack Magdhaba from the north and the north-east. He was also told to cut off the enemy’s line of retreat along the wadi bed. The ICC Brigade, Chauvel’s strongest striking force, was ordered to advance directly on Magdhaba. The 1st LH Brigade was Chauvel’s reserve, with orders to be prepared to advance on the right of the cameliers.

When Chaytor heard that small groups of mounted enemy troops were escaping up the wadi bed, he sent the 10th ALH Regiment right around the enemy position towards Aulad Ali to cut them off.

The enemy positions were very well concealed, and this made it difficult for the attackers and the gunners to locate them. The ground across which the New Zealanders had to advance was flat and open, with only occasional stunted bushes here and there to provide illusory cover. As a result, they made very slow progress.

At 10 a.m. a pilot landed his aircraft near Chauvel’s HQ and told him that the enemy was withdrawing. Chauvel immediately ordered his reserve, the 1st LH Brigade, to move straight into Magdhaba. Brigadier-General Cox led his brigade into the open at the trot. Coming under enemy shrapnel fire, he changed direction slightly and increased the pace to a gallop, opening out into artillery formation. It quickly became obvious that the Turks were not departing, and that to continue the advance on horseback in the face of heavy fire risked the destruction of Cox’s brigade. He abandoned his spectacular charge and led his brigade into cover in the wadi to the north-west of Magdhaba.

By noon the New Zealanders were still slowly advancing towards the village and one of the redoubts. To their right the cameliers were also advancing slowly, and Cox’s Australian brigade was moving south-eastwards along the wadi. To the south, the 10th ALH Regiment was at Aulad Ali, and the rest of the 3rd LH Brigade was still held in reserve by Chaytor.

As the two New Zealand regiments advanced they diverged from each other, and a gap opened between them. Chaytor sent the 8th and 9th ALH regiments of the 3rd LH Brigade into this gap in an effort to force a result.

At 1.05 p.m. Chauvel heard that the engineers had failed to find any water at Bir Lahfan. As the horses had not had a drink since before they left El Arish the previous evening, Chauvel knew that he would soon have to withdraw his force back to El Arish to water the animals. The slow progress of the attack so far suggested that the prospects of capturing Magdhaba quickly were poor. Chauvel told Chetwode by telephone at 1.50 p.m. that he intended to break off the action and return to El Arish. Chetwode urged Chauvel to fight on, even if it cost him some of his horses. Chauvel agreed to try one more time, and he prepared to issue orders for one last concerted push at 4.30 p.m.

Even as Chauvel was talking to Chetwode, the enemy redoubts began to fall in quick succession. The Wellington regiment and the 8th and 9th ALH regiments captured a redoubt on the eastern plain, along with the single enemy mountain gun battery. Meanwhile, at 3.20 p.m. Cox’s 3rd ALH Regiment and the cameliers attacked another redoubt. The combined forces charged across an open, flat piece of ground and captured the enemy position at the point of the bayonet, taking 95 prisoners. Machine guns were brought forward into the redoubt, from where they could fire into the next one. This fell at 4 p.m. to converging attacks by the 2nd and 3rd ALH regiments.

To the south, the 10th ALH Regiment had advanced back up towards the enemy redoubts on the western side of the wadi. There was better cover on this side of the wadi, and the Australians were able to get very close to the enemy on horseback. One squadron of light horsemen, carrying rifles with fixed bayonets in their hands, galloped straight through a redoubt garrisoned by 300 Turks. They survived by sheer boldness, helped by the bad shooting of the enemy. A little more cautiously, the light horsemen turned and attacked the redoubt, aided by a squadron from the 2nd ALH Regiment and by part of the Wellington regiment, which had crossed the wadi from the village. The 8th and 9th ALH regiments and the CMR also crossed the wadi, the Canterburys gaining touch with the 10th ALH Regiment. These regiments then attacked the rearmost redoubt. These last two redoubts were captured by 4 p.m.

By 4.30 p.m. the entire position had been captured, although scattered shots were fired from sand dunes south of the position until dark. The mounted men assembled in the village as the sun set. The regiments were mixed up and it took some time to sort them out, bring up the horses, water some of them, and collect the prisoners.

Ninety-seven dead enemy soldiers were buried on the battlefield. 1,282 prisoners were rounded up, along with four mountain guns, a number of machine guns, 1,200 rifles, 100,000 rounds of ammunition, 51 camels and forty horses. The attackers lost 22 men killed and 134 wounded. In the NZMR Brigade, nine men and three horses were killed, and 56 men and seven horses were wounded.

Chauvel left part of the AMR, the 1st ALH Regiment and a squadron of the 3rd ALH Regiment to clear the battlefield and destroy the buildings. They bivouacked on the battlefield overnight and continued their work at dawn. After a few horses had a drink in the wells at Magdhaba, the other horsemen and cameliers began the ride back to El Arish, taking the fit prisoners and a few trophies with them. The night was very cold, and the men and horses were exhausted. Many men had not slept for three days and nights, and they were so tired that many experienced hallucinations during the long ride. The WMR historian descried this march as one of the most difficult ever conducted by the regiment.

The horsemen eventually reached their bivouac ground on the beach at 6 a.m. on Christmas Eve. Breakfast was interrupted by the appearance of a German aircraft which bombed the camps. The prisoners were handed over to the infantry to guard and feed them. After watering and feeding the horses and themselves, the exhausted men slept the day through.

Soon after their defeat at Magdhaba, the Turks took the hint and withdrew all of their remaining posts from Sinai, with the exception of a position near Rafah. The Turkish commanders underestimated the range and combat power of the Anzac and British mounted troops, and they overestimated the powers of resistance of the largely-Arab defenders of Magdhaba. As soon as the attackers were close enough to launch a bayonet charge, most of the Arab defenders of Magdhaba immediately surrendered or fled. The price of these errors had been the loss of a complete regiment. It was not to be the last time that such costly miscalculations were made by enemy commanders.

This posting is an edited excerpt from my forthcoming book on the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade in the Middle East 1916-1919. I ask that any reader detecting errors of fact let me know.

Merry Christmas.

Terry Kinloch

[Guest Douetil]

I am interested in the Brigadier General Cox referred to in Terry Kinlock's piece about the Battle of Magdhaba. I wonder if this is this the same person as the Lieut Col LH Cox MC mentioned as receiving the 1937 Coronation Medal, at that time a member of 61st Foot (Devonport) Glosters, and in 1943 as Major General LH Cox, Singapore Division, Royal Army Service Corps?

I'd be very grateful for any help with this.

Thank you

Phil Douetil

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

No, it refers to the Australian General Charles Frederick COX CMG CB DSO MID who was born around 1863.

Cox served all in the Australian Military Forces, first in South Africa in the Boer War and commanded the 1st LH Bde during WWI.

He was a sucsessfull polition MHR who was also a citizen soldier here in Australia, very comen in those days.

He retired as a Major General 1st Cav Div in Australia in the thirties.

Cheers

S.B