Was the German learning process quicker than the British?

[Paul Hederer]

"agree with Chris. My special focus are the storm formations, so naturally I run on about them, but they actually had a relatively small role in the actual fighting..."

I think we're mixing two things here. There were special assault units formed at Army level, and there were attack formations formed at a much lower level by the units themselves.

The small-scale attack units were very involved in the fighting at Verdun, for example. Each attacking company had an organized Stosstrupp formed from their own infantry and attached Pioniere. They played a vital role in breaking the French defense. When reading the regimental histories you come again and again across the phrase "The Stosstrupp was brought up to take the blockhouse..." I'm not speaking of Rohr's units here at all.

Some of the attacking units at Verdun also underwent special training behind the lines in late 1915/early1916. The 3rd Jaeger battalion (which I posted about earlier) was one such unit which at least wrote about this training. Some of the regular infantry units underwent the same training. It sounds very reminiscent of the large-scale training that many German army units underwent prior to the 1918 offensives.

As the question was asking who was learning quicker I wanted to write specifically about tactics used at Verdun, showing what the Germans were employing in early 1916 as opposed to 1917/18.

It would be interesting if a French Army expert could tell us a bit about French assault tactics during the same time period.

Paul

[bob lembke]

Pete;

Very interesting family history. I have not been able, with my limited effort on our geneology, to go back more than to the late 19th Century. My wife's family came over here in 1634 and they have a good deal of info going back to 1540 in England.

Fortunately, I hsve a lot more info on the development of infiltration and other storm tactics. It is the focus of my WW I study and I probably read or organize my material 2-4-6 hours a day, for about six years now. I do not use secondary sources a lot, but primary sources and documents, and then official histories, with caution. The largest number are in German, followed by English, French, and Italian. (Bruce Gudmundsson's book is absolutely top-notch, and it is one of the few secondary sources that I would quote without hesitation. However, it is so well footnoted that perhaps it should not even be considered a secondary source.)

The Garde=Reserve=Pionier=Regiment (Flammenwerfer) was the first storm unit, and the largest, but not that well known, for a variety of reasons. Probably 80% of what is written about it and German FWs in English is nonsense, and a lot of it deliberate disinformation pumped out by a Brit and a Yank general for 20 years. There are also specific reasons why the Germans did not write a lot on this topic after the war.

However, I have hundreds of pages of material written by G=R=P=R officers, including the CO, and a lot of documents, and among other things detail the development of the infiltration tactics, starting in early 1915. Major Dr. Reddemann called them (in translation) "Indian-style tactics" or "staulking tactics". Many of the tactics developed to use the FW on the battlefield were rather curious and counter-intuitive, and if they could get away with it (in smaller attacks), the Flamm=Pioniere tried to not even involve regular infantry in their attacks, as they were usually more of a problem than a help. Sometimes they had time to train infantry in their methods, and even had flame officers lead picked infantry cadres for a given attack. (My father also told me about the uselessness of a lot of infantry in their attacks. However, he loved to "work" with the expert and trust-worthy men of Storm Batallion Rohr.)

There were hundreds of these attacks carried out by flame troops in 1915, 1916, and 1917 (149 {I think} at Verdun alone, many using these infiltration tactics (My father was wounded in two of the Verdun attacks, and one was a pre-dawn infiltration attack on Hill 304), before Riga, and hundreds more by the storm battalions. G=R=P=R and S=B Rohr gave hundreds of training courses and demonstrations for German and Central Powers (Austro-Hungarian, Turkish, Bulgarian) officers and NCOs, some held by cadres sent to the East. I have specific dates and places for many of these.

Bob Lembke

[bob lembke]

Paul's observations are on the nose. I was writing about the formal storm units, the one battalion attached to each army, but there were many more storm formations, either thrown together for an operation, or perhaps somewhat permament, within many or most "regular" units. I know less about these, but they were the product that the formal storm units were supposed to nurture along.

I have studied one attack at Verdun in great detail, an attack 28. 12. 16. on Dead Man's Hill. (I am going to have to run from memory here; my computer is in lockdown) A couple of regiments (including IR 155) were going to attack, but in fact they were combed through, and three temporary storm formations, each several companies in strength, were chosen out of the mass, although my sources do not say on what basis. The rest of the two regiments sort of sat out the attack, but were available to move up later. To these storm troops were added pioneers and flame troops. They were able to practice the attack on a mock-up of the French position prepared behind German lines.

The men were given the plan of the battle. I have a letter my father was allowed to write the night before the attack, to his father (a staff officer), and he accurately laid out the plan and scope of the attack, when the letter is compared to other sources. (I assume the men were able to write the letters, but that they were embargoed until the attack was launched.) As my father was a flat-out private, it is clear that all the men were briefed on the plan of attack. (How many British privates were provided with a detailed and overall plan of an attack, including the time and date that they were supposed to pull out of the captured positions?)

In the attack my father saved the life of an officer of IR 155 who had his right hand blown off by a French 75, and minutes later my father and his Troop attacked again, and he and all the rest were wounded by another French 75 shell, and he, the worst wounded, lay in no-man's-land for three days, and had an adventure during this period. I not only have four letters from him detailing the attack (In hospital he had a lot of time to write), but I also have a multi-page account from the officer he saved, which has been published at least twice. He mentioned Pop saving him. I also recently obtained a photo of the officer and several other officers from IR 155 in 1918; he is hiding the stump of his right hand behind his back, presumably not to spook the wives, families, and girlfriends of the other officers.

I also have a piece of my father's left upper arm bone blown off the bone by the fragment, but a nurse in the hospital threw the fragment, which the surgeon had also given him, away while he slept.

That attack was not an infiltration attack, but a carefully led attack led by FWs. The other attack at Verdun where father was wounded was a pre-dawn infiltration attack.

Bob Lembke

[Crunchy]

Jon,

Just a small point that may have had a bearing on the issue you have raised. The Military History Section of the German Great General Staff was a highly regarded group which had the function of analysing recent military operations for the purpose of drawing lessons for future operations and developing new tactical techniques. This had been in operation since the middle of the 19th Century and was thus a well developed and respected function within the German Army. It was a centralised function that drew on a great range of experience and reports and disseminated its conclusions widely. I don't think the Allies had such a centralised approach to analysing operations - from my understanding it tended to be more dispersed at Corps and Army level. Perhaps this was a factor in the Germans adapting more quickly.

Paul might be able to add more detail on this, as my reading has only been from secondary sources.

Regards

chris

[squirrel]

Jonathan,

I agree asbout the way that the Germans went for defence in depth.

I only stated that the Germans chose and held their ground - nothing about heavy concentrations of troops in the front line, tactics or other methods. It was as near a genralisation as I could get without going in to specifics.

Hell of an interesting thread has developed though.

[Jonathan Saunders]

It was a centralised function that drew on a great range of experience and reports and disseminated its conclusions widely. I don't think the Allies had such a centralised approach to analysing operations - from my understanding it tended to be more dispersed at Corps and Army level. Perhaps this was a factor in the Germans adapting more quickly.

Chris - many thanks. This is an interesting point.

Regards,

Jon

I only stated that the Germans chose and held their ground - nothing about heavy concentrations of troops in the front line, tactics or other methods. It was as near a genralisation as I could get without going in to specifics.

Understood.

Regards,

Jon

[bob lembke]

Primary source material from the flame regiment gave an interesting example of the infiltration tactic, from 1918, unfortunately not exactly dated, although itseems to have been from the Spring 1918 offensive.

A German advance was held up and pinned down by a large British concrete block-house that artillery had not been able to knock out. A half-platoon of about 30 Flamm=Pioniere with four FW set out to reduce it. In one of the usual tactics, they set off, not toward the objective, but in a wide arc to the side, what they termed "pincer tactics", moving as unobtrusively as possible, sneaking down a ruined communication trench they had found which provided some shelter. (Often on these attacks only one man was allowed to move at a time, rushing to the next shell hole, followed by the next after an interval, so as not to attract much attention, if noticed at all.)

As they moved they suddenly came under MG fire and two men were killed. Only then they noticed a Brit tank further off to the flank that had spotted and MGed them. Some of the men and two FW then diverted further and circled behind the tank, which was stationary, rushed it from the rear, enveloped it in flame, and then rushed right up to it and inserted a flame nozzle into the tank thru a firing aperature and gave it a coup de grace into the compartment.

The Halb=Zug then set off again and worked their way behind the large blockhouse. As they rushed the rear some british soldiers noticed them and opened some rifle and revolver fire (I assume the MGs were mounted on the front of the block-house) but the pioneers got close and fired a burst of flame into a slot, causing a great commotion inside. The occupants surrendered, and (I believe, again running on memory here) three officers and 73 men filed out and surrendered. The block-house contained seven MGs.

A total of three flame pioneers were killed, two by the surprise fire from the tank. The NCO leading the half-platoon got a promotion. The three dead was quite a toll; the flame regiment as a whole had 890 dead, killed in action, died of wounds, died of sickness and accidents, over 653 flame attacks, probably just over one per attack. In one of his letters my father described an attack where three men died and a dozen were wounded as a "catastrophy". Most units attacking on the Western front would not describe such a "butcher's bill" as a catasrophy.

Bob Lembke

[Pete1052]

Your speculation is off the mark

Ahoj, Borys!

I found out what Hoplophilia means. When one handles the U.S. Rifle, Caliber .30, M1, an injury known as "M1 Thumb" can happen, but I've never heard of a case of "M1...." Oh well, forget it....

[Paul Hederer]

Jon,

Just a small point that may have had a bearing on the issue you have raised. The Military History Section of the German Great General Staff was a highly regarded group which had the function of analysing recent military operations for the purpose of drawing lessons for future operations and developing new tactical techniques. This had been in operation since the middle of the 19th Century and was thus a well developed and respected function within the German Army. It was a centralised function that drew on a great range of experience and reports and disseminated its conclusions widely. I don't think the Allies had such a centralised approach to analysing operations - from my understanding it tended to be more dispersed at Corps and Army level. Perhaps this was a factor in the Germans adapting more quickly.

Paul might be able to add more detail on this, as my reading has only been from secondary sources.

Regards

chris

Chris,

There is a gentleman here at the forum by the name of Mart who posted quite a lot about this recently. You could do a search on his posts. Perhaps we could get him to join in the convseration here as well.

Paul

[Pete1052]

The low number of casualties from bayonet wounds documented by the medical people in the Great War mirrors the experience of the American Civil War, in which few casualties of that kind were recorded by the U.S. Army Medical Department.

The best explanation I can offer is that bayonet tactics were an accepted part of military doctrine, so if you hear something over and over again you tend to believe it. My other explanation is more practical--if you're out of ammunition and there are guys with foot-long bayonets 50 feet away running at you, the thing to do is to run away. Maybe a Victoria Cross moment will present itself later, but not today.

There's also an alternative explanation--that most men don't want to harm someone in that way.

The value of the bayonet is in how it intimidates, not in how it kills.

[Pete1052]

The short answer is yes, the Germans were way ahead of us. They looked at war much more professionally than the British, French, or American armies ever did.

The following observation about World War II is from A Genuis For War, The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945, by the late Colonel T.N. Dupuy, U.S. Army, a soldier and historian:

"On a man for man basis, the German ground soldiers consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50 percent higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances. This was true when they were attacking and when they were defending, when they had a local numerical superiority and when, as was usually the case, they were outnumbered, when they had air superiority and when they did not, when they won and when they lost."

In the introduction to his book, Col. DuPuy recalled how as a pimply-faced lieutenant in Italy he teased a just-captured German captain who had commanded a battery of 88s. Col. DuPuy said he said something to the effect of, "Well, I guess you don't feel like a member of the 'master race' now." The captain dryly replied, "Before I ran out of ammunition I destroyed five of your tanks. I ran out of ammunition, but you didn't run out of tanks."

[jamesmcdonald]

Jonathan, I read somewhere that when Churchill came back from France, comparing the British to the German army, he said "We are children next to them when it comes to war"

Looking at the casualties they inflicted on the Allies, I tend to agree with that

Jim

[Old Tom]

Hello,

Pete's reminder about Colonel Dupuy's book is timely. I wish I had remembered it when I made my remarks about the expansion of the BEF and the lack of trained staff for the many new headquarters. A number of contributors have mentioned the evolution of British tactics and dissemination of improvements. Some favourably others not. Haig did not appoint a, Director of Training? (Maxse) until quite late in the war. I have yet to read the Leavenworth paper on German Tactical Doctrine. Can any of our American members say if Dupuy was associated with Leavenworth when he was writting?

Another thought; are British Staff College papers as freely available?

Old Tom

[bob lembke]

"Jonathan, I read somewhere that when Churchill came back from France, comparing the British to the German army, he said "We are children next to them when it comes to war" "

Churchill certainly got a bloody nose in his brief stay in Belgium. Although I have studied it in detail, I do not have a good overview, and perhaps some Pals might have opinions.

After Brussels was taken by the Germans the III. Reservekorps took a blocking position north of the city, facing Antwerp, while the bulk of the German Army on its right flank poured through Brussels and headed west to turn the flank of the Allies (the Schifflin Plan). III. Reserve Corps was reinforced with other formations, about three divisions worth, mostly third-rate units (nominally, such as the Naval Division that had been formed days earlier; III. RK was a reserve formation and might be considered "second-rate"). So it totalled about 70,000 men. (My grand father was the "Id" of the Generalkommando of the army corps.)

Opposing them was the citadel of Antwerp, the third largest complex of forts in the world, with something like 30 or 70,000 fortress troops. There was almost the entire Belgian field army, about six divisions; since Belgian divisions were enormous, about twice the size of German divisions, this was quite a force. Another Belgian division, cavalry I think, was protecting their lines of communication to the west.

Finally Churchill arrived with the British Naval Division.

The Germans attacked the forts of the outer ring at about the south by south-east quadrant, and of course had their 42 cm howitzers and 30.5 cm Austrian and German mortars, which were able to reduce forts that were considered to be able to hold out against "conventional" artillery for three months, without support, in a matter of days. (In a letter that he wrote from the firing position of a battery of these guns firing on a major Belgian fort, g-f wrote: "You must admire the courage of these fellows (the Belgian garrison), who are sitting there and taking this pounding". G-f did not know that the garrison had fled the fort through its rear exits two days before, although the light positions about the fort were still being held by the Belgians.)

So admittedly the Germans could reduce a given Belgian fort in say two or three days. But there were two or three rings of forts, about 100. The Belgian and British forces, including the fortress troops, numbered something like 150,000 or 200,000. But the III. RK, two second rate divisions and three third-rate divisions, defeated the Allied force in weeks. About 3500 men of Churchill's Naval Division had to flee into Dutch internment.

Why couldn't the Allies just stand and fight, having the advantage of 2-3 to 1 in numbers, interior communications, and the elaborate fortifications and other defenses? (The Belgians supposedly tore down all houses, etc. in a wide ring about Antwerp to provide clear fields of fire.)

But Antwerp fell, the Allies fled in several directions, the Kaiser was delighted (G-f and about 18 other officers of the Generalkommando (army corps staff) got, I believe, their EK I and EK IIs, von Beseler, the CO, got his pour le merite, and Churchill took with him the memory of how the 16.5" howitzers demolished the Belgian forts. He took that experience with him to the planning of the attack on Gallipoli, where he assumed that the 15" guns of the mighty Queen Elisabeth would demolish the Turkish forts and batteries. However, Churchill (seemingly not a "detail man") did not consider that the 16.5" howitzers, firing special armored "fort-busting" shells weighing 2550 lbs. at an elevation of 70 degrees, were very different guns than the flat-shooting British and French battleship guns, helping to set the fiasco of Gallipoli.

Any comments? Any ideas why the Allies ran? Were they afraid that their lines of communication were going to be cut?

Bob Lembke

[Pete1052]

I have yet to read the Leavenworth paper on German Tactical Doctrine. Can any of our American members say if Dupuy was associated with Leavenworth when he was writing?

As a retired army officer Col. Dupuy would have had access to papers done by Fort Leavenworth, and he probably attended Command and General Staff College at that post. In a biographical sketch of him I did not read about him having had any assignments to Fort Leavenworth. Also, he was in Burma during World War II so the anecdote about the American lieutenant speaking to the captured German captain in Italy did not involve him personally, it must have been someone else. Forgive me, but it's been more than 25 years since I read A Genuis for War.

[Paul Hederer]

The short answer is yes, the Germans were way ahead of us. They looked at war much more professionally than the British, French, or American armies ever did.

The following observation about World War II is from A Genuis For War, The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945, by the late Colonel T.N. Dupuy, U.S. Army, a soldier and historian:

"On a man for man basis, the German ground soldiers consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50 percent higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances. This was true when they were attacking and when they were defending, when they had a local numerical superiority and when, as was usually the case, they were outnumbered, when they had air superiority and when they did not, when they won and when they lost."

In the introduction to his book, Col. DuPuy recalled how as a pimply-faced lieutenant in Italy he teased a just-captured German captain who had commanded a battery of 88s. Col. DuPuy said he said something to the effect of, "Well, I guess you don't feel like a member of the 'master race' now." The captain dryly replied, "Before I ran out of ammunition I destroyed five of your tanks. I ran out of ammunition, but you didn't run out of tanks."

Pete,

Just to throw in some prespective Col. Dupuy has been heavily criticized for his ideas of "German superiority," in his combat effectiveness work. After trying to make his formulas reflect historical outcomes, and just not seeming to get it to work, he came up with his "german superiority factor," which has been dismissed as just plain silly by other experts.

Paul

[Pete1052]

Paul,

I know that Col. Dupuy was regarded as being something of a heretic in Washington DC for his writings on the subject. Although we faced some elite divisions in Normandy, for much of '44 and '45 we mainly fought against Volksgrenadier divisions, which were hastily organized, equipped, and trained. Although we won the war, those ad hoc organizations gave us a run for our money. My dad recalled that the German POWs he saw in '45 were mostly teenagers or old men.

Dupuy's book A Genuis for War is mainly about the growing professionalism of the German army starting in 1807, not merely the application of operations research techniques to the assessment of WW II.

Pete

[Paul Hederer]

Paul,

I know that Col. Dupuy was regarded as being something of a heretic in Washington DC for his writings on the subject. Although we faced some elite divisions in Normandy, for much of '44 and '45 we mainly fought against Volksgrenadier divisions, which were hastily organized, equipped, and trained. Although we won the war, those ad hoc organizations gave us a run for our money. My dad recalled that the German POWs he saw in '45 were mostly teenagers or old men.

Dupuy's book A Genuis for War is mainly about the growing professionalism of the German army starting in 1807, not merely the application of operations research techniques to the assessment of WW II.

Pete

Pete,

Good point. Sorry, I shouldn't have mixed the subjects. I see a lot of people quoting Dupuy in relation to the Germans, as proof of some type of innate German combat prowess--the issue of German combat effectiveness bears closer examination.

Paul

[Old Tom]

Hello,

Re Antwerp and the RN Division. My knowledge of the Antwerp action is quite limited and of the Belgian army practically zero. However, on that poor base, it seems to me that sending the RN division was not a high spot of British military planning. The force had only just formed, lacked much equipment and only the Royal Marine element could be considered trained. At that stage of the war I gather the British Naval Staff were at an early stage of development and the General Staff were otherwise engaged.

Old Tom

[Jonathan Saunders]

Hello,

Re Antwerp and the RN Division. My knowledge of the Antwerp action is quite limited and of the Belgian army practically zero. However, on that poor base, it seems to me that sending the RN division was not a high spot of British military planning. The force had only just formed, lacked much equipment and only the Royal Marine element could be considered trained. At that stage of the war I gather the British Naval Staff were at an early stage of development and the General Staff were otherwise engaged.

Old Tom

I think the decision to send an RND force to Antwerp was purely down to the First Lord of the Admiralty and probably him alone, and did not involve the War Office in any way.

Regards,

Jon S

[Robert Dunlop]

Any comments? Any ideas why the Allies ran? Were they afraid that their lines of communication were going to be cut?

Bob, the defence of Antwerp involved the remnants of the Belgian Army, who tied up significant numbers of German attackers as you mention. The Belgian Army was still a reasonably sizeable force but nothing like 150-200,000 men. The army had been spread around Belgium when the Germans breached the border and violated Belgian neutrality. Large numbers of men were lost, captured or escaped into France when the fortresses of Liege and Namur were overrun. Further losses occurred during the retreat to Antwerp. By the time of the German attack on the Antwerp forts, there were probably only about 30-40,000 men from the regular army, supplemented by a garrison of around 20,000 reservists.

The Antwerp fortresses were well placed for defending against unsupported infantry attacks. They were no match for the heavy guns. The defenders had to be spread around the perimeter, further reducing their numbers in relative terms. There were few defensive lines between the forts. The Belgian heavy artillery was non-existent ('Quant à l’armement, l’artillerie lourde faisait complètement défaut. Le pays était en pleine période de profondes transformations militaires') and 57mm fortress guns / 75mm field guns were not match for the heavy German artillery. Even so, the seige used up precious German time and resources.

Numerous sources indicate that the withdrawal of the Belgian forces was decided when the city came under long range heavy artillery fire. Souttar's book 'A Surgeon in Belgium' gives a graphic account of the shelling of the city. It was already clear that the last defensive line would not last. There was no point in maintaining a standing army within the enclave of Antwerp, particularly when it could be surrounded. Perfect sense to evacuate.

'L’action de L’Armée Belge: Période du 31 Juillet au 31 Décembre' noted that the decision point actually came earlier, and was related to the implications of the Race to the Sea:

'Jusqu’au début d’Octobre, le péril à éviter était l’investissement de l’armée par les forces allemandes qui se trouvaient devant Anvers.

Un nouveau danger allait surgir.

La retraite de la Marne avait amené, le 13 Septembre, le gros des armées allemandes sur la ligne de l’Aisne, l’aile droite vers Lassigny. A partir de ce moment, les armées en présence avaient constamment cherché à se déborder par leur aile occidentale. L’aile allemande s’était ainsi étendue de plus de Lassigny vers le Nord et elle avait atteint les environs de Lille au commencement d’Octobre.

Il en était résulté pour l’armée belge le danger d’être coupée de l’armée franco-anglaise, si le front allemand venait à s’étendre encore vers le nord: de Lille à la mer vers Nieuport, on mesure 60 kilomètres, tandis que de la Nèthe à Nieuport on en compte 140. Au début d’Octobre, l’armée belge voyait donc sa retraite menacée non seulement par l’armée de siége, mais aussi par l’aile droite des armées allemandes opérant en France.'

Seely gives the following account of an interview with the King of Belgium at this time:

'The next morning I drove out to the line of defences on the River Nith, to which the Belgians and the naval brigade had fallen back. All the main forts were holding on except one in the centre, which had been demolished by the 42 centimetre shells and evacuated by the survivors of the garrison. We were busy entrenching ourselves on the line of the Nith, and it was not a bad position. I came back in the afternoon and had a long interview with the King of the Belgians. He told me he doubted our ability to hold Antwerp, because, as he said, his troops had not yet recovered from the desparate fighting at Liege and subsequent engagements. Moreover, the gigantic German guns and high explosive shells dominated the Belgian Artillery.

He said that all would not be lost when Antwerp fell, even if the whole of his country was over-run and every building destroyed, provided always that there was a Belgian Army in the field at the end. He said, "However long the war goes on there must be peace at last, and if, when the combatants sit around the table, I or my representative is there, representing the Belgian Army still fighting, my country will survive; otherwise it will be dead."

Some British forces did make their way north into Holland, where they sat out the war. The bulk of the Antwerp defenders got clean away. The Belgian Army reformed just north of the Belgian border, and with the help of the innundations and the British naval gunfire support, ensured that the German Army never got past them.

Robert