German units east of the river Jordan

[domsim]

Hi folks

I have been trawling through the War Office Intelligence summaries for Palestine at the National Archives (for a long time!), trying to identify Ottoman units operating in Jordan during the Arab revolt. i have some reasonable info. on Turkish units. i have also come across references to German units of infantry, cavalry and artillery mainly in relation to activities in the north of Jordan around the Dead sea where the Turkish 48th division was checking the arab advance.

I have the German infantry as the 703rd Infantry Battalion, the artillery might be the 701st Artillery Regiment but I can't ID the cavalry. One intelligence reference refers to the german battalion 'and its troop of cavalry'. Might this mean the cavalry was battalion specific or were they attached from aproper cavalry regiment?

Any info. on these units gratefully accepted

Cheers

Dominic

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Dominic

G'day mate

I pricked my ears up at the mention of the 703rd - this was one of the units deployed at the Battle of Abu Tellul. I won't say much in this post but in the subsequent posts put a little bit of the available material in front of you. Hopefully this is what you are after.

Cheers

Bill

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Sinai and Palestine by H. S. Gullett

Chapter XXXIX

Abu Tellul

From the close of the Es Salt operations early in May until early in July, the Turks showed no disposition to attack. But partly from fear, and partly, perhaps, as a deliberate attempt to compel the British to keep a large force in Jordan valley and so suffer heavy wastage, they maintained steady pressure against Allenby's right flank. Visible movements of their troops, intermittent gunning, and accurate sniping all disclosed activity and readiness. Although forced by this policy to keep their troops also on the low ground, the enemy enjoyed many advantages over Chauvel's command. East of the river his main force confronting the bridgeheads was located in the foot-hills of Gilead, or on the eastern slopes of the range, which is, as we have seen, a region far less harsh than the Wilderness country on the west. Moreover, the Turks in the valley itself were, by their remarkable powers of resisting disease, better able to stand the ordeal of malaria and heat and dust than the British. This was illustrated by the fact that, while the British medical service laboured unceasingly to destroy mosquitoes and to ensure the health of the troops, the Turkish camps were, as usual, left to look after themselves. No fight was made against mosquitoes; no precautions were taken against insanitary conditions or impure water; yet it is probable that the enemy's wastage was considerably lighter than that of Chauvel's horsemen. When in September some of the Anzac regiments in their advance left their clean areas, and were compelled to camp even for one night on ground won from the enemy, they were assailed by swarms of mosquitoes, and within a few weeks nearly every man went down with malaria. In the regiments which moved directly across the river from the clean ground, and which gained the tableland without camping on low country evacuated by the enemy the subsequent infection was relatively low. Had the Australians and New Zealanders spent the summer under Turkish conditions, they must have been annihilated.

Chauvel was never apprehensive about his two bridgeheads. Strong naturally, and with an unrivalled zone of fire, they offered nothing but destructive losses to any enemy attack which was not preceded by a bombardment far beyond the capacity of the Turkish guns. A blow at the Mellahah sector might have gained local success; but, unless it was accompanied by the capture of the Abu Tellul positions, it would, as it was exploited, have laid the attackers open to an immediate counter-stroke on their right flank. Any concern Chauvel had about his valley defences was directed towards Musallabeh and the line of posts extending south-west into the hills.

Musallabeh formed the apex of a sharp local salient, based on the Auja. South-east from Musallabeh, about 2,000 yards away, a post was established on the rocky outcrop of El Maskerah, overlooking the plain; behind that to the west, at a distance of about 1,500 yards, was another detached post, placed high on a rocky eminence known as "The Bluff." Down the western side of the apex, across a rough valley and about 1,000 yards from Musallabeh, was " Vyse Post "; then, divided by sharp ravines, and proceeding south-west and south, the posts of "Vale," "View" and I' Vaux," "Zoo " and ''Zeiss "; after which posts continued a few miles further south-west into the rising hills. These posts were from 400 to 1,000 yards apart; they were wired and dug. or built up with stone sangars, and the intervening ravines were covered by light curtains of wire. Behind the posts ran the Wadi Edh Dhib, a rugged crooked ravine, and across this to the south, lying irregularly east and west, rose the harsh stony ridge of Abu Tellul. This ridge, which gives its name to the whole area, was in reality the key of the situation; its possession commanded the fine stream of the Auja, which courses from the hills immediately to the south of the ridge. But, although a number of reserve posts had been prepared on its slopes, it was too close to the water to be used as a firing line, and was therefore covered by the advanced defences from Musallabeh to Vaux. The British batteries covering the posts were concealed in pockets south of the Tellul crest, on ground from which their removal in an emergency must have been laborious and slow. With the guns so close, and the indispensable water immediately behind, the position was one which must be held at all costs. No ground could be yielded, even for a few hours.

The weakness of the posts was the steep broken ground by which they were divided, and the equally rough country between them and the Turkish lilies about 1,500 yards from their front. Particular care was given to their preparation. No area on the front received so much attention from leaders and staff. Brigadiers and divisional commanders freely visited the posts; Chauvel and his chief of staff, General Howard-Vyse, went over the troublesome ground in detail; the Commander-in-Chief went in person to satisfy himself that the best had been made of it. Yet, when all the brains of the army had been concentrated on it, it remained clear that, considering how few troops were available for the protection of the line of posts, the enemy could, by a resolute effort, at any time advance over "dead" ground, force his way through the intervening gorges, and reach the valley between the posts and Abu Tellul. All attempts to secure effective zones of machine-gun and rifle fire had failed, and it was recognised that the batteries could not put down a barrage sufficiently searching to blunt the enemy.

Cox's 1st Light Horse Brigade relieved Grant's 4th Brigade on the sector early in June. after having been in camp for three weeks on the Judean hills near Bethlehem. That was the only spell the regiments of the 1st Brigade had enjoyed since February. The pressure on the tired men was otherwise unremitting, and even on the upland the so-called rest was marked by schools for non-commissioned officers, Hotchkiss gunners, and signallers, with hard training generally for all ranks. Wastage had been heavy; owing to the failure of conscription in Australia reinforcements were scanty, and the brigade was substantially below strength when the men rode back to the valley.

The line from Zeiss Post to Musallabeh, which was the brigade sector, was held by two regiments, with the third in reserve about the Wadi el Auja. In June the defences were still incomplete, and to ensure the position against assault men worked in the terrible heat as navvies are never called upon to work. As the ground was under easy observation from the high ground to the north-west, the digging and wiring and building of sangars (in which the reserve regiment actively participated) was pressed on throughout the night.

Sleep by day was made almost impossible by the extreme temperature, which rose as high as 128 degrees in the shade, and the men, though they had netting against the flies and mosquitoes, were tormented by myriads of vicious little sand-flies. Working at night they were often bitten by scorpions, while a swamp beside El Maskerah was infested with snakes, and sent forth swarms of the feared mosquitoes. Early in July Granville's 1st Regiment was in reserve, while Bourne with the and held the right sector as far as Vyse and Bell with the 3rd the left from Vyse to Zeiss. Bell had only about 210 rifles available for the line-an index to the reduced state of the whole brigade.

During June and the first fortnight of July the enemy steadily increased his gun-fire upon the position. After harassing the posts with 77's and 4.2'5, he added a battery of 5.9's to his bombarding artillery. But, as the cover was always improving, the Australian losses caused by this shelling were slight. At the same time the enemy freely shelled the horse-lines of the reserve regiment along the Auja, and at times inflicted severe casualties. Early in July movement of troops and a general increase in activity gave notice that an attack was imminent, despite a report from Intelligence that the Turks were embarrassed by water difficulties and contemplated a withdrawal from that part of the front. At this time, Bourne held Musallabeh with one squadron and a troop under Captain M. D. McDougall, Maskerah with four troops and two machine-guns under Captain F. Evans: and Vyse with four troops and two machine-guns under Major W. J. Brown; a detached bombing party was placed at " Vane Post," out in front of the main line, under orders to fall back on Vyse if heavily pressed. This left Bourne with three troops in reserve, of which he placed one on The Bluff and held two close to Vyse. Regimental Headquarters were situated in the Wadi Dhib immediately behind Vale, which was held by a troop of the 3rd Regiment under Lieutenant H. E. McDonald, at this time under Bourne's command. Of Bell's regiment on the left one squadron under Major Dick occupied Vale, View, and Vaux, one squadron Zoo and Zeiss, and one squadron was in reserve. The 4th Light Horse Brigade, on its withdrawal from the sector in June, had been held in camp a few miles south of the Auja as a general reserve in case of attack.

The attitude of the defenders was a remarkable one, and was based on the complete faith of brigade and regimental commands in their junior officers and men. It was anticipated that, when the blow fell, the line would he pierced between posts, and that the enemy would stream into the irregular valley between the posts and Abu Tellul. But it was confidently believed that the little garrisons would, even though isolated, stand firmly against the enemy for at least some hours-a resistance which would suffice for Granville's reserve regiment to appear on Abu Tellul and smash the enemy by a counter-stroke That the enemy could in the face of water and transport difficulties advance in great strength was not anticipated. The assault was actually made in the darkness of the early morning of July 14th and the spirit with which it was awaited was expressed a day or two before by Bell. He was asked if he thought the front line could stop a determined attack. '' No." he replied, " they are able to come through." " What of the posts? " he was asked. " The posts," he answered " will stand, unless they are withdrawn for tactical reasons or completely destroyed. Since we landed on the Peninsula (Gallipoli) I have not known a single instance of light horse troops, whether under officers or non-commissioned officers, having given up a position they were ordered to hold." Bell's faith in the men he led with much distinction was fully justified by the events of the 14th.

Reserves of water for the posts had been stored in petrol-tins and a few hundred empty bottles which had remained after a very rare issue of beer. The troops were therefore safe against thirst for a day or two, and well equipped with munitions. Sure of a heavy and critical fight, but with no thought of anything but success, they awaited the expected struggle. On the 16th, the enemy's gun-fire had been unusually heavy, both on the posts and on the British batteries. Early in the night patrols were heard close to the Australian wire and about an hour after midnight McDougall reported from Musallabeh that the enemy appeared to be massing in the wadis ahead. Soon afterwards Dick reported that movement, apparently of a strong body of troops, could be heard about 1,000 yards in front of Vale and View, and Bell at once asked for a protective barrage by the British batteries, which promptly responded. Heavy shelling by the enemy for a time deadened the sound of his approach; it ceased suddenly, about 2.30 am., and the Australians could distinctly hear words of command shouted by German officers. It was then renewed for nearly an hour - the intensive fire destroyed communications between Bourne and brigade headquarters-but ceased abruptly about 3.30 a.m. when the enemy, a thousand strong, fell on Vale and the wired gaps on either side. Lieutenant McDonald, with about twenty men, could offer no effective resistance, and was at once withdrawn by Bourne, returned to Bell's command, and sent to one of the prepared positions on Abu Tellul. As the attack developed, Bourne, fearing Vale would be overrun, prepared to shift his headquarters. At the same time he sent one of his three reserve troops under Lieutenant W. K. King, to occupy a post on the east of Abu Tellul, with orders to cooperate with the post on The Bluff in delaying the advance if the enemy should break through.

Immediately afterwards the enemy swarmed through Vale and up the ravines on either side, swept over Bourne's headquarters. and swung eastwards down the valley between the line of posts and the slopes of Abu Tellul. Bourne, with his staff and regimental details. withdrew to Abu Tellul, firing briskly as they went at the enemy close behind. At the same time a heavy assault was made on the garrison at Musallabeh. Cutting the entanglements in the darkness, the Germans bombed the light horsemen off one of the posts; but a spirited counter-attack, led by Sergeant J. E. Carlyon: at once drove them out, and, although they many times advanced resolutely against the four posts on the position, the Australians steadily held their ground. Vyse, to which the bombing party on Vane had retired, gallantly withstood the heavy frontal attack, but was soon completely surrounded.

At daylight the garrisons at Musallabeh and all the posts were isolated and under vigorous assault; but the light horsemen, not at all flustered and having good cover, were able to direct a very effective fire at close range on the enemy massed in their rear. The Germans, who were now climbing the slopes to the northern side of Abu Tellul and The Bluff, were directly behind and exposed to the machine-gun, Hotchkiss, and rifle fire of the garrisons at Vyse and Musallabeh, and were at the same time being enfiladed by Bell's men from View and Vaux. These two latter garrisons had poured heavy fire into the force which overran Vale in the darkness and had been largely responsible for its swing to the east. The posts were furiously attacked, but their garrisons could not be broken and they shot down and beat off wave after wave of the German infantry.

The post on Maskerah was now attacked from the rear, and Captain Evans rushed his men to an alternative position, already prepared, where they could hold their ground and at the same time bring fire to bear on a movement developing against The Bluff. The attack had unfolded very rapidly, and the situation was yet too obscure for Cox to commit Granville's reserve regiment. But when the Germans, despite the galling fire on their right flank and rear, began to climb the slopes of Abu Tellul and The Bluff, the position was becoming critical. Had they gained complete possession of Tellul, they might easily have withstood the counter-stroke of Granville's weak squadrons and seized the batteries immediately on the southern side; while if they received reinforcements, they might, even without capturing Tellul. still overcome the heroic resistance of the posts in their rear. The Bluff was at this moment occupied by one troop, less than twenty strong, under Lieutenant L. J. Henderson,' and the extreme right post of Abu Tellul by Lieutenant King with a similar force. The two adjoining posts on the main ridge were manned by Bourne's regimental staff and a handful of details. As day broke the Germans marched in force from the little garrisons under King and Henderson. and at the same time assailed the posts further to the west.

Bourne's orders were that the ground must be held at all costs, and the isolated parties of Queenslanders fought doggedly in the face of irresistible odds. King was killed while directing his men, but his gallant troop fought on and the Germans did not enter the post until every man had become a casualty. Henderson's men on The Bluff showed the same fine tenacity. Their young leader fell severely wounded, but continued to direct the unequal fight, and with only three men who were not killed or wounded kept the enemy outside the sangars. This heroic remnant were still on their ground when the fight closed.

Meanwhile the two posts further west on Abu Tellul had been fiercely engaged. Here the batmen, grooms and signallers from regimental headquarters under Lieutenant G. T. Pledger, the adjutant, and Lieutenant H. S. Wright: the acting signal officer, were the only troops between the Germans and the British batteries a few hundred yards behind. One post was lost; Bourne, who was personally directing the fight, then withdrew both parties to a prepared trench about 150 yards behind the crest. Here, as the enemy showed on the skyline, they had a good target, and for more than an hour arrested the advance. Cos. at brigade headquarters south of the Auja, had been aroused by the fire at the beginning of the attack, and at once advised Chaytor, whose headquarters were north of Jericho. Grant was ordered to hold his brigade ready, and to send at once a regiment to report to Cox.

As soon as the position was clear, and Cos was aware that the Germans were advancing on Abu Tellul with the light horse posts still standing in their rear, he acted with characteristic decision. " Get to them, Granny," was his brief and comprehensive order to Granville. Already in the darkness Granville's squadrons along the wadi were waiting beside their horses, impatient for the word to advance. Rugged as was the country to be covered, it was known in minute detail by every trooper in the regiment; every man knew, too, how critical must be the situation with his friends of the 2nd and 3rd Regiments. At 340 a.m. one squadron was ordered to report to Bourne on Abu Tellul, and four machine-guns, which had been held in reserve, were soon afterwards ordered forward, two to each end of the ridge. Shortly before 4 a.m., \\hen it had become plain that the main blow was falling on the right sector of Tellul, Granville sent a second squadron to join the first, and at the same time Bell, of the 3rd Regiment, was ordered to push his reserve squadron in the same direction. The ridge covered the approach of Granville's men, and Major Weir, who was leading the two squadrons, joined Bourne soon after sunrise. If the hard pressed posts were to be saved, the counter-stroke must be instant. Covering fire was ordered from the post further left, occupied by the men of the 3rd under Lieutenant McDonald, and from two machine-guns under Lieutenant H. Hackney.' Weir's men, who had dismounted some time before, were now ready with fixed bayonets for the charge. With an eager shout the light horsemen topped the crest, and followed their leaders in a rushing charge upon the Germans. Surprised and caught scattered in the open, the enemy offered but slight resistance, broke, and fled down into the valley. As they ran, they came nearer the deadly fire of the defenders of Vyse and Musallabeh, and were flanked on their left from View and Vaux. Trapped and distracted, and with all order gone, they " ran about (in a light horseman's words) like a lot of mad rabbits."

This dramatic stroke completely cleared Abu Tellul.

But the enemy was still strong on The Bluff, where Henderson's battered men were fighting desperately, and was also making further attempts against View and Vaux on the west. Granville with his reserve squadron was ordered to move along the edge of the valley and clear The Bluff from the east, but this advance was broken up by very accurate enemy shell-fire. It was then decided that Weir should assail The Bluff with the bayonet; and, with good covering fire from the Notts Battery and "B" Battery of the Honourable Artillery Company, the light horsemen, advancing with confidence and dash about 8 am, speedily cleared the position and captured upwards of 100 prisoners. Soon afterwards the enemy surrounding View withdrew, leaving twenty-two prisoners and marly dead and wounded on the ground; a squadron of the Wellingtons, advancing from Zeiss, cleared away the Germans who had been threatening Vaux, and by 9 a.m. all the hostile force inside the Australian posts had been accounted for, and the original line restored. One hundred and five enemy dead and forty-five wounded were found inside the light horse posts; the prisoners numbered 425, of whom 358 were Germans, the dead and wounded being in proportion. In addition, the Australians captured four machine-guns (some of which were afterwards used against the enemy on The Bluff), thirty seven light machine-guns, and a large number of rifles. The light horse casualties were two officers (including Lieutenant King) and twenty-one other ranks killed, and seven officers and thirty-nine other ranks wounded. The ammunition used by the brigade was: rifle 19,000 rounds, Hotchkiss 20,000, machine-gun 30,000.

This exciting little fight had some features which gave it an interest far beyond the destruction of a few hundred enemy troops. It was the last deliberate offensive attempted against the British in Palestine; and it was the only occasion in the campaign in which German infantry were used as stormtroops. It had, therefore, significant effects upon the two rival armies. All through the campaign officers going to Palestine from France were disposed to belittle the fighting qualities of the Turks, and to declare that the British in the Holy Land were very fortunate not to be opposed to Germans. The fact that a force of German infantry about a thousand strong had been so decisively beaten by a brigade of light horsemen in position was not in itself remarkable. But the Australians were none the less elated at the result. They found on this day, as they had discovered before the attack was made, that the German, although incomparably superior to the Turk as an offensive fighter, was very inferior as a rifle shot to his despised ally. The constant sniping duels between the light horse and the Turks were evenly matched affairs, in which excessive keenness and exposure on either side always ended in disaster. But Australians sniping Germans quickly learned that they could move with relative safety into the open, and rely upon their quicker and straighter work to beat the enemy.

Another point arising out of the attack, of considerable interest and value to the British, was the additional evidence it provided of the discord in the enemy's camps. The captured German officers complained bitterly that in the assault they had been betrayed by the Turks, who were to have attacked simultaneously on the Mellahah front and against the bridgeheads east of Jordan. They spoke very frankly and in terms of disgust of their allies, and made no attempt to conceal their chagrin at the result of their first essay in Palestine Moreover, the Australians were flattered by the statements of both German and Turkish officers that they had been assured by their German Intelligence that the light horsemen and New Zealanders were resting at Bethlehem, while the position which they were to attack was held by Indians and a few British yeomanry.

As the prisoners were marched back towards Jericho, their appearance awakened an extraordinary interest in all the British troops; when they reached Jerusalem, the curiosity and ill-concealed delight of the great majority of the populace was boundless. The news of the reverse, with its peculiar racial significance, travelled quickly on both sides of the Jordan, and had a moral effect very damaging to the enemy. Among all Arabs and the population generally from Jerusalem and Maan to Aleppo, the complete destruction of this German force - greatly exaggerated in the telling - did more to shake Turco-German prestige than anything which had happened since the capture of Jerusalem.

The Germans had been admirably equipped, except that their only head cover in that destructive sunshine was the little round cap they had worn in the early fighting in France. In light machine-guns they were relatively stronger than the Australians, and, far removed as they were from the German bases, their campaigning gear as a whole belied the current belief that the enemy was short of army supplies. The day of engagement was one of fierce heat. By 7 a.m. the shade temperature \vas above 100 degrees; later in the morning the thermometer in the operating tent of the 1st Light Horse Brigade Field Ambulance stood at 120 degrees. The Germans had drunk their scanty supplies of water early in the morning, and consequently suffered extremely from thirst; when they were rushed with the bayonet. The Bluff, they were rapidly approaching a stage of collapse. Their initial attack was marked IJY perfect discipline and much vigour; but from the moment they were caught on their right flank by the garrisons of Vaux and View, and turned east along the valley where they were assailed at close range from View and Musallabeh, their position was hopeless. Their continued effort against Abu Tellul was in the circumstances, a fine one, but with direct fire on their backs as they climbed the ridge their assault was piecemeal and feeble.

To Granville's two squadrons all credit is due for their slashing work with the bayonet, which brought the fight to a close. But even without that advance the enemy was already defeated, and must, unless speedily and heavily reinforced, have been compelled to retire or surrender. The light horse position was saved at the outset by the steadiness and terribly accurate fire-practice of the men in the posts from Vaux to Musallabeh. arid by the heroic resistance in all the surrounded posts, especially at the positions on The Bluff and Abu Tellul held by King and Henderson. As at the Ghoraniye bridgehead in April, Cox disclosed a fine sense of the situation: Bourne's forward leadership was cool and admirable, and the work of his 2nd Regiment of Queenslanders, on whom fell the brunt of the resistance, was never excelled in the career of the light horse.

With but occasional exceptions, this long Palestine struggle was elevated by clean and chivalrous fighting arid by generous and sympathetic treatment of prisoners. Australians who fell into Turkish hands were, it is true, subjected to extreme hardship and at times ill-usage. Yet such is the inevitable penalty of a war against a half-civilised foe. The Turks treated the British prisoners from Palestine as they treated their own rank and file, no better and no worse; and men of Western origin would sicken and die under conditions in which the hardy and stolid Ottoman flourished. The Germans captured at Abu Tellul were handled with sympathy and courtesy by the light horsemen. Water-bottles were everywhere shared with the parched prisoners; and the Germans, as they left the headquarters of Anzac Mounted Division in the evening to proceed by motor-lorry to Jerusalem, expressed their gratitude in rousing cheers for their captors.

Statements by prisoners, which were confirmed by the papers captured later in the year at Nazareth, showed that the attack at Abu Tellul was intended as the preliminary blow of a scheme designed by the enemy to overwhelm Chauvel's entire force in the valley. The main assault, delivered by the 24th Turkish Division (including two German battalions), was to penetrate the Auja defences in the foot-hills, and seize Jericho and the roads to Jerusalem. As soon as Abu Tellul was captured, another division, the 33rd, was to drive through by the plain between Musallabeh and the Jordan, and take in rear the bridgeheads at the Auja crossing and Ghoraniye. At the same time a containing attack, supported by a heavy bombardment, was to be made against the bridgeheads from the east of the river. If the Germans had been successful against Cox in the early morning, the Turks behind would probably have advanced according to plan; but, when the spearhead force was destroyed, the whole offensive, except for isolated demonstrations, was abandoned. The Turks had commonly complained that the German assistance on the front was, except for machine-gunners, limited to staff work and supplies, while they were left to face the British bullets. So strong was the feeling in 1918 that the Turks, learning that at last some German infantry was to do some fighting may quite possibly have given ready promises about cooperation, and then deliberately held back and allowed their allies to suffer.

Soon after 5 am., while the fight was proceeding at Abu Tellul, a German infantry force appeared on some high broken ground about I,000 yards east of " Salt " and " Star " Posts on the Mellahah. Vigorous shelling quickly compelled the enemy to take cover; and, although his batteries freely bombarded Ryrie's positions, the infantry showed no disposition to engage at close quarters. Lieutenant J. D. Macansh of the 5th Regiment was then sent out with fourteen men to test their strength. Creeping forward, the light horsemen approached within twenty yards of the enemy-who numbered from 150 to zoo-before they were discovered. Despite their inferiority in numbers, the Australians then opened fire with their rifles and, before the Germans recovered from their surprise and confusion, had seized fifteen prisoners and commenced their withdrawal. The Germans followed closely, throwing bombs from a distance of only a few yards, and calling upon the Australians to surrender. Macansh, however returned with his prisoners, with only one of his own men wounded.

Fire from the " Star," " Shell," and " Scrap " Posts was then concentrated on the enemy force, and its retirement prevented, while " A " Battery of the Honourable Artillery Company, locating two advanced machine-guns, killed the crew of one and forced the other to withdraw. Despite the terrific heat, the keenness of the Queenslanders when they learned that they were opposed by Germans was boundless; and Captain Boyd, who commanded the squadron, which was scattered over the three posts, had difficulty in keeping his men within their defences. At about 8 a.m. Macansh again went out, accompanied by Lieutenant B. R. Byrnes and twenty men, and his adventure provides an admirable example of light horse craft, daring, and striking power. Moving cautiously through the mud-hills, he again got within bombing distance of the Germans before his men were discovered. Working round the enemy, the handful of Australians dashed in with bombs and bayonets, and in a few minutes had killed twenty-five Germans, wounded thirty, and taken thirty prisoners. The remainder fled panic-stricken towards their wire entanglements a thousand yards away, the light horsemen shooting them as they ran. The Queenslanders had an officer and two troopers slightly wounded. " The enterprise throughout," wrote Colonel Cameron, with proper pride in his men, " was a fine example of able and gallant leadership, inspiring men to any undertaking, however hazardous."

During the day a force of the enemy about 2,000 strong moved towards the Umm esh Shert crossing on the east of the Jordan, but did not attack. A similar force was seen in the open about Shunet Nimrin, and his artillery was very active. Further south, on the scrubby plain country between Ghoraniye and the Dead Sea, a body of Turkish infantry marched towards the El Henu Ford, and gave some regiments of Indian cavalry an opportunity for a brilliant display with the lance. The Jodhpurs and the Mysores were hurried across the Jordan by small swing-bridges at El Henu and Makhadet Hajla, while the Sherwood Rangers and the Poona Horse moved out from Ghoraniye bridgehead. Screened by the scrub, the Jodhpurs and Mysores were galloping down on the Turks before they were observed. The Mysores assailed them in front, while the Jodhpurs crashed into their flank. About ninety Turks were taken on the lances; another ninety were made prisoner, and the trophies included four machineguns. This was the first charge made in Palestine by the Indian cavalry, and it had a useful effect upon the spirits of Allenby's new horsemen.

A steady increase in enemy artillery activity along the Jordan during the summer served to confirm the belief that the Turks feared another British effort to break east and north f rum the valley. Immediately following the enemy failure on the 14th, there was heavy shelling of the light horse posts, horse-lines, and watering places. As a rule the horses concealed along the wadis in the foot-hills escaped lightly, but the dense clouds of dust caused by movement to water seldom failed to draw gun-fire, and losses were frequent. On July I6th the horse-lines of Granville's regiment came under direct observation of enemy artillery firing from the east of Jordan; Captain E. C. Battye and a trooper were killed, and Lieutenant D. M. M. O'Connor'' and a few others were wounded, while endeavouring to remove the horses. In a few minutes fifty-eight animals were Idled and twenty-seven wounded-a severe loss to the regiment.

The heat in the valley had gathered in intensity during June and July, while each day the dust grew deeper and finer, and the stagnant air heavier and less life-giving. Wastage from sickness and sheer exhaustion became more pronounced, it being noticed that the older men offered the stoutest resistance to the distressing conditions. Shell-fire and snipers caused casualties which were. if not heavy, a steady drain on the Australian force, and when men were invalided, the shortage of reinforcements necessitated bringing them back to the valley before their recovery was complete. A few days after the fight at Abu Tellul, Cox's brigade was withdrawn to the hills, and a little later, to the delight of the men, was marched right down to the Jewish settlement of Wadi Hanein, where from July 26th to August 16th they enjoyed the pleasant summer climate of the Philistine plain, and the fruit and wine and simple civilisation of the Jews. The New Zealanders and Ryrie's brigade left the valley soon afterwards, and went into camp near Bethlehem, where Chaytor had his headquarters in the Carmelite monastery.

It was then the turn of the Australian Mounted Division and the Indians to swelter on the Jordan. But, severe as the ordeal had been, it had, thanks to the work of the medical service, imposed fewer losses than had been feared at the outset; by the Australians, who had been through the dust and heat of southern Palestine and the blistering sands of Sinai, it was borne with amazing cheerfulness. Notwithstanding the extreme heat, the abnormal air-pressure, the dust, mosquitoes, flies, and other vicious pests, the prevalent note in the ranks was far from an unhappy one. As midsummer passed, although the troops knew that they had still two months of extreme heat and discomfort to endure, men's thoughts turned to the renewed offensive which, they instinctively knew, must come with the autumn. Their faith in the High Command had been a little shaken by the two failures east of Jordan, but those misadventures were now almost forgotten. There never was a time in the campaign when all ranks were so confident of individual and collective superiority over the foe as they were in this summer of 1918. And their faith in their Commander-in-Chief was absolute. Soon after the middle of August Chaytor was back in the Jordan valley with the Anzac Mounted Division where he relieved Hodgson's brigades on the northern sector.

Already the decision had been taken to arm the 3rd, 4th and 5th Light Horse Brigades with swords. Grant with the 4th Brigade was on his way to a camp in the olive-groves west of Ludd where the men were to be trained. Divisional commanders and brigadiers had been consulted about the use of the sword. In Chaytor's command the proposal was not favoured, and the troops were left to conclude the campaign with their rifles. But both Grant and Wilson were keen to possess the cavalry weapon. Already their brigades had owing to the enthusiasm of Lieutenant-Colonel R. H. Osborne - an Australian, but a professional Imperial soldier, who was chief staff officer to Hodgson's division-been freely exercised in the use on horseback of the detached bayonet as a short sword, and had handled it effectively in the dash of the 8th Regiment into Es Salt. Officers and men entered with great zest into their sword exercises. Sportsmen all, they forgot their weariness as they played about with the new weapon. Their actual training did not exceed a few hours; but day and night they practised among themselves, until in two or three weeks they reached a degree of efficiency which vastly astonished the few British regular non-commissioned officers in charge of their instruction. It was jestingly said that, when they moved from Ludd, there was not a wild dog left alive within several miles of their camp. The secret of their success was, of course, their exceptional skill in the saddle and the tractability of their seasoned horses. The sword, even at the outset, was no encumbrance to them, and at that stage in the war the horses would have showed little concern if a machine-gun had been operated from their backs.

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Dominic

This is a map of the battle extracted from the book by Lindsay Baly called "Horseman, Pass By", a very good primer on the subject.

Cheers

Bill

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Dominic

Below is a map of the area drawn up at the time. It looks quite crappy due to the fact that this is a photograph taken from a microfilm entry due to the unavailablity of the collection at that time. Hopefully next year the originals are available. In the meantime, we are all stuck with this.

Cheers

Bill

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Dominic

Last pic mate. The mandatory captive pic. If you have an idea of the units from the uniforms, let me know.

Cheers

Bill

[domsim]

Dear Bill

Thank you very much the information and so much of it-very useful and very interesting. Thanks for going to such trouble.

I remembered I had a copy of Bryan Perrett's Osprey book on 'Megiddo 1918' so I dug it out and find he mentions the Asia Corps in his order of battle. The artillery unit was the 701st artillery battalion (I found in my notes that they had a detachment to the east of the Jordan in March 1918). He also notes that the 703rd Infantry Battalion (and the other 2 battalions the 701st & 702nd) each had an attached machine gun company, a troop of cavalry, an assault gun platoon (mountain guns or howitzers) and a trench mortar section. Quite a formidable little unit! I know the 703rd assault gun section was made up of 2 105mm howitzers.

Sorry I am not to good on uniform ID's maybe another pal might be able to help?

Cheers

Dominic