Palestine: not the side-show that many claim it to be

[Michael Molkentin]

Has anyone done any work on, or read anything that challenges the rather popular notion that Palestine (and the eastern theatres in general) was a 'side-show'?

Prior and Wilson's 'The Somme' got me thinking about this, as it shows that a number on War Cabinet members pushed for a deployment to Salonika at various stages in 1916. What is more, the shortage of equipment in the East - shells and aircraft in particular- has now been shown to be a universal problem for the allies, not only in the East. Finally, the British used tanks -albeit unsuccessfully- during the second assualt on Gaza, at a time when tanks were not in an abundent supply. It is interesting therefore, that this special weapon featured in a 'sideshow'.

Has anyone any insights into this question of sideshows? Is the literature on this topic well covered?

[dycer]

Michael,

Have you sen the post I added re your question on scholarly Books on Palestine.

The Book I mention does include an element of what you are asking e.g. Lloyd-George's push to have the campaign upgraded,conflict with Robertson and the use of obsolete tanks including the problems they had with sand.

There is also a bibliography in the Book with other suggested reading material.

Assuming you live in the UK I suggest you try and order the Book in your local Library rather than initially purchasing.

George

[Take on me]

I don't know about scholarly literature but this thread, or those who have posted in it, might help you out,

 

Jon

[T8HANTS]

Side show or not, we are all still living with the consequences, could be it was the most important side show of the 20Centuary.

Gareth

[steve fuller]

I have an enduring interest in one particular Battalion who fought in the sideshow (5th Bedfords) so have spent many an hour on the subject!

Personally I can see why it was classed as such but I suspect it was done so more with hindsight than at the time. Yes the Western Front battles were enormous compared to Palestine and I agree that the war was always going to be "won" in F&F but I believe it was the long periods of inactivity that made it viewed as a sideshow.

When you consider it, other than the failed Turkish assault on the Suez early in the war and quelling the Senussi in 1916, nothing happened until March & April 1917 (gaza's obviously). Then it was a long pause to repalce the C in C and waiting until he had positioned & reinforced himself before launching the 3rd Gaza in Nov 1917.

A period of offensives that took them to Jerusalem livened things up but then it all stopped again after the Spring Offensives in France March 1918 as resources were diverted away once again. It was only really September 1918 that saw the final stages of things and by 30 October it was all over.

So, all in all, I think that if you measured the months there were actions and battles compared to F&F, it is understandable to see where the opinions came from.

That said, I personally disagree with it being labelled as such and find it quite insulating to the men and women who endured the conditions, but can understand that in the large scheme of things, it was a minor war in comparison to other theatres

[Ozzie]

Agree Gareth. Very much so.

Steve, given the vast distances involved there would be periods of inactivity. But, especially with the Light Horse, there were always sortees, snipers and intelligence gathering going on. Conditions may not have been mud, but searing heat, little water, and freezing night temperatures made this area of the war very much a trial of endurance. They fought nature just as much as the enemy.

Kim

[Ozzie]

These are the words of a Light Horseman who went through it from start to finish. (Hope it works)

[Ozzie]

Can't get it big enough with in the limits , will try agin.

[Ozzie]

again

[Ozzie]

Can't do it. Will try and find time to type it up. It is worth reading.

Cheers

Kim

[montbrehain]

Ozzie, can see you like your Gee Gees ? thought this may be of interest ? Not much of a photo to start with, but better than nothing. On the back it says "Taken months ago when at Massaid ?? before coming out from El Arish. Monty who carried me through Maghdaba, with Butler on Jimmy.

[Ozzie]

Thankyou.

Those horses endured so much.

One night the men were riding along when the horses started to go crazy, putting their heads down and tearing at the bit. They had just entered an area where there was crops/grass, after being on sand in the desert for two years. Some soldiers wept when they realised that the horses would now have decent food, instead of iron rations.

For anyone interested in horses, the reading of the Light horse histories show just how much a horse can take and how close man and beast can become.

Kim

[stevenbecker]

Mates,

Purhaps we should also look at it from the other side because what did the Germans or Turks think about the capture of Egypt or more importantly the bloking of the canal?

There so called invasions, the first in 1915 and the other in 1916 were not in great strenght or provided with military equipment so were these attempts any more then drawing British troops to defend the Canal while larger Turkish forces were used else where?

The strenghtening of the Turks forces in Palestine didn't even start till late 1917 and 1918 when the Gaza line was broken and the British Army flooded palestine.

Should the Turks have been more fairdinkum about the Canal and Egypt would they made their invasions better?

What it appears that the Central Powers only wanted to tie down the British in Egpyt, first with signs of invasion and under taking limited attempts also with the local menace like the Senussi and Egpytian natonalism.

It was only when the British won at Gaza that the front became more important.

Cheers

S.B

[Michael Molkentin]

Some interesting insights from all quarters. Keep them coming please.

Has anyone read the War Cabinet minutes that refer to the Palestine campaign? There could be some interesting insights into the contemporary, as opposed to historicised, view of Palestine as a 'side show'.

The campaign was quite significant in terms of the employment of air power. It was the first (of very few) times in history when one air force has completely dominated another (what we might call 'air superiority'). It was also a watershed in the role that air power could play in supporting (and destroying) armies on the ground.

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Michael

G'day mate

I am a little lost on this comment:

The campaign was quite significant in terms of the employment of air power. It was the first (of very few) times in history when one air force has completely dominated another (what we might call 'air superiority'). It was also a watershed in the role that air power could play in supporting (and destroying) armies on the ground.

Which airforce are we talking about and which army?

Cheers

Bill

[Redradial]

Can't do it. Will try and find time to type it up. It is worth reading.

Cheers

Kim

To save typing it all out could you copy and paste it into Word or Notepad and post that as an attachment, would that work?

Red

[Michael Molkentin]

Michael

G'day mate

I am a little lost on this comment:

Which airforce are we talking about and which army?

Cheers

Bill

Bill,

Excuse me, that statement was rather vague.

In 1918 the 5th and 40th RFC Wings attained one of the most complete examples of air superiority in history, during the months leading up to Allenby's September offensive. So secure was allied airspace, that during the days immediately before the offensive, a Turko-German intelligence report stated that all was quiet, despite Allenby's massive arms build up.

The British and Australian sqaudrons also played a significant role during the offensive itself, specifically in disabling the Turkish communications network and also by supporting ground operations. On the 21st and 22nd of September the Australian squadrons trapped the retreating Turkish 7th Army in a series of waddies and canyons and effectively wiped them out with constant bombing and strafing runs.

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Michael

G'day mate

I am glad you clarified that comment. Yes, in 1918 the Allied airforces did have air superiority over the Turks. Whether this played any important role in the subsequent destruction of the Turkish forces in September is a moot point. Prior to that, from 1915-1917 the Turks had almost complete air superiority but did not destoy the Allied army in the Sinai or over Gallipoli. This was a time when "one air force has completely dominated another" but the conclusion to your thesis was at odds with the facts. It wasn't until the insertion of SE3A Scouts at Deir el Belah that the Allied forces began to gain parity and then air superiority. However, this was no certainty in 1917. In the attack on Beersheba, the Turks launched many air raids which were not contested by the AFC. They led to many casualties. It was the anti-air activity on the ground that brought down one Taube on 1 Nov 1917.

In contrast, there were two air novelties that led onto more sophisticated ways of fighting, both of which are still used now. They were:

1. The use of the aircraft carrier to project power into the enemy's heartland; and,

2. The use of air craft to carry specialised troops used to raid the interior communications lines of the enemy.

The British employed the first while the Turks the latter.

The most notable British aircraft carrier was the HMS “Ben-my-Chree”.

This ship was employed up and down the Palestine coast raiding the Turkish rail and air infrastructure. The aircraft also flew sorties specifically for the Desert Mounted Corps.

As a return favour, the Turks at Kossaima, launched ground attacks on the rail and telegraph lines which straddled the Darb el Sultani. While it was an irritant for the Allies rather than a real threat, it is the activity that is important. Specialised demolition troops were despatched with the aircraft. When the aeroplane landed at the section of line to be demolished - a difficult task in itself - the demolition team - 2 max - would set the charges and do the damage.

The notion that it was air superiority that was responsible for the breakthrough in September 1918 needs careful examination. You say: "So secure was allied airspace, that during the days immediately before the offensive, a Turko-German intelligence report stated that all was quiet, despite Allenby's massive arms build up." Surely the intellegence report would say: "Due to allied air superiority we do not know the state of their forces." The reality is that most of the forces were hidden from view in the various orchards near the front line. From aerial observation, detecting these troops would have been difficult. Furthermore, in the Jordan Valley, fake horses and troop movements occurred on a massive scale. Basically wooden horses were constructed in huge numbers giving the impression that the cavalry was committed to the Jordan Valley. In addition, the standard ruse for simulating lage horse movements was done dragging tree limbs across the ground to beat up huge amounts of dust. Turkish aircraft were almost invited to fly around to give the wrong information.

On the ground, it was the infantry which broke through the trench system and the cavalry that exploited the gaps. The capture of 10,000 Turks at Jenin by the 3rd LH Bde is indicative of the fact that the Turks did not know that their front had collapsed. It was a rude shock to them to find the Australians were in Jenin and that they were surrounded. The Turkish air losses occurred only because they set fire to their own aircraft on the ground. The further 10,000 Turks captured at Baramke Barracks in Damascus had tried to flee to Tripoli up the Barada Gorge which was turned into a charnel house by the 3rd LH Bde the night before. Again, after the slaughter in the gorge, they gave up without a fight - they being too stunned to organise any resistance. None of this was done through any use of Allied airpower. The Turks still had their aircraft and they occasionally used them.

At the end of all of this, I suppose I am getting at the notion that sometimes generalisations do not bear up under scrutiny.

Cheers

Bill

[stevenbecker]

Mates,

Just to add even with a smaller airforce in Egpyt and palestine the Germans/Turks kept their superitority over the British untill the new machines came to the British/Ausies in 1918. As stated by Bill,

But as to the number of Sqn's in 1918 as the British incressed their Sqns the German also did and they were almost the same nin umber by late 1918.

Again the quality of aircraft was the difference with the British now better then the Germans who still kept there older aircraft on this front instead of the better and newer ones.

The British seamed the lean that lesson even if it took four years but the Germans seamed to forget it?

Cheers

S.B

[Michael Molkentin]

Thanks for your insights Bill. I am really wrestling with the primary documents to refine my ideas on the role of air power in the Middle East. I appreciate the opportunity to test my ideas out on people who have obviously read a lot more widely than I have at this stage.

It wasn't until the insertion of SE3A Scouts at Deir el Belah that the Allied forces began to gain parity and then air superiority. However, this was no certainty in 1917. In the attack on Beersheba, the Turks launched many air raids which were not contested by the AFC. They led to many casualties. It was the anti-air activity on the ground that brought down one Taube on 1 Nov 1917.

I agree that there was "no certainty" of air superiority in 1917. I do, however, argue that by the Third Battle of Gaza, the RFC/AFC was certainly turning the tables. This was due to a shortage in men and munitions in the German Flying Corps and a simultaneous increase in Allied air power (notably the SEs and Bristols). It was also due to increasingly sophisticated tactical developments implemented by the RFC's HQ staff and individual squadrons.

During the week after Beersheba, the Germans did, in the words of Col. Borton (GOC RFC Middle East), mount "considerable aerial activity” to cover the Turco-German withdrawal. In the 40th Wing's resume for operations for that week though, it does indicate that the Germans were beginning to show reluctance in engaging allied recon aircraft, particularly the Bristol Fighters of 1 AFC and 111 RFC. [This document is in the Mitchell Library in Sydney, L.W. Sutherland Papers, MLMSS1046]

Despite this, that the 40th Wing was quite active and successful in its operations during the week of Beersheba. They did indeed contest a number of raids, and in terms of offensive operations, the 40th Wing dropped 6 360 lbs of bombs, largely on retreating enemy troop formations. 1 AFC clocked up 233 hours, 19 minutes and the Wing exposed 253 negatives, principally of the defences around Hushdi and Kauwukah and north of Wadi Hesi.

I would suggest that these figures suggest at least the beginning of a slide from German to Allied control of the air.

The notion that it was air superiority that was responsible for the breakthrough in September 1918 needs careful examination. You say: "So secure was allied airspace, that during the days immediately before the offensive, a Turko-German intelligence report stated that all was quiet, despite Allenby's massive arms build up." Surely the intellegence report would say: "Due to allied air superiority we do not know the state of their forces." The reality is that most of the forces were hidden from view in the various orchards near the front line. From aerial observation, detecting these troops would have been difficult. Furthermore, in the Jordan Valley, fake horses and troop movements occurred on a massive scale. Basically wooden horses were constructed in huge numbers giving the impression that the cavalry was committed to the Jordan Valley. In addition, the standard ruse for simulating lage horse movements was done dragging tree limbs across the ground to beat up huge amounts of dust. Turkish aircraft were almost invited to fly around to give the wrong information.

Indeed, it does need careful examination, and I admit that generalisations are historically dangerous. Equally dangerous, however, are the words "surely" and "would" when examining the past. The primary documents (that I have read so far) suggest that the Germans were indeed suprised by the offensive, and that air power played a significant role in achieving this. I do accept (as does the AFC's official historian) that efforts of concealment and deception on the ground were also important.

Allenby wrote of the offensive: “That the enemy expected an offensive on my part about this date is probable. That he remained in ignorance of my intention to attack in the coastal plain with overwhelming numbers is certain.”

He also reported that “the chief factor in the secrecy maintained must be attributed, however, to the supremacy in the air… During one week in June 100 hostile aeroplanes had crossed our lines. During the last week in August this had decreased to 18. In the next few days a number were shot down with the result that only 4 ventured across our lines during the period of concentration”. Major Addison (CO 1 AFC) added that for several days prior to the offensive, ”not a single enemy machine got over our line”.

When the HA did cross the lines it was at an exceptionally high altitude- what Addison terms the ‘tip and run’ principle. At this height though, in his assessment, “the observer would need to rely more upon his imagination than any other faculty”. German documents confirmed this: during the fortnight before the offensive, German recons were reporting that camp capacities had remained unchanged, and that troop movements were insignificant; this, despite being the period of most intense preparations.

Again, thank you for this lively discussion, Bill. You are obviously well-read (and I suspect, written) on this topic. I would appreciate further correspondence with you as I continue to work on the air war in the east.

[Michael Molkentin]

Mates,

Just to add even with a smaller airforce in Egpyt and palestine the Germans/Turks kept their superitority over the British untill the new machines came to the British/Ausies in 1918. As stated by Bill,

But as to the number of Sqn's in 1918 as the British incressed their Sqns the German also did and they were almost the same nin umber by late 1918.

Again the quality of aircraft was the difference with the British now better then the Germans who still kept there older aircraft on this front instead of the better and newer ones.

The British seamed the lean that lesson even if it took four years but the Germans seamed to forget it?

Cheers

S.B

The quality of the aircraft was not the only difference. Other factors played a role in the ascendency of Allied air-power in Palestine.

The two sides did have an approximate numerical equity in 1918, but still, the Germans seemed to lag in other areas. It is possible that one area was the quality of ground recruits, and/or the material they had to work with. Among other references to dicey German logistics and workmanship, an Australian rigger named Joe Bull inspected a downed German machine on 5 March 1918 and wrote in his diary: “the workmanship in general and the repairs in particular, were extremely rough”. Late war combat reports also refer to German aircraft 'falling apart' in mid air, and not carrying rear guns.

Material from a captured German Flying Corps war diary sheds further light upon the state of German air power in 1918. In August, the German 301 Squadron reported in its diary that, after losing two machines, their was a “suspension of all flying of other machines in front of the 111th Army. The carrying on of flights on the rest of the front will be <i> attempted </i> to be maintained <i>occasionally</i>”. [my italics- emphasises the reticence of this squadron to dominate its airspace]. New German aircraft arrived on the front, but the pilots were shattered, and most sat on their aerodromes to be picked off by allied raiders. “Sickness and other causes”, according to one document, caused this shortage [was ‘other causes’ was a euphemism for shattered morale?]. On the 15 September, a diary noted that “Owing to the extraordinary lack of pilots, limited flying can only be carried out in spite of the arrival of 20 new DFWs”. Perhaps this response from the German airmen is unsurprising, as the Australians alone destroyed fifteen and forced down twenty-seven enemy aircraft during the eight weeks prior to the offensive.

It seems then that, even though both air forces had comparable numbers of aircraft, the difference came down to pilots, morale and mechanical/logistical support on the ground.

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

Yes I would also agree the quality of German and soon a small number of Turkish pilots did lead to higher losses within these Sqn's.

But also a number of newer British Sqn's also had there share of inexpirenced pilots.

But I believe the German suffered more from this as they had to bring both men and machines a long way over land by rail while the British admin and resupply system could replace these quicker then the Germans. Even if they had a longer move by sea.

Cheers

S.B

[Take on me]

Has anyone done any work on, or read anything that challenges the rather popular notion that Palestine (and the eastern theatres in general) was a 'side-show'?

Prior and Wilson's 'The Somme' got me thinking about this, as it shows that a number on War Cabinet members pushed for a deployment to Salonika at various stages in 1916. What is more, the shortage of equipment in the East - shells and aircraft in particular- has now been shown to be a universal problem for the allies, not only in the East. Finally, the British used tanks -albeit unsuccessfully- during the second assualt on Gaza, at a time when tanks were not in an abundent supply. It is interesting therefore, that this special weapon featured in a 'sideshow'.

One thing that I feel that people forget aboput the First World War is the fact that the conflict was a total war. In the total war scenario it is imperative that the enemy is engaged wherever he, or she, exists. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire was the product of British, French and Russian campaigns in the Middle East, as long as the Ottomans remained in the war they were a strategic ally to Germany and as such had to be defeated. An Ottoman Offensive could threateen the Suez canal, a vital link between Britain and the Empire, or alternatively the oil fields of the middle east, which were vital for the Allied war effort. Furthermore these campaigns produce victories, such as the Decmber 1917 capture of Jerusalem, which had a big effect in proping up moral on the Home Front, ramifications such as these are often ignored by historians but it has to remembered that Britain had just fought the costly Third Ypres Offensive and a victory was needed.

The collapse of Germany's Allies were an important factor in their decision to surrender, not quite as important as defeat on the Western Front, or the blockade, but important nonetheless. Even a power as supposedly ineffectual still seriously challenged Britain adn France in the Middle East and fighting potentail like that ought not to be taken lightly. When the Ottoman Empire left the war, together with Austria-Hungaryh and Bulgaria, Germany was isolated in Europe, strategically her position stopped being disastrous and became catastrophic. With no Allies the Germans had nothing to even hold up the Allies as they raced towards the borders of the Reich from west and south, no further chance of negotiation or even avoiding defeat. Thus it seems reasonable to say that ''side shows'' likePalestine were actually a fundamentally important part of waging a total war.

Jon

[FAAAEd]

Side show or not, we are all still living with the consequences, could be it was the most important side show of the 20Centuary.

Gareth

Indeed it was an important side show. The navy of the day was becoming increasingly oil fired and then there was the burgeoning importance of aviation, motor transport, tanks and aviation. Sykes-Picot will inform, see:

Wikipedia

for more.