Hidebound?

[Tim Birch]

I am reading "The Killing Ground" by Tim Travers which is a most interesting study of military attitudes at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century. It shows how Haig and most Great War commanders were products of the military schools of thought and training of the times. They were attempting to fight a 20th century war with 19th century doctrines, and the book goes a long way towards explaining why.

Haig did as he was taught at Staff College, after all that is what Staff Colleges are for. That is to turn promising junior officers into good and reliable senior officers fit for high command. Army Officers were generally ordinary men of average mental ability. They were not Oxbridge Dons or research fellows. The good ones did as they were taught, and who were they to challenge the Military thinking of the time?

Haig was taught at Staff College to stick to a plan and see it through, if nessessary in the face of adversity. This may explain the reluctance to call off the Somme and Third Ypres earlier than he did. They had also been conditioned by all their training and the accepted doctrine of the time into accepting that high casualties were the inevitable and unavoidable product of modern warfare

The book has got me thinking about the concept of originality in military tactics.

Academics involved in original reseach are generally not the sort of people who are attracted to a military career. The stakes are very high, and it takes someone of exceptional moral courage and intellect to introduce radical ideas into military tactics, particularly when this involves a major shift away from everything you have been taught throughout your military career.

If someone has an original concept, there is no real way of testing it other than in battle. Excercises help to some extent, but no excercise will replicate such problems as the psychological shock of battle on your forces, loss of moral or casualties, and most importantly the enemy's reaction, particularly when your idea is ventururing into the unknown.

A commander has to test his concept on the battlefield. If he gets away with it he is considered brilliant (or lucky), if he fails he is considered incompetant or foolhardy. Its no wonder that commanders such as Haig tended to stick to the tactics they had been taught and which in the past had proved successful.

Tim

[Hedley Malloch]

Absolutely agree, Tim. And it all raises the fascinating question of how strategies change and how new ones develop. If they cannot develop 'top down', then perhaps they come about 'bottom up', from changes and innovations made at quite low levels in the organisation. Read Paddy Griffiths' book on the development of war-winning innovations in British Army tactics; the picture he paints is very much one of 'bottom up' change.

This is why I think the 'butchers and bunglers' vs the British Army as a learning organisation wrongly polarises the debate on the effectiveness of the Army during the War. It could have been a learning organisation with lots of 'bottom up' change, but led by 'butchers and bunglers' who could not manage their way out of a paper bag.

Incidentally the description you paint of strategy formation in the British Army is universal and timeless. All organisations resemble your description to a greater or lesser degree - it was not just a problem for the Army. Years ago I took a MBA Strategic Management course. The case study used to demonstrate the general problems of strategic implementation in modern business was one of the first day of the battle of the Somme. Farrar-Hockley was required reading.

[mmbennett]

This may explain the reluctance to call off the Somme and Third Ypres earlier than he did.

That may be so, but was Haig truly in the strategic position to abandon the offensives after the (undoubtable tragedy) of July 1st? In certain areas, his "breakthrough" tactics of limited artillery bombardment and fast infantry attacks did achieve some success, notable in the remarkable efforts of the 36th (Ulster) Division. No doubt he did believe that a breakthrough was possible until the winter rains of November (which provided for a great divide between himself and Rawlinson). One could argue that the strategic situation of the French at Verdun dictated the only option of continuing the attack (one could also then raise the point of Haig's unnecessary deference to the French Generals).

In Warner's biography, there is a reference to night time infantry/artillery assaults under Rawlinson which did achieve success at the Somme Ridge and surrounding areas. Can anyone expand on this?

Regards and thanks in advance,

Matt

[Chris_Baker]

In Warner's biography, there is a reference to night time infantry/artillery assaults under Rawlinson which did achieve success at the Somme Ridge and surrounding areas. Can anyone expand on this?

It's presumably a reference to the attack of 14th July, when the advanced units pierced the German second line at Bazentin and probed as far forward as High Wood - only to find another line there.

I added a war diary extract to the site recently, of the 2nd Royal Irish Regiment that was involved in this attack. It's here.

[Chris_Baker]

notable in the remarkable efforts of the 36th (Ulster) Division

... and even more so in the areas of 30th, 18th (Eastern) and to some extent 7th Divisions.

[michaeldr]

I have not yet finished reading 'The Killing Ground' however even at this stage it is hard to escape the conclusion that Tim's one word summary of the army's character, "Hidebound," is spot on.

Ten years earlier the Russo-Japanese War had provided examples of the use of machine-guns and of close artillery support (did I see mention made of a barrage rolling forward only 30 yards ahead of the advancing Japanese infantry?) The British army had observers there at the time but for some reason had difficulty later in interpreting the lessons.

The Hidebound army still thought in terms of two principal assets, men (infantry) and horses (cavalry), the rest (artillery etc) were just add ons to be used if they could be fitted in. This may seem like a gross over simplification but the facts indicate that it is not so far from the truth. The army had great difficulty in moving forward with new ideas. The opportunities presented by new technology were not grasped. New thinking was not applied, but rather (reluctantly it seems) the new weapons were forced to fit into the preconceived plan and thus their full potential was not realised early enough.

By the way, was this just a War Office/Army problem? The Navy had already been forced to bite the technology bullet, changing from wood to iron, from sail to steam to turbines and from wind to coal to oil. While the Master General of Ordnance was saying that no new machine-gun was being considered, the Navy was holding trials of a Vickers light machine gun, which was arguably in fact just what the infantry needed. The Lewis gun was available for aircraft in 1912 but only adopted by the army in late 1914. The Navy (RNAS) sent armoured-cars to France and Belgium in 1914. If one branch could grasp the techno-nettle, why couldn't the other?

I am looking forward to finishing the book

Regards

Michael D.R.

[Tim Birch]

was Haig truly in the strategic position to abandon the offensives after the (undoubtable tragedy) of July 1st?

Matt

There was never any question of calling off the offensive in the light of events on 1 July.

The awful reality was that at the time it was not seen as a "tragedy", but merely a "setback". As I said in my previous post high casualties were not unexpected, although it as probably days if not weeks before the full picture relating to 1 July became known.

There is a tendancy these days to concentrate on the awful events of that one day. High casualties had been occuring since the war started and would continue throughout every major action. At the time public and military resilliance to casualties was remarkable, but this was mainly because they were seen as tragic yet to be expected. By 1916 no one expected the war to be won other than at great cost. There was also the concept that the grim business had to be seen through otherwise the dreadful losses would appear to have been in vain.

The attack of 14 July was a success which reinforced Haig's and GHQ's beliefs that they were on the right track (although Haig had had misgivings beforehand and had only reluctantly agreed to it). The great pity was that there were no more surprise night attacks of this nature during the Somme campaign, and one wonders why this formula was not adopted, modified and repeated?

Tim

[mmbennett]

Certainly I agree with you Tim. The Battle of the Somme for the vast majority of the British public is epitomised in that fateful morning of July 1st. The mentality and perceptions of the public are what have made TV shows like Blackadder Goes Forth such a resounding success - it simply could not have worked without such a mentality. The assumption is that war poets such as Owen and Sassoon were typical of all British soldiers, when there is hardly any evidence to prove this assertion. Even the most noted war poet, John McCrae, makes a demand for victory from his superiors:

To you from failing hands we throw

The torch; be yours to hold it high

If ye break faith with us who die

We shall not sleep, though poppies grow

In Flanders Fields

The Somme was the first learning curve of a wholly untested force, and any other army in such a position may have collapsed in the wake of such tragedies, but not the British. The resiliance of our armies in these colossal struggles are what made the victories of 1918 possible. Had Haig called off the offensive, the Germans would have been able to divert their forces back to Verdun, and finally eliminate the French Army, leaving the BEF isolated in Northern France (the same could be said for Passchendaele - I recall reading that it was Petain who persuaded him so). Warner is most definately correct in stating that - "Haig is so often remembered not for his victories, but for the cost of them. His critics have often stated that what he achieved with men, should have been achieved with metal".

Warner is also correct in pointing out that all criticism of Haig appears to lack any sort of plausible alternatives. For example, Lloyd-George stated in his memoirs that a campaign in the Mediterranean would reduce the stalemate on the Western Front - had he heard of Gallipoli? Salonika? His plan was little more than an elaborate bluff and there is no evidence to suggest that this would have reduced the number of casualties.

Regards,

Matt

PS: All points raised here would make great additions to my coursework - thanks again!

[Cliff. Hobson]

Hidebound is I believe an appropriate description, the war games at Staff College

were no doubt thoroughly researched and practised. Cavalry Generals

lacked the basic apprenticeship of the infantry Generals and with it the

ability to think on their feet, a la Dorrien Smith.

[BMoorhouse]

Others may disagree, but surely the senior Generals were not that hidebound as many actively sought to encourage discussion about tactical innovation (if all of the circulars etc that were presumably circulated with official sanction are to be believed.)

I think that it is very easy to criticise their thought processes with what is now considerable hindsight but I think that a few factors need to be born in mind;

The whole ethos and organisation of the British army was one aimed at colonial policing. There was an extremely rapid realisation (by the 'hidebound' commanders) that huge changes were required at all levels for a major continental war. (I am talking about the infrastructure and re-organisation required to support the BEF, the armaments programmes and tactical reorganisations such as bombing sections) That was something that was realised very quickly, but obviously took far longer to implement.

There was a massive change in technology in a very short space of time - aeroplanes in combat, poison gas being used, the widespread use of heavy artillery, smoke shells, the invention of the tank and on a smaller level grenades and light machineguns (or automatic rifles ) like the Lewis gun and mortars.

All commanders would not always appreciate the potential of many of these weapons, or indeed how to deploy them to their greatest effect. It is a lot easier for us today to do that. A lot of what was learned had to be learned at a low tactical level and be passed up.

Whatever the criticisms of these commanders, the evidence of the significant introduction of these new weapons (The hidebound British seemed to have been far ahead of the Germans in armoured warfare, deployment of light machineguns etc), as well as significant advances in tactics employed during the war which were not only permitted, but sometimes actively encouraged must surely provide some evidence that innovation and creativity was allowed at all levels?

I think that there is always a danger that we do not confuse the manner in which they discussed their ideas with a lack of creativity and flexibility.

Brendon.

[bmac]

It seems to me there are several examples of 'good practice' in the years 1916-7: Rawlinson's attack on the Bazentin Ridge, The Canadians at Vimy and other early parts of Arras, Plumer at Messines and parts of the early attack at Cambrai. The common thread between them is that they were planned by Army or Corps commanders with either little active support from and/or with crippling post-attack interference from GHQ.

The 1st July 1916 was very much Haig's idea (Rawlinson, whose army was mostly involved, wanted the 'bite and hold' approach and Allenby, part of whose 3rd Army attacked Gommecourt as a diversion, wanted his men's attack to be somewhere else).

My criticism of Haig is based on three things:

1. He persisted with ideas of breakthrough battles even when the evidence showed that these were either unlikely or impossible and never truly adapted to the concepts of either 'bite and hold' or Joffre's wearing out battle. Both the Somme and 3rd Ypres were conceived of as war-winning breakthrough battles and neither came close;

2. Because he never truly embraced either Rawlinson's or Joffre's ideas both battles dissolved into a series of poorly organised, purely tactical affairs which all too often lacked proper infantry/artillery co-ordination and which became the 'futile' attacks complained of by the men and war poets; and

3. Even when juniors organised highly sucessful 'local' attacks, they were then only too often wasted through higher interference (the failure to learn the lessons of Bazentin, the replacement of Plumer and the resulting delays after Messines, the attempts to turn a local tactical success into something more at Cambrai).

I can see little in the 1916/7 period that Haig could be proud of though several of his juniors made major strides in incorporating lessons learned and new technology. Haig's position as CinC was impregnable, however, not least because of his excellent Court connections and I do wonder what might have happened had one of those officers with a success to their name had been given charge of the BEF.

[mmbennett]

One could also argue that it was Haig's unnecessary deference to both Rawlinson and Joffre that resulted in the finished plan for the Somme battle. Haig had argued against using a lengthy artillery bombardment with Rawlinson, and for the infantry and cavalry to break through the lines immediately without the need for consolidation (one could also argue that this tactic may have retained the element of surprise). Rawlinson argued against this, believing that the troops would need to carry over 60lbs of equipment each to successfully occupy the German trenches. Warner also mentions that Haig had proposed that small parties of soldiers should attempt ascertain whether the German wire had been cut before the main infantry assault. It seems that, on this occasion, Haig deferred too easily to his subordinates, who argued against this.

American historian J.M. Winter has concluded, in The Experience of World War I that:

"It is ironic that if Haig had been more forceful in pressing through his own tactical ideas, events on that fateful July morning could have been very different."

... and even more so in the areas of 30th, 18th (Eastern) and to some extent 7th Divisions.

Yes. In all of these cases a short artillery bombardment was followed by a quick attack. To give Rawlinson his credit, the successful attack of the 14th July was his idea.

Regards,

Matt

[Guest Tom Brearley]

Interesting stuff. Some (slightly random) thoughts:

The Lewis gun was available for aircraft in 1912 but only adopted by the army in late 1914.

This is stretching things a bit far. An aviation version of the Lewis may have been tested in 1912 but it wasn't until 1915 that anyone saw a real need for mounting machine-guns on scout aircraft. Both sides' flying services started the war lobbing bricks etc at each other!

The 'bottom up' argument must be qualified by the fact that only at staff level could the procurement decisions be made which allowed the use of Lewis gun sections, Mills bombs, creeping barrages, and tanks etc. This shows that the brass certainly didn't have their heads in the clouds - they were responding to what Brigadiers and Majors were telling them. Whether the strategic goals set for the users of this equipment were always sensible is another matter...

It seems a bit harsh to ascribe the successes to Army or Corps commanders, and the failures to the C-in-C. In 1917, for instance, Haig asked Plumer for an attack at Messines and Gough for an attack at Ypres. Messines somehow becomes Plumer's triumph and Ypres becomes Haig's mire. If we are to criticise Haig for the major battles, shouldn't we also give him the credit for authorising the local successes?

Tom.

[mmbennett]

It seems a bit harsh to ascribe the successes to Army or Corps commanders, and the failures to the C-in-C. In 1917, for instance, Haig asked Plumer for an attack at Messines and Gough for an attack at Ypres. Messines somehow becomes Plumer's triumph and Ypres becomes Haig's mire. If we are to criticise Haig for the major battles, shouldn't we also give him the credit for authorising the local successes?

Yes I agree. Haig was not faultless (no human is), but he does, in my view, deserve to be taken as a serious historical character who was able to achieve victory with a far larger army than ANYONE in 1914 had anticipated, or even contemplated. As is common with most criticisms of Haig, plausible and workable alternatives are hard to come by. As the British Army pursued their great learning curve, so did the officers and the General Staff. Haig was no technophobe, and I do not believe that his past as a cavalry officer obscured his perception of the new technology on the Western Front from 1917-18.

Regards,

Matt

[bmac]

... and even more so in the areas of 30th, 18th (Eastern) and to some extent 7th Divisions.

Yes. In all of these cases a short artillery bombardment was followed by a quick attack.

I am not aware that the duration of the bombardment re-1st July varied along the front. Evidence?

What there was on the XIII Corps front was a greater concentration of heavy artillery as a result of co-operation between the British and the XX French Corps plus the attachment of 100 French guns. This resulted in a 4:1 advantage over the German artillery which was effectively destroyed before the attack. Unlike other parts of the front, the majority of casualties here were caused by machine guns rather than artillery. Had the 1st July front not been stretched over such a long distance then tactical artillery superiority as was achived around Montauban could have been achieved elsewhere perhaps with similar results.

As to the Messines/Ypres argument, yes, Haig asked Plumer to organise the Messines attack. He should be given credit for selecting that officer but not too much of the organisation AFAIK. Then, for reasons I cannot fathom, he replaced Plumer with Gough for the 3rd Ypres attack (because Gough was more of a 'thruster'?) and allowed a long pause between the two attacks. We can argue the toss about the suitability of the land east of Ypres but it was certainly the case that the battle was sustained long beyond there being any obvious strategic benefit in the same way that the Somme was kept going far too long IMHO. The choices of battlefield, commander and how long to keep the battle going were all Haig's and criticism for each of those decisions still seems reasonable to me.

[michaeldr]

Tom,

Welcome to the forum (and Chris, thanks for adding the right of the line and bringing this talent on board)

re the Lewis gun; I have no doubt that you are correct that 1912 was only a date on a calendar. Likewise however, while the army may have approved of the weapon in 1914, it only reached the battalions at the front the next year or indeed the year after that.

Was the senior officer class which was produced by the Staff College of the late Victorian era open to new ideas or to critical advice? The evidence produced by Travers suggests not.

An example which may appeal:

"....in Ireland in 1912, when at the post-manoeuvre discussions regarding the use of aeroplanes for reconnaissance, it was generally agreed that aeroplanes were useful for strategic but not tactical reconnaissance, because of the length of time required to deliver messages. Major General Groves, then a junior officer, disagreed, and suggested signals or dropping messages. There was a frozen silence, reported Groves, and afterwards his regimental commander called him in, tore him a strip off him, calling him a 'young puppy' for raising his voice in the Divisional GOC's presence, and said that he had let down the regiment."

[Monash successfully used this message-drop system with his 'strike-a-light' patrols in 1918 - there may even be earlier examples]

Regards

Michael D.R.

[mmbennett]

I am not aware that the duration of the bombardment re-1st July varied along the front. Evidence?

My apologies. I was in fact referring to Rawlinson's success on the 14th July. The 7th was involved in such an attack, and it would appear that I misquoted. Sorry.

Then, for reasons I cannot fathom, he replaced Plumer with Gough for the 3rd Ypres attack

That is where I will agree with you. Plumer's success at Messines Ridge warranted his inclusion in the battle plans for Passchendaele. That much is perfectly clear to me. Like I stated previously, I do not maintain that Haig was faultless, nor do I maintain that his command was free from strategic and tactical errors. Haig is of interest to me primarily because of the legacy and enigma that surrounds him, and after reading of the Daily Express article in November 1998, campaigning for his statue to be removed from the Cenotaph in Whitehall (which I have since visited), I felt compelled to learn more about this contraversial character.

Regards,

Matt

[Guest Tom Brearley]

Mike

Thanks for the welcome. Interesting quote! As Matt says, Haig is well open to criticism for the reasons you mention; I just feel in the interests of balance he should also be given some credit for the things that went right on his front.

Message dropping by aeroplane was in use well before 1918 - usually in connection with 'contact patrols', which reported the progress of the infantry during an attack and then dropped a marked map back at Corps HQ. This proved far quicker than tapping out coordinates in morse. There are some remarkable pictures of RFC machines damaged by friendly shells as they flew through the barrage to carry out this very dangerous work.

Tom

[Edward_N_Kelly]

Actually there is a grain of truth in all the arguments put forward here (from my reading of the Great War).

There was a definite problem of a slow realisation that this was a different war - a war of "industrial death" but it affected all ranks (not just Haig). It was institutional because of the nature of warfare that the British Army had conducted until then and how the governments of the day financed and structured them. Change was progressing but the war came too soon (for all combatants - the Germans, Austria-Hungary and the French also suffered because of the changes in technology versus doctrine).

Haig's own problem was his 4 or 5 point "how the battle would develop" (working from memory - and I am at work away from references) which was taught and retaught from the junior leaders to the staff colleges. The final two points covered the "dogfight" and the "breakthrough" (my terms - again memory) - the duration and resources required of the former and the transition to the latter stage were the most difficult for GHQ (and this also occurred under Haigh's predecessor).

The planning for Somme contrasted with the later battles assumed a comparatively short "dogfight" and it became obvious that it was not to be - but other factors forced its continuation (Verdun). Likewise for 1917 we see improved resources hopefully creating the short duration "dogfight" but it also encountered better German defences.

The one time the "dogfight" was close to being short - Cambrai - the ability of the troops to push on and through was defeated by the lack of reserves to exploit (or the necessary "pre-stunt" planning to mean that they were available - Ypres took precedence).

1917 again became bogged down by the need to come to the aid of the French by maintaing pressure on the Germans.

1918 - he actually got it right.

(He was actually very correct in his appreciation of these factors if they were applied at an operational or strategic level - working on a time span of years - rather that for an individual battle. He was one of the few that thought the war would end in 1918 (when discussing it in late 1917) - reasonable or just blind optimism ?!?)

Equipment did not suddenly appear for no reason (well most didn't !) - GHQ had to have a use for it before it would be produced in large numbers. Tactics likewise could not become widespread without some form of imprimatur but the troops had to be brought to some form of standard of training before they could be introduced to "new" tactics (and there had to be a lot of lessons relearned with the start of "open" warfare in 1918 including a lot of equipment that was no longer useful or needed).

The British were not resistant to change. Indeed in same cases pointed out by Griffiths they became over enthusiastic! It reoccurred in WW2 in the move to WW2 "Jock" columns in the Western Desert - the wrong lessons were "learnt" for the wrong reasons. Thankfully that never caught on...

Edward

[Chris_Baker]

Then, for reasons I cannot fathom, he replaced Plumer with Gough for the 3rd Ypres attack

Plumer's success at Messines Ridge warranted his inclusion in the battle plans for Passchendaele.

Actually I am not so sure, and I can understand Haig's position on this.

The Ypres offensive was meant to be a break through, break out, recapture the Belgian coast and perhaps start rolling up the Gereman line from the north. Big, fast, sweeping stuff. (It may have been ridiculously optimistic and misplaced, but that's what it was). Certainly not a "bite and hold", which Messines had been, even if in rather spectacular style.

Plumer, the careful planner, realist/pessimist, logistician, was never going to be the right driving force for such an affair. Gough, the thrusting, thick-skinned/optimistic type, with the grand horizons of the cavalry in mind, was.

In retrospect, the great tragedy and irony of course was that - even without the monsoon - that there was no chance of such a breakthrough. Once realised, Plumer's skills were required, not Gough's. And to be fair to Haig, he did finally switch.

So I do not think Haig was wrong to choose Gough to lead the offensive. The grave error - and who is to blame for this: Haig? Charteris? the Cabinet? Lloyd George? - was the notion that the enemy line at Ypres could be broken through in such a fashion, at this time.

[Guest paddy]

G'day

Back to the old "read it somewhere" scenario, but I have long understood that Haig suggested that Plumer follow up Messines almost immediately, P asked for a couple of days to position guns etc, Haig said no, called in Gough, who took much longer to get going.

Pat

[Guest Tom Brearley]

Pat

Prior & Wilson say (on p.64 of Untold Story) that Haig asked Plumer whether the north of Second Army could capitalise on the success of Messines and grab some of the Gheluvelt Plateau in preparation for Gough's major offencive. Plumer replied that he would need three days. Haig then ordered the two northern Corps of Second Army transferred to Fifth Army and asked Gough to consider it. After a few more days Gough concluded that the defences were becoming too strong and that the Plateau should be incorporated in his main attack.

(As Prior & Wilson note, "the only consequence of the C-in-C's determination on a hasty sequel to Messines was no action whatever.")

So it seems 'Goughie' was earmarked for the battle by Haig before this episode.

Tom

[mmbennett]

Now that you mention it Chris, it is far easier to understand Haig's decision.

In retrospect, the great tragedy and irony of course was that - even without the monsoon - that there was no chance of such a breakthrough. Once realised, Plumer's skills were required, not Gough's. And to be fair to Haig, he did finally switch.

Indeed, for this he should be given credit, but did the possibility exist of attacking Passchendaele Ridge immediately after the success at Messines? If so, was Plumer the right man for the job? Could a Messines-style attack have taken Passchendaele also? I appreciate your reply, more information for my coursework essay!

[Chris_Baker]

Gough took up his appointment on May 30, that is, before Messines, which was only seen as a preliminary.

When Fifth Army command took over the Ypres front (10 June, ie after Messines) there were 203 heavy howitzers and 444 field guns in position. Up to 31 July, they combed and begged for guns from the other armies, adding another 752 and 1422 respectively. "Third Ypres" as we know it could not have been launched on 10 June, on this front.

The best chance of immediate follow up to Messines was Plumer's Second Army offer of three days to reposition the huge number of guns already on his front. Presumably (I'll have to check) Plumer was in any case taking about attacking from the position just won (ie south of the Menin Road, down to Ploegsteert) and not from the Ypres canal towards Passchendaele. You could by this means grab the high ground south of the road, and outflank the Passchendaele Ridge. I believe this is exactly what they should have done - and indeed Haig returned to this after the attack north of the Menin road bogged down and it was all too late.

The key feature of the Messines attack was of course the great mines, which had been started in 1915 and were already in position in mid 1916. Such preparation could not have taken place to hit the Passchendaele Ridge (some miles from the start line, of course) on 31 July...and it had not been thought of as a means of breaking the first line. The other feature of Messines was the incredible artillery barrage, which was not quite repeated at any time during Third Ypres.

[Greenwoodman]

The artillery barrage at Messines was unprecedented, and caused enormous damage to the German lines, and large numbers of casulaties. But Ludendorff blames the mines for the penetration at Messines:-

He wrote in his Memoirs “we should have succeeded in retaining the position but for the exceptionally powerful mines used by the British, which paved the way for their attack….. The result of these successful mining operations was that the enemy broke through on June 7th…..The morale effect of the explosions was simply staggering”.

Without the mines, would an exploitation northward by Plumer have worked?