U-Boat Blockade of UK

[Guest Bob English]

Hi,

I am essentially new to this forum and would like to start with a more generalized question to forum members.

U-Boats and the blockade of England.

Basically , how effective was it? I have read that some highly placed UK politicians and Naval officers expressed some very deep concerns in 1917 regarding how much longer England could endure shipping losses. I suppose I am asking how much of this is myth vs. reality. How much damage were the U-Boats doing and was England truely (at any point ) on the brink of defeat because of the U-Boat offensive?

My second question regards the naval air patrols from the coasts of England and France. How important and/or effective were they in providing relief to shipping as regards U-Boat attacks?

Thanks.

[Borden Battery]

Hello Bob English

In addition to responses on the GWF, here is a website with much of the information. Also, try the Search function as there are hundreds of thousands of previous postings to gather information from.

Regards

Borden Battery

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U-Boat

This website contains detailed information on the German U-Boat from both the Great War and the Second World War. The site also contains a small discussion forum and a good source of referenced material and articles. While the site is primarily Second World War, there is a growing commitment to the Great War. Statistics indicate apparently in WWI a total of 375 U boats sank 6596 merchant ships, a total of 12,800,000 tons. The site is operated from Iceland by Gudmundur Helgason with a detailed database being developed by Michael Lowrey. [April 2005]

www.uboat.net

[joseph]

Bob,

Germany's unrestricted submarine campaign was limited in large measure only by inadequate force size. Twenty or thirty 500 to 700 ton U-boats on station in the vast expanses of water around the British Isles simply were insufficient to do the job.

After the war the German Admiralty blamed it on the resources taken from the shipyards to repair the Fleet after the Battle of Jutland and so drastically reducing the production of submarines.

Regards Charles

[Regulus 1]

Archive material and biographies from british politicians proof very clearly that if the US had not entered the war, there was a very large possibility that the UK would have witdrawn from the war ! The ships sank faster then they were constructed and it is very often forgotten that the U-boat war was much more important in WW I then in WW II, which is also clear with the number of ships sunk and the total on BRT. By 1918 things went back in favour of the Allies.

[joseph]

There was no doubt that things’ got bad but when it did the economy and people reacted and changed.

British national character proved far more resilient than the German experts had predicted. Price mechanisms enabled Britain's economy to substitute commodities: London introduced mild forms of rationing, and by adding other types of flour to wheat created a so-called "war bread" that in 1917-8 saved about thirteen weeks' consumption of wheat flour. In a strange turn of events, the British outdid the Germans when it came to "war socialism" and "war economy." In short order, the government created a Ministry of Shipping and a Food Production Department, and appointed a "food controller" who by the end of the war oversaw 90 percent of the nation's imports and bought and sold 85 percent of the food consumed in the country. In an almost obscene fashion, the submarine campaign translated into a healthier nation--even given the absence of 13,000 doctors called to the colours. The female death rate in 1917 due to cardiovascular diseases, diarrhoeal diseases, and complications of pregnancy was well below that for 1912, 1913, and 1914. The mortality rate due to scarlet fever and rheumatic fever likewise fell in 1916--as did that among women during childbirth and among their offspring. By 1918, per capita caloric intake among civilians was probably higher than it had been in 1914. (Olsen)

The weekly food consumption of beef, bread, flour, and milk by British working-class families in 1917-18, for example, remained at the same level as it had been before 1914; that of bacon, potatoes, and margarine actually increased. (Ministry of Shipping)

Regards Charles

[historydavid]

quote: "how effective was it?"

The following is an extract from Naval Operations (History of the Great War based on Official Documents) by Henry Newbolt (the emphasis is mine):

"In the latter part of March 1917, Admiral Sims, who was then serving as President of the Naval War College at Newport, was summoned to Washington, told that war with Germany was imminent, and ordered to proceed to London as rapidly and secretly as he could. His orders were to " studv the naval situation and learn how we could best and most quickly co-operate in the naval war." He reached England on April 9, and interviewed Admiral Jellicoe (First Sea Lord) on the following day. America had declared war on April 6 and there was no longer any reason for reserve or secrecy.

Admiral Jellicoe seems to have described the position to Admiral Sims in the same way that he described it later on in his memorandum to the War Cabinet: the losses in our merchant fleet were so serious that they could not be borne, and the first and most urgent need was for destroyer reinforcements in the Queenstown command. In addition, the Admiralty desired the American navy to strengthen our hold on the outer routes by establishing a flying squadron in the Atlantic to hunt for raiders, by keeping squadrons off the south-east coast of America, the Gulf of Mexico, and the west coast of America as far as Panama; and by maintaining another squadron in China to look after Allied interests in the Far East. In the matter of the blockade, the American Government was asked to institute special examination of neutral vessels loading in the United States.

The actual facts of the submarine campaign were a revelation to Admiral Sims; he had never imagined for an instant that the situation of the Allies was so critical, and he lost no time in cabling two very serious reports to the Navy Department. He accepted the Admiralty's view without demur; the submarine campaign was the deciding factor of the war, and the decisive theatre of the campaign was the " focus of all lines of communication in the Eastern Atlantic." He therefore urged that the Navy Department should immediately send as many destroyers and anti-submarine craft as could possibly be spared. The destroyers were to be based on Queenstown and have an advanced base at Berehaven; the anti-submarine craft were to set up an inshore patrol. In order to overcome any possible opposition or reluctance on the part of the Navy Department, Admiral Sims added a detailed criticism of the suggested alternatives which were then being discussed in London and (presumably) in Washington."

You also have to be aware that the introduction of convoys was still being resisted by the British Admiralty on the grounds of a lack of escort ships (a belief shared by Sims, incidently).

Best wishes

David

[Adrian Roberts]

My second question regards the naval air patrols from the coasts of England and France. How important and/or effective were they in providing relief to shipping as regards U-Boat attacks?

The principle aerial anti-submarine resource of the RNAS were their non-rigid airships. The RNAS boasted that no convoy escorted by airships lost a ship to U-boat attack (in fact there were a couple of exceptions to this).

The airships could not of course attack the submarines themselves; with their inflammable hydrogen would be vulnerable to the submarine's guns. But they would report the position of a submarine to escorting destroyers by wireless; this meant that when airships were in the vicinity the U-boats would have to remain submerged, which with a submerged speed of only 6-7 knots meant they could never catch the convoy. The exception to this was when the Rigid Airship R29 sunk the UB115 on 29/9/18, in conjunction with surface vessels.

It is impossible to know how many sinkings were prevented by naval air patrols, and therefore how decisive the difference was. But it is thought that at least 226 British airships were constructed, almost all for shipping protection, and 103 were on charge at the armistice, so it can be assumed that their use made a considerable difference.

Some U-boats were sunk by Curtis and Felixstowe flying-boats, but I do not have figures for this.

Adrian

[Guest Bob English]

I appreciate the excellent input. I have read that the UK had a system of alternating "meatless", "wheatless", and "heatless" days every week to save on food supplies and I suppose coal. How long this system was in place I have no idea. I am not clear whether this was the reaction of a nation feeling a tightening noose or simply a wise precaution to a potential although remote danger.

It does seem there was some real panic among at least a few in the stratosphere of British government and military. Whether they were among the best informed or least informed I can't say. I am aware of no shortages in medical supplies, rations or ammunition suffered by Empire troops on the western front. I am also unaware of any sort of real deprivation on the home front.

Doubtlessly the recorded shipping losses are enormous. If the figures are anything approaching accurate certainly the loss of hulls would have been a source of real fear even if no pressing need had yet developed. Just looking at the numbers (1917) I would have have to believe losses FAR exceeded the ability of the UK to make good.

Perhaps also the prespective of what else was taking place in 1917 would explain a mood of fear, depression and apprehension. Russia out of the war. French armies on the very edge of mutiny if not outright collapse. Further stalemate and endless casualty lists. Then U-Boats on top of it all....

[healdav]

One of the contributing factors to the success of the U-boat was that the escorts had very few weapons against them.

The depth charge really only came into its own in 1917 when the hydrostatic fuse became universally available. Even then, the U-boat had to be found before it could be attacked. The 'asdic' of those days was very, very primitive (it wasn't ASDIC). Basically, hydrophones were used to listen for propellor sounds, and both distance and depth were estimated, then depth charge fuses were set for the amount of time it was thought it would take for it to sink to that depth. Not exactly guaranteed to give accuracy.

The use of balloons to spot U-boats was the most useful of all defences -as were aircraft in WW2 (why didn't they use balloons as well, I wonder?)

It was certainly strange that convoys were not used immediately on outbreak of war and that the Admiralty opposed them for so long (they even went to the extent, some accounts say, of mixing in all ships on the sea to the Isle of Wight ferry, to bump up the number to be protected).

The USN ships arrived when there were weapons, although detection was still very primitive.

The general increase in the health of the nation once reationing came in was reflected also in WW2. It was said that whilst people who were poor could cut down on essential food when it was a free for all to buy, they were ashamed to admit they couldn't afford the rations and so spent money on food rather than other things.

[Guest Bob English]

I had read on a website yesterday that it was claimed by the British they lost only five ships to U-Boats while under air cover. Which I assume means either ballons or aircraft. Unfortunately I did not mark the site and have to find it all over again.

As an aside its never failed to astound me that the lessons of convoys and air protection not only had to be relearned in round two, but by the United States separately from the Uk. In the interim of which U-Boats had a field day off the east coast of the U.S.

[Guest Bob English]

To whom:

Some figures of intrest. After considering total shipping tonage production vs. what was lost by the Empire in 1917 they were in the hole by 2,353,000 tons. The second quarter of that year being the worst at -956,000 tons. U-Boats accounted for greater than 85% of shipping losses. These figures regard commercial shipping only.