The Es Salt Raid

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Mates

Here is a brief summary of the action from the book: Horseman, Pass By - Lindsay Baly

TWENTY

The Es Salt raid

In the event, Allenby's orders for the operation were ambitious. They directed Chauvel, having consolidated his hold on the Moab plateau from Es Salt to the Jordan River (at Jisr ed Damieh) and established control of the country to the south of Amman as far as Madeba, to 'at once prepare for operations northwards, with a view to advancing rapidly on Deraa'. Deraa was 80 miles further on, even a few miles north of the Sea of Galilee. The Commander-in-Chief said bold and rapid marches must be made and that it was 'probable that during these operations, considerable help may be counted upon from the Arabs and the closest touch must be maintained with them'.

Allenby has been criticised for such ambitious thinking, but with his troops being sucked into the Western Front and reeling under the German offensive, his mind was on a global plane and trying to devise a scheme that could knock Turkey out of the war. With Deraa captured, it would be another short step to Damascus, then Aleppo and the ultimate possibilities. But Chauvel had to produce the ways and means, and at the final conferences had the plan at least broken down into components, each dealing with some objectives. In this way, conditions would be implicit, such as if and when the line Jisr ed Damieh-Es Salt-Amman is consolidated, and so on. One thing at a time.

The incursion to Amman was always called a 'raid', with that word's connotation of withdrawal afterwards. The Es Salt incursion of 1918 had 'raid' thrust upon it in the history books. There had not been any intention to withdraw, but rather to open up a large and ambitious front. The German General Leman von Sanders fought it for the enemy and gave it a chapter called 'The Second Battle of the Jordan' in his memoirs.

This goes to some degree in articulating my general conclusions.

In my disagreement with Baly, I have an issue with the leadership given by Chauvel at this occasion. Baly treats Chauvel well indicating that he did what he could with a defective hand. Indeed, all the negatives for Es Salt are placed on the sghoulders of Allenby while all the good things that came out of it - if we can call it that - are all attributed to the leadership of Chauvel.

I will have to think about this a great deal more before I come to that conclusion.

Cheers

Bill

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

As I have said else where Allenby and Chauvel were thinking to much about what they were going to do instead of what the enemy was going to do.

They failed completly to understand that German formations had been arriving in Palestine for some time and the Turks were sending more troops into the area.

They also failed to see where these formations were on the battlefield and sweeping statments like pushing on to Derra and so forth is like Arnham in Sept 1944 "A Bridge to Far".

They had checked an attack along the Jordan River in April but the Turks in that area were not entirly defeated only retired. They would come again after the Es Salt Raid but again meet defeat.

Are there any Intell reports of the Enemy on file that gives a view of the other side of the hill at the AWM?

Of cause when I make these coments I make them from the area of post war and know most of the facts, Allenby/Chauvel didn't and Allenby used these same tactic's some moths later and did what he planned all the way to Damascus.

Like Chess he was thinking five moves ahead and some times you miss what is one move ahead.

Cheers

S.B

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Steve

G'day mate

The make believe element was placing a bet on the co-operation of a group of people who were not under the orders of Allenby - the Arabs around Es Salt. It was clearly a delusion that they would have the sheer quantum of support promised by their client - a client who had no intention or ability to follow through with the support British gold purchased. It was not as if Allenby could demand a refund.

Cheers

Bill