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Remembered Today:

The Es Salt Raid


Guest Bill Woerlee

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Hi Bill,

Just a quick note of thanks for the wonderful documents you have provided on this subject. All very interesting stuff . I particularly like the info about Grant at Gallipoli.

Cheers

Geoff S

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Guest Bill Woerlee

Geoff

G'day mate

Not sure I can talk to you now - you being a Lieutenant and me being a Captain - just not cricket old chap. :)

Thanks for your comments.

I am using this as a method of getting the facts clearly in my own mind Geoff. If I am going to give Grant a serve regarding his alleged cowardice, then I want to make sure the story is correct. This is the best way of doing it. Expose the thoughts and discover the weaknesses. Far better here than going into print and being proved to be a right proper pratt through poor research and reasoning.

There is more to come regarding Es Salt and specifically Grant's role.

That is being done as sort of a mental relaxation while writing on Gaza 2.

Cheers

Bill

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Guest Bill Woerlee

Mates

Since we are talking about Grant and Es Salt, it is good to see what Grant had to say about the episode.

Here are his comments to Bean.

post-7100-1143332934.jpg

The comment about being relieved of command is interesting and I shall be following that up with the Chauvel documents when I find them.

Cheers

Bill

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Guest Bill Woerlee

Mates

Some folks have reminded me that their ability to read small print is restricted so below I have provided a digital verson rather than the analogue version above.

Cheers

Bill

The casualties were 6 killed and 17 wounded. When ordered the brigade reached the Damiye-Es Salt track at 0530.

At 1530 on the 30th the 4th LH Brigade group came under the direct orders of Desert Mounted Corps. At 1705 a message was received from Descorps ordering the Brigade to withdraw behind the Nahr ez Zerka and to cover the Jisr Ed Damiye-Es Salt road, but the brigade was not to be compromised if heavily attacked. This was to confirm the instructions received verbally from General Chauvel earlier in the afternoon.

I was anxious about the position of the guns, and instructed the commander of the 19th Brigade RHA (Major Allen) to reconnoitre a line of retreat for the guns. He afterwards informed me that he had done this, I Asked him again early in the morning of the 1st May if he could withdraw the guns if we were heavily attacked, and he assured me that he could. When we were seriously attacked I asked him about the route to withdraw them, and he pointed down the plain over which the enemy were advancing, and said that was the route. The 11th LH Regt withdrew their water cart half full under shelter of the hills, and if the route had been reconnoitred the guns of A Battery, HAC at least should have been saved. At it was they were stuck among a lot of rocks on the exposed face of the hill, and the horses were all shot by rifle fire before they could be got out. The horses had all been disabled when I passed through the battery.

From the wording of the 5th line from the bottom, it would be inferred that I had been relieved of my command. This was not so.

When the 1st LH Brigade had withdrawn from the hills the Turks who had followed them attacked our right rear. One squadron of the 1st Light Horse Regiment was sent to check them on the left of the Canterbury Regiment, then came the squadron of the Dorsets on their left, and then the 8th LH Regt was sent back to close the gap between the Dorsets and the 4th LH Brigade. All these troops were placed under the command of the 4th LH Brigade. (Note. - General Godwin's action was timely and very welcome.) The enemy had moved two batteries from Red Hill and placed them in the foothills north of our position. Throughout the day he was trying to work round to our right rear. One squadron of the 4th LH Regt suffered heavily from reverse fire and had to be drawn further back.

At 1800 written instructions were received as follows - "The whole of the ANZACS and attached troops will withdraw to original bivouacs West of the Jordan commencing at 1845." General Chaytor told me over the telephone on no account to delay the withdrawal, as two columns of Turks had been observed coming down from the vicinity of El Haud with the intention of cutting us off. The Brigade and attached troops withdrew by units from the left, the 12th, 11th, and 4th LH Regts and attached M Guns at 1845, 8th LH Regt at 1915, Dorsets at 1930, 1st LH at 1945, CMR at 2000, each unit informing the unit on its right when it was withdrawing. This programme was carried out without a hitch and the withdrawal showed a good example of discipline at a critical time of all the troops concerned.

In September 1918 the 4th LH Regt captured a Turkish officer in Damascus who had been employed in the Intelligence section. In discussing the operations at Jisr Ed Damiye and the Jordan valley, he said: "We thought we had you cornered, but this was not so, for the English ride where the Turks cannot walk. Besides, we had over 2,000 casualties."

Hope this helps.

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Guest Bill Woerlee

Mates

Here is the Cameron account.

post-7100-1143411300.jpg

The comments are self explanatory in light of all the above postings.

Cheers

Bill

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Wow, an impressive piece of research Bill. You have just doubled (at least) my knowledge of this conflict. Reading through though, I couldn't help thinking of the individual trooper or soldier. Many,many miles from home, days of marching with little idea of the big picture, and then being ordered to attack a hill occupied by unknown enemy forces. Being killed on the Western Front seems to be a tragedy; losing your life in an attack that required a huge effort even to reach, and yet is barely remembered, in a land that owed allegience to neither side, seems especially sad. I hope you reach publication.

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Guest Bill Woerlee

Mates

For those short of seeing, here is the transcript of the Cameron letter. I might add that I have a copy of the original letter in his handwriting and thus if you see any difference between the below version and the typed version, it is specifically because the typist made the usual typographical errors.

This chapter deals with an operation that attracted much attention at the time, and I am doubtful if officially the facts were ever known. I am sorry if "I did this or that" appears rather often in my statement, but since you want all the information possible, I couldn't help it.

My impression of the description of this incident is that General Grant's report failed to acknowledge the responsibility of having made several serious tactical errors. Any statement that I make can be verified by responsible officers of the 4th LH Brigade.

On the 30th our dispositions appeared to me to be obviously wrong, and I suggested to General Grant that the 4th Regiment be moved from our right flank to fill the gap towards Red Hill; also that the guns be placed in a position on a spur further south and opposite Red Hill, where they could cover our front and if necessary have a "get away". I had my regiment astride the Es Salt track, my right flank being protected by rugged country almost impassable to the enemy.

On the morning of the 31st I asked Colonel Bourchier to support me in a further appeal to General Grant. We persuaded him to come up on to the high ground behind BHQ and pointed out the danger of our position. finally he agreed to the suggestion and ordered Colonel Bourchier to move his regiment. We had walked about twenty yards towards the camp when I said to General Grant: "It's too late, Sir, we will now go and fight them." the enemy had launched their attack. Our batteries and BHQ came under heavy shell fire.

It is not generally known that BHQ withdrew without notifying regimental CO's. Brigade could not be reached on the field telephone. A runner reported them gone, we didn't know where, but guessed somewhere south. The enemy were now pushing us hard. Bourchier came to my command post, not being able to find BHQ. We could plainly see the enemy progress towards Rd Hill, and knew that immediate action was necessary. Withdrawal along the plain or foothills was now impossible, so I arranged with Bourchier that I would hold the enemy while he withdrew behind me. He, owing to the roughness of the country and being hampered by his wounded, made very slow work of it. By this time one squadron of the 11th LH on my left were in sore straits. They could not find their regimental or Bde HQ. I explained the position to the squadron commander and ordered him to pull out and join his regiment somewhere to the south.

We knew that the fate of General Hodgson;'s force depended on us holding the line at Black Hill where we covered the Umm Esh Shert track. We were committed to fighting to a finish on this line. Worn out, the men, suffering from thirst and want of sleep, never did better. In holding the enemy during that withdrawal, the 4th LH Brigade performed its most important service during the campaign. Although the failure of the general operation started with our brigade at Jesr ed Damiye, nevertheless sufficient credit has never been given for the stubborn resistance to the heavy enemy attacks during those days. The withdrawal of the 12th and 4th LH Regiments through the rugged hills and the race to get in front of the enemy was no mean effort. In my opinion, it was much more worthy of commendation than our Beersheba action.

Hope this makes the reading easier.

Cheers

Bill

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Gidday Bill,

This stuff is gold mate. I am really enjoying the information you have presented from the dusty archives of the AWM...I don’t think much of this info has ever seen the ‘light of day’. I can’t remember much of it being referred to in bibliographies that I have read.

I don’t have a problem if you want to cane Grant, but I seem to remember that he may have asked Chauvel (I think? ) for additional forces. That does not detract from the fact that evidence points to the fact that the forces under his command appear not have been placed particularly well. The fact that the guns were lost basically ensured that the matter would receive additional investigation. Not so much because of the casuslaties. It was a serious matter (loss of the guns) and the 'heads' would have felt that someone should have been accountable. The RHA actions were subsequently vindicated in latter investigation.

Plus the fact that the Beersheba stunt had received such widely favourable press only a few months earlier, ensured that Grant would inevitably be spared from being the public humiliation of being sent home – as he was a senior officer he would never have faced a FCGM.

Cheers

G

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Guest Bill Woerlee

Dave

G'day mate

Thanks for your comments.

The Es Salt Raid was a scandal at many levels and consequently many of the failings were deliberately hushed up for the sake of towing the party line rather than producing accurate history. Both Bean and Gullett are complicit with the cover up which obviously came from higher up. The truth was uncomfortable then as it is now. There are folks who howl at me in rage for exposing these documents because it upsets the pastoral view of history as a triumphalist vehicle with the Palestine campaign being a smooth run operation guided by the genius of Chauvel and Allenby. These documents demonstrate that this is far from reality. But those schooled in the myth of Palestine resent having their comfort zone examined. I have been called some pretty nasty things as a consequence. As Voltaire said: "Burning a book is no argument." In this case, hiding a document does not change history. Truth has its own intrinsic quality.

As the time comes, I will be analysing the Es Salt raid in great detail and it will cause a perceptional problem with the official historians. Now that I am in possession of the documents - copies albeit - they cannot be conveniently lost or misfiled. At the moment, these ramblings are my way of exposing the evidence in a systematic manner. If folks want to make their own conclusions then they now have the documents to do so. No cover up.

Cheers

Bill

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Guest Bill Woerlee

Geoff

G'day mate

I will be caning Grant because of his lack of ability and no desire to consult with those who knew better. However, one also has to deal with the commanders who put him there in the first place knowing full well that he was a dud. It has been suggested that Grant and Chauvel were from the Queensland clique which owed loyalty to each other regardless of the use-by date brought on by developing exigencies and the necessity of war. General Howard Vyse was another dud in this clique.

If Grant cops a serve for being the incompetent on the ground, then Chauvel must cop a bigger serve for being the commander who put him there.

Cheers

Bill

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Geoff

G'day mate

I will be caning Grant because of his lack of ability and no desire to consult with those who knew better. However, one also has to deal with the commanders who put him there in the first place knowing full well that he was a dud. It has been suggested that Grant and Chauvel were from the Queensland clique which owed loyalty to each other regardless of the use-by date brought on by developing exigencies and the necessity of war.

If Grant cops a serve for being the incompetent on the ground, then Chauvel must cop a bigger serve for being the commander who put him there.

Cheers

Bill

Fair enough mate,,for me it's generally a matter of apportionment- when it comes to blame. It rarely rests with the individual. But i freely admit the doc's you have presented on this thread have altered my opinion on Grant. Thanks agian for puttin in the time & effort to present them...

Cheers

G

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Guest Bill Woerlee

Geoff

One thought on the Beesheba Stunt. Grant had been publicly lionised for that event. He received instant gongs and was feted in Australia, a place devoid of Australian heroes that the mud on the Western Front could never produce. Politically it was impossible to expose Grant as a dud by the AIF. That would have called into question the competence of the AIF command structure and thus given a wavering public a definite feeling of a lack of confidence in the whole affair. Don't forget, we are now at the stage of 50,000 deaths, two lost referrenda and growing anti-war feelings. A scandal like this hitting the headlines could be the straw that broke the Australian public camel's back. No way was Grant ever going to be done in under any circumstances.

So then Gullett has a problem. Write the truth or keep to the party line. Bean has a similar problem. They choose the political decision to duck. They have an investment in a War Memorial so a bunfight like this could derail just about everything. So they used the tried and true method of "duck and cover".

Cheers

Bill

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Geoff

So then Gullett has a problem. Write the truth or keep to the party line. Bean has a similar problem. They choose the political decision to duck. They have an investment in a War Memorial so a bunfight like this could derail just about everything. So they used the tried and true method of "duck and cover".

Cheers

Bill

Gidday Bill-

Gullet/Bean wrote what they felt they could under the circumstances. I think they chose to omit the contentious issues like Es Salt. If you saying that they self-imposed a form of censorship in areas that were damaging I would agree. The contentious would never make it to print, particularly as many of the key players were still alive when the history was being written.

Men who were in the Permanent Forces in Aust prior to the War were in a very powerful position to appoint men that they ‘liked’ I have no doubt that Chauvel (and Antill) had their favourites. But I would need more evidence, than Grant & Chauvel were both Queenslanders to confirm that they had a special clique. Chauvel would not have risked his (growing) reputation if he felt Grant was a complete liability. Remember Antill was dumped in 1916, when it was found that he was out of his depth,,& he even had his supporters post Nek..

Cheers

G

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Guest Bill Woerlee

Geoff

G'day mate

I don't blame Gullett and Bean for what they did - they were creatures of their time. They are no better or worse than our current crop of bureaucratic intellectuals who mouth off the Sergeant Shultz defence wherein that despite all the evidence, they know nothing and see nothing. As the scandals keep rolling on, it is just SSDD. At least we can rectify their "duck and cover" activity.

Despite all of that, I am not quite sure why Gullett accepted the Grant story of Beersheba and the delivery of orders in preference to that of Chauvel. No one's reputation was at stake - Beersheba was already won. And yet in Gullett we have Grant at a face to face with Chauvel getting his orders to charge. This was just pure fantasy. The Chauvel letter posted above clearly demonstrates that.

It puzzles me greatly.

Cheers

Bill

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Mates,

Bean, poor fellow did this for a number of our battles.

He could not expose those Generals of High office and their circle of friends is so true.

There is a bit about this in "Dont Forget me cobber" by Corfield.

Cheers

S.B

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Guest Bill Woerlee

Steve

G'day mate

You are absolutely right - Bean fought a great many battles and won them - the AWM is the prize we have on the one hand and the Official Histories on the other. My comments do not blame Bean or Gullett - they did what they could in the circumstances.

Luckily they also had the conscience to leave the documents so that their actions could become available to future generations and bring the truth - the truth that frightened them - into the open. While they may have covered up some of the stories, they had the integrity to leave a paper trail for us to follow and make amends. For that I am grateful - we can finish the job the Bean and Gullett just couldn't during their lives for all the reasons you have stated.

Cheers

Bill

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Despite all of that, I am not quite sure why Gullett accepted the Grant story of Beersheba and the delivery of orders in preference to that of Chauvel. No one's reputation was at stake - Beersheba was already won. And yet in Gullett we have Grant at a face to face with Chauvel getting his orders to charge. This was just pure fantasy. The Chauvel letter posted above clearly demonstrates that.

It puzzles me greatly.

Cheers

Bill

Sorry I can't answer that question mate. But I note that the first edition of the Official History was published in 1923. Perhaps, having depicted the story the first time in 1923 Gullet was reticent to make changes, as I cannot believe the variance went unnoticed by the author. The next edition published in 1935 could have reflected the information provided by Chauvel. It does seem quite strange. Perhaps the story had already assumed a romantic stature, that the author felt loathe to amend. (i.e an Australian giving another Australian the order to take Beerseba)

And I agree we are very fortunate that the paper trail you have uncovered still exists. It's availability is a miracle given the timeframe and the information it contains. This kind of stuff is great-All these draft comments are pure gold and adds more to my understanding of the events.

Cheers

G.

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Guest Bill Woerlee

Mates

Here is the account of Colonel Bailey of the 11th LHR.

post-7100-1143518940.jpg

His second paragraph is a polite way of remonstrating against Grant who suggested that he did not need the 3rd LHB to help him defend the Es Salt road. The other thing to note is that while Grant was not relieved of his command, he was placed under the direct orders of Chaytor, the second best thing to being relieved - relieved in everything but name.

Cheers

Bill

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Guest Bill Woerlee

Mates

Here are the comments of Maurie Bouchier, commander of the 4th LHR.

post-7100-1143519291.jpg

The thing to note here is the description of absolute chaos. Cameron has given him permission to retreat - if you read Cameron's letter. So Bouchier orders his regiment to withdraw.

Cheers

Bill

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Guest Bill Woerlee

Mates

As mentioned above, the thing that stands out clearly in the letters from the various commanders is the chaos that descended upon the 4th LHB. There was a definite lack of leadership - the commanders' comments tell of that. It is clear that during the beginning of the Turkish counter attack, the leadership lines broke down with the Regimental commanders. No one, including Grant, talks about orders and repositioning - the commanders did what they could for their own regiments to save their own men. There was no plan. The fact that Chaytor was given command and restorred some semblance of order indicates that Chauvel already knew that the expedition to Es Salt had gone pear shaped and he was trying to salvage something out of a complete mess.

Cheers

Bill

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Guest Bill Woerlee

Mates

Now to answer the final question asked:

"My question is, is it possible that men in Grant's situation are judged from battle to battle or do they develop a character because of the cumulative nature of their leadership? So does he learn his "art" or is he treated well by historians?"

A general is only as good as his last battle so in essence, Grant too is judged from battle to battle. It is clear that Grant did not grow in his art as he becomes less and less capable of leading his men as time goes on. Possibly he believed the propaganda about Beersheba and thought that he was invincible. He has no feelings of guilt about his role at Es Salt so I think he genuinely thought he performed well - just that everyone else failed, even the Turks. Indeed, as bold as brass, he cites stories that are clearly untrue - the one about his meeting with Chauvel before the Beesheba charge comes immediately to mind. This penchant for self glorification is confirmed by Cameron and his scathing letter.

In the end, I think politics determined that Grant was always going to get a good hearing, especially after the war. It would be highly embarrassing to admit that they built up a dud - better to praise him up for the sake of unity. The commanders who suffered under him did the right thing and kept their knives out of public view when they back stabbed him.

So in conclusion, Grant's performance deteriorated from every engagement. He was a dud and proved it to everyone. Chauvel found it difficult to admit to this but eventually did. Now it is only the Australian people who are left to be informed.

Cheers

Bill

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Guest Bill Woerlee

Mates

After dealing with Grant, we need to look at the role played by Chauvel - this will give us a clue as to the nature of the Es Salt Raid.

Here is a note from LC Wilson written on 6 May 1918.

post-7100-1143615369.jpg

This letter reveals a great deal about the plans that lay behind the action.

Cheers

Bill

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Guest Bill Woerlee

Mates

It is the last sentence in the penultimate paragraph that gives the game away and describes the nature of the action. Here we have Wilson saying:

"This recommendation was approved and would have been carried out after dark on the evening of the 3rd May, but orders were received to withdraw from Es Salt that evening."

This was a transaction that occurred between Chauvel and Wilson. In other words, Wilson expected to stay in occupation for quite some time. He had no expectation of retreating after a period of time. This was not a raid but an occupation.

Yet after the order to retire, it was given the name of raid which carries with it the notion that the troops would come in with the express purpose of retiring in good order once the strategic objectives were achieved.

Cheers

Bill

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Guest Bill Woerlee

Mates

To see exactly what the plan was at Es Salt, it is instructive to see the aims of the attack.

Below is a summary by LC Wilson written on 8 May 1918, a couple days after the event.

post-7100-1143690883.jpg

Commentary to follow.

Cheers

Bill

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Guest Bill Woerlee

Mates

In his usual style, Wilson attacks the problem at all different levels going from the grand plan right down to his role in the plan.

The aim of the plan from Descorps was to take territory with the obvious end result of setting up a base from which to capture Amman and cut the Hejaz Railway thus creating a massive POW camp in the south along the track. The tactical and strategic implications are clear - it would remove in an instant some 20,000 Turkish troops from their area of operation. While the Turks were free to roam around along the Hejaz Railroad, they were effectively removed from the Turkish war effort.

The one thing that is very clear is the notion that there was going to be no movement from the hills once they entered. In other words, this was not a raid.

The roll attached to the 4th LHB was to capture the vital passes with the assistance of the 3rd LHB. When Grant gave the all clear, the 3rd was to ride up into the hills asap to capture all the essential points. The 5th Mounted Brigade was to exploit the opening.

The number of troops allocated for this task - the AMD - was to small for the opposition. Chauvel did not commit many resources to this project which basically means that Allenby did not give him the resources. On the plains, the Light Horse were good at exploiting weaknesses but in the hills where physical conditions were different, they were likely to be fragmented. Any enemy attack needed only to be strong at one point to secure the failure of the mission. They knew the stength of the attack and also the choke point.

What surprises me is that Chauvel did not place much of a premium on the choke point. To ensure the safety of his Division he placed one brigade at the point in which the whole attack required to remain in their hands.

The Turks threw 5,000 men against a Light Horse Brigade which when fully manned only produces 1800 men of which only about 1400 rifles were actually available for service which meant effectively covering 800 yards of front line rather than the miles they were actually given.

So we have a poor plan putting a Brigade to cover territory more appropriate for at minimum two brigades with a commander who was himself a dud. We now have the makings of a tragedy with almost a rout.

The line comes from Allenby who orders Chauvel to undertake an invasion on the cheap. Indeed, Allenby wanted Chauvel to eventually capture Deraa, the logical jumping off point to Damascus. Chauvel reluctantly agrees and sends his AMD off without properly assessing the risks. We have seen this tendency before at Romani when the 5th LHR galloped straight into a trap of slush and slime. In other words, poor assessment of the task. Despite the earlier raid, it appears as though nothing had been learned.

Finally we have Grant at the bottom of the food chain.

Cheers

Bill

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