The First World War. Germany and Austria-Hungary

[RodB]

I've been reading this hoping to get some idea of what was going on on the Central Powers side.

On page 70 he makes the, to me, strange statement : "Neither the Committee of Imperial Defence nor the Cabinet was prepared to debate the details of continental commitment. Hence, when the War Council met on 5 August 1914, the day after Britain's declaration of war against Germany, there existed no plans concerning military strategy, the likely size of the BEF, or its probable destination and deployment".

I was under the impression that, to the contrary, the size, destination and deployment of the BEF (to Maubeuge), and the necessary deployment of the British and French navies, had been agreed informally with the French over the past few years, and that all the mobilization details had been worked out. The smooth and fast arrival of the BEF on the French left wing surely proves that ?

[truthergw]

I've been reading this hoping to get some idea of what was going on on the Central Powers side.

On page 70 he makes the, to me, strange statement : "Neither the Committee of Imperial Defence nor the Cabinet was prepared to debate the details of continental commitment. Hence, when the War Council met on 5 August 1914, the day after Britain's declaration of war against Germany, there existed no plans concerning military strategy, the likely size of the BEF, or its probable destination and deployment".

I was under the impression that, to the contrary, the size, destination and deployment of the BEF (to Maubeuge), and the necessary deployment of the British and French navies, had been agreed informally with the French over the past few years, and that all the mobilization details had been worked out. The smooth and fast arrival of the BEF on the French left wing surely proves that ?

I have been puzzled by this myself. I think the usual explanation is that no formal agreements had been made so no fixed arrangements. The usual formula was that there had been informal conversations between French and British staffs. The reality seems to be that plans had been laid to a fair degree of detail but they had no legal status, i.e. the existence of the plans could not be used as an excuse for implementing them. It's not impossible that I have got this all wrong.

[Dikke Bertha]

Hello

I would agree with truthergw. No formal plans were agreed at Cabinet level although Wilson had been in informal discussions with the French for a few years. It was a matter of putting Wilson's plans into place despite the misgivings expressed by Kitchener. The French referred to this as Plan W (for Wilson).

[RodB]

Thanks Dikke - this is the first I have heard of Plan W.. all the (English language) texts I've read refer to Plan 17, not to Plan 17 - W, but a websearch returns a few entries. What do French texts call the Plan ?

Would it be fair to say that French planning assumed that this agreement was rocksolid despite it only being verbal ? Certainly Ambassador Cambon's dealings with Grey in August indicate this.. there were mutterings about loss of British honour. Perhaps this is an example where there is no clear borderline between fact and mythology.

[Dikke Bertha]

Hello Rodb

Plan 17 was a mobilisation plan and not a plan in the same sense as the Schlieffen Plan. It was not a plan for the invasion of Germany. Plan W was the polite French reference to the British land contribution.

When war appeared inevitable, the French were very anxious that the British Government would row in behind them but there was no firm military alliance which committed Britain to military support as was the case with France and Russia. British moral support and naval support would have been sufficient in the beginning. The 10 kilometre/5 kilometre no entry zone on the Franco German border was to ensure that France could never be accused of being the aggressor and the refusal by the French Government to allow Joffre to cross the Belgian border was to ensure that British public opinion would stay on their side.

There was no guarantee that Britain would come in on the French side especially if the French had crossed into Belgium nor was there an immediate rush of support for the French in the British Cabinet when war became inevitable.

Joffre's initial plans did not involve the use of the BEF but it had been agreed between Wilson and the French General Staff that a BEF of 6 infantry divisions and one cavalry division would take up position on the French left near Maubege. I think the French were keen to have a BEF on French soil as this would effectively commit the British Government irrevocably.

The British Government felt "honour bound" to go along with what Wilson had agreed to even though Kitchener had certain misgivings. The committment was reduced to 4 Divisions and a cavalry division. Kitchener would have delayed their departure if he had had his way until the situation had developed between the French and German armies.

All interesting stuff don't you think.

Regards

[truthergw]

Hello Rodb

..................

There was no guarantee that Britain would come in on the French side especially if the French had crossed into Belgium nor was there an immediate rush of support for the French in the British Cabinet when war became inevitable.

...........................

All interesting stuff don't you think.

Regards

I agree, fascinating and a great place to play " what if ". It was not inconceivable that Britain would mount a watching brief with regard to her army and put a naval blockade in place to fulfill her commitment to Belgium. The great danger from this, as fas as France was concerned, was that GB would be free to disengage if Germany made the proper responses. The BEF was tiny in comparison to the forces fielded by France and the Central Powers. but it represented a binding commitment.

[Dikke Bertha]

I agree - the perfect "what if" scenario. Didn't Churchill say "the terrible ifs accumulate" in reference to this period?

If Kitchener had had his way he would have kept the BEF in the UK and deployed it after the French and German armies had clashed. If the Germans won the campaign then I think it is safe to say that the BEF would never have engaged.

Given the 4 years slaughter to follow maybe that would have been a cheaper result?

More ifs

Regards

[RodB]

I feel that a quick German victory would have resulted in a sort of German-led NATO and a Mitteleuropa dominated by Germany. Their losses would have been relatively low so they wouldn't have demanded the ridiculous reparations that came up later to justify a long war to the public. The US and its ally Britain would have pursued a Cold War for many years afterwards, but eventually everybody would have calmed down and got on with life. After 40 years of world condemnation and economic over-extension Germany wiould have withdrawn from occupied territories. Hmm. sounds familiar.

[Dikke Bertha]

RodB

I think you are wandering a little off subject. Obviously a quick victory by either side would have resulted in a shorter and cheaper war. The consequences of German victory is quite another debate but the consequences of an Allied victory were not exactly glorious!

In your scenario what makes you think that the US and its ally Britain would have conducted a Cold War for 40 years. The US was not really interested in getting involved in European affairs at that time. Any British hostility to Germany at that time was mainly economical. Germany had already occupied Alsace and Lorraine for over 40 years and did not "withdraw". I think you may be thinking with modern viewpoints.

Regards

[RodB]

I was referring to Belgium and Russian Poland as the occupied territories that Germany would have faced complaints about. Alsace-Moselle had been part of the Holy Roman Empire, and Germany had just as much claim on them as France.

My thought on a cold war following was because the emergence of a superpower Germany which practised a political doctrine of anti-liberal Kaizerism and neo-Listian economics, would have been just as threatening to the "liberal" mercantile-monopolist-capitalist system of USA and Britain as Bolshevism was - and the US and Britain in effect started the Cold War against the USSR by sending troops there in 1919. So I can't see Britain and the USA accepting a Europe run by Germany without resistance. So if Germany rather than USSR had arisen as the "bad guys" I can imagine Britain and USA reacting similarly.

I'm not sure whether Belgium might have quite happily settled down as a province within Germany, but it certainly would have had symbolic meaning for USA and Britain in the same way "occupied" Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania etc had after 1945.