Biography of Kitchener

[Dikke Bertha]

I saw a book today (cannot remember the author) about Kitchener.

The title describes him as "the architect of victory"

Not sure I would agree with that conclusion.

Anybody any views?

[DMcNay]

It might be the book Andy Hollinger is discussing here:

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...showtopic=48549

[AndyHollinger]

Actually two different books ... this one in 1977 and the new one, trying to popularize his impact ... published 2005

[Dikke Bertha]

Hello again.

Sorry for the confusion.

The book I am looking at is "Kitchener - Architect of Victory - Artisan of Peace" by ? Pollock

I did not buy the book so I can comment on the text. My query is the title. Could Kitchener be called "The Architect of Victory" (or the "Artisan of peace" for that matter - seems strange given that he did not live to see the peace).

Regards

[Chris_Baker]

On the basis that he was instrumental in committing Britain to building an appropriately sized army for a long continental war - once the politicians had committed us to such a war - yes, there is some truth to it.

[Dikke Bertha]

Perhaps "one of the contributors to victory" rather than the architect of victory or the artisan of peace.

Do you think his contribution warrants such an accolade?

[AndyHollinger]

Well, a lot goes into definitions... Kitchener's army probably wouldn't have happened without him ... although the Yeomanry could have expanded to meet the need ... so in the sense that a mass army was needed, yes ... apart from that, I'd say he was a key player but left early and was a marginal player in affairs other than that.

[Dikke Bertha]

Thanks Andy.

I would say that it a very fair summing up. He did play a role in 1914. He did foresee a long war. His visit to Sir John French was needed and effective. A key player in the beginning but not an architect of victory or an artisan of peace.

I have read very many biographies but I do tend to avoid them if there are other sources as I find that biographers tend to become very subjective and lose their objectivity and proportion. I usually end up disliking the person before I get to the end of the book. Having said that I confess that I recently purchased a new biography of Petain.

Regards

[bob lembke]

"Dikke Bertha",

Totally OT, and personal as well, but can I assume that "Dikke" is Flemish for "Dicke"?

I will comment that so many of the advanced students of WW I are Flemish, and I see no evidence at all of Wallons being interested in the Great War. Or are they all posting on French fora?

Bob Lembke

[RodB]

My .05 c on this is that Kitchener got sucked into the continental delusion that "more men is better" - Britain lost the opportunity to fight smarter - to realize that what was really needed was a huge logistical support network for its small elite frontline forces. Looking back now, in such a confined space more men = more casualties. Kitchener lost the chance to fight smarter, using the Empire's financial and industrial power to wage the war on British rather than Continental terms. The French had won the Marne, the crisis was over. To me Kitchener, far from being an architect of victory, was another donkey.

[truthergw]

My .05 c on this is that Kitchener got sucked into the continental delusion that "more men is better" - Britain lost the opportunity to fight smarter - to realize that what was really needed was a huge logistical support network for its small elite frontline forces. Looking back now, in such a confined space more men = more casualties. Kitchener lost the chance to fight smarter, using the Empire's financial and industrial power to wage the war on British rather than Continental terms. The French had won the Marne, the crisis was over. To me Kitchener, far from being an architect of victory, was another donkey.

I think that there is a large amount of hindsight being used here. If I am not mistaken, you are suggesting that Kitchener should have employed Blitzkrieg strategies and tactics. That would have required a completely different approach to how to make war. That took the lessons learned over the whole of the war and was only tentatively being put into effect in 1918. Like all soldiers, Kitchener's thinking was based on the last war he fought with mistakes corrected (hopefully).

[RodB]

No, I'm going back to the US civil war, where the North got as many men killed as it could put in the field.. it was ultimately its greater economy and productive capacity that defeated the South. Europeans didn't seem to learn anything from this. Neither did they learn from the Crimea. The message was that modern warfare was all about logistics and support resources, and money to pay for it. Seems to me if all that is in place, the fewer men the better at the front... at least that's what Donald Rumsfeld told me in the pub last night. I just get the feeling that generals in WWI were so gungho precisely because they had so many men to waste, it was a hindrance to them getting smart. Certainly the Australians thought so.

[FAAAEd]

I think that there is a large amount of hindsight being used here. If I am not mistaken, you are suggesting that Kitchener should have employed Blitzkrieg strategies and tactics. That would have required a completely different approach to how to make war. That took the lessons learned over the whole of the war and was only tentatively being put into effect in 1918. Like all soldiers, Kitchener's thinking was based on the last war he fought with mistakes corrected (hopefully).

Of course Blitzkrieg strategies required technologies not available in Kitchener's time, that is armoured brigades and close ground support from the air. The old style cavalry charge was only of limited use, and in very special circumstances, due to the proliferation of the machine gun. Trouble was, many of the top brass were from the cavalry and didn't appear to have the flrexibility of mind that characterised 'Jeb' Stuart's operations during the USCW.

[Terry_Reeves]

I'm a little confounded by some of the comments made here. This was a war that was fought on a scale that was hitherto unknown. It was the first war fought by fully industrialised nations. It was not just a European war, but an inter-continental war.

How does anyone think that this war coud have been fought in any other way once the battle liines had settled down after mid-1915 against a very determined enemy, who was not going to be shifted come what may? No chance of outflanking or encirclement, that is quite clear. The stalemate was only going to be broken by tackling the enemy head on, principally with artillery and infantry, and that meant manpower.

The imperatives of fully industrialised warfare also brought about new ideas in terms of logistics. For the first time,civilians were brought into the military system to improve the logistics organisation in a theatre of war. By this I refer to Sir Eric Geddes and and others , such as senior managers in the rail and shipping industries who were given commissions , honorary or otherwise,. These men were accepted by the military, which does not paint a picture of dyed in the wool, "top brass"who were "from the cavalry" and who had no flexibilty. Not forgetting of course, that the many improvements in terms of logistics, and new or improved technologies - allied to tactics - took time to develop. From this came the development of the all arms battle, a concept still in use today. That is not to say that there were not bad senior commanders, nor that Kitchener ws the sole architect of victory, but at least he had the foresight to see that manpwer was probably the most critical element in this new type of warfare.

By the way, K of K spent his regimental career as a Sapper officer.

Terry Reeves

[FAAAEd]

I'm a little confounded by some of the comments made here. This was a war that was fought on a scale that was hitherto unknown. It was the first war fought by fully industrialised nations. It was not just a European war, but an inter-continental war.

Terry Reeves

I have snipped most of your post not because there are no points there worth comment but because you appear to be 'fired up' by some of my comments in this thread which were not further amplified because I have made a number of comments on a thread similar in nature where I had already pointed out that this was a new kind of warfare that Britain's army had to be geraed up to fight. All credit to Kitchener for initiative in some aspects of this.

I fully understand, and commented on, the need for industry to gear up for manufacturing all items from arms and munitions to clothing and rations for the troops in the field, and much else. I also mentioned, including an example in this thread, that there were strategic imperatives behind decisions to open offensives.

However, in the specific example that I gave, Gough attempted a further advance in the early stages of Ypres III without ensuring that enough artillery was in place to provide the weight of supressive fire required to achieve success without excessive casualties. This in marked contrast to the gains made by French divisions on adjacent sections of the line who did have the necessary artillery.

One would have thought that lessons learned in previous offensives should have been employed here. Of course the weather on this front did not help but then the going ahead despite the weather, with all the ensuing difficulties is surely an example of the 'inflexability of mind' alluded to.

Your being confounded is noted but I am confounded that a commentator of your long experience should be confounded thus.

[Dikke Bertha]

"Dikke Bertha",

Totally OT, and personal as well, but can I assume that "Dikke" is Flemish for "Dicke"?

I will comment that so many of the advanced students of WW I are Flemish, and I see no evidence at all of Wallons being interested in the Great War. Or are they all posting on French fora?

Bob Lembke

Hello Bob,

Staying OT and personal. My name is Dikke Bertha, my father before me was Dikke Bertha as was his father before him and there are seven other Dikke Berthas in my family. None of us are Belgian.

Regards

Dikke Bertha