Liddle Hart.

[armourersergeant]

I have been wondering if Liddel Hart can be considered the Father of the Great Wars myths of imcompetant generals and the lions being led by Donkeys type attitude.

Whilst we all may have a lot to be greatful to the man for the intrest he has perhaps created in the subject it does appear that he almost alone, or altleast by his direction' seems to have fathered the WW1 myths of incompetance and butchery.

It is sobering to think that if he had been killed (God Forbid) on the Somme battlefield that History may have shone differently on Haig and others. I have recently read an article from a book ( 'Look To Your Front' studies in the first world war, by the commission for military history.) and I had not realised how much inflence he carried almost to his death on the writers as recently as the 1960's and as such only since his death have others been able to make in roads into the myths perhaps created by him and his followers.

i must state that the article does say that it would be unfair to blame LH for all that has transpired but i cant help wondering myself.

Comments?

Arm.

[Charles Fair]

Arm, as always another great question.

LH is certainly an intriguing character, and his reputation/influence does seem to have undergone a roller coaster ride since 1918. From what I can remember he does seem to have been broadly in favour of what the BEF had achieved in the war in the 1920s, but changed his opinions in the 1930s as he switched to favouring a strategy of the 'indirect approach' i.e. an Easterner in WW1 terms. He had an almost reverential view of the generals at the end of the war, but this does seem to have changed to viewing them as Donkeys by the 30s.

He had definitely fallen out of favour during WW2, and appears to have had some bitterness towards his neglect at this time. He seems to have made attempts to demonstrate that the actions of Guderian, Manstein et al in WW2 were a result of his writings in the 1930s - he saw himself as a prophet unheeded in his own land. His reputation was resurrected in the 1960s - I think in connection with his influence on the Israeli military (1967) and thinking on nuclear strategy.

LHs attitude towards WW1 and the generals is studied in the first third of "Liddell Hart and the Weight of History" by John J Mearsheimer pub Cornell/Brasseys 1988. This is not a biography, but a very detailed study of LHs writings and their influence. Mearsheimer, a Prof at U Chicago is often highly critical of LH, and believes that he was too critical of the generals.

Rather more sympathetic is Brian Bonds "Liddell Hart - A Study of His Military Thought" pub Cassell 1977. Bond studied under LH in the 1960s. Bonds essay on LH in 'Look To Your Front' is much more critical, and acknowledges his influence on Alan Clark's "The Donkeys" for which LH vetted the draft, 'Oh What a Lovely War' and other works of the 60s.

A more conventional biography of LH is Alex Danchev's "Alchemist of War: The life of Basil Liddell Hart" pub Weidenfeld & Nicholson. Danchev makes the point that having been wounded on the Somme and not gone back to France LH was 'a prime candidate for early war bias' (p 106) i.e. he had not had a chance to really see and understand the BEF's capability and sucess in the 100 days. Danchev's view is similar to that of Bond in the LTYF essay.

Other sources are: a chapter on LH in "The Education of An Army - British Military Thought 1815-1940" by Jay Luvaas pub Cassell 1965. Also "Studies in British Military Thought - Debates with Fuller and Liddell Hart" by Brian Holden Reid pub U Nebraska 1998

Whatever his weaknesses, I think LH will continue to exert an influence on military thought in the future, but will be viewed more cautiously than before.

[armourersergeant]

Charles,

I have to confess to not having read much regarding LH or by him. For want of a better phrase he was a God looking down. I of course knew that he was critical of many things that happened and a great patron of Mobile and tank warfare. I did also think that Guderian was actually a follower of his ideas, you seem to say this is not the case and that he claimed him to be, that is interesting.

I have adopted a knew motto which is at the bottom of my signatiure. I am fast realising that there are many Myths in this subject of which i thought i was aware but i am realising that much i first learnt fifteen/twenty years ago was some what uneducated. My recent return in depth to this topic is proving very enlightening.

His God like status in which i thought he was held is sometimes baffling and I for one was guilty of believing what he said was true to the point where i would not have challenged it for fear of 'ridicule'. This is rather a stupid stance considering i have never read much about or by him in depth. Which goes to show how easy it is for wrong opinions to be formed by the uneducated.

It is interesting that he was 'pro generals' in the twenties and 'anti Generals' in the thirties, which ironically seems to imply that he took three times as long to change his ideas as did the Generals who he later criticised. Thank god they were not so slow during the four years they were in command in adapting to new ideas.

Still i would agree he certainly does seem to be a great/intriguing character and worhty of some praise for the commitment and dedication he served to the topic.

Arm.

[Hedley Malloch]

Arm: I am not sure what you mean when you describe it as 'a myth'?

What do you mean?

Regards

[armourersergeant]

Soory,

I refer to Myth in the sense of the war as a whole and how it was conducted by the generals. When i grew up they were all butchers and bunglers and others stood out as the good guys. I relised many years ago that the generals were not all bad but the mass conception by many is that they were usless. A good example is a conversation i had with my brother three weeks ago, and he should know better.

i have also since learnt whilst returning to the great war in recent months that much else i had thought to be fact is not queit correct. i have in studying general Snow come across alot of 'Myth' regarding this chap much quoted by senior historians but hardly any are backed up with fact and direct sources. that does not of course mean it is wrong.

Sorry for the 'speed' of this but i am of to work soon and have got to get ready.

hope that clarifies.

Arm.

[Neil Burns]

Hi Arm and all,

Again a great topic!

I think a few things outside of Liddel Hart have influenced the Donkey School (if I may call it such). First the casualties for ground gained is appalling in the First World War and I know one must take inot account logistics,communications etc. but still to the layman thousands of casualties for a few hundred yards is a mind-boggling waste of life. Contrast this with the German Spring 1918 Offensives where speed and some mobility returned and again it contrasts poorly with Allied efforts of the prior years.

The rise of Germany in the Thirties and the Second World War also had a huge impact. The fact that Germany re-armed for another round just 20 years later gave the "Great War for Civilisation" a rather hollow ring. Add to that WWII being such a mobile, fast paced series of campaigns that, with some exceptions, showed real results could only reflect negatively on the First World War Commanders.

I may be biased in this but I also think that increased study in the US Civil War also had an impact. Massed rifle fire, trenches , improved artillery, conscript armies etc are all present and as the ACW was perceived more an more as the first Modern or industrial war people began to wonder why so little seeemed to be learned from it from 1865 to 1914 (Though I think the Austro-Prussian and Franco Prussian and Boer War had a hand in that).

So even though LH may have been the spokesman for this I think he was not a voice in the wilderness.

Take care,

Neil

[armourersergeant]

I think that the Staff college studied alot about the American civil war, especially about Jackson and manouvering etc but i take your point that it was possibly not taken in the overall context as a large war, after all it was just those silly colonials killing each other.

By definition if we credit LH with the mastery of the WW1 myth we would have to conceed that he was all powerful and that if he had chose to back the Generals he would have turned favour toward them, which i think would not have been as easy as the path he took. When studied this way i think we can perhaps see that the conditions and losses made it easier for many to accept that it must have been because somebody bungled there job.

Bloody hell i've changed my opinion twice in one day.

Arm.

[Charles Fair]

I did also think that Guderian was actually a follower of his ideas, you seem to say this is not the case and that he claimed him to be,  that is interesting.

There is a whole chapter on LH and the German generals in the Mearsheimer book. It also comes up in the last chapter of the Danchev biography. The Germans were working things out for themselves in the 1930s, and LHs writings of the 1920s may have had some influence, if only to confirm to the Germans that they were on the right lines. However, LH was only one writer - others e.g. Fuller, Martel, and the Russian Marshal Tuschaevsky had as much prescience and/or influence. LH was not unique and certainly did not have the German generals as his acolytes on bended knee as he would have you think.

Guderians 'Achtung Panzer!' is a case in point. This is an excellent analysis of the tank in WW1 and suggestions for its future employment. Written in 1937, LH is only mentioned once, and does not appear in the bibliography. (It was republished in English in 1999 by Brockhampton press with an introduction by Paul Harris (Sandhurst lecturer?) and is well worth a read)

Although LH was writing some good stuff about the use of armour in the 1920s he was getting it badly wrong in the 1930s in which he switched back to a strong belief in the power of defence, and the futility of offense. In this he was in line with many British generals. He completely failed to forsee the fall of France in 1940. This 'badly damaged LH's reputation' (Mearsheimer p.178) partly because his writings influenced some of the defence policy decisions of the 1930, decisions which contributed to the defeat in 1940.

He managed to spin his 'lost reputation' of WW2 into the god like status he had attained in the 1960s. One was was through constant stress on his more prescient writings in the 20s, whilst conveniently ingoring the dodgy stuff of the 30s.

The other way was that immediately after WW2 he spent a lot of time with the German generals - this included helping them arrange translators and publishers, often in return for acknowldeging the supposed influence of LH.

Guderian's memoirs is another example. First published in German, they included no reference to LH. However, the English edition included a new paragraph in which LH is extolled above all others as the inspiration behind the early victories of the panzers. This paragraph was put there at LHs own request when Guderian was indebted to him in various ways. Another similar case concerns the insertion of a footnote in the Rommel papers. (Both cases are discussed in Danchev and Mearsheimer.)

Whilst LH undoubtedly had some influence on German thinking, he managed to spin it out of all proportion.

His God like status in which i thought he was held is sometimes baffling and I for one was guilty of believing what he said was true to the point where i would not have challenged it for fear of 'ridicule'.

Part of the problem is that he has been seen as god-like and not challenged by those outside a narrow specialism. It is easy to pick his name as the preeminent British mil historian of the 20th century, and use his writings uncritically to give credibility to one's case. If there is one name of a military historian that the general public could name it would probably be him first, then probably someone like John Keegan. I suspect the media are no different.

I think he is now being seen properly (by historians at least) as an influential historical figure, but not as an infallible god on a pedestal. His writings should be used with care, considering the context of when, why and who they were written for. He was after all as prone to fallibility as the rest of us.

[uncle bill]

Not forgetting Estienne and even De Gaulle

[Muerrisch]

Regarding lives lost per yard [or meter] gained, we never seem to hear of the first German onslaught August 1914 in these pejorative terms. Nor a little affair called Verdun. Always the Somme, always Passchendaele. Now, why would that be?

The big aspect of the Donkeys' military careers, is that, when the war was winnable, they won it. Or was it winnable before, if so, the date escapes me?

And I sit firmly on the fence re. the Donkeys in general and Haig in particular. But, with the aid ot the best professional army we ever sent overseas, we avoided losing in 1914, and with the best civilian and conscript army we have ever had, led by the same [mostly] Donkeys , we won.

Speaks for itself.

[Neil Burns]

Hi Arm,

When I mentioned studying the ACW I meant more the experiences of Fredericksburg, Petersburgh and Cold Harbor where entrenchments and concentrated rifle fire decimated attacking infantry units. Everybody loves to study Jackson's Valley Campaign and the tenacity of Grants Vicksburg campaign but I think that was only halgf the story.

LB 1914-18,

Very true the Germans also made some horrendous decisions but there was also a greater degree of accountability. German mistakes led to officers losing their jobs. Excepting of course the Kaiser! Passchendale decimated British reserves for little advantage and made the German offensives of Spring 1918 that much more successfull in my opinion.

Also 2 and a half million doughboys in France had at least a little bit to do with the Germans losing their will to resist. The French also had their share of Bunglers and I rarely see anyone rallying to Neville's defense it seems to be a real Haig issue.

Personally I think every country was woefully let down by their leadership from 1914-18 which led to the political unrest between the wars.

Take care,

Neil

[Charles Fair]

Regarding lives lost per yard [or meter] gained, we never seem to hear of the first German onslaught August 1914 in these pejorative terms.  Nor a little affair called Verdun.  Always the Somme, always Passchendaele.  Now, why would that be?

We don't do we? This obession with the Western Front and 1916-17 in particular is a peculiarly British thing. It is now deeply ingrained in our national psyche - presumably because our total casualties in WW1 were about double those of WW1. I think it also has something to do with WW2 clearly being a 'just war' the barbarities of Nazism clearly had to be defeated. The causes of WW1 are now lost to the national consciousness - defending something as un-PC as the British Empire lends WW1 an ambiguity that WW2 does not have.

To just about any other nation WW2 surpasses WW1 in horror - global casualties 3 times greater. Stalingrad?

I have spoken to French colleagues and friends on this many times. They do not share our angst about WW1 - The Germans invaded, they had to be defeated and kicked out. This was achieved - sure, there were some mistakes on the way e.g. Nivelle - but the Allies won. They see WW1 as history not polemic.

I believe French angst is reserved for WW2. First the shame of 1940, and the mistakes leading up to it that made defeat inevtable. Then Vichy and collaboration, and the resistance etc. I dont believe that France will be ready to really understand WW2 and see it as history until the last of that generation have died.

But, with the aid ot the best professional army we ever sent overseas, we avoided losing in 1914, and with the best civilian and conscript army we have ever had, led by the same [mostly] Donkeys , we won.

Agreed, we came nowhere near losing in 1914 like we did in 1940. There were British politicians wanting to make peace with Germany after Dunkirk. (But for some strange reason Dunkirk is remembered in the British national psyche as a marvellous victory!) Things never got as bad in WW1 as they did in 1940 and the fall of Singapore - events which to me are the nadir of British military achievement in the 20th Century. Strange that those generals never get considered as Donkeys while those who finally got it right in 1918 are.

[Jonathan Saunders]

I do have trouble with Haig particularly and was adamant to keep out of this thread but I just cant help myself! If you dangle the carrot long enough the donkey (no pun intended) cant be held responsible for its actions.

This is probably going to be a ramble so I can get it all off my chest in one go. It isn’t directly aimed at any one post but will in a round about way reply to some of the comments made and ask questions of others.

To begin, I think the entrance at Langmarck and the term “Slaughter of the Innocents” does reflect that Germany is at least aware of the unnecessary loss of life they sustained in the early months of the war. I have little knowledge to comment on Verdun or its similarities with the Somme offensive. What distresses me about the Somme is the way in which lives were thrown away. Others may have different reasons to think positively or negatively about the battle and those that commanded it but for me it is the … negligence and I cant think of any other word suitable. Was it Hawthorn Crater blown 10 minutes before the advance? No sound strategy of using the barrage (by this I mean employment of a creeping barrage, or stop-starting the barrage during the previous week’s bombardment to ensure the Germans were unaware whether a cease fire meant advance or not, and to try and catch them out and inflict more casualties on them), the idea of men walking over No Mans Land with full packs, the fact that a lot of reports from raids into No Man’s Land earlier that morning confirmed the wire had not been cut (throws up all sorts of questions re the interpretation of intelligence and same being wilfully ignored – in comparison German intelligence, I believe, told them exactly when the attack would take place), the change from “bite and hold” to a breakthrough offensive and was this because Haig just had to involve his beloved cavalry, and so the questions go on (Chris - I have avoided mentioning tanks). In WW2 Monty lost a lot of men defeating a much smaller Africa Corps at Tobruk but he achieved success and by and large that meant his tactics were successful – men did not die unnecessarily or in vain. For me it doesn’t wash that eventual victory in 1918 absolved Haig (or Rawlinson) from blame for the Somme and between those dates we had Third Ypres – what was it, 2.2m shells landing on reclaimed land a few feet above water level, followed by expecting men to fight and guns be carried through the resultant mud! It just doesn’t make sense and this isn’t a case of hindsight – it must have been obvious what would happen. Then 1918, would Haig have still achieved victory if the German army hadn’t over-run their resources, both human and materials. How does Haig’s offensives compare to the ease with which the Germans were able to advance in March 1918? What does this say about Haig? Then when victory was achieved, was Haig really the genius behind it – would we still have achieved victory after 4 years of fighting if Haig had been sacked in 1916 or 1917, or hadnt been CinC at all? And was it mostly the same Generals in 1918 – Haig and Rawlinson were there. Allenby had been packed off to Egypt, Gough had been sent home, there was never any controversy regarding Plumer’s ability. What of Currie, Monash, Birdwood and Byng who had all developed and secured high ranking promotion since 1916. Did they actually learn from the appalling mistakes that Haig had presided over, thus victory occurring despite of Haig and not because of him.

I know Ive asked for it but if I cant get answers from this forum then I wont find them anywhere else so shot me down in flames, tell me Im naïve, Im wrong, but tell me why because I have formulated these views from both pro and anti sources. I don’t mean to be controversial and I know Haig particularly is a bit of a taboo subject because of the passion he invokes both for and against, and I know I should steer clear of this subject but for the life of me I cant see what essential ingredient Haig had that I am missing.

[Neil Burns]

Hi All,

I know the Somme was done at the request of the French but I think Signals brings up a very good point with Third Ypres (Passchendale). I think the theory that the Somme was carried on beyond his point of termination due to French pressure contrasts with his own decision to continue Passchendale for much too long.

I would use the example of Eisenhower who mad some costly mistakes (Hurtgen Forest) which cost many men their lives but the Allies did eventually win the war but I don't think victory really absolves culpability.

I hate to constantly refer to the US Civil War but I beg your indulgence as it is a point of reference for me, but in Grant's memoirs he clearly shows his remorse and regret for the attack at Cold Harbor (against an entrenched enemy) which cost so many men their lives. He makes no attempt to justify this error of judgement in the context of the whole which I think many Haig apologists do.

i hope this makes sense!

Take care,

Neil

My apologies I posted this under the wrong topic!

[armourersergeant]

Signals,

The thing i have the most trouble with involving any generalship of the great war is spliting the what we can see know and what we believe must have been obvious even given that they were trained and nurtured in a comletley differenent socity to the one we live today, and the what was not obvious gien the times and facts of the day.I believe more and more that we can never really judge how they did because we were not there under the constraints both real and socila that they lived under. It is in some ways like saying that those born into Nazi society that became Hitler youth should have realsied what they had been taught was wrong. ( i realise this is a bad example but.)

I have grave doubts about Haig and try to stay objective but it is not easy. I believe that he was often quilty of interfering when he should not have and at other times letting his Generals do as they plesaed when they should not.

Learning is a part of the human process and some do it faster than others but we do not become expert over night. The British generals and the Dominions went from small scale colonial wars to a full large scale war to which they had no knowledge and very little planning.

I will not say you are wrong but i can not say you are right. The points you make must have some validaty but its how we judge them in the context of the times and the vacum they were in. This for me is the crux and i have difficulty in evaluating this.

Hope that made sense

Arm.