Pre-War Enlistment & Training (RFA)

[richardprice]

Can anyone tell me what the standard routine for training and allocation to Brigades would have been for men joining the RFA prior to 1914? Were they allocated to brigades garrisoned locally for training or trained centrally and then allocated to a brigade? How long would training last for and what basic skills would a Gunner be taught? How were troops moved around the UK - rail? Any help/comments/suggestions would be most appreciated.

Thanks

Richard

[joseph]

Richard,

Im not quite sure if this answers all your questions but gives an overview.

Before 1914 the dispersion of the British army across the Empire and the British Isles greatly affected its training. Many posts were small, and brigades were fragmented to save money or support the civil government rather than concentrated for formation or combined arms training. There was an annual training cycle with two seasons. First came individual training, to teach the soldier the specific skills needed to do his job; in the artillery, this included training a gun detachment as a whole. Then, collective training (including firing practice) molded the guns into a battery. Partly because so many units were scattered around the empire, most training time was spent at quite low levels: battery, company, squadron, or battalion. There was some time allotted for brigade-level training, if a full brigade could be assembled. On top of this were maneuvers, but these did not happen every year, nor were all units involved.

Individual training could be done in barracks and on parade grounds, but firing could only take place on the ranges. There were several artillery ranges in the British Isles, but most were only barely large enough for modern artillery. This limited the number of possible firing positions and target areas, so practice camps became ritualized, with targets popping up in the same spots year after year. Commanders learned what the range to the target area was, and over time, since all units would hit the well-remembered targets, the training lost most of its value except to see which unit could open fire first. These problems of utterly fictitious firing conditions were compounded by the fact that no more than six hundred shells were allowed for annual firing, and that counted both those fired in collective training and at practice camps. This meant that a gun would fire only a few rounds per "tactical situation," and it gave the entire proceedings an air of unreality. One step taken at some (but not all) camps was to conduct joint tactical exercises with the infantry, encouraged by the 'affiliation' of infantry and artillery brigades after 1907. But again these could be mere ritual, since the guns had to stop firing just when the infantry reached the crucial moment of assault. The decline in standards of officers and NCOs (particularly battery commanders and Battery Quarter Master Sergeants) was a perennial complaint of senior officers. Yet if prewar tactical ideas quickly went out of date, many of the individual skills did not. These were useful building blocks, but were hardly comprehensive.

These comments cannot be uniformly applied, because there was no tactical uniformity within the Royal Artillery. Batteries trained separately, brigades had different ideas, and divisions were equally diverse, and to top things off, many batteries were not even assigned to divisions. Even though the CRA's peacetime duties centered around training, they had relatively little discernible input. They could fuss around their brigade commanders, but it certainly did not help that some CRA’s were less than impressive to their subordinates. One officer later wrote, phrasing it delicately, that F. D. V. Wing (CRA of the 5th Division) "may have given the impression that he knew little about Gunnery detail." There was no central school for artillery officers or gunners—even though some senior officers wanted one—probably because it would undermine the authority of the division commanders.

The Royal Artillery was divided into the Mounted Branch (Royal Horse Artillery and Royal Field Artillery) and Dismounted Branch (Royal Garrison Artillery), and the two had different training. Garrison Artillery had more time for individual training, since their units traveled less and did not have to spend time on stables duties. This may have improved their gun drill, but they had even less firing practice than their colleagues. Moreover, their training was less realistic than the field artillery's because it omitted a crucial target category, the "obstacles" that would be an important wartime target. Some very advanced ideas developed in the RGA, including gun calibration, so that first shots would be more accurate, but here too the lack of a central training authority meant that improved training was the product of an individual crusade by one man, Walter Bland. Siege artillery was specifically criticized for moving and firing slowly, which was unfair judgment since the siege artillery had no assigned horses (civilian carters had to be hired for maneuvers), and since heavy guns always fire more slowly than lighter ones. Maneuvers should have put the final polish on training, but there were many difficulties. To save money, many units deployed at half strength, and commanders had to balance the need for simulating realistic movements against the bills for crop damage that would result. Maneuvers were the best chance for joint training with infantry and cavalry, but the cooperation was often a one-way street. To the extent that there was ever official criticism of the artillery for their role in joint maneuvers, the artillery bent over backwards to do what the infantry and cavalry officers wanted.

The Place of the Artillery

in the British Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918

Regards Charles

[edwin astill]

The German artillery seemed to have performed better than the British - certainly in the early stages of the War. Perhaps a question of equal and parallel interest is "How did the German artillery train before the war?"

Thanks, Chales, for the interesting response.

Edwin Astill

[richardprice]

Charles,

Thanks for this very informative background; given the rise of engineering within Victorian and Edwardian society the Artillery Regiment must have seemed to be the technical arm of the Army.

I guess however not much has changed over the years - realistic training must have seemed a drain on the public purse. The reason for my question is that my Grandfather joined up at London in 1910 and seems to have travelled to Maryhill, Glasgow and then on to Ballincolig in Southern Ireland to guard the powder mill there before travelling to Colderton as part of the 124 Brigade - New Army in 1915 and then on to St Omer. From your information it seems his travels were mainly connected with the movement of his brigade and not part of a training programme. In the time of horse and cart the distances seem large - although I guess rail transport might have been used.

Thanks again for the information.

Regards

Richard

Richard,

Im not quite sure if this answers all your questions but gives an overview.

Before 1914 the dispersion of the British army across the Empire and the British Isles greatly affected its training. Many posts were small, and brigades were fragmented to save money or support the civil government rather than concentrated for formation or combined arms training. There was an annual training cycle with two seasons. First came individual training, to teach the soldier the specific skills needed to do his job; in the artillery, this included training a gun detachment as a whole. Then, collective training (including firing practice) molded the guns into a battery. Partly because so many units were scattered around the empire, most training time was spent at quite low levels: battery, company, squadron, or battalion. There was some time allotted for brigade-level training, if a full brigade could be assembled. On top of this were maneuvers, but these did not happen every year, nor were all units involved.

Individual training could be done in barracks and on parade grounds, but firing could only take place on the ranges. There were several artillery ranges in the British Isles, but most were only barely large enough for modern artillery. This limited the number of possible firing positions and target areas, so practice camps became ritualized, with targets popping up in the same spots year after year. Commanders learned what the range to the target area was, and over time, since all units would hit the well-remembered targets, the training lost most of its value except to see which unit could open fire first. These problems of utterly fictitious firing conditions were compounded by the fact that no more than six hundred shells were allowed for annual firing, and that counted both those fired in collective training and at practice camps. This meant that a gun would fire only a few rounds per "tactical situation," and it gave the entire proceedings an air of unreality. One step taken at some (but not all) camps was to conduct joint tactical exercises with the infantry, encouraged by the 'affiliation' of infantry and artillery brigades after 1907. But again these could be mere ritual, since the guns had to stop firing just when the infantry reached the crucial moment of assault. The decline in standards of officers and NCOs (particularly battery commanders and Battery Quarter Master Sergeants) was a perennial complaint of senior officers. Yet if prewar tactical ideas quickly went out of date, many of the individual skills did not. These were useful building blocks, but were hardly comprehensive.

These comments cannot be uniformly applied, because there was no tactical uniformity within the Royal Artillery. Batteries trained separately, brigades had different ideas, and divisions were equally diverse, and to top things off, many batteries were not even assigned to divisions. Even though the CRA's peacetime duties centered around training, they had relatively little discernible input. They could fuss around their brigade commanders, but it certainly did not help that some CRA’s were less than impressive to their subordinates. One officer later wrote, phrasing it delicately, that F. D. V. Wing (CRA of the 5th Division) "may have given the impression that he knew little about Gunnery detail." There was no central school for artillery officers or gunners—even though some senior officers wanted one—probably because it would undermine the authority of the division commanders.

The Royal Artillery was divided into the Mounted Branch (Royal Horse Artillery and Royal Field Artillery) and Dismounted Branch (Royal Garrison Artillery), and the two had different training. Garrison Artillery had more time for individual training, since their units traveled less and did not have to spend time on stables duties. This may have improved their gun drill, but they had even less firing practice than their colleagues. Moreover, their training was less realistic than the field artillery's because it omitted a crucial target category, the "obstacles" that would be an important wartime target. Some very advanced ideas developed in the RGA, including gun calibration, so that first shots would be more accurate, but here too the lack of a central training authority meant that improved training was the product of an individual crusade by one man, Walter Bland. Siege artillery was specifically criticized for moving and firing slowly, which was unfair judgment since the siege artillery had no assigned horses (civilian carters had to be hired for maneuvers), and since heavy guns always fire more slowly than lighter ones. Maneuvers should have put the final polish on training, but there were many difficulties. To save money, many units deployed at half strength, and commanders had to balance the need for simulating realistic movements against the bills for crop damage that would result. Maneuvers were the best chance for joint training with infantry and cavalry, but the cooperation was often a one-way street. To the extent that there was ever official criticism of the artillery for their role in joint maneuvers, the artillery bent over backwards to do what the infantry and cavalry officers wanted.

The Place of the Artillery

in the British Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918

Regards Charles

[Keith_history_buff]

Within the corps of Royal Artillery, there were 2,552 officers and 50,808 other ranks serving under Regular terms of service as at 1 August 1914. Of these, 1,376 officers and 27.377 other ranks were in the R.H.A. and R.F.A. with the balance in the R.G.A.

Source:
Statistics of the military effort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914-1920 ( SMEBE )

Section 12: Growth of the Royal Artillery, pg 162