Cavalry at Arras

[withcall]

To quote Jonathan Nicholls' 'Cheerful Sacrifice', ch2, p27.."the Cavalry Corps, consisting of three divisions, was to be ready to exploit success and burst out through the gap created by the infantry."

These divisions were the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Cavalry divisions.

Does anyone have an opinion as to why the British High Command still thought that cavalry were able to break through gaps.? Bear in mind that this was 1917. The army had been through Mons, Le Cateau, 1st Marne. the Aisne, 1st Ypres. Neuve Chapelle, Gallipoli, 2nd Ypres, Aubers Ridge, Festubert, Loos, the Somme.

When was the last time prior to spring 1917, in British military history, that the cavalry had broken through anything?

What evidence does anyone think the planners used to inform their decisions?

[Tom Morgan]

Could it be that the planners thought that the opportunity for a cavalry break-through was, in fact, highly unlikely, but there was a "senior member of the team" who wanted that clause to be inserted in the plan? In these circumstances, there was nothing to be lost by keeping him happy.

Tom

[armourersergeant]

Had a breakthrough occurred and the Cavalry had not been on hand to exploit a German retreat, they would have had egg on their faces! and been rightly critcised for bad planning.

regards

Arm

[Chris_Baker]

The purpose of the cavalry was not to break through - that was the job of the artillery and infantry. They were there to exploit a break through. There were no chances to do this at Arras, but opportunities did present themselves at Cambrai later in the year and on the Somme in 1918. Of course by then, the fast but vulnerable cavalry had been supplemeneted by the armoured - but 8mph tops - Whippet tank.

[Robert Dunlop]

Please don't forget what happened at Megiddo. It was a superb example of the exploitation of a breakthrough. There had been previous attempts and plans to achieve this that never came off. But once the conditions were right (and a commander could never be sure in advance), cavalry (and light horsemen) had a major impact.

Robert

[ianw]

Firstly if you have 3 expensive cavalry divisions you do have to be seen to be at least planning to do something with them!

However, in defence of my grandfather's trade, our cavalry were very good soldiers indeed who shot and fought as well as many infantrymen. Their horses were capable, in the right conditions, of delivering them to critical parts of the battlefield very quickly indeed. They didn't just add tone to the brawl.

[truthergw]

.................................

Does anyone have an opinion as to why the British High Command still thought that cavalry were able to break through gaps.? Bear in mind that this was 1917. The army had been through Mons, Le Cateau, 1st Marne. the Aisne, 1st Ypres. Neuve Chapelle, Gallipoli, 2nd Ypres, Aubers Ridge, Festubert, Loos, the Somme.

When was the last time prior to spring 1917, in British military history, that the cavalry had broken through anything?

What evidence does anyone think the planners used to inform their decisions?

For the period of the first three battles you mention, the cavalry on all sides was actively engaged and performing heroically. As Ian says, British cavalry performed as mounted infantry. For long stretches of the retreat to the Marne, the French cavalry were the covering screen on the BEF's left flank.

[withcall]

Fair point about the cavalry involvement in autumn 1914, and yes, Megiddo was a great success. I'm not for a minute being critical of the soldierly qualities of the cavalry, but there is still the point about exploiting the breakthrough, given what British commanders must have known about the quality of the terrain east of Arras, especially after a massive artillery bombardment. A wet spring after a cold and miserable winter in northern France poses different problems from September in Palestine. Good soldiers that they were, the Turks didn't have a Hindenburg Line to fight behind. These conditions, and the absence of any recent precedents of successful offensive action by cavalry are not just apparent through hindsight - they must have been apparent at the time. Also, when they got caught by modern weaponry, as they did at Monchy, the cavalry were even more vulnerable than infantry.

[spike10764]

I think at the time, due to the unreliability and still lesser numbers of tanks, their limitations, and the still evolving methods of their use, the Cavalry were still the only arm of exploitation of a breakthrough.

[truthergw]

Fair point about the cavalry involvement in autumn 1914, and yes, Megiddo was a great success. I'm not for a minute being critical of the soldierly qualities of the cavalry, but there is still the point about exploiting the breakthrough, given what British commanders must have known about the quality of the terrain east of Arras, especially after a massive artillery bombardment. A wet spring after a cold and miserable winter in northern France poses different problems from September in Palestine. Good soldiers that they were, the Turks didn't have a Hindenburg Line to fight behind. These conditions, and the absence of any recent precedents of successful offensive action by cavalry are not just apparent through hindsight - they must have been apparent at the time. Also, when they got caught by modern weaponry, as they did at Monchy, the cavalry were even more vulnerable than infantry.

One of the most frustrating things in trench fighting, for the high command, was the way infantry bogged down in the trenches. Even after a successful attack they could only occupy the trenches they had captured. The dream of having the cavalry get past that holdup and have several thousand troops through into the country beyond, free to manoeuvre and perform the tactical movements they had practised at staff college must have been very powerful. It was the way they had learnt to make war, it is what infantry and cavalry were for.

[Robert Dunlop]

Withcall, you rightly point to a number of very specific differences between Arras and Megiddo. It is important, however, to also look at the generalities. Prior to Megiddo, the Ottoman Army had been stubborn in defence. First and Second Gaza illustrated their ability to withstand the British assaults. As the war progressed, it was becoming harder to maintain the high standards. By Megiddo, the Ottoman reserves were stretched. It finally became possible to manoeuvre the reserves away from the decisive point of attack. Once the breakthrough was achieved, ie the line of defence was broken, then a breakout was possible. It was the lack of reserves in the area of the breakout that enabled the success of Megiddo, IMHO, rather than the terrain per se. You could argue (rightly) that the terrain contributed to the lack of mobility for the Ottoman reserves - the rail network of the Western Front made it much easier to get reserves into position. It was recognised, however, that a similar situation might pertain on the Western Front if and when the Germans ran out of reserves. Put it another way, an army will reach a point where it can no longer function as a coherent defensive entity. Historical analysis provided many examples of this principle. It need not be a 'dream' as such, just one of many axioms of war if you will. The real question was: when would such an event occur? As it turned out, it was not until August 8th 1918 that Ludendorff came to the realisation that he no longer had the reserves. The German army never collapsed as such. It was able to shorten its lines, freeing up limited reserves but was constantly being worn down in the final months. In hindsight, we know it did not collapse before the Armistice. But who could have known that at the time? And then it would not just be Allenby's name to go in history as masterminding a breakout with cavalry. He maintained a significant mobile force in a climate/terrain that was seriously anti-horses, at least from a water-supply perspective. It paid off. The British cavalry might have too.

Robert

[withcall]

Good points from the replies. My final words on the subject - 'truthergw' used the word "dream" Yes, it was a dream, based on God-knows-what reality. He also makes the valid point that they had been taught and trained in a particular vision of how war might be fought, given a certain set of circumstances. It's unfair, I suppose, of me or anyone else to expect generals to be prophets and visionaries. They aren't now, and they weren't then.

[armourersergeant]

This thread is a classic case, I think, of how difficult it is to not use hindsight when looking at WW1.

The Cavalry was still the fastest weapon to pursue a retreating army at that time, if however vunerable to well dug in men. We can look at this and say 'by God cavalry and a breakthrough and pursuit, just not gonna happen'.

regards

Arm

[Robert Dunlop]

I would caution against believing that the cavalry were taught and trained for a vision of cavalry breakout and exploitation. It was recognised by many (but not all) cavalry officers that the role of the cavalry was changing/had changed significantly. It is not the case, despite many comments to this effect, that the British were alone in recognising this fact. One of the most forward-thinking cavalry officers that I have come across from the immediate pre-war period was in fact German. His books were translated into English and accompanied by introductions from no less than Sir John French.

The potential impact of small-arms and especially artillery fire was well appreciated. The latter gave particular concern because of the potential distances over which artillery could kill. Hence the need for the vital reconnaissance role of the independent (sometimes called 'army') cavalry, whose reconnaissance squadrons and patrols extended tens of miles in front of the main army. As the main armies approached, divisional cavalry patrols would take over whilst the independent cavalry divisions moved to the flanks. Here the goal was to gain dominance over the opponent's cavalry. First and foremost, this was to deny the enemy's powers of reconnaissance. If decisive battle could be precipitated against the enemy's cavalry, then the advancing cavalry was to exploit the rear areas, attacking the heavy artillery, lines of supply and delaying reinforcements.

The cavalry was meant to play a key defensive role in the event of retreat. The BEF illustrated this. The cavalry units played a significant role in supporting the infantry rear guards. Less well understood is the role that German cavalry units and their supports played in the German retreat to the Marne.

What of the deep penetration/exploitation by cavalry? I have read pre-war accounts written by cavalry officers who recognised that historically such exploitation was VERY rare. Effective pursuit and annihilation of armies is very difficult to achieve. But there were precedents. One German writer recognised the aftermath of Waterloo as just such an example. I am not sufficiently knowledgable about this phase of the battle to comment. If you look at 1914, there were several instances where cavalry came close to fulfilling this potential. The BEF was fortunate that von der Marwitz's Corps was so far west at the time contact was made (this partly explained the relative lack of German intelligence about the whereabouts of the BEF before Mons). As it was, the German cavalry only just managed to get to the Battle of le Cateau. Had they been echeloned in front of the German First Army and travelling south instead of west, the BEF would have been in real trouble. Why do I say that? Well, you only have to look at what happened when the Germans detected the split between the BEF and Lanrezac's Fifth Army after the Battle of St Quentin. The latter were in a nasty salient. The Germans frantically tried to contact Richthofen's I German Cavalry Corps, which finally responded by plunging towards Fifth Army's rear, almost reaching Soissons. It was quite touch and go for a while, but thanks to a combination of the BEF, some smart work by the French 4th Cavalry Division and some of their infantry colleagues, as well as the exhaustion of the German cavalry, disaster was staved off.

Nèry was another example of how the cavalry, in this case German, could penetrate more quickly than their infantry colleagues during battles of manoeuvre. It also showed how resolute defence could make it difficult to exploit such penetration.

Megiddo illustrated how a breakout could work with mounted troops. There were occasional charges. But the real problems for the Ottoman Army revolved around the mounted troops reaching key passes and defiles before the withdrawing infantry. These points of tactical significance were held by firepower, not the sword or lance. These tactics were anticipated before the war began. Again, it was not just the British who realised that the key to future of the cavalry lay not in the glorious charge with arme blanche but in the rapid mobility of men who were highly trained in musketry. Don't let stories of French and German cavalry carbines put you off appreciating that they could be effective weapons.

Robert

[Adam Harland]

There seems to be a belief that the exploitation that was envisgaed for the cavalry was that they were to break through and then march all the way to Berlin. The cavalry were used at Arras, taking Monchy le Preux and suffering similar rates of casualties to assaulting infantry divisions. They were in a position to quickly exploit an opportunity and beat the enemy to possession of an impotant position. In this role they acted very much in the role of mounted infantry which was one of the hallmarks of the British cavalry doctrine after the Boer war. It seems as if the only view of how cavalry were to be used was as some sort of khaki clad charge of the Light Brigade. The cavalry who took Monchy had swords ( but then infantry men had bayonets and that in a war dominated by the guns) but more importsantly they had a MG company ( one of whom won a VC) and they were fighting the same war as every one else. In an experience that was very similar to successful infantry assaults, the advanced troops attracted the response of the enemy artillery and suffered casualties as a result. Were they in as good shape the day after withdrawal from the line.....no, but neither were the assaulting infantry divisions.

It has been the tradition that the cavalry were the arm of exploitation, of taking an opportunity, and this was based upon the a reappraisal of the shock value of mounted troops in the face of firepower. This did not happen in 1914 -18, but in the 18th century. French cavalry could not break the British squares at Waterloo and suffered acordingly. Was Napoleon stupid to have cavalry in his army? In an age when most of an army moved on foot, someone on a horse would move faster.

In relation to the Great War cavalry 'debate' it is perhaps useful to consider the german offensive of 1918. Many commentators consider this to have been a model of the offensive arts, but the casualty rates were extremely high and it suffered from the unalterable fact that attacking infantry cannot intrinsically move any faster than the infantry retreating in front of them. Yes, infiltration tactics avoided the strong points of linear defences, but there was no German arm of exploitation and no strategic victory.

In the British exploitation of the victories of the second half of 1918, the use of mounted troops, and especially the support of horse drawn RFA units did allow some degree of traditional exploitation. They did not get to Berlin, or destroy the German field forces, but they did move faster than the opposition and never allowed them to settle unharried at any one position. Haig, who recognised the superiority of aerial reconnaisance in 1914, and was the first British commander ( or is that first anywhere?) to use tanks did not maintain cavalry because they were pretty but because there was not a better way of doing their job. At the end of the war it would appear that the cavalry's ability to do that job was in a terminal decline, but that they had done the job, and to some noticeable effect.

[squirrel]

Look at the traditional role of the cavalry.

Recconaisance

The charge

Persuing a retreating enemy

A mobile force to reinforce a position quickly

The first two were really out of the question after the trench lines stabilised.

The latter two were the role of mounted infantry as was recconaisance and once the trench lines were crossed it was the only force available at the time to maintain contact with the enemy, report their whereabouts and harass where circumstances permitted.

[ypresman]

Hi

First and foremost, Mr (Sir) Douglas Haig was a cavalry General.

When Lt.General (Sir) Hubert Gough took the new 3 Cavalry Div, appointed by no other than Mr Haig, there was a means to the motive.

The aim was to , as quite correctly stated before, exploit gaps in the 4th Army offense.

Between the the 3rd Army at Gommecourt, (where the 56th London Div were to link up and surround the town), and the the 4th Army at Beaumont, there was roughly a mile gap.

Mr Haig thought he could plug this and other gaps with his cavalry...

Now there was no love lost between Allenby (3rd Army) and Haig. Mr Haig ignored the concerns of Allenby, because as well as we know he was under pressure, but Mr Haig knew he was sending in an untrained army who were not ready for the job.

He saw this as a last opportunity for his beloved cavalry to play a major part in the war, support the untrained troops and shine through. It was an opportunity not to be wasted.

We know better.....ahhh hindsight.....

Cheers

Marc.

[Robert Dunlop]

Other roles for cavalry included:

Preventing the enemy's cavalry from carrying out reconnaissance.

Providing communications services between divisional and independent cavalry (typically for the purpose of reporting on reconnaissance), and within infantry divisions (supplementing cyclists and signals).

Provided mounted guards for headquarters.

Protecting exposed flanks.

Providing a mobile force to threaten the enemy's exposed flanks.

Harassing the enemy's lines of communications (as opposed to pursuit) - the best example was the operation of Gironde's squadron from the 22e Dragons, la Division de Cavalerie Provisoire. They almost captured von Kluck.

Protecting lines of communication.

Robert

[ypresman]

Hi

First and foremost, Mr (Sir) Douglas Haig was a cavalry General.

When Lt.General (Sir) Hubert Gough took the new 3 Cavalry Div, appointed by no other than Mr Haig, there was a means to the motive.

The aim was to , as quite correctly stated before, exploit gaps in the 4th Army offense.

Between the the 3rd Army at Gommecourt, (where the 56th London Div were to link up and surround the town), and the the 4th Army at Beaumont, there was roughly a mile gap.

Mr Haig thought he could plug this and other gaps with his cavalry...

Now there was no love lost between Allenby (3rd Army) and Haig. Mr Haig ignored the concerns of Allenby, because as well as we know he was under pressure, but Mr Haig knew he was sending in an untrained army who were not ready for the job.

He saw this as a last opportunity for his beloved cavalry to play a major part in the war, support the untrained troops and shine through. It was an opportunity not to be wasted.

We know better.....ahhh hindsight.....

Cheers

Marc.

OOOPS..Sorry, wrong thread, should of been the 1st July offense on the Somme...please move me...

[ypresman]

Units and Formations......