Drunken soldiers?

[bmac]

I know there are a few 46th Division experts out there so may they can comment on this. At the NA today I was ploughing through the replies commenting on the drafts of the Official History. As usual it was to do with Gommecourt but something struck me. Almost every officer from the 46th Division requested, successfully as far as I can see, that any mentions of the supposed drunkeness of a significant number of men be withdrawn from the text. Having read that chapter I can see no reference to this, however, I later came across a letter from no less an authority than Col J F C Fuller (of 'Decisive Battles of the Western World' fame) who was attached to the 37th Division, immediately to the 46th Division's left. His letter stated that there was no doubt men from the 46th Division were drunk and that this considerably hindered their attack. His suggestion was that the rum issue intended for all ranks to be used in the attack got no further than the reserve lines (because of the awful state of the communication trenches) where all of it was consumed by the follow-up waves of the various battalions. His view was that this helped explain the complete breakdown of the attack when the leading waves were left isolated in the German front lines with the support waves unable to negotiate the trenches. It might also explain a comment in the Official History about "...a party told off to carry concertina wire (who) could not for some time be got to understand that they must drop their loads and help form an attacking wave."

Mind you, Fuller also says "the command and the staff work of the 46th Division was shocking" and, of course the divisional commander was the only one sacked after 1st July (though there is a lot more to this than meets the eye!). And another officer talks about the story that the staff of the division played tennis as the battle raged.

Comments/rebuttal/confirmation anyone? I find this rather intriguing.

[John_Hartley]

Bill

I enter this one with some trepidation have contributed to the "Ulster Division were not pi**ed" thread.

Unless your research suggests otherwise, you might wish to think that 46th Div officers wanted the references removed because it wasnt true. But, perhaps, what had already built up were some myths to explain what happened - particularly by neighbouring units. I would think confirmation, or otherwise, would come from private accounts and records. The truth is out there.

John

[zooloo]

Almost every officer from the 46th Division...

For confirmation that seems to me substantial. With two questions.

How many is "almost every"?

Does anyone suggest it is rumour?

Very interesting find which ever way.

Excellent job. It is good that people like you do this, thank you.

zoo

[bmac]

By 'amost every' I would reckon 6-10. sadly I didn't make a record (others things to do).

[toofatfortakeoff]

I have found two that were on the General Staff of 46 until 8/7/16 C and T (or should that be G and T)

[zooloo]

Thanks for those bits.

Can you remember if the tone was don't print this "terrible falsehood" or "embarrassing fact"?

It's quite interesting, if it was true, is the way the Official History left a hint for those in the know.

Are there other examples of the OH being censored/edited like this?

zoo

[Borden Battery]

Here is some associated information on the 46th Division - Borden Battery

The Western Front Association

Source: http://www.westernfront.co.uk/thegreatwar/...lesomme1916.htm

Order Of Battle

For The British Expeditionary Force On The Somme July – November 1916

46th (North Midland) Division (T.F.)

Major General Hon. E.J. Montagu-Stuart-Wortley (relieved) then Major General W. Thwaites

137th Brigade

1/5th South Staffordshires

1/6th South Staffordshires

1/5th North Staffordshires

1/6th North Staffordshires

138th Brigade

1/4th Lincolns

1/5th Lincolns

1/4th Leicesters,

1/5th Leicesters

139th Brigade

1/5th Sherwood Foresters

1/6th Sherwood Foresters

1/7th Sherwood Foresters

1/8th Sherwood Foresters

Pioneers: 1/Monmouths

Also, this link with a summary by John Bourne, Centre for First World War Studies provides some collaterial background on the man and the division but no mention of drunkeness.

[bmac]

Can you remember if the tone was don't print this "terrible falsehood" or "embarrassing fact"?

It's quite interesting, if it was true, is the way the Official History left a hint for those in the know.

Are there other examples of the OH being censored/edited like this?

On the first point it really isn't clear. I don't recall anyone saying that it was definitely untrue but the impression was even if true it wasn't widespread and that putting it in the text would further blacken the Division's reputation. If you don't know, the 46th Division was the only division whose commander was immediately sacked (by Haig on 4th July) and was the only one subject to a Court of Enquiry. Given that Haig wrote in his diary on 1st July that he had begun to the think that the men of the VIII Corps (Serre/Beaumont Hamel) had not even left their trenches and as he'd expressed concerns about Hunter Weston (GOC VIII Corps) on the day before the attack this is quite extraordinary. But, of course, Haig and Montagu-Stuart-Wortley, GOC 46th Division, had 'history' and this was something of a settling of scores in my view.

Other 'censorship' I don't know and you'd have to read all of the voluminous correspondence. One thing I did come across was many letters from Lt Gen Kiggell in the late 30s trying to get Edmonds to tone down Haig's optimism about a possible breakthrough on the Somme on 1st July. Defending his boss to the end!

[Jack Sheldon]

I have already drawn attention in the thread concerning the 36th (Ulster) Division to the fact that John Keegan discussed this saga in 'The Face of Battle' under the section headed 'The Final Preliminaries' to Part 3 'The Somme'. I suggest that those interested take a look at it. There was clearly something to the story, even if certain persons acted to have it suppressed later.

Jack

[Steve Bramley]

Hi Bmac,

The 1/5th lincolnshires were in reserve in Midland trench from 8.30 a.m. They spent the whole day in this trench under shellfire receiving casualties. They received no orders to advance. They finally received orders to send up two officers per company to reconnoitre the enemy frontline. Further orders were issued for the Battalion to attack at 11 p.m, this was subsequently changed to midnight. The Battalion left the trench at 9.30 p.m. and proceeded through Fonquevillers to the front line. The communication trenches were found badly battered by shellfire, with many dead bodies in them, and very congested by stragglers and wounded coming in from no man's land. Progress was very slow and it was 11 p.m before the battalion met and received their orders from the O.C.

At 11.30 p.m. the orders from Brigade were changed and the Battalion oredered not to consolidate the front line but to retire as soon as touch with parties of Sherwood Foresters supposedly holding out in the front line was made. This was attempted in pitch blackness several subsequent order changes were made and it was obvious that there were no Sherwoods still in the enemy front line. Eventually their orders were to bring in all wounded Sherwoods that could be found. 1 officer was killed, two wounded and 45 o.r. casualties sustained in attempting this. 39 Sherwoods were rescued before dawn.

This was the last action of the 1st July 1916. The 1/5th went in to No mans land with the same task the next night and recovered 5 wounded and 21 bodies. Lt Welby received the M.C., Sgts Coppin and Willerton the MM as did L/Cpl Bowness and Pte Austin. Sgt Goodchild received the DCM for locating the body of one of his own officers Lt. Walcott.

There is little doubt that the 46th Division suffered later for having their Commanding Officer dismissed. I have yet to find out the details of why this happened to the First full Territorial Division to embark for France, a month before the 56th, who were undoubtedly of far superior in quality.

I have not found any reference to drunkeness in my research so far, so cannot help you there. I have looked through the register for Courts Martial for '15 and '16 and there are only 4 1/5th men registered, none for drunkeness. There was a large batch of Monmouthshires C's M for this offence in mid 15, but this did not seem to effect their performance at the Hohenzollern Redoubt on Oct 13th 1915.

I am going to the NA at the end of this month and would be very interested to see the references that you mention in your first post, would it be possible for you to let me know please?

Also could you point me in the right direction as regards reading material to find out how the 56th managed to dig a full trench in the middle of no mans land before the attack, I am very interested in how they managed to complete this amazing task.

Not sure if this helps any,

regards,

Steve.

[bmac]

There is little doubt that the 46th Division suffered later for having their Commanding Officer dismissed. I have yet to find out the details of why this happened to the First full Territorial Division to embark for France, a month before the 56th, who were undoubtedly of far superior in quality.

I am going to the NA at the end of this month and would be very interested to see the references that you mention in your first post, would it be possible for you to let me know please?

Also could you point me in the right direction as regards reading material to find out how the 56th managed to dig a full trench in the middle of no mans land before the attack, I am very interested in how they managed to complete this amazing task.

Steve,

On the three issues mentioned above:

1. The GOC, 46th Division, 'Eddie' Montagu-Stuart-Wortley, had severely angered Haig whilst he was GOC 1st Army. MSW was very well connected and knew the King and, when the 46th left for France to become the first territorial division (not battalion) to fight on the Western Front, the King asked MSW to write to him keeping him posted on their activities. MSW asked French and Smith Dorrien for permission which was granted. The 46th were then given the task of the Hohenzollern attack about which MSW had severe doubts. The attack went in and they suffered 4,000 casualties. Haig was in overall charge of the attack and bitterly criticised MSW after the action described by the Official History as a 'useless slaughter of infantry'. Haig then covered his back by attacking the conduct of MSW and the performance of the 46th without knowing the full facts. In his diary, Haig wrote on the 24th November 1915 "I do not think much of Maj Gen Montagu-Stuart-Wortley... and have spoken to GOC XI Corps (Haking) on the subject." Haking then asked MSW whether he wrote to the King to which MSW said yes to which Haking allegedly replied "I had incurred the severe displeasure of a higher military authority, viz. Sir Douglas Haig, GOC 1st Army". Actually MSW had ceased writing after the Hohenzollern debacle because otherwise he might have felt it necessary to criticise Haig's direction of the attack.

The sacking of MSW after Gommecourt may well have been justified on the basis of the organisation and planning of the 46th's attack and he was severely criticised by a number of senior officers. The recommendation for the sacking came from VII Corps GOC, Snow, who was himself the subject of severe criticism for the planning of the attack and who was not even in France for ten days just before the attack took place. Snow appears to have 'got his retaliation in first' by demanding the removal of MSW with which Haig was only too happy to comply. Interestingly, on the day after Snow wrote to Allenby (GOC, 3rd Army) requesting MSW's removal, a VII Corps staff officer, under Snow's name, wrote to the 46th congratulating them on their efforts.

If incompetence was the justification for MSW's sacking then several other senior officers should have been sent home with him. Otherwise it looks like a bit of score settling by Haig (and you could read all about this if only I could get some bl**dy publisher to take my manuscript on Gommecourt!!! )

2. You can read all about MSW's attempts to clear his name in his personnel file WO 138/29. When it was released the Times devoted a long article to the subject in 1998.

3. The new trench by the 56th Division (again, you could read all about this if only I could get some bl**dy publisher to take my manuscript on Gommecourt!!! )

Relevant files: 56th Division staff WO/95 2931, 167th Brigade and components WO/95 2946, 2949-50, RE field companies WO/95 2942.

It was a brilliant operation. Shame the attack was rather less so.

[Steve Bramley]

Bmac,

Thanks for the reply and the references, I will look them up.

I have also, during my research, come across high respect for MSW from the men under his command in the Division. The story seems full of intrigue.

I find the original 'drunkeness' accusations very hard to beleive, speaking only as to the character of the men that I have researched.

It must have been very disappointing for the 56th Division to have almost acheived their objective. I read an account (posted last year? on the forum) by a 56th Officer who laid the blame for the failure in no uncertain terms on the 46th Division.

The class (literally) comparison between the Divisions was very different I beleive. The 56th would have contained very very influential (in civilian life anyway) soldiers even at juinior officer level.

The 46th it would appear, certainly suffered after this, but some may say 'redeemed' themselves at Bellenglese in 1918!

I hope that you find a publisher soon, i'll look forward to reading your book.

Steve.

[Chris]

Hi all

I was trying to find this article a week ago in relation to a recent other post on drinking, but by the time i found it this thread seemed far more relevant.

'Gallant Lieutenant Hutt (Tutty to everyone) made a little speech to the 13th Scunthorpe and Brigg platoon on the eve of the battle.

I can remember his words.

"At 2 o clock i shall blow my whistle, i shall go over the top and you shall follow me! I shall be plonked and you will also probably be plonked but as long as you are able, you must go on. If your own brother is hit, you must go on."

The lads laughed.'

These are the recollections of Edward Burgess (1/5th Lincs - part of 46th Division), as he wrote them 20 years later. Whilst not talking about Gommecourt, he is referring to another attack by the 46th at the Hohenzollern redoubt on 13th Oct 1915.

Now i have always understood 'plonked' to mean pi**ed, but a language expert may feel free to correct me and suggest that in this context 'plonked' may be being used to describe being hit????

Anyway thought i would add it to the debate. (Hope you got the pics Lee)

Regards

Chris

[David T. Spurr]

The 11th Bn Royal Warwickshire was part of 112th Brigade, 37th Division.

On the first day of the Somme (1st July) the battalion was at Hannescamps, the

division providing a defensive flank and smoke bombs in support of 46 Div's attack

at Gommecourt. They were not to attack but to induce the enemy into believing

that they would do so. In the first wave of the 1 July attach the 5th Sherwood

Foresters and 7th Sherwood Foresters (two units of the 139the Bde of the 46th

Division) were to the right of the 37th. To the right of these units were 6 South

Staffordshires and 6 North Stafffordshires (two units of the 137th Bde in the 46th).

At that time Br-Gen H. Bruce Williams was GOC of the 137th Bde in the

46th Division. It is interesting to note that H. B. Williams became GOC of the

37th Division on 9 Nov 1916 and was in command of the 37th until the Division

ceased to exist in the spring of 1919.

Regards

David