The Final act

[The Plummed Goose]

By dawn on the 8th, there were still nearly 17,000 men ashore but it was decided to complete the operation after dark. The garrison now consisted of the greatly reduced 13th, 29th, 52nd and Royal Naval Divisions. The 52nd, as the result of its devastating casualties and lack of reinforcement, was down to less than 3,000 all ranks, and the 29th, which had been brought up to near its full war establishment of over 17,000 for the August battles, could muster only 4,145.

Gallipoli, Michael Hickey, p. 333 (to be continued)

[frev]

"Anxious to avoid a repeat of the Anzac evacuation, von Sanders ordered a major attack for 7 January. It opened with the heaviest bombardment of the entire campaign and the explosion of two large mines. The assault force met very stiff resistance when it sprang from the trenches; so stiff that follow-up units refused to charge. Their officers first shouted encouragement, then insults, but few men ventured into the open and near certain death. The men, it seemed, sensed that the campaign was nearly over and thus had no desire to expose themselves to now unneccessary dangers. The attack fizzled out. Next day, Ottoman guns shelled the British trenches quite severely but no more infantry charges were attempted. That night the last British units slipped away."

P. 114 - A Turkish View of Gallipoli - Canakkale. Fewster & Basarin.

[The Plummed Goose]

As night fell the front trenches began to thin out and the same measures were taken as at Anzac. The men filed out past successive check-points; fuzes were lit and barbed wire barricades drawn across the vacated trenches. Feet muffled in sandbags, the silent columns moved steadily towards the beaches. From the Asiatic shore came a steady bombardment, as had been the case every night for months. When the marching columns neared Sedd-el-Bahr, the heard the notes of the bugler posted on the ramparts, who sounded a long 'G' when he saw the flash of "Asiatic Annie's" discharge, the signal for everyone quietly to move off the track and wait in the ditch untill the shell exploded.

Gallipoli, Michael Hickey, p. 333

[Jonathan Saunders]

Must admit I thought about Joe Murray late last night and the men of the RND making their way to Sedd el Bahr for the evacuation ... and of their feelings both of joy to be leaving the Peninusla and of guilt that they were betraying those they left behind.

[michaeldr]

‘Were it not that they represent merely one episode in the greatest of all international conflicts, the various incidents that signalised the contest would be conned over by the professional fighting men of all lands to the full as keenly as of late have been the annals of the American civil War, the history of the Franco-German duel of 1870-71, and the records of the hostilities between Russia and Japan in the Far East.

An official account of the fight for the Hellespont will, we may assume, appear in due course, elucidating many matters that to-day remain obscure and bringing to light factors bearing on the issue that are at present only realised by those who were fully behind the scenes. Still, even as it is, we know enough about what occurred to be in apposition to appraise the principal occurrences of the campaign fairly correctly, and to justify our deducing theories from them as to the principles which govern certain aspects of the naval and military art. The attempt to reach Constantinople made by the Entente Powers in 1915 ranks as one of the most remarkable martial undertakings recorded in history. Not one set of operations that can be named since the conquest of Canada, so nearly embodies the ideal of amphibious warfare. On the side of the Allies, admirals and generals were continually called upon to grapple with novel tactical and administrative problems of rare complexity. Their opponents, labouring as they were under a crushing responsibility and hampered by indifferent land communications and an inefficient military system, remained undismayed and managed to keep their flag flying in despite of all. The withdrawal of the British and Australian forces from the Gallipoli Peninsula furnishes an illuminating example of what method, combined with foresight, will accomplish when war-experienced and well-disciplined troops under mettle-some leadership serve as the material to be handled by a competent staff. Nor, if the annals of campaigns ancient and modern be ransacked for deeds of heroism and of grit, will there be found a more inspiring story than the immortal tale of the first landing by Sir Ian Hamilton’s troops on Turkish soil hard by the Dardanelles.’

[the concluding lines of ‘The Dardanelles’ by Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell KCB]