On the Psychology of Military Incompetence

[Clive Maier]

On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, Norman Dixon, Pimlico, 1994, 0-7126-5889-0, paperback

First published by Jonathan Cape in 1976 and most recently in paperback by Pimlico in 1994, this is possibly an unique book by probably an unique author. Professor Norman Dixon came late to academia. He entered university as an undergraduate only after a ten-year service in the Royal Engineers. During his military career he worked mainly on bomb disposal and when he was wounded he ascribed the incident largely to his own incompetence. The judgement may have been harsh but it was perhaps what propelled him into a study of experimental psychology.

In his own preface, Dixon sets out the theme of his work with a clarity that characterises the whole book.

“This book is not an attack upon the armed forces nor upon the vast majority of senior military commanders, who in time of war succeed in tasks which would make the running of a large commercial enterprise seem child’s play by comparison. It is however, an attempt to explain how a minority of individuals come to inflict upon their fellow men depths of misery and pain virtually unknown in other walks of life.”

Dixon provides a study of the authoritarian character and the military mind. On the way in which discipline and obedience can regress into pointless stubbornness, intransigence, a refusal to learn and a denial of the evidence before the eyes. His examples range from the Crimea to World War Two and take in Cambrai and the siege of Kut but this is not primarily a work of military history. It is concerned more with traits such as intellectual ability, bullshit, character and honour, an antipathy for anything thought of as effeminate – and equating that with defensiveness. Thus to some commanders it could seem almost cissy to have a habitable trench or a parity of machine guns. The Great War provides all too many examples of commanders who tried to conserve their forces being branded as irresolute and lacking in driving force. There was a time when massive losses were seen as positively meritorious. It is a central thrust of the work to examine how such a mindset could possibly have come about.

Professor Dixon has produced a fascinating book that illuminates a type of military mind and goes far to explain what otherwise appear to be incredible failures of command. Sadly, many of the characteristics on show here will be all too familiar to those engaged in industry, commerce and politics as well.

The book is supported, as all scholarly books should be, by chapter notes, a bibliography and an adequate index. Recommended.

[mordac]

Hi Clive:

If you look on the upper right hand corner of any message YOU post, there'll be additional 'Delete' and 'Edit' buttons between the 'Report' and 'Quote' buttons. Select the 'Edit' button, make the needed corrections, and resubmit your post. Have to admit, with no built-in spell checker I've use this edit function a time or two or three...

Garth

[Clive Maier]

Thanks Garth but been there, tried that. I can edit the body of the message but not the topic title. Unless I am missing something.

Regards,

Clive

[mordac]

Hi Clive:

Sorry, how could I have missed the 'topic title' in your post? I'm putting it down to the fact it's a little after 9:00 AM here on the west coast of Canada and I haven't had my first cup of coffee yet!

The title line is locked for users to edit.

Garth (off to put the coffee on)

[andigger]

Since the Donkeys theme tends to recurr on the Forum this book might be popular. Although it does not deal directly with senior commanders (possibly Haig) and their tactics... it does deal with the impact they had.

Andy

[Justin Moretti]

I've read this book. Although I must agree with a large part of it, his analysis of Field Marshal Haig smacked too much of Freudian 'bulls*it' itself, and I felt that Dixon's automatic ascribing of Haig's asthma to neurosis was unfounded.

Not a book I would read again, I'm afraid.

[Robert Dunlop]

I have just finished this book. It may have been a ground-shaker in its time. But woefully outdated from a psychological perspective now. Dixon has done a reasonable job describing some of the attributes of incompetent commanders. Linking these to toilet training, well almost as bad as the notion that asthma is a psychosomatic disorder.

Dixon describes several features of military training and customs. He points out that these are focused on the British Armed Forces. Fair dues. But he then generalizes. Though at times there are glimpses that this view is too narrow. For example there are brief contrasts with the Australians in WW1 and the modern Israeli Army.

Haig is described as incompetent because of the large number of deaths under his command. Allenby is held up as a paragon of virtue by contrast. Yet he oversaw the period of highest daily losses - the post-Vimy Ridge phase of the Battle of Arras.

Now that Haig's diaries have been published (well significant chunks of - and should that be 'again'?), it is clear that Dixon's assessment of Haig's criticisms of everyone else is way too limited. Haig says lots of positive things about people as well. And his letters to his wife contain a softness.

Just a few of the reasons why I am with Justin on this one. "Not a book I would read again" nor recommend.

Robert

[Plan]

I read the book, years ago. Admittedly, it got some stuff that sounds silly to those who, like me, don't live in the psychology world. Just like some military stuff sounds silly to the civilian (like me). And maybe, in both cases, these things really are silly.

But I would not let that, or the fact that the authors commits the unforgivable sin of criticizing Haig, deter one from reading it.

It may have a few "particulars" wrongs, but overall, it does explains some of the mystery of "idiotic" leadership decisions, by otherwise brilliant individuals. Such as tunnel vision, lost of touch with reality. The effect of pressure, the need for success, on the assessment of reality. The notion that "we are the good guys and so will not fail".

I have exercised leadership of some form from an early age (16?), and have been a keen observer of other who leads in any capacity. And I witnessed in civilian reality a lot of the pitfalls, patterns, detailed in this book. And generally, the author explanations makes sense.

Forget that it is about the military (and criticize Haig), and look at the actions of your boss, or some previous boss, or politicians, or anyone "in power" and you may find that the book has more than a few redeeming qualities...

The thesis that military mind-frame, based on obedience, respecting rules, aggression and thus promoting those who show those abilities ("fit-in"), at the expense of those who show initiative, original thinking, is far from idiotic in the context of WW1... In fact, it may be central to WW1 leadership issue.

This is not a book that one will entirely agree with, especially the examples. It may not, for many, be worth buying. But it is worth reading, or at least attempting to, and making-up your own mind about it's thesis. It is challenging. Unless one is looking for comfort in the praise of Haig, in which case, one should avoid it...

By the way, the book covers much more than Haig, it is not ALL about Haig...

Why does everything has to revolve around Haig?

Well, maybe the answer is in the book!

Maybe the worst flaw of that book is to imply that the characteristics it studies are particular to "military". I would venture that they apply, to a large extend, to any group.

Anyway, my only advice is, read some of it, and then make-up your own mind about finishing it...

Pascal

[Justin Moretti]

Don't get me wrong, I'm quite happy to criticise Haig: Tim Travers' "The Killing Ground" and a couple of works by Prior and Wilson (The Somme, Command on the Western Front) have taken off him the shine that John Terraine laboured so hard to put there. It's not so much that Dixon criticises Haig as the psychological grounds on which he does so.

Asthma-as-neurosis and the Freudian obsession with the bowels have been passe for some time, and what seemed to me as a junior medical student to be an interesting psychological theory to explain Haig now seems to this long-since-graduated doctor to be clutching at straws. Even as a medical student, I thought deep down that it all sounded rather silly; now I am sure it IS silly. And wrong.

[Hedley Malloch]

The question raised by Dixon is why do otherwise intelligent people make and implement decisions which irrational, stupid and callous. More important, why do they persist with these decisions when it becomes clear to everyone that these decisions are irrational etc etc. Clearly this is a question of importance to students of decision making in any organisation and not just the British Army. After all we have all worked in organisations where we have been able to observe this at first hand.

Dixon's analysis is based on the insights of Freudian psychology (he is/was a Professor of Psychology), but recent years have seen a shift from the psychology of individuals to decision making in small groups. The current 'hot number' for explaining irrational decision making is Groupthink, an idea popularised by a US psychologist called Janis. The theory and the ideas behind it are simple to understand but too long to describe here, but if you are interested you can find out more at: http://www.abacon.com/commstudies/groups/groupthin.html

In my opinion Groupthink is a much better idea for explaining why strategic decision making goes badly wrong. It also shows that explanations based on 'donkeys' are an oversimplification.

I first came across Groupthink about 15 years ago on the Open University MBA Strategic Management course. A case study is needed to illustrate any idea on an MBA course. The case study used by the OU was ... the Battle of the Somme! The required background reading for MBA students was Farrar-Hockley.

More recently the idea surfaced again in the official report into the events of September 11 where it was used to explain the breakdown in decison making on that day by the US defence and aviation management agencies.

[Paul Hederer]

Clive,

Thanks for the in-depth review, and to the others that posted their views.

"regress into pointless stubbornness, intransigence, a refusal to learn and a denial of the evidence before the eyes..."

Hmm, he didn't write this about my (military) workplace, did he?

The author's thesis sounds interesting to me, and I appreciate again your post.

Paul

[Plan]

  The current 'hot number' for explaining irrational decision making is Groupthink, an idea popularised by a US psychologist called Janis.  The theory and the ideas behind it are simple to understand

Hi Hedley

Didn't Janis had something to do with transactional analysis? It rings that bell...

Anyway, from the paragraph you wrote on Groupthink, it sounds interesting, I'll look into it. Decision making tend indeed to be influenced by the "group", and how one relates to it (approval/rejection/dominance). I'd like to read on a "model" of it, so I will check it out. Unfortunatly, the link you gave appear to now be obsolete, but that is ok, such is the Internet and Google is there.

Thanks for bringing Groupthink to our(my) attention.

Paul H.:

Hmm, he didn't write this about my (military) workplace, did he?

Well, it's a bit like the Dilbert comic strip, it more or less applies to a lot of contexts! And some more than others... ::

Pascal

[Hedley Malloch]

I have not come across Janis in connection with transactional analysis, but I am not an expert on TA.

The link http://www.abacon.com/commstudies/groups/groupthink.html does not work via this page, but it does work via Google. I do not understand this.

Groupthink shifts the focus of the incomptence debate from stupid individuals ('donkeys') to groups of relatively clever people who collectively do thngs that they would never do as individuals. I have seen Janis used a couple of times in some of the better written books on strategy on the Western Front.

[AndyHollinger]

I read the book when it came out and disliked it ... I spent time in the US Army and understood it ... this thread has made me revisit my thinking about the book and it seems to explain some of the issues one finds in History, especially military history. Worth a read and its ideas are plausible as "influences" and "tendencies" ... I tend to discount authors who "have the answer" ...

[Captain Dave]

I loved this book, having played soldiers a bit myself, it was a fantastic tool to take the pi$$ out of senior officers who were not performing terribly well.