The Great War Generals on the western front

[armourersergeant]

The Great War Generals on the western front 1914-1918.

By robin Neillands

hardback or paperback

Robinsons publishers.

500 plus pages.

A big undertaking as a book for this topic but handles very well on the whole. It is perhaps a little over balanced in favour of the Generals but some still come out of it with a bad rep.On reflection after just finishing the book i can say i have a better understanding of the workings off the generals and what restrictions they had to put up with.

The book takes the frame of examining how the main generals did by studying the war on the western front as it progressed and gives you a view of not just the tatics they used but the restrictions put on them. It does not study the battle itself but how the general went about conducting it or not as the case may be.

Things i learnt that had not really sunk in before,

1)That most obviously given that the majority of the 'qualified' staff soldiers died in the main in 1914 it took some years and some hard learning before their replacements were upto scratch.

2)The French played more than a hand, directly or indirectly, in the way that the British Generals fought on the western front and this greatly effected where and how the battles were fought.

3)How many lessons were learnt by some generals and that given time they adapted to the conditions and finally came up with tatics that worked.

4)How many lessons (perhaps with apparant hindsight) they did not adopt quickly enough.

5)How very probably there were no quick fixes and that many of the so called great generals that were promoted near the end were only good because of what they learnt along the way.

On the whole then for the real expert perhaps not much for he/she to learn. For me who whilst I did not think them completely incompetant i learnt alot about the factors they had to face in accomplishing their aspect of the war.

The only thing i am disappointed with is know i have finished i am left with a feeling that perhaps it went the other way regarding who was bad. The only two names that stick on the negative side are French and Gough. No real surprise here. ok it did only cover the Army commanders and above on the whole and some of the better corps commander like Monach and Currie but I feel there were places where he could have been more critical and rightly so to the conduct of some commanders.

A wothwhile read for what i learnt and a book i would reccomned to those whow perhaps would like an over veiw of how the generals conducted the war and the restrictions they faced.

Arm.

[Mark Hone]

My wife tried reading this as a Great War primer and although she enjoyed the first sections she eventually felt bogged down in all the detail of divisions, corps etc. This is a problem with many books of this kind, particularly for those unversed in the arcana of military terminology. Neillands could have done with a glossary at the back.

Neillands has written some decent books, although he is regarded as a 'second hand' historian by some, presenting other peoples' ideas in a popular format (a charge I have also heard levelled at Richard Holmes, no less). Gary Sheffield's 'Forgotten Victory' is a clearer and less cluttered introduction to the revisionist debate and to the course of the war itself.

[Jonathan Saunders]

I, too, initially enjoyed the first chapters but then found it increasingly opinionated and contradictory and selective in its interpretation of evidence. At the same time I bought Great War Generals I also bought Nielands Attrition but I haven't bothered opening it in case it is more of the same.

[andigger]

Thought I'd bring this back up to see what others who have read it in the mean time think.

Also how does Neillands' coverage of French compare to The Little Field Marshall which just came out?

Andy

[truthergw]

Thought I'd bring this back up to see what others who have read it in the mean time think.

Also how does Neillands' coverage of French compare to The Little Field Marshall which just came out?

Andy

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I was given this book at Christmas. I read it and thought of reviewing it for the forum. Trouble is, I can't make up my mind about it. He constantly repeats his view that the generals were not all that bad, standard 'revisionist' stuff. However, the evidence he presents very often points in just the other direction. I got the impression he wanted to defend the General Staff against a charge of incompetence, I doubt if many people still think them guilty of indifference, but the evidence he presents is insufficient to clear them.

There is another thread about defining 'revisionist'. I think this book is a classic example. No new facts that I could see but a new presentation and an attempt at a new interpretation. An attempt that failed to convince me. Thought provoking and therefore worth the time but not one I would rush to recommend.

[Arnie]

Neiland jumps on the old band wagon suggesting that Liddel-Hart, Clarke and Laffin criticised the whole officer corps, when of course their criticism was limited to a handful in the period 1914 - 15. Neiland, Corrigan Holmes and the blessed Terrain by their suggestion and giving Haig and Co the credit for important actions that were rightly decisions made by Lloyd George and others they have tried to impose a new revisionist prospectus Sheffield's & Todman's Book 'Command and Control on the Western Front' States that Haig's GHQ was a shambles up to July 1918, Generals from the Staff did not visit the front line as a matter of policy, and in fact the war was won in spite of Haig and GHQ and not by them.

The Germans were quite clear why the British were superior, In John Lee's Book 'The Warlords' He describes the German Government's Tribunal as to whaf went wromng in 1918

Hans Delbruck the famous german war historian stated in his evidence that:

The great German military historian Hans Delbruck also gave evidence. Later, when Ludendorff had published his memoirs, Delbruck wrote a series of fiercely critical articles, blaming the militarism of the Great General Staff for the defeat. He compares Germany unfavourably to England, where the generals were kept under control by the govern­ment. The English understood the dictates of attritional warfare. The German generals wanted nothing less than a victory of annihilation. In staking everything on one last great offensive in 1918 the generals ignored an absolutely vital factor, the dreadful state of German supplies of food and ammunition, and the derelict transportation system servicing their armies. This desperate attempt at a 'Napoleonic' solution to Germany's dire situation threw away the advantages gained in 1917, when a negotiated peace should have been won: 'The German high command had gambled away the war intentionally and criminally and then it had done everything in its power to hinder the start of peace negotiations, asking for them only when it was too late'.4 In a bitter conclusion, he declared, 'Ludendorff changed the defensive war into a war of conquest. He did not understand the strategic requirements of the war and, by his resistance to the king and government, brought on the revolution that finally buried the German Empire'.5

On the same theme Admiral Muller an advisor to the Kaiser made this statement;

But who were our politicians during the war? Hindenburg, Luden-dorff and the political branch of the Great General Staff.... Mistake after mistake had been made, above all the casual handling of peace with Russia, whose collapse had been a boon of immeasurable value to us and should have been exploited to release troops for the West. But instead of this we conquered Latvia and Estonia and became involved with Finland - the results of an excess of megalomania. Very seldom did the actual political leaders manage to prevent the acts of violence planned by the High Command.3

Would not the British Army have been in a quandry if in 1915 if Lloyd George had not over ridden the General staff and insisted on the adoption of the Lewis Gun

Consider what would have been the Butchers Bill if the Government if the War cabinet had not kept a tight hold of reinforcements

Would we have won the U boat war if the Government had not over ruled the Admiralty and insisted on convoys

Arnie