4th Bn Grenadier Guards

[KIRKY]

Hi business friend has asked about his grandfather :

William Henshall, Private - 21222, 4th Bn Grenadier Guards, died 27th Sept

1915

Anyone tell me what they were doing that time? Any extracts from diaries?

Thanks

tony

[Ali Hollington]

Will look for further details later, but the bn attacked Hill 70 by Loos on that day. The attack seems to have been a bit muddled, as the bn gets split into two groups during the move into attack positions, both parties attacking Hill 70. Casualties amongest the officers seem heavy and the attacks come to a halt short of the german trenches. Source- The GG in the Great War by Lt-Col The Right Hon Sir Ponsonby.

I will check the divisional history and add any further info later.

Hope this helps.

Ali

[KIRKY]

Thanks for info so far, look forward to the rest!

[KIRKY]

Anyone got anymore??

Tony

[Ali Hollington]

Sorry for the delay.

Source: History of the Guards Division in the Great War 1915-1918, Cuthbert Headlam. (My copy is a Naval and Military Press reprint).

Typos- mine

Page-- 58-65

Attack by the 3rd Guards Brigade on Hill 70

"In his orders for the attack on the 27th Sept. Lord Cavan made the operation to be carried out by hte 3rd Guards Bde. against Hill 70 contingent upon the success of the 2nd Guards bde. in its assault on the Chalk Pit and Puits no. 14 bis. The reason which influenced him is obvious - with the puits still in enemy hands, the task of capturing the redoubt on Hill 70 would be infinitely more difficult as an enfilade fire could be brought to bear from this position upon nearly all the ground which would have to be crossed by the troops attacking Hill 70 from LOOS. During the course of a battle, however, owing to the difficulties of communication and general confusion, it is seldom possible to carry out orders to the letter, and, as events turned out, the 3rd Guards Bde. made its attack on Hill 70 notwithstanding the fact that the 2nd Guards Bde. had failed in its attempt to capture the Puits."

It then goes on to outline the activities of Lord Cavan that morning and the order of march to the attack, 4GG, 1WG, 2 SG, 1GG setting off from VERMELLES area about 2.30 pm. The troops deployed into artillery formation as they advance and on crossing the crest of a hill near FOSSE No. 7 came under artillery fire taking some casualties, moving approx. 1 mile into LOOS entering german communication trenches to the N and NW of LOOS.

" Unluckily, however, just as the 4th Bn GG was debouching from one of these communication trenches and entering LOOS, it encountered a violent discharge of gas-shells (no 100% is gas shells where being used at this dates so this could be a mistake). This caused some delay and confusion as the men had to put on their gas-masks, while their commanding officer, who was on his way to from Brig-General Heyworth's headquarters to rejoin his bn as it entered the town, was himself gassed and compelled to leave the scene of action. The command of the bn. this unexpectly devolved upon Major the Hon. Myles Ponsonby."

Edited 2 December , 2005 by Ali Hollington

[Ali Hollington]

cont.

"It was during this temporary confusion that about two and a half comapnies of the 4 bn, under the command of Captain Morrison, the leading company commander, got detached from the remainder of the bn, and, losing their way in the network of narrow streets, worked round to the northern edge of the village instead of advancing straight through it. As soon as he realised that he had made a mistake in direction, Capt. Morrison sent several runners to brigade headquarters for instructions, but, as he recieved no replies to these messages and found himself in touch with the 2nd Guard bde, he thought it best to join in the attack of the SG on PUITS no. 14 bis and then to endeavour to rejoin his own bn for the attack on HILL 70 as soon as the Puits had been taken."

As the attack on the puits failed he and his group end up in a defensive position along the LOOS-BENIFONTAINE road until the evening.

[Ali Hollington]

cont.

The brigade commander (Heyworth) realises that the bn has been split so orders the remaining men (approx. 200) to support the attack of the 1WG. At his time Heyworth believed the Puits had been captured so ordered the 1WG to move up and carry out its assault immediately.

Bn. commander 1WG(Lt Col Murray-Thriepland) places the GG detachment on the left for the attack, which was launched at 5.30pm.

Shortly after Murray-Thriepland received new orders to cancelled the attack, as Heyworth is now aware that the Puits have not been captured, however this was too late as the troops were already attacking.

"The leading companies of Grenadiers and Welsh Guards had little difficulty in scaling HILL 70; there was at first comparatively little machine gun or rifle fire while the enemy concentrated his guns on LOOS and on the last two bns of the brigade which were still moving down the slope into the village. As soon, however, as the attacking troops reached the crest of HILL 70, they encountered a furious machine gun fire directed upon them from the redoubt which was held in strength by the germans, and also from PUITS no. 14 buis. Both the Grenadiers and the Welsh Guards suffered severely during this stage of the advance, but, notwithstanding their losses, the troops succeeded in reaching to within 25 yards of the enemy's position. Explicit orders had been given to all commanding officers that on no account were they to go beyond the crest of HILL 70. The Welsh Guards, therefore, remained just below the top of the hill, but, owing to the fact that Lt-Col Hamilton had become a casualty so early in the day, it would appear that this order had not been communicated to Major Ponsonby, and the Grenadiers accordingly pressed on towards the redoubt. To this unfortunate circumstance must be attributed the greater part of the casuaties suffered by thte 4 bn in this action."

A footnote mentions that the troops map's had the redoubt marked on the northern slope of the hill, whereas it was actually on the reverse slope.

As the evening comes on, Murray-Threipland receives report which lead him to believe that the objectives had been taken, at loss and requests re-inforcement. These arrive in the shape of 2SG and the missing part of 4GG. Murray-Threipland goes forward to check the situation and decides that the positions held are too exposed to enemy fire. A defensive line is made further back, and the troop withdrawn to this.

Some of the 4GG don't fall back till the night of the 28th and many of the wounded are not recovered by the British.

I hope this helps, sorry for any typo's.

Regards

Ali

[Owen D]

I think I've got a first hand report about this action from a veteran of the battle. If anyone interested I dig it out.

[KIRKY]

Hi Guys. great stuff, I will mail this info to my mate , a great Xmas read for him,

Tony