Stuff Redout

[KIRKY]

Hi we are visiting the Somme in 10 days time , looking to poke around Stuff Redoubt. Been in the general area in past but never sure of exact location, can someone talk me in from the Stump Road cem.?

Tony

[Desmond7]

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...g%20field&st=20

Pile of detail on this area here. Should get you to the right spot.

[KIRKY]

Thanks for that, missed that great thread when on hols!

Tony

[Jack Sheldon]

Tony

Here are a couple of scans to help you. The first is an original, which gives the layout, troop deployment and names of commanders for the Second Position (Sud I - IV) on 1 Jul 16. Just to make it a bit more interesting look at the manning and the number of weapons. Companies were around 250 men at the time and we have 5 companies covering from Grandcourt to Zollern (Goat) Redoubt and a further battalion (3rd Bn Bavarian Res Inf Regt 8) from Zollern to Mouquet Farm. They are backed by 4 machine guns from 1st MG Company Res Inf Regt 119 and 6 from MG Sharpshooter Troop 89. Every time I read an account saying that on 1st July the German Second Position was there for the taking, I permit myself a quiet smile.

Jack

[Jack Sheldon]

Tony

Here's the second map, this time with the major old trench lines superimposed on the modern topo map. Note that if you walk across the field to the isolated Grandcourt Road cemetery, you are reallgetting the Stuff Redoubt feeling. As you can see it is located virtuall n the line of the second trench of the redoubt. There are top notch views to the north from this point over the ground where the Schwaben Redoubt counter attack was launched on 1st July 1916.

Jack

[KIRKY]

Thanks again,

Tony

[Jack Sheldon]

Any time. I look forward to hearing how your trip went.

Jack

[Desmond7]

Jack - with regard to 'there for the taking' ...

As I understand it, the Ulster Div were halted in front of Stuff not by their own artillery (as I am sure you are well aware) but by a concentrated German bombardment called down on the exposed parties who were working their way towards ther redoubt.

This is an old chestnut for me and I realise you will only be able to engage in conjecture BUT ..

I am convinced this legend of Irishmen 'advancing too fast and too far only to be destroyed by their own bombardment' (which we now know to be wrong) formed the basis of a central scene in 'Oh What a Lovely War'

If you have not seen the film (which I enjoy mainly for the songs) then you will not be able to help me. If you HAVE seen the film, I'd like to hear your views.

Des

[Jack Sheldon]

Desmond

It's too long since I saw the film to say for sure. As an entertainment it was excellent, as history it wasn't. I really do not know if the 36th were stopped or even affected by a British bombardment falling in the wrong place, but I would just offer you a few extracts from the history of Reserve Field Artillery Regiment 26 which you might find to be helpful. This is not a direct translation, just the sense.

'At 9.15 am (i.e. 8.15 British time) British soldiers were seen in the Artillery Hollow (Battery Valley) Grandcourt. Oberst Erlenbuch, the regimental commander spotted them from his HQ on Hill 131 [nowadays 133] southeast of Miraumont and ordered the adjacent heavy howitzers of 1st Bn Fd Arty Regt 20 to bring fire down on them. At the same time, he sent orders to artillery groups Berta and Adolf [both with a large number of guns at their disposal] to 'Destroy the British in Artillery Hollow'. In the meantime 3rd Battery RFAR 26 had spotted the problem themselves and were firing into the British from a flank. Joining in over direct sights from near the Ruined Mill, was 2nd Battery RFAR 27. From the Stuff Stop Line rifle fire was brought to bear by various units.'

Now you can take your pick about which artillery did the most damage to the attack. A possible misdirected British barrage, or the German guns which had been pouring down fire on them from 45 minutes after H Hour. Whatever it was that checked the 36th and forced them to begin to withdraw back towards the Hansa Position and Schwaben Redoubt, nothing can detract from the extraordinary gallantry, dash and tactical skill which enabled at least some of them initially to exploit the particular vulerabilites of their breakthrough point so well. Could they have pressed on to take the German Second Line if they had been reinforced, or if the equally brave formations to their left and right had been able to make some progress? It is not possible to say for sure. I think that it would have been difficult because, as I have demonstrated, another of the myths of 1st July is that the Second Position was unmanned. You have seen the proof to the contrary for yourself in the scan I posted. It was those very companies that carried the burden of the Schwaben counter-attack and they took it back - just. If they had the oomph to attack over that open ground and prevail, just consider what they might have done in defence.

Jack

[Desmond7]

jack - I wrote this piece some time ago with help from R J. White head .. the relevant section is near the end.

WHILE the main body of men from the Ballymena area fought in the subsidiary action north of the River Ancre, many local men also fought in the battalions engaged in the ‘main attack’ on the infamous Schwaben Redoubt.

This heavily fortified trench system was arguably the hard core of the German defence system. It

was well equipped with machine guns and was backed up with close artillery support units.

Its defenders on July 1 had endured an unprecedented barrage for seven long days and nights. In

fact, the British High Command sincerely believed that the weight of explosive which had fallen

on the German lines would crush any opposition.

One commander had told his men they would walk across no-man’s land, occupy the enemy

trenches and boil up some tea. He was not the only high ranking officer to believe that the work

of the ‘big guns’ would make the offensive a low-cost operation.

It seems that the officers of the Ulster Division had serious doubts about the effectiveness of the

bombardment and half an hour before ‘zero’, the assault battalions crept out into no-man’s land

and took cover in a sunken road in front of the German trenches.

When the barrage moved off the German front line at precisely 7.30am, the Ulstermen rose up

from their hiding place and charged at breakneck pace towards their objective.

General Sir Henry Rawlinson the architect of the assault feared that ‘Kitchener’s Army’ was not

well trained enough to adopt the tactics of the ‘regular’ army and had given strict orders that

battalions should move forward at a walking pace because he feared that the men would become

disorganised without the strict control of their officers.

Sadly, the units which followed these instructions were mown down in the first ten minutes of

the attack.

But the Ulster Division’s wild charge caught the German defenders still sheltering in their

dug-outs. It was literally a perfect assault - fast, powerful and ruthless. For a relatively low

human cost, the Division had captured the German forward line, about 800 yards of front, at a

single bound.

John Millar, from Paradise Avenue in Harryville, served with the 11th Royal Irish in the

108th Brigade, which attacked on the left front of the Division.

He described the momentum of the charge in a letter home to a friend in Ballymena:

“My cousin Sam was killed and we miss him very much, but God took him away where

there is no pain or suffering. Doubtless you have heard of the big battle we were in on 1st

July. I will never forget the charge we made that morning into the German trenches. Our

fellows fell very rapidly and yet those of us who weren’t hit ran on across and soon put the

Germans out of their trench at the point of the bayonet. And again we charged them in

their third line and fourth line and succeeded in taking those lines but we had to retire later

owing to no reinforcements coming up.

“Lots of Ballymena fellows fell, among them was Harry McIlroy who fell wounded at my

side but I have since heard that he got back to hospital. I heard of several others of our

battalion from Ballymena.”

Rifleman Millar’s brief account of the attack is typical of the soldier’s view of the battle. They

charged, if they were lucky they made it into the German trenches and then fought until forced to

pull back. No flowery descriptions for Millar, he seems hugely relieved just to be among the

living.

His final paragraph merely hints at his feelings about the attack and the loss of so many friends.

He writes: "If I were to tell you about the awful scenes and sights which I saw you couldn’t

read them for the horror of it. If only the people at home knew and realized what the boys

out here are doing for them they wouldn’t be in the mood for holiday making." (1)

Another Ballymena soldier’s letter quoted in the Observer of July 21, 1916, provides further

evidence of how effective the swift advance of the Ulstermen had been - and also how safe the

German troops felt in their deep dug-outs despite the long-running British bombardment.

"When we entered the first line of trenches we took the Bosches by surprise. Many of those

we caught had been in the act of shaving and we had them before they knew we were after

them!"

If such common sense tactics had been applied by every unit in the offensive during the opening

moment of the attack, the first day on the Somme could have been a fantastic success for the

British army. Instead, to both the right and left of the Ulster Division, equally brave men climbed

out of their trenches, formed up as if on an excercise and walked slowly towards the enemy lines.

German machine-gunners facing such units could barely believe what was happening before their

very eyes. Then they opened fire.

It was hardly worth aiming, bullets swept the fields and scythed down thousands of men. In many

cases German soldiers climbed up out of their trenches and fired from open positions at the

oncoming ‘Englanders’. Incredibly, the waves of attackers kept marching into this hellish fire,

many with their heads bent forward as if walking into a hail storm.

The 29th Division (nicknamed ‘The Incomparables’) and the 32nd Division, each of which

contained ‘regular’ battalions of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, fell in their droves. As a result,

in the Thiepval sector, the Divisions on e either side of the Ulstermen did not even reach the

German barbed wire ... their inability to do so was to have a terrible effect on the jubilant

Ulstermen who were now sending back the first prisoners and preparing for the next stage of

their attack.

With the attack on either side firmly repulsed, the Germans now turned their fire on the second

wave of Ulster Division troops as they crossed no-man’s land with the aim of passing through

their comrades and taking the Schwaben Redoubt itself.

From the ruins of Thiepval village and various other strongpoints, machine gunners poured fire

into the flanks of the exposed Ulstermen. This ‘enfilade’ fire in combination with the stout

defence mounted by German soldiers in the Schwaben tore huge gaps in the ranks and slowed the

advance for a time.

Author Martin Middlebrook commented in his definitive history of that day: "These Germans

(in the redoubt) had not been caught in their dug outs like some of the front-line defenders.

The Ulsters had to fight hard for the redoubt but their Irish spirit was roused; they had

captured one German trench, they could capture the redoubt."

While this struggle was on-going, the Ulster Division’s ‘follow-through’ brigade, made up of the

four Belfast battalions moved up for the attack on the German second line. They faced withering

fire from three sides and an increasingly heavy German artillery barrage which plastered the open

ground with shrapnel and high explosive.

One soldier compared the no-man’s land of the morning of July 1 with the scene he had become

so familiar with in the past.

Writing home, he said: "While on sentry duty, how often had I looked out over that same

piece of ground. How calm and peaceful it had looked then, how fresh and green with long

grass blowing in the wind..

"Now not a green or level spot remained. Great jagged craters covered the smoking ground

and in the blue sky above white, puffy clouds of shrapnel burst, spattering the earth with

missiles."

It was at this point that one of the battle’s legendary events took place. Major George Gaffikin, a

company commander with the 9th Royal Irish Rifles (West Belfast Volunteers) could see that

some of his men were shocked by the firestorm through which they would have to charge.

Middlebrook reported: "Gaffikin took off his orange sash, held it high for his men to see and

roared ... ‘come on boys, no surrender!’ This action drew a whole crowd of men after him

over no-man’s land."

Interestingly, Philip Orr, who performed an in-depth study of the Ulster Division’s actions on

that day spoke to a veteran who angrily dismissed the above account as a ‘myth’.

Malcolm McKee, interviewed in the Belfast Telegraph of July 1966 when the battle’s fiftieth

anniversary was marked, said: “What if Major Gaffikin waved an orange handkerchief? It was

our unit colour ... and even if he did shout about the ‘Twelfth of July’, who would have heard

him?”

Whether or not Gaffikin waved a sash or not, the Belfast men did hurl themselves into the fray,

but, instead of storming the German second line, they found themselves embroiled in the fight for

the Schwaben.

This maze of tunnels, trenches and dug-outs was now the scene of some of the fiercest

hand-to-hand fighting witnessed on the Western Front. Men from at least six battalions were now

bombing, bayoneting and blundering their way through the clouds of chalk dust and black smoke

from explosions in this confined space.

Only junior officers had been allowed to take part in the attack and many of these men who could

have provided cohesive orders for the men had been killed or wounded.

In fact, two lieutenant colonels had disobeyed direct orders and joined in the assault. One died

early in the attack and the other was unable to make it to the Schwaben.

As a result, the fighting was a vicious close quarter melee, aptly described by one survivor as a

‘Belfast riot on Mount Vesuvious’ - a nice allegory which almost disguises the reality of what

was going on. Belfast riots inevitably involved two mobs throwing cobblestones at each other - a

deadly enough pursuit.

On the Schwaben, the cobblestones were hand grenades and one can only imagine the scene as

bombs were hurled back and forth between defending Germans and attacking Ulstermen. As a

result, the Schwaben must have resembled the early stages of a volcanic eruption as the grenades

exploded all around. Whole packs of grenades were tossed into the entrances of German

dug-outs. Others ‘posted’ Mills bombs down the dug-out stovepipes.

Interestingly, one of the bombers was a Kells man, who had moved to Glasgow before the war.

Bobby Campbell was one of a number of Ulstermen who had returned to fight with the men from their native land.

For whatever reason, he and many other Glasgow and west of Scotland men, found themselves with the 11th Btn.

Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.

In his excellent study of the battalion in the Great War, Ex-skin Bill Canning lists all those who lost their lives.

This is what the local newspaper had to say:-

Th Ulster movement in the Maryhill Division of Glasgow has lost one of its foremost workers by the death in action

of Lce. Cpl Robert A. Campbell, of the Inniskilling Fusiliers (Ulster Division). Deceased, who was a native of

Galdanagh, Kells, removed to Maryhill along with his parents a number of years ago. He took an active interest in

furthering Ulster’s interests in Maryhill, and among the many Ulstermen in the district he was highly respected. He

was one of the first members of the Glasgow UVF and had been with the Ulster Division since January 1915.

The deceased was a bomber and in the afternoon of 1st July while taking part in the offensive, he, along with many

other good Irishmen, was killed. His parents who are well known in the Galdanagh District and who now reside at 14

Campbell Street, Maryhill, Glasgow have received a letter of sympathy from his officer, in which it is stated:-

“Bobbie was one of the best men I ever had. He was a fearless and upright soldier and I can assure you that

everyone in the battalion will mourn his loss.”

Lce. Cpl. Campbell was also a member of both the local Orange and Masonic Lodges. His older brother, William,

who is in the Cameron Highlanders, was wounded at Loos last year. He is now serving in Salonika. Aug 4 1916

The Schwaben Redoubt was now being attacked by elements of six battalions, from three

different sides. The two companies of German infantry defending the redoubt put up a strong

defence and the fighting was vicious. Hand grenades, rifles, bayonets and trench knives were

used as the Irishmen moved deeper into the redoubt. By 8.48 A.M. the C Line and the Schwaben

Redoubt had been taken. RJW.

As bombs exploded, bayonet men rushed forward to secure the next few yards, killing stunned

defenders as they had been well trained to do. But all the time, the casualties amongst the

Ulstermen were mounting steadily - they were also running short of ammunition and especially

grenades.

Water was also running out. Men in combat develop tremendous thirst and on this hot summer

day the ability to re-hydrate sweat drained bodies was vital. Attacking troops carried their water

in one bottle, hung from their belts - they were depending on re-supply for their next drink.

But by now it was virtually impossible for anyone to cross no-man’s land. The Ulstermen were

firmly lodged in the German lines ... but they were on their own.

However, fighting spirit remained strong and with the Schwaben Redoubt finally under their

control, the mixed units of the Division were drawn onwards towards another vital enemy

strongpoint.

In German, this fort was known as Feste Stauben - the British knew it as ‘Stuff Redoubt’ and its

capture would have been the crowning glory in an attack which had already surpassed all

expectations.

Sadly, Stuff Redoubt was to prove a ‘bridge too far’ for the tiring Ulstermen. As they swept

forwards, men were caught up in a whirlwind bombardment which shattered the attack and

inflicted dozens more casualties.

For years, historians of the battle assumed that the speed of the 36th Division’s attack had carried

the men right into the middle of a British artillery barrage.

The incident was even depicted as a scene in the famous sixties’ musical ‘Oh! What a lovely

war’ ... in the movie, a group of Irish soldiers led by a grizzled sergeant are forced to take

cover as shells blast around them.

"Those are our guns!" complains one soldier.

"Well get back and tell them they’re shooting at us!" orders the weary sergeant.

As the’runner’ sets off, the sergeant mutters: "And if the Germans shoot him .. I’ll kill

him!"

However, , it now seems that the British gunners were blamed wrongly for this early case of

‘friendly fire’. An American researcher with a keen interest in the German soldiers defending this

section of the line has drawn attention to recently discovered testimony which sheds new light on

the famous incident.

Over recent years, Ralph Whitehead has examined the Schwaben defence in fine detail,

unearthing remarkable eye-witness accounts and cross-checking these with official reports and

maps depicting the area as it was in 1916.

He is now convinced that the Ulstermen were on the verge of an astonishing success when a unit

of German artillery caught them in the open. He believes that most accounts of the British

barrage ‘falling short’ were based on the account below.

"The German 2nd line was virtually undefended at this time. An unarmed artillery observation

group from the 26th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment watched helplessly as the British soldiers

approached their position located in Stuff Redoubt. One member of their group, Unteroffizier

Felix Kircher, later recalled:

"We laid in our dugout and from time to time one of us went upstairs to watch the region.

Suddenly, at 9 o’clock, an observer shouted down the dugout steps in an amazed voice: ‘Der

Tommy ist da, kommt rauf!’ The Tommy is here, come up!

"We rushed up and saw a lot of khaki-clothed men with flat steel helmets. They were the first

Englishmen we had seen so near, running up and down in front of our barbed wire, searching for

a breach in it.

"Most of them were young boys just like us - about 20 years old. We were in a desperate

position. Being artillery observers we had no weapons and no ammunition. Each moment we

expected a raid with hand grenades. But nothing happened. Then the English artillery began to

shoot at our trench, but the shells fell too short and exploded among their own people. We saw

corpses whirling through the air and the survivors stormed back down the hill."

Ralph Whitehead : "The accepted version is that the Ulstermen ended up in the British

bombardment that had not advanced yet and if it were not for this friendly fire they could have

advanced even further.

"What I found recently in my research gives an entirely different version, one that contradicts

Martin Middlebrook among others. The error seems to have occurred from the acceptance of the

memories of Felix Kircher (see above).

The records I have translated from the 26th Reserve Feld Artillerie Regiment that was attached to

the 26th Reserve Division relates that the advancing Ulstermen were observed by the regimental

commander Oberst Erlenbusch who ordered the 'Englishmen' to be annihilated. The heavy field

howitzers from the 1st Battery Field Artillery Regiment 20 opened fire as well as field guns from

the 3rd Battery 26th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment and the 2nd Battery 27th Reserve Field

Artillery Regiment fired from various locations over open sights into the enemy ranks. The

survivors fled back toward the Schwaben Redoubt.

"The alleged friendly fire observed by Kircher was in fact the concentrated artillery fire of at least

10 German field guns and heavy howitzers."

It was the high water mark of the Ulster Division’s advance. Some fifty men were able to get into

a section of the Stuff Redoubt but as German reinforcements could be seen arriving in large

numbers, it must have been obvious to the forward troops that their position was precarious.

It was the high water mark of the Ulster Division’s advance. Some fifty men were able to get

into the Stuff Redoubt but as German reinforcements could be seen arriving in large numbers, it

must have been obvious to the forward troops that their position was precarious.

Nevetheless, they consolidated the section of the line they did hold, sharing out ammuntion or

taking water and bullets from their dead comrades. Any German stick grenades were swiftly

gathered up by the Ulstermen who found they could throw the potato mashers further than their

standard ‘Mills’ bombs.

In the hours that followed, desperate little bombing matches and close quarter fighting took

place. The Ulstermen fought hard and well, but the Germans were equal to the task .. and they

had the reserves to accomplish their aims.

On the other hand, it was virtually impossible to cross no-man’s land and re-supply the dog-tired

soldiers who had swept forward so strongly that morning.

Eventually, after hours of battle, those who could made their way back to the British lines.

Thus ended a day of horrific losses.

[Jack Sheldon]

Desmond

Great descriptive writing. It really captures the essence of what must have been a desperate fight. What I will do in the coming days is really sift through my material, especially the archival stuff and see what else I can find to underline what happened. If it turns out to reinforce the idea that the German artillery was largely responsible for bringing the attack to a halt, it was only the first of many such instances during the battle - see my description of what happened around Flers on 15 Sep. I did once see a comment by an artilleryman, which(inevitably) I can't find, saying something like 'Once again the attackers broke through the infantry, but stalled in front of the guns'. This is quite believable, in the sense that the gunners could not easily move out of position, so it was fight or die for them too. I also believe that this particular subject is worthy of our continued study to see if we can turn up more relevant documentation - For example in the main archive in Stuttgart where I have never opened an artillery file as yet. We may have much still to learn.

Jack