MG Barrages

[Nick]

Pals,

Can anyone advise where I can discover about the use of MG barrages in the Middle eastern theatres? I have access to some good sources, including the official histories and most of the more commonly available texts, but can't find anything that really tells me about the extent to which Murray/Allenby/Nixon's forces utilised MG barrages as were practised on the Western Front.

I'm trying to find evidence in support of the use of barrage fire on this front, and the typical strength of the unit laying down the barrage. A Brigade MG company could, in theory, lay down a very substantial barrage.

Can anyone suggest wher I might find somthing of this nature, or better still, post an extract or comment on this?

Thanks

Nick

[Robert Dunlop]

Nick, I know of one limited example. It occured when the Auckland and Canterbury Regiments, New Zealand Brigade, attacked Hill 288 en route to Jericho. In the NZ MG Corps history 'With the Machine Gunners in France and Palestine', the following is recorded:

'When the Auckland Regiment advanced to Hill 288 to assist Canterbury Regiment all the available guns concentrated a covering fire that crept forward with the advance until the hill was captured.'

In other actions, guns were typically pushed forward into advanced positions and then used to enfilade Turkish positions. This *suggests* that the use of barrages may have been more limited because conditions favoured more advantageous deployment of MGs in Palestine.

Robert

[Nick]

Robert,

Thanks, that's interesting. Massed use seems to have been limited. Clearly the nature of the terrain and the (generally) less static nature of the battlefield conspires against this. I wonder what other reasons there might be? Any ideas?

The deployment of the MG company during Brigade assaults is my pet subject of the moment. Clearly where possible most of the guns would be positioned so as to give maximum supporting fire right up to the enemy positions, but balancing that need with the potential requirement to consolidate that position with MG's to provide a defence once that position is captured - requiring some of the guns to be positioned so as to deploy into the new front line very soon after the position is taken.

The Turks on the other hand seemed to have deployed a 'strength in depth' philosophy for their guns, almost in the expectation that front positions would fall, and inflicting maximum damage on the British and Empire troops who, on taking the initial position, may be unable to supress the turkish MG's deployed further back where the British MG;s cannot reach

Does that make sense? I'd welcome your views.

Nick

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

I couldn't much of the use in massing MG's for a task in LH or Camel Corps books I have.

In fact the MG Sqn's attached to the LH bde's hardly get a mention but for a charge by the 2nd LH MGS at Khuweilfe.

The 26th MG Co get a mention with the Camel Bde but like most mentions in books its only the detachment/attachment of a few guns for a given task.

Sorry

S.B

[Bruce Dennis]

"Massed use seems to have been limited. Clearly the nature of the terrain and the (generally) less static nature of the battlefield conspires against this. I wonder what other reasons there might be? Any ideas?"

This may be relevant: in "The Social History of the Machine-Gun", by John Ellis, he spells out a damning fact: the tactics taught to Allied infantrymen for the first three years of the war concentrated on close-quarters fighting and did not reflect the murderous power of machineguns against advancing troops in open ground. Several examples were given of one or two well placed m/gs inflicting horrendous casualties but the advancing British/Commonwealth troops continued as taught, in rows forming waves, at walking pace. It would be interesting, in light of this, to find that the same army was teaching tactics using machineguns in massed forms. Do you know if the tactic of mg barrage was taught, or perhaps the result of opportunity and experience in the field, not official procedures? It would be good to find out for certain one way or the other, and hope you will post whatever you learn.

Regards,

Bruce

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

I have mentioned before on another site some thing about the Aussie officers who commanded the LH units during the war.

It appears they lacked the knowage of how to use the fire power units attached to their Bde's during the early part of the war.

This is true not only of the the MG's but also the guns of the RHA.

I cannot find an Artillary officer (CRA) attached to the HQ's of Chauvel's or other Mounted Div's during 1916 who may of been able to control the fires of the Gun's and MG's against targets.

I know most aussie LH officers had only limited service along side the Artillary units with the Milita in Australia pre War and even limited in the Boer War.

So untill a Artillary officer was attached to the Mounted Div's in 1917 did the use of all arms come into the fore but again it took Allenby to refine this.

When I say Mounted div's I mean all weather Anzac or Australian Mounted with there Aussie, NZ and British Yeoamnry Bdes.

If you know of any officers who may have been attached in 1916 I would like to know them.

Cheers

S.B

[Nick]

Steve, Bruce and Robert,

Thanks for your replies.

Steve, am I right to assume the MG charge you refere to was in support of the Camel Brigade on 6th November? This is described briefly in de Lancey Forth's account of the action.

I've not found any real evidence of large scale barrages being planned or used in anyway the same fashion as was seen on the Western Front (see here for a plan of the Hamel barrage in 1918:

The barrage was certainly being taught on the Western Front, but evidence of it's practice out East seems - at the moment at least - weak.

I'll keep searching.

Nick

[Robert Dunlop]

...in "The Social History of the Machine-Gun", by John Ellis, he spells out a damning fact: the tactics taught to Allied infantrymen for the first three years of the war concentrated on close-quarters fighting and did not reflect the murderous power of machineguns against advancing troops in open ground.

Bruce, it would be interesting to know what alternative was proposed by Ellis. Was he suggesting that troops not be taught close-quarters fighting? Please be assured that I am not asing this question in a flippant or sarcastic way - it can be hard to tell with email messages and the like. I think what he is referring to is the problem of getting the infantry to their objectives. I am not sure there was any alternative *infantry* tactic that could have been used to do this. The real issue was suppressing the MGs, for which the artillery had the chief role. Tanks became valuable as well. The evolution of infantry tactics reflected, in large part, the evolution of new weapons systems that increased the intrinsic firepower of infantry units. By this means it was at least possible to take on the MG nests distributed in depth behind the forward defensive line once the artillery barrage had inevitably moved on.

  Several examples were given of one or two well placed m/gs inflicting horrendous casualties but the advancing British/Commonwealth troops continued as taught, in rows forming waves, at walking pace.

One has to be a little careful in interpreting these anecdotes. While not wishing to understate the effectiveness of well-placed MGs, particularly firing in enfilade, there is a great tendency for historians to underestimate the effectiveness of rife fire.

It would be interesting, in light of this, to find that the same army was teaching tactics using machineguns in massed forms.  Do you know if the tactic of mg barrage was taught, or perhaps the result of opportunity and experience in the field, not official procedures?

The tactic of MG barrages is often attributed to the Canadians. It was definitely taught. The concept makes sense in some ways. If you are in a situation where the flanks are not exposed, it is hard to use MGs in enfilade to support an advance. Heavy MGs were not suitable for accompanying the initial advance, at least not in any numbers. A proportion of MGs would be tasked with accompanying the infantry for the purpose of consolidation. So why leave lots of them sitting idle? MG barrages were used to supplement artillery barrages, so the hail of bullets would precede or fall between barrages of HE and shrapnel. Barrages were also laid onto approaches, forming up areas and similar objectives that were in range. My Grandfather recalled targetting a cross-roads junction on one occasion. I have not come across many descriptions from Germans who were on the receiving end. Those I have read confirm it was not pleasant.

I have attached an example of the barrage plan for Messines from the history of the NZMGC.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Nick, your comments make sense. I cannot speak to the Turkish tactics. My guess is that these would have closely followed German tactics, which were similar to what you describe. This comment should not be taken to mean that the Turkish machine gunners were only capable of learning from the Germans!

As to other factors on the Entente side. I only know about the New Zealand MG Squadron. Frankly, there were not enough guns to facilitate the big barrages on the Western Front. The squadron appears to have supported their compatriots. Seemingly there was no move to group MG assets together, though this may have happened in other parts of the line.

The other interesting, and I think important, difference is the nature of the objectives. On the Western Front, it was most likely to be 'bite and hold'. Territorial objectives were circumscribed. Thus artillery and MG barrages were a very useful adjunct, particularly in the consolidation phase. In Palestine, the presence of the mounted infantry and cavalry / yeomanry units meant the possibility (even if it was not realised, as in 2nd Gaza for example) of a mobile exploitation phase. Best not to have too many guns locked into a barrage scheme that then leaves many MGs behind. Just a thought.

Robert

[Bruce Dennis]

Robert, first let me say I know exactly what you mean about not knowing from an email whether the writer was sneering or not. I take all comments and questions on this forum at face value unless smilies tell me otherwise.

What John Ellis said, from memory, was that it took three years for the Allied High Command to see that the training given to new, inexperienced troops was not appropriate to counter the greatest threat they faced: advancing over open ground towards positions defended by machineguns. I believe he gave statistics showing casualties from mgs compared to artillery. He focused on the method of advance taught to the troops, and presumably the young officers as well, of orderly ranks, evenly spaced, following at set intervals, and also questions the practice of carrying full kit (seventy pounds?) in an attack which reduced the iindividual’sability to move freely and quickly. The examples he cites of one/two mgs wiping out attacking troops are detailed and would be easy to check, plus he compares Central Power tactics which, once again from memory, were adapted after only a few months of trench warfare to incorporate lessons learned. He does not minimise the importance of training front line troops for close quarters fighting, but rightly points out that the troops were not trained in how to get close.

My point, not to be confused with Ellis's, is that considering the devastating effect of mg fire in trench warfare, it is surprising that it took three years to stop teaching troops to advance in orderly, target-like fashion, but even more curious if during that period of time machinegun barrage was a tactic taught to the Allied troops. If the right hand was teaching good mg tactics, the left hand should not have been denying them.

Nick, sorry to hijack your thread without making a more positive contribution to your original query.

Bruce

[Robert Dunlop]

I take all comments and questions on this forum at face value unless smilies tell me otherwise.

Thanks Bruce.

What John Ellis said, from memory, was that it took three years for the Allied High Command to see that the training given to new, inexperienced troops was not appropriate to counter the greatest threat they faced: advancing over open ground towards positions defended by machineguns.

If Ellis suggested this, then I would respectfully argue that the key to getting the infantry across was to suppress the MGs (and enemy artillery) and cut the wire by other means, most significantly with the artillery. It took time to build up the guns and shells, as well as train the artillery. Their infantry colleagues took quite a while to appreciate the full importance of counter-battery fire, as well as creeping and other forms of barrages.

I believe he gave statistics showing casualties from mgs compared to artillery.  He focused on the method of advance taught to the troops, and presumably the young officers as well, of orderly ranks, evenly spaced, following at set intervals, and also questions the practice of carrying full kit (seventy pounds?) in an attack which reduced the iindividual’sability to move freely and quickly.

There were examples of this approach. The most frequently quoted is July 1st 1916 - the opening day of the Battle of the Somme. When you look at this in more detail, not all units attacked in this way.

  The examples he cites of one/two mgs wiping out attacking troops are detailed and would be easy to check,

It would be interesting to learn which examples he cited. I know of several, for example the Jaegers who survived the initial bombardment in the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. Even so, more detailed analysis may sometimes reveal that significant numbers of German riflemen were also involved in these situations.

plus he compares Central Power tactics which, once again from memory, were adapted after only a few months of trench warfare to incorporate lessons learned.  He does not minimise the importance of training front line troops for close quarters fighting, but rightly points out that the troops were not trained in how to get close.

Understood, but see above.

My point, not to be confused with Ellis's, is that considering the devastating effect of mg fire in trench warfare, it is surprising that it took three years to stop teaching troops to advance in orderly, target-like fashion, but even more curious if during that period of time machinegun barrage was a tactic taught to the Allied troops. If the right hand was teaching good mg tactics, the left hand should not have been denying them.

Sadly, there was too much of this. One reason (not the only one) for the tragedy of July 1st is that while British artillery commanders knew the importance of effective counter-battery work, their infantry counterparts overruled them. On the far right, this was not the case, which helped the attack on Montauban to suceed.

Thank you for sharing this insight into Ellis' work.

Robert

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

Yes 6th Nov 1917 is the date of that charge of the 2 LH MGS to move to support the 3rd Camel Bn and a number of other British Bn's cut off after the night attack which lost direction.

My readings show the importantance of MG suport fire but mostly the use of the MG sect/Troop of the Regt in the LH or Company in the Camel Corps.

That during a number of battles they were forced to group their MG sections to achive fire surpoirity at a given point.

There is a good account with the Camel Bde attack at Rafa where single companies had been fighting all day with out gainning any ground untill Smith after talking to his Bn commanders moved two companies to a flank and grouped all his company MG sections in two postions (each MG sect had three lewis guns) thus with some fire power advantage at a given point he sent the two companies in which captured the first redoubt and led to the collapse, (with the sucsess of the NZMB) of the garrison.

There was also a rare grouping of guns in which three batteries were combined to suport this attack, but all LH histories dont mention much or anything on the use of firepower to achive there objectives.

What is also interesting dispite the writtings in most accounts of this all mentioned the groupings of the section MG's of the companies but no where is there mentioned the use of the Bde MG Sqn (26th Camel MG Sqn). Its like they disappeared? But they must have suported this attack but how I surpose I will never know.

Cheers

S.B

[Ozzie]

Notes from 8th LH officer at Course on Cavalry Training 29th Oct 1916

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[Ozzie]

sorry about the skewing.

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[Ozzie]

I don't know if these have been much help, but they were the current teachings of October 1916 for the Light Horse and you may get something out them.

Cheers

Kim

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks Ozzie. Really appreciate the effort you have made to post this material, which is fascinating. I note the comments about maintaining mobility as a key tactical option on attack.

Robert

[Nick]

Blimey Ozzie, what an interesting set of posts - it'll take a while to read through this, but, like Arnie, "I'll be back"

Nick